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The W. E. Upjohn Institute is pleased to publish the first 
in-depth study of the most basic element of the Comprehen 
sive Employment and Training Act (GETA)—Training. The 
central finding of this study is that CETA training is a pro 
ductive investment returning benefits to society at well above 
costs.
This volume includes a summary of findings and recom 
mendations prepared by the designers of the study, Sar A. 
Levitan and Garth L. Mangum, an analysis of national 
longitudinal data written by Robert Taggart and summaries 
of detailed field studies completed on 11 sample prime spon 
sors.
The findings are particularly timely as the training pro 
grams are being redesigned in light of shifting economic, 
demographic and political realities.
Facts and observations as presented are the sole respon 
sibility of the authors. Their viewpoints do not necessarily 
represent positions of the W. E. Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research.
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In its first 8 years, the Comprehensive Employment and 
Training Act (GETA) hardly suffered from want of atten 
tion. Legions of evaluators, critics, defenders, and reformers 
have scrutinized the program since its inception. Surprising 
ly, however, they have tended to ignore the most basic 
element—the T in GET A—and have focused instead on the 
program's employment aspects and administrative issues. 
Emphasis on employment components was inevitable, since 
job creation was a primary strategy. The successive addition, 
expansion, and later contraction and final abandonment of a 
large and countercyclical public service employment pro 
gram represented major shifts in policy, and the process was 
highly controversial. Throughout, the uniqueness of 
CETA's decentralized policymaking drew attention to its 
management and decisionmaking procedures, or the lack of 
them. In 1977, youth demonstration projects took center 
stage. Reenactment in 1978 focused on issues of recentraliza- 
tion, allegations of fraud and abuse, and recategorization, 
and, in addition, sought to target CETA more closely on the 
economically disadvantaged population. Training conse 
quently received little scholarly or public attention. Even the 
annual congressional appropriations, accompanied occa 
sionally by flurries of activity adding new demonstration 
projects, concentrated on funding levels and intergovern 
mental relations.
The focus of this study is on the quality, effectiveness and 
management of CETA occupational skill training and on 
complements to employability development such as basic 
education, English as a second language, and training for
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job search. The primary emphasis is on adult programs 
operated at the local level. The study is concerned not only 
with assessing CETA training but also with describing its 
contents, institutional setting, and administrative structure.
The quality of training in a decentralized decisionmaking 
system can be assessed only by direct observation at the local 
level, which requires detailed field study. The effectiveness 
of the results can be determined by an examination of 
postprogram labor experiences of participants. However, 
CETA prime sponsors and their training contractors have lit 
tle information on training outcomes beyond the first few 
weeks following training. Fortunately, a long range 
longitudinal followup system is in place at the national level 
through the Continuous Longitudinal Manpower Survey 
(CLMS), while the CETA management information system 
(MIS) can be a source of substantial data on costs.
Because CETA training varies so widely, the selection of 
the sample areas is crucial. Since available resources limited 
us to 12 case studies—only 11 were completed for inclusion 
in this volume—we selected sites that are geographically 
distributed, representing a wide range of political and deci 
sionmaking structures, and whose performance, as assessed 
by national indicators, is diverse. The second key in case 
studies is to assure that the field researchers are 
knowledgeable, yet objective. The resulting combination of 
areas and the researchers are:
Baltimore, Maryland—Gregory Wurzburg, Youthwork, 
Inc.;
Dallas, Texas—Robert McPherson, University of Texas;
Indianapolis, Indiana—Earl Wright, W.E. Upjohn In 
stitute for Employment Research;
Montgomery County, Maryland—Marion Pines, 
Baltimore Metropolitan Manpower Consortium;
Vll
North Carolina Balance-of-State—Edward Dement,
MDC, Inc.;
Ottawa, Michigan (not included in this volume); 
Penobscot, Maine—Andrew Sum and Paul Harrington,
Northeastern University; 
San Francisco, California—Garth L. Mangum, University
of Utah; 
Seattle, Washington—R. Thayne Robson, University of
Utah;
Tucson, Arizona—Garth L. Mangum, University of Utah; 
Utah—R. Thayne Robson, University of Utah; and 
Worcester, Massachusetts—Morris A. Horowitz and
Joanne Loscalzo, Northeastern University.
The above include two moderate-size cities (Worcester and 
Tucson); five large cities (Baltimore, Dallas, Indianapolis, 
San Francisco and Seattle, each with a population of over 
500,000); five counties, including one metropolitan county 
(Montgomery), a rural county in Michigan (Ottawa), and a 
consortium of three rural counties (Penobscot); a state act 
ing as a single prime sponsor (Utah); and a balance-of-state 
(North Carolina).
All major regions in the country are represented in the 
study: New England by Penobscot, Maine, and Worcester, 
Massachusetts; middle states of the Atlantic seaboard by 
Baltimore and Montgomery County, Maryland; the 
Southeast by North Carolina balance-of-state; the Southwest 
by Dallas, Texas and Tucson, Arizona; the Midwest by In 
dianapolis, Indiana; the Mountain states by Utah; and the 
Pacific Coast by San Francisco, California and Seattle, 
Washington.
Though our sample cannot be called statistically represen 
tative of the 476 prime sponsors funded in fiscal 1980, it can 
be considered illustrative of most of the kinds of organiza 
tions and activities typical of prime sponsors. What we
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found is a reasonable representation of the realities of 
CETA. Each was studied by a knowledgeable and author 
itative CETA watcher who received complete cooperation 
from the actors on the scene. Complete case studies for each 
prime sponsor are published in a companion volume, CETA 
Training: A National Review and Eleven Case Studies,
The "worm's-eye view" of CETA training from the local 
level is supplemented by the "bird's-eye view," based on na 
tional management information for all prime sponsors and 
impact information gathered for all CETA programs. This 
supplementary assessment by Robert Taggart focuses on the 
aggregates resulting from the diverse experiences noted in the 
case studies and suggests the representativeness of the trends 
and outcomes noted in specific locations. It also provides 
estimates of impacts and insights concerning patterns of ef 
forts which are only possible to derive from studies involving 
large samples of trainees drawn from many prime sponsors. 
The findings of most importance relative to the local ex 
perience are highlighted in the first section in this volume.
The overview of the whole project, "Summary of Findings 
and Recommendations," explores the quality of CETA 
training by:
1. Providing historical and national perspective for the 
case studies.
2. Assessing the quality of training found at the 12 sites.
3. Examining CETA's decisionmaking processes related 
to training.
4. Offering recommendations for improvement of train 
ing quality.
Unless otherwise stated, all information about prime 
sponsor operations is from their respective internal sources. 
The customary references to data sources have therefore 
been deleted. These data do not necessarily agree with data 
released by the U.S. Department of Labor.
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We are indebted to our colleagues who prepared the case 
studies for critical review of this overview. Mary Bedell sup 
plied editorial comment on the case studies, while Richard 
Belous, Howard Bloom, Janet Johnston, and Brian Linder 
reviewed the overview. Nancy Kiefer, Cathy Glasgow and 
Gwen Luke provided administrative assistance in carrying 
the project through the usual drafts. We are also indebted to 
the 12 GET A prime sponsors and the U.S. Department of 
Labor for their cooperation.
This study was conducted under the auspices of the Na 
tional Council on Employment Policy. The Edna McConnell 
Clark, Ford, Charles Stewart Mott, and Rockefeller Foun 
dations funded the study. In line with their usual practice, 
the foundations left responsibility for the design and content 
of the studies and the overview to the authors.
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Summary of Findings 
and Recommendations
Sar A. Levitan and Garth L. Mangum
The basic premise of the Comprehensive Employment and 
Training Act (CETA) was that local decisionmakers could 
design and deliver services more appropriate to their local 
economies and populations than any nationally uniform pro 
gram. Therefore, the nature, quality, and effectiveness of 
the programs offered by 476 prime sponsors manifests great 
diversity. Nevertheless, it is possible to make some 
generalizations from examination of the national enroll 
ment, costs, and outcomes data and from intensive study of 
the training activities of 12 prime sponsorships. First, the 
conclusions and then the supporting arguments:
1. CETA training is a sound social investment. The na 
tional data suggest that the social returns for each dollar 
spent on CETA-funded classroom training amount to $1.14, 
while each dollar spent for on-the-job training (OJT) returns 
$2.28. When public service employment is conducted as OJT 
in the public sector, it too has a substantial payoff, but that 
is not true of run-of-the-mill work experience projects.
2. The quality of CETA classroom training is primarily a 
product of the local institutions. Prime sponsors normally 
buy services from whatever training entities exist in the com 
munity. Fortunately, more prime sponsors have access to 
some high-quality training institutions, but the others must 
settle for what is available. However, though CETA may 
have had limited impact on the quality of training available 
in most communities, it has had a major impact on the will 
ingness of training institutions to enroll and serve 
economically disadvantaged trainees.
3. The dependence of CETA on the availability and quali 
ty of the local training system applies to other services. Most 
often, the CETA prime sponsor functions as a broker and 
coordinator of services rather than as a service deliverer. The 
chief elected official and prime sponsor staff can encourage 
quality services but, with few exceptions, cannot deliver 
them. The prime sponsors depend, therefore, on the perfor 
mance of: (1) the education and training institutions; (2) the 
public employment service, which provides labor market in 
formation, certification of eligibility, payment of 
allowances, operation of intake and assessment centers, 
marketing of OJT, and other linkages with the employer 
community; and (3) local community-based organizations, 
which are spotty as to their service delivery capacity but im 
portant for their client-advocacy role.
4. Judged by the quality of facilities, equipment, cur 
riculum, and instruction, the quality ranking of training in 
stitutions in descending order tends to be: (1) private pro 
prietary schools, (2) public vocational and technical schools, 
(3) skill centers developed under the auspices of the Man 
power Development and Training Act (MDTA) between 
1963 and 1973, and (4) training activities of community- 
based organizations. However, choice among institutions is 
complicated by the fact that ranking in terms of ability to 
understand, relate to, and serve the disadvantaged is exactly 
the opposite. Therefore, prime sponsors are constantly forc 
ed to compromise between these two sharply differing 
measures of quality.
5. While CETA training is a continuum of earlier pro 
grams, significant changes have evolved. The most notable 
changes developed under CETA are:
a. Greater utilization of broad occupational offer 
ings, achieved primarily through referral of eligible 
individuals to mainstream training programs in 
private and public schools and colleges.
b. The expansion of nonoccupational training ac 
tivities such as remedial basic education, English as 
a second language, prevocational orientation, and 
job-search training.
c. Participation by communities not previously serv 
ed.
d. The additional or expanded use of new service 
deliverers.
6. Persistent obstacles to improvement of the system are:
a. The federal prime sponsor rating system credits 
procedure rather than substance and neither 
measures nor rewards quality.
b. The data system measures short run rather than 
long-run outcomes. Longer-duration training has a 
higher rate of return than training of short dura 
tion. To date, only the short-run data have been 
available to decisionmakers.
c. CETA has not succeeded in linking its offerings 
with complementary services offered by the pro 
grams or sequencing the training and services it of 
fers.
d. The high payoff of OJT is also not apparent to the 
prime sponsor in the short run. Marketing OJT is 
expensive for prime sponsors in terms of staff time 
expended. In addition, the subsidy, equalling 50 
percent of the wage for a few weeks, tends to be 
primarily attractive to marginal employers.
e. The allowance system distorts incentives for under 
taking training. Many of the disadvantaged 
clientele must have financial support to afford 
training participation, but uniform allowances at 
the level of the federal minimum wage for all 
enrollees appear to encourage some to participate 
more for the sake of the allowance than for the 
training.
f. The federal budgetary process denies prime spon 
sors opportunity for long-range planning.
g. The federal staff is ill-equipped to provide useful 
technical assistance.
h. Both prime sponsor and federal staff lack training 
backgrounds.
Still, there is reason to take satisfaction in CETA training 
accomplishments, but there is ample opportunity to make a 
sound system better. The key steps are:
1. Training and employability development should be 
made the highest priority of the CETA system.
2. The system should encourage and support a two-tiered 
structure of classroom instruction, consisting of a 
remedial career-entry phase, designed to serve the 
disadvantaged with remedial education, career ex 
ploration, job-search training, and occupational skills 
that can be acquired in no more than 36 weeks; and a 
career-development phase available to those who prove 
themselves in the first phase.
3. To induce employers to provide on-the-job training, 
subsidies should cover a "try-out" period during 
which the trainee is in the workplace but receiving a 
CETA stipend until the employer has an opportunity 
to assess the trainee's worth. Public service employ 
ment should, in most cases, function similarly, as 
public sector OJT.
4. The training allowance system should be reformed to 
include: (1) reimbursement for the out-of-pocket ex 
penses of training participation, paid to all, (2) a sub 
sistence component based on family income, and (3) a 
cash incentive for high performance.
5. The federal funding commitment should be made to 
prime sponsors at least 2 years ahead.
6. An aggressive personnel exchange system should give 
federal, state, and local staff substantial experience at 
each of those levels.
7. A technical assistance, staff training, and curriculum 
development entity should be developed that is capable 
of bringing meaningful help to the local level.
8. A rating system should be devised stressing qualitative 
factors and rewarding positive long-range results. The 
system should reflect data derived from the Con 
tinuous Longitudinal Manpower Survey upon which 
the first point of this summary was based.
9. There should be constant experimentation in search for 
improvements in the quality and outcomes of training. 
The adaptation by local training institutions of 
computer-assisted and computer-managed instruction, 
already proven in Job Corps to be effective with a 
disadvantaged population, deserves serious considera 
tion.

1. The Scope of CETA Training
Antecedents
Congress passed the Comprehensive Employment and 
Training Act in 1973 with the aim of consolidating federal 
employment and training resources. Chief elected officials, 
known in CETA parlance as prime sponsors, representing 
local units of government with populations of more than 
100,000 and states on behalf of smaller areas, were eligible to 
participate in the program. Prime sponsors were to plan, 
design and administer local programs consistent with general 
federal guidelines, subject to local advisory council review 
and regional Department of Labor approval.
CETA is best understood and appraised as a continuation 
of employment and training programs that had existed since 
the early 1960s under the Manpower Development and 
Training Act (MDTA) of 1962 and the Economic Opportuni 
ty Act (EOA) of 1964. It made available under one 
authorization a range of services aimed at improving the 
employability and earnings experience of workers from low- 
income households. On the administrative side, CETA 
transferred decisionmaking authority at the state and local 
level from the state employment service, state boards of 
vocational education, and local community action agencies 
to elected officials identified as prime sponsors.
This study is illuminated by the recognition that CETA in 
herited from its predecessor programs the institutions or ser 
vices they established, though significant changes have been 
made in the ways in which those institutions are used and in
8
the mix of services provided. Labor market interventions 
under CETA's predecessors were limited to classroom and 
on-the-job training, remedial education, work experience, 
subsidized public employment, and supportive services to 
make participation in the other components possible. CETA 
has added to this list a range of nonoccupational training. As 
the program's title indicates, its offerings can be divided be 
tween those that stress job creation and those that emphasize 
employability development. The latter is the focus of this 
study.
Prior to CETA, training occurred primarily in three in 
stitutional settings, with minor use of a fourth. Initially, 
most training was offered to class-size groups in existing 
public vocational education facilities. This arrangement suf 
fered from serious drawbacks. First, the training was often 
offered at inconvenient hours because the facilities were fully 
utilized during regular school schedules. Second, the schools 
offered the trainees a limited range of occupational choices. 
Third, the out-of-school population of generally limited 
education was taught by instructors accustomed to, and with 
pedagogy designed for, mainstream in-school youth.
An alternative soon emerged that attempted to correct the 
first and second problems. The remedy was tuition payment 
for, and referral of, individuals to ongoing postsecondary 
vocational and technical school programs (known as in 
dividual referral). But that was useful only for those who 
could compete with the regular student body.
The third alternative was the skill center. This new institu 
tion was developed specifically to meet the needs of MDTA 
enrollees drawn mostly from among the poor and deficiently 
educated, classified as the "disadvantaged" population. 
Modular training curricula were structured for adaptations 
to individual instruction, so that trainees could enter im 
mediately upon enrollment, rather than await the start of a
new class, and progress to some extent at their own pace. 
Emphasizing individual needs, trainees could begin without 
prerequisites and leave for employment when their potential, 
their endurance, or their resources were exhausted. Remedial 
education, either preliminary to or integrated with occupa 
tional training, was available to those who needed it. The 
skill centers also provided supportive services, centering on 
the personal problems faced by the trainees. The services in 
cluded advocacy counseling to help with personal problems, 
transportation, minor health care, child care, job develop 
ment and placement. The skill centers utilized whatever low 
cost facilities were available, burdening the centers and their 
trainees with an unfortunate stigma. Observers expressed 
concern that the student body included a mixture of the up 
wardly yearning and those attracted mainly by the stipends.
Since the state boards of vocational education were 
responsible for providing the training sites, limited use was 
made of private training institutions. Occasionally training 
was contracted with private proprietary schools. Additional 
possibilities that emerged out of the antipoverty movement 
were the community action agencies (CAAs) and the 
community-based organizations (CBOs). Only a few CAAs, 
the Opportunities Industrialization Centers (OIC), and the 
Operation Service-Employment-Redevelopment (SER), and 
organization oriented toward serving Mexican-Americans, 
played significant training roles during that period.
A technical assistance operation known as AMIDS (Area 
Manpower Institutes for the Development of Staff) provided 
inservice staff training, curriculum development, and other 
help directly to the federally supported training sites, but 
these disappeared with the advent of CETA.
Given the limited resources and the clamor for enrollment 
by the eligible population, program administrators attemp 
ted to ease the conflict by cutting the duration of training
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and making it possible to enroll more applicants in training 
programs. The problem was compounded by the fact that 
enrollees were paid stipends, consisting of the average state 
unemployment compensation payment plus allowances for 
dependents and training-related out-of-pocket costs for 
adults, and lesser amounts for unmarried youths. The 
stipends consumed half of the resources. The law also re 
quired restricting training to occupations having 
"reasonable expectations of employment."
This combination of a disadvantaged clientele, pressures 
for immediate placement, and the short duration of courses 
limited the training choice to entry-level preparation for oc 
cupations requiring rudimentary skill and characterized by 
high turnover rates. Three-quarters of all pre-CETA 
classroom enrollments were in seven occupational categories 
and all at the entry level: clerical, health care, automotive 
repair, machine operation, welding, building service, and 
food service.
On-the-job training began slowly and accelerated so that 
by 1968 about half of MDTA's enrollments were in OJT 
slots. Representatives of the public employment services or 
community-based organizations offered employers an 
average of $25 a week for 26 weeks (the equivalent of 15.6 
hours pay at the minimum wage in the early 1970s) as a sub 
sidy for hiring MDTA eligibles. Predictably, only the small 
marginal employers were attracted by the subsidies and then 
only if the most qualified among the eligible were selected. 
Since these employers normally lacked training capability, 
the subsidy primarily bought a placement in a low-paying 
job. Nevertheless, the costs were low and the placement was 
built in, with retention likely, so a high ratio of benefits to 
costs was assured.
CETA was introduced, not because MDTA and EGA were 
failures, but because it was thought that local political ac-
11
countability would produce a service mix, including training, 
better adapted to the local scene. In addition, it was assumed 
that quality would improve if local institutions had to com 
pete for the right to provide GET A services. Focusing on 
what has happened to the quality and effectiveness of train 
ing under CETA should help answer whether those assump 
tions were correct.
Magnitude of CETA Training
Under CETA, the nation's commitments to employment 
and training programs rose dramatically, but employment 
generation captured the lion's share of dollars and people. 
There were over 2 million new enrollees in CETA programs 
in fiscal 1980. Over two-thirds of these new participants were 
in work components, or nearly half if the youth summer pro 
gram enrollments are excluded. Job creation components 
also accounted for two-thirds of the 1 million service years of 
employment and training activity estimated for fiscal 1980. 
The number and distribution of service years by program 
components follow:
Service years Percent 
CETA component (000) distribution
Total 1,097.5 100.0 
Local programs 1,041.8 95.2
Classroom training 219.9 20.0
On-the-job training 54.3 4.9
Summer youth work experience 126.2 11.9
Youth transition services 41.3 3.7
Nonsummer work experience 252.3 23.0
Public service employment 347.8 31.7
Job Corps 35.7 3.2
National programs 20.0 1.8
12
Whereas training expenditures predominated in the policy 
mix prior to CETA (accounting, for example, for nearly 2 of 
every 3 dollars expended in 1969), they fell to less than a 
fourth of CETA outlays by 1974 and to only 15 percent in 
1978, before rebounding to 21 percent in 1980. The source of 
the relative shift was massive allocations to job creation 
rather than decreases in training funds. In fact, with plen 
tiful employment funding under other titles after 1975 and 
with public sector employment proscribed under Title IIBC 
after 1978 (the title giving prime sponsors the most discretion 
to choose among alternative services), more of that title's 
funds could be expended on classroom training and OJT, as 
follows:








The relative distribution of training dollars has also 
shifted during the first 6 years of CETA. OJT has accounted 
for between 8.7 percent and 13.8 percent of Title I or IIBC 
expenditures, while the share of classroom training during 
the same period rose from 34.4 percent to 57.1 percent of 
IIBC allocations.
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The rising expenditures for training have provided oppor 
tunities for an increasing number of persons in need. The 
new participants, or annual flow through training programs 
each year, rose rapidly over the early 1960s to 336,000 an 
nually in fiscal 1967. The participant levels reached 481,000 
annually by 1972, and declined during the next 4 years. 
Growth resumed in 1976, reaching a peak of 773,000 in 1978, 
followed by a decline over the succeeding 2 years. Most of 
the secular increase resulted from the growth of local 
classroom training enrollments. In fact, average OJT par 
ticipants during the first 6 years of CETA were only two- 
thirds the average from 1969 to 1974. With the erosions of 
inflation and the beginnings of budget cuts, the pattern of 







































This study focuses on the regular and continuing funding 
that Congress appropriated for training under CETA, ex 
clusive of Job Corps. In addition to direct allocations to 
prime sponsors, funds were also allocated under Title IIBC 
to state governors for vocational education. Other training 
funds came from youth training programs, a special ap 
propriation for a demonstration skill training improvement 
program (STIP), a private sector initiative program (PSIP), 
and other titles of CETA. The Title IIBC formula allocation 
has accounted for about half of the CETA training, as the
14
percentage breakdown of fiscal 1980 enrollments and expen 
ditures indicates:
(percent distribution)
Expenditures by Participants by
program program 
Source of Funds components components
Total training 100.0 100.0
IIBC 49.9 61.0 
Supplemental vocational
education 4.7 * 
HD 1.4 2.1
III 1.5 3.3 
STIP 2.6 1.3
IV
Youth employment 6.5 11.8 
Job Corps 28.0 9.3
VI 0.7 0.6
VII (PSIP) 4.7 10.6
'Participants counted under Title IIBC in CETA MIS reports.
2. Local Vantage
The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act pro 
vided funds in 1980 to 476 state and local govern 
ments—known as prime sponsors—for the delivery of ser 
vices designed to improve the skills and the employment op 
portunities of low-income individuals experiencing dif 
ficulties in the labor market. While not necessarily represen 
tative, the 12 intensive case studies are a microcosm of the 
CETA system. This can be demonstrated by first comparing 
them on a few key variables with national averages. The 
quality and effectiveness of the training provided by each 
prime sponsor is assessed, and the aspects of regulation and 
administration that have an impact on quality are reviewed. 
The national and local reviews then become the source of 
conclusions and lessons related to the entire system.
Classroom Training
Allocation Determinants
Nationally, prime sponsors enrolled half of their Title 
IIBC participants in classroom training. Most of the prime 
sponsors interviewed indicated a preference for classroom 
training, and all but Baltimore, San Francisco, and North 
Carolina balance of state enrolled a higher proportion than 
the national average in classroom training. But because of
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variations in costs per enrollee, expenditure patterns did not 
coincide with those for enrollments, as indicated below:
Classroom training under Title IIBC, fiscal year 1980
Percent of Percent of 
Location total participants total expenditures




Montgomery 62.4 48.4 
North Carolina balance
of state 39.6 33.6
Ottawa 62.5 18.9
Penobscot 53.2 2L6





Nationally, neither the local unemployment rate nor the 
age structure of the participant population explain the dif 
ferences in service mix. Also, in making cross-prime-sponsor 
comparisons, it is not certain that common definitions were 
used. It might also be expected that classroom training 
would decrease with rising unemployment; however, the op 
posite has tended to be true. As unemployment has risen, 
more Title IID and VI PSE funds became available, thereby 
freeing up Title IIBC money for added training. On a cross- 
sectional basis, there is a tendency for those prime sponsors 
with the lowest unemployment rates to show the greatest 
commitment to classroom training, a relationship which 
does not hold true for on-the-job training. The major depar 
tures from this generalization are those less-populated areas 
with limited access to training institutions or private 
employers.
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1980 civilian 1980 unemployment
labor force rate
Location (000) (percent)




Montgomery 309 3.5 
North Carolina balance
of state 1,684 7.1
Ottawa 70 4.7
Penobscot 87 6.4





Prime sponsors have also complained about the require 
ment of maintaining the same level of service to youth under 
Title IIBC after the addition of new Title IV youth programs 
in 1977. This provision forced them to emphasize work ex 
perience under Title IIBC, since this was the most common 
youth activity in this title. Yet, the studies found no consis 
tent correlation, positive or negative, between the share of 
IIBC funds devoted to youth activities and the ratio of train 
ing to work experience under that title.
Institutional Setting
The providers of classroom training varied widely among 
the 12 sites studied. In Seattle, Tucson, and Utah, the major 
providers were the skill centers, which originated under 
MDTA. In San Francisco, the use of community-based 
organizations was favored, along with minor use of a skill 
center and a substantial amount of individual referral to 
private schools and the community college system. In North 
Carolina, the community colleges and technical institutes 
had most of the action, as was the case in Penobscot, where
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private colleges rounded out the classroom training facilities. 
In Dallas, two school districts and two CBOs shared most of 
the training activity. The overriding concern was with pro 
viding low per-capita cost training. Baltimore and Worcester 
used a mix of public and private schools and some employers 
to provide classroom training. Rural Ottawa County, lack 
ing training facilities of its own, provided living expenses and 
tuition aid to send many of its trainees out of the area. Some 
of the more rural areas of the Penobscot consortium follow 
ed a similar practice. Montgomery County enrolled its 
trainees in public and private schools, as well as local col 
leges. Indianapolis relied wholly on individual referrals to 
public and private colleges.
To generalize from the case studies, public postsecondary 
schools seem to provide most of the training, with skill 
centers in second place, followed by CBO-run schools and 
then private proprietary schools. In contrast to the national 
picture where individual referral purportedly predominates, 
enrollments in class-size groups were more common than in 
dividual referrals in all of the study locations, but this was 
true primarily because of the unusual CBO delivery system in 
San Francisco, Seattle, and Dallas.
Though skill centers played the predominate role in three 
locations, they were important in two others and supplemen 
tal in one. In Seattle, Tucson, and Utah, the skill centers pro 
vided the bulk of occupational training for the prime spon 
sor, but, in Baltimore and San Francisco, the skill center had 
a limited CETA role. These MDTA institutions still seem to 
be characterized by the same advantages and shortcomings 
they offered during the earlier period. Their staffs are 
typically dedicated to serving a disadvantaged population, 
and a range of on-site services required by disadvantaged 
trainees is generally available. On the other hand, the train 
ing tends to be limited to an average of 26 weeks and a max 
imum of 36 weeks (except for health care occupations where
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licensing requirements require longer training periods); the 
facilities are often poor, though the equipment is generally 
adequate, and the institutions are likely to have low prestige 
in the community.
Most skill centers make use of existing structure. For in 
stance, the Tucson skill center was initially housed in aban 
doned department store, garage, and restaurant buildings. In 
Utah, one skill center is in a former laundry building and 
another, in what was formerly a high school. The Baltimore 
skill center is also in an abandoned high school, as is the 
Dallas facility, although the latter has been lavishly remodel 
ed. The San Francisco skill center is housed in an abandoned 
elementary school. However, the latter institution has lost 
most of the attributes that typify a skill center. The Seattle 
facility, which was the major provider of CETA occupa 
tional training in that city, was exceptional in being the only 
center built for that purpose. Owned and operated by the 
Seattle Opportunities Industrialization Center, it has the 
allegiance of its enrollees and the black community, but 
although it is well-designed and -equipped, it still does not 
appear to command the general prestige that its quality 
deserves.
Beyond these examples of MDTA continuance, the oc 
cupational training locus seems to have shifted to standard 
public vocational schools and proprietary schools, sup 
plemented by specialized programs run by CBOs. In the 
mainstream public and private institutions, which serve the 
general population, CETA enrollees are referred individually 
to the regular program, with any necessary fees paid from 
CETA funds. This approach provides the CETA enrollee 
with training as good as that available to the taxpaying or 
feepaying public and allows participants to report to peers or 
prospective employers, "I'm at the technical college," rather 
than, "I'm in CETA."
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The drawback is that only those who are fairly self- 
motivated and who can compete with the regular clientele in 
the school will last. Some schools do provide remedial educa 
tion, but that is not the norm. A few prime sponsors follow a 
sequencing process in which an enrollee can spend time in a 
remedial component at one institution and then be referred 
to a skill training institution. However, almost every CETA 
prime sponsor has far more applicants than available slots, 
and the case studies found waiting lists for training ranging 
from 3 to 6 months. Thus, most sponsors considered it in 
equitable to invest heavily in some eligible persons, thereby 
leaving no funds for others. The regional office staff, and 
national policy as well, reinforced this concern by inveighing 
against high per-capita cost and setting up an assessment 
system that commends program for combining low costs and 
high immediate placements but largely ignores the quality of 
training offered.
Community-based organizations also play a larger role 
under CETA than they did under MDTA. The Opportunities 
Industrialization Centers (QIC) have been in the skill train 
ing business since the mid-1960s and in many cities provide 
high-quality training in a wide range of occupations. The 
Seattle OIC, as noted, is an outstanding example. However, 
in many other cities the OIC offering is limited and, in some 
places, of low quality. OIC provided a narrow range of 
training in Dallas and North Carolina, and it had been drop 
ped for poor performance in San Francisco and Mont 
gomery County. Often, as in Dallas, the prime sponsor must 
share responsibility for not simultaneously supporting and 
spurring the CBO to higher-quality efforts.
While OIC offers occupational skills, other CBOs tend to 
restrict their offerings to remedial prevocational components 
and to sponsorship of on-the-job training. However, the 
trend is for local community-based organizations to add 
entry-level skill training components. Facilities tend to be
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unsatisfactory, but the training emphasizes those occupa 
tions that require little training equipment. CBOs are par 
ticularly effective where the primary concern is with the in 
struction of English as a second language. In some cases, the 
support of CBOs may be motivated by a desire to "give them 
a small contract to keep them alive." However, the San 
Francisco and Seattle CBOs are both politically potent and 
offer highly competent instruction.
Training Occupations
High turnover occupations predominated among the 
training activities of the 12 case studies. Most of the 
enrollments seem to be in clerical, health care, automotive 
and auto repair, welding, machine operation, building ser 
vice and food service, just as they have been since the days of 
MDTA, but some significant change has occurred. Clerical 
and health care occupations are, in generally high demand so 
that, depending upon the level of investment in time and 
training costs, jobs can be found at lower or higher levels 
within the occupational cluster. Given the backgrounds of 
the enrollees and the relatively short training time allowed in 
most CETA programs, the clerical trainees tend to attain on 
ly marginal levels of skills. Yet the demand is sufficient in 
most locations to assure a respectable placement rate in the 
60- to 80-percent range. Admission to health programs tends 
to be more selective. Training for licensed practical or voca 
tional nurses, an MDTA creation, continues to be the 
outstanding CETA health care program. Training extends 
from 36 to 52 weeks, and placement is almost guaranteed if 
state certification standards are met. Yet, within the health 
care category, the Nurse's Aide Academy program in Dallas 
is evidence that programs of short duration can be produc 
tive when attuned to the needs of the client population and 
the demands of the labor market.
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There seems to be a small and sporadic, but still signifi 
cant, trend toward a broadened occupational range in class- 
size projects. Training for computer-related occupations and 
office machine repair are on the increase. Other occupations 
are added from time to time in response to local economic 
conditions, but the conditions and the programs rarely con 
tinue over long periods of time. In fact, CETA-funded train 
ing activities appear to be more flexible in phasing in or out 
according to community need than is common among train 
ing institutions.
The trend toward increased use of individual referral has 
expanded the range of occupations for which training is of 
fered and is nearly as wide as the total offering of the local 
training institutions, but the numbers trained add up to few 
in each occupation. Examples from the 12 case studies in 
clude radiologic, biomedical, psychiatric and graphic 
reproduction technicians, dental hygiene, drafting, air con 
ditioning, computer programming, graphic reproduction 
technician, and cosmetology. However, many of these are 
2-year programs. CETA tries to limit enrollment to 36 
weeks, with an average, scheduled course duration of about 
26 weeks, and it rarely pays for more than 52 weeks of train 
ing. In a few cases, in Penobscot especially, CETA was 
found to be paying tuition allowances for the first half of a 
2-year training program, leaving those who can afford it to 
finish at their own expense. Apparently there is interest in 
long-term training but an unwillingness to pay the price of 
reducing the numbers served since for every person enrolled 
in an expensive long-term training course, others are left 
without service.
To demonstrate the importance of this kind of activity, the 
skill training improvement program (STIP), initiated in 
1977, earmarked funds for both high level skills and long- 
term training. The funds were allocated to prime sponsors on 
a competitive basis. To support the same training for the
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same number of enrollees from regular prime sponsor funds 
would have absorbed a high proportion of available funds 
and resulted in the rejection of many applicants. However, 
the last grants for STIP projects were awarded in the first 
quarter of fiscal year 1979 from fiscal year 1978 funds, and 
no additional funds have been allocated for the program.
Other problems are associated with long-term training. 
Not only are these training programs more costly, but they 
tend to have higher dropout rates and no higher immediate 
placement rates than short-term courses, even though the 
analysis of national data indicates that their payoff in the 
long run is greater. Many eligible people lack the persistence 
and financial ability required to last through a long-term 
training program. They are apparently willing to train for 
the relatively low-paid jobs plagued by high turnover rates 
that seem to be available even during economic slumps.
As a matter of general policy, the Baltimore prime sponsor 
had opted for expensive, longer-term offerings in its regular 
training program. That was achieved at the price of con 
siderable selectivity among applicants. The Seattle skill 
center had historically shown a preference for long-term 
training, thereby contributing to criticisms of high per- 
capital cost. Worcester's largest skill training activity was in 
low-level clerical skills, but it had also carefully selected 
enrollees for electronics and computer programs. Mont 
gomery County tried high-level skills on an individual basis 
without stipends but had to screen 1,100 applicants to find 
33 persons qualified for a biomedical technician program. 
Several others had similar experiences with STIP. While the 
completion rates in these long-term offerings were generally 
lower than in short-term courses, those who completed were 
placed in jobs with considerably higher pay.
Success at running long-term training for high-level oc 
cupations presupposes either concentration on a better-
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prepared segment of the CETA-eligible population or a 
greater investment in remedial activities. The Baltimore 
prime sponsor has clearly made the selectivity choice for oc 
cupational training, as has Worcester for some of its pro 
grams. Utah and Penobscot had CETA-eligible populations, 
which in general had these characteristics, but they had not 
chosen to invest in long-term training. Tucson has chosen to 
serve a population ready and willing to qualify for 
minimum-wage jobs, while San Francisco stressed relatively 
low-cost English as a second language for predominately 
female immigrants. Dallas chose to focus on a needy black 
population but then failed to adjust the curriculum to meet 
those new needs. For others, the choice between lower-level 
enrollees and higher-level skills remains a troublesome one.
On-the-Job Training
Seven of the prime sponsors studied enrolled a larger pro 
portion of their IIBC participants in on-the-job training than 
the national average, including Penobscot and Ottawa, 
which enrolled more than double the national average. The 
variation in the percent of funds and participants enrolled in 
OJT was even greater than in classroom training.
Most of the prime sponsors studied praised OJT but then 
tended to make relatively little use of it. Enrollment in OJT 
ranged from 0.2 to 24.6 percent of the total IIBC enrollment 
in the 12 sites, despite the favorable results already indicated 
and the cost advantages documented below. The key deter 
minant in the use of OJT appeared to be the relative ag 
gressiveness of the agencies accepting the OJT marketing 
assignment, which is usually delegated to the public employ 
ment service, CBOs (especially Urban League), and local Na 
tional Alliance of Business (NAB) chapters.
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On-the-job training under Title IIBC, fiscal 1980
Percent of Percent of
Location total participants total expenditures




Montgomery 1.2 0.6 
North Carolina balance
of state 13.7 12.1
Ottawa 24.6 13.4
Penobscot 23.7 15.9





Penobscot used the state federation of labor as one of its 
OJT developers and had established a well-designed and 
carefully monitored system, linked with other services. 
Worcester had a high-quality, coupled classroom/OJT pro 
gram sponsored by local banks and administered by the local 
NAB chapter. In Seattle, Utah, and North Carolina, the 
employment service marketed OJT far more energetically 
than did the prime sponsor. Ottawa County had no 
classroom training institutions, and OJT served as an alter 
native to sending trainees outside the area at a high cost for 
transportation and lodging; Dallas had the advantage of a 
tight labor market to help "sell" the advantages of on-the- 
job training to employers. Indianapolis used OJT only in 
isolated cases because employers had earlier criticized the 
4 'red tape" that it involved. Private industry councils ex 
pressed interest in OJT promotion but were only beginning 
to get involved in the effort when the case studies were 
prepared.
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For the prime sponsor, a major obstacle to greater use of 
OJT is the high staff costs involved in persuading individual 
employers to contract for OJT slots. Many employers are 
reluctant to take on a CETA enrollee. They tend to question 
the qualifications of the eligible population and are fearful 
about the amount of red tape that may be involved in the 
contracting process. The result is tnat, in most cases, only 
small marginal employers, to whom a half wage subsidy for 
3 to 6 months may be attractive, sign up for one or two 
trainees. Moreover, in some rural areas, an absence of even 
small employers makes the development of OJT contracts 
nearly impossible.
One much-advocated approach to serving the disadvan- 
taged is a remedial education/classroom instruction/on-the- 
job training sequence, which Penobscot had achieved for 
some enrollees. However, given the limited funds available, 
the outside pressures to keep per-capita costs low, and the 
logistical difficulties involved in developing such complex 
programs, most prime sponsors considered it more ap 
propriate, if not more politically expedient, to run three 
parallel programs. The expansion of job-search training 
seems to be adding a fourth parallel track for the job-ready, 
who may need only placement services, but for whom the 
public employment service does not have an appropriate job 
listing. The tendency is for prime sponsors to decide on some 
division of available funds for each of these tracks, contract 
for the needed services, and then monitor the activities under 
each contract.
San Francisco is an example of a prime sponsor that ad 
vocates high-support OJT and has had some positive ex 
perience with it. (The emphasis is reflected in the expenditure 
of a high proportion of funds to support a rather low pro 
portion of its participants.) The program is an example of 
the remediation/classroom training/OJT sequencing pro 
cess. It begins with a commitment from the employer to take
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on one or more of those persons who have successfully com 
pleted the first two training phases—usually with some 
limited right of selection. Often the employer provides a 
training facility at the workplace, along with some equip 
ment and instructional assistance from the company person 
nel office for a work-simulation training phase. Those who 
attain a prescribed performance level, or a predetermined 
proportion of them, are then offered permanent employ 
ment by the firms involved.
Well-paid jobs on a structured promotion ladder, with ac 
companying job security and fringe benefits, have been at 
tained through this route. Examples include employment 
with a grocery chain, a public utility, and an engineering 
association. Nevertheless, the level of enrollments fluctuated 
with the needs of the companies—frequently involving affir 
mative action requirements—and could not be sustained. 
Not only must a willing employer be found, but uncommit 
ted dollars must be available at the appropriate time—and 
these programs tend to be expensive. Both community and 
federal pressures are aimed at committing every expected 
program dollar at the beginning of the fiscal year and 
thereafter keeping costs low. Yet, a cooperating employer 
may find it difficult to adjust his labor needs to the schedule 
of federal fund allocations. Thus, launching a successful 
OJT effort usually involves the fortuitous availability of 
funds that are either uncommitted or deobligated from other 
contractors or prime sponsors.
The San Francisco prime sponsor also offers an illustra 
tion of an approach that is related to the high-support OJT 
program, but is less expensive and therefore has a chance for 
greater continuity of funding. Advocacy organizations for 
minorities, women, and the handicapped are funded for the 
sole purpose of making placements, without offering any ac 
companying remedial education. As a prime sponsor staffer 
put it, representatives of these advocacy groups "follow the
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equal employment opportunity enforcers around offering 
companies relief by providing selected, though CETA- 
eligible, people with the right affirmative action 
characteristics.*'
North Carolina used an alternative approach, called 
"work site assessment," which was funded by the state 
rather than CETA. In this program, workers are paid a sti 
pend by the employment service while they are assigned to a 
host employer's establishment. After a trial period, the 
employer may reject the worker, offer unsubsidized employ 
ment, or accept an OJT contract.
Beyond these few exceptional programs, OJT was a 
useful, if routine, component of each prime sponsor's reper 
toire of program strategies. Its high benefit-cost payoff, 
clearly noted at the national level, was unknown to local 
operators and not readily apparent from any of the data 
available to them. The difficulty of marketing OJT, the high 
administrative cost of the personalized contracting process, 
and the overrepresentation of marginal employers among the 
contractors acted as disincentives to heavy sponsor involve 
ment in that activity. The fact that planned OJT expen 
ditures were substantially greater than actual expenditures 
for most of the prime sponsors indicates both the desire for 
OJT and the difficulties of its promotion.
Nonoccupational Training
The expansion of nonoccupational training is one of the 
most intriguing developments among CETA training ac 
tivities. Included among these efforts are instruction in basic 
education, English as a second language, prevocational 
orientation, coping skills, motivation, and job search train 
ing. These services are sometimes supplied separately and 
sometimes, in any combination, included as adjuncts to oc 
cupational skill training.
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The steady increase in the educational attainment of the 
work force and the decline of jobs that do not require at least 
some reading, writing, and simple arithmetic skills make lack 
of basic education an increasingly serious handicap. General 
education development (GED) certification as a substitute 
for a high school diploma is, therefore, a component of 
growing importance. Many CETA eligibles cannot succeed 
in occupational training without first or simultaneously par 
ticipating in remedial education and often in English as a 
second language. Some programs have demonstrated their 
ability to raise reading and arithmetic performance three 
grade levels during a 12-week course, though the usual pro 
gress is less dramatic.
The persistence of Spanish as the mother tongue among 
rural peoples of the Southwest and Puerto Ricans on the 
East Coast, together with the flood of more recent im 
migrants from Latin America and the Far East, has made 
English as a second language (ESL) the largest training pro 
gram of some prime sponsors. Increasingly, it has become 
vocational English as a second language (VESL) with the ad 
vent of curriculum materials teaching language in a job con 
text. ESL (or VESL) tends to be highly successful in terms of 
placement rates, retention rates, and the gain between pre- 
and post-training wage rates. San Francisco had the widest 
range of ESL offerings among the 12 prime sponsors 
studied, enrolling persons whose native tongue was Spanish, 
Chinese, Korean, Filipino, Vietnamese, Cambodian, In 
donesian, and Russian. Seattle also had a growing ESL com 
ponent, serving various Asian refugees. Dallas and Tucson 
offer ESL for Hispanics, with Operation SER as contractor. 
Other primes had more limited ESL activities. For all of 
these groups, their very presence so far from their points of 
origin is evidence of their motivation, and many have 
substantial skills that can be applied only after language 
competence is obtained.
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North Carolina had the heaviest investment in prevoca- 
tional orientation, with a state appropriation of $2.3 million 
in addition to CETA funding. In 47 of its 58 community and 
technical colleges, CETA and non-CETA disadvantaged 
enrollees are given 8 weeks of a combination of remedial 
education, career exploration, and various life-coping skills. 
The numbers enrolled exceed the numbers enrolled in 
CETA-funded occupational skill training. This human 
resource development (HRD) program emerged as a natural 
consequence of reliance on public postsecondary institu 
tions, which were not prepared to deal with a disadvantaged 
student body. Though it functions within the same institu 
tions, it is separate from and not linked with occupational 
skill training. The Baltimore prime sponsor was unique in 
establishing its own in-house faculty for conducting most 
nonoccupational training as an alternative to contracting it 
out.
The hottest new entry among the nonoccupational pro 
grams is job search training. A person who knows how and 
where to search and how to impress an employer can usually 
find at least a high-turnover, low-paying job. Typically, the 
job search program enrollees are taught during a 2-week 
course to prepare resumes, fill out applications, and practice 
answers to the most common questions asked by interview 
ing employers. The enrollees then learn to use the telephone 
yellow pages and classified advertisement sections in the 
newspapers in order to identify employers likely to have the 
job they want and for which they are qualified. They practice 
telephoning skills and then spend long, supervised hours call 
ing for interview appointments. Reported placement rates 
tended to range from 70 to 90 percent among the cases 
studied, though parallel programs for work incentive pro 
gram (WIN) enrollees in the same cities were observed to 
have as low as 30 percent success rates. Moreover, there is as 
yet no substantial data on retention rates and, more impor-
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tantly, no data on whether or not the participant has obtain 
ed a permanent job-seeking skill, which works in subsequent 
spells of unemployment.
The nonoccupational offerings rest on two assumptions: 
that a high proportion of jobs require no specific pre-entry 
skills and that turnover produces a flow of jobs, even during 
less-than-prosperous times. However, few programs indicate 
how to distinguish between primary and secondary labor 
markets and how to choose and attain jobs with promise. 
Unlike occupational skill training, which is usually provided 
by public education institutions and proprietary schools, 
private contractors appear to dominate nonoccupational 
training, except for ESL where community-based organiza 
tions predominate.
Training Costs
Training costs varied widely across the study sites, but 
gross cost data are of limited value because the scope and 
content of the training differed widely (Table 1 which is 
drawn from national DOL data sources includes only in 
structional and administrative costs but not allowances). On 
ly Indianapolis and Seattle of the 12 prime sponsors exceed 
ed the national average cost per positive termination of 
$3,170, with only Indianapolis recording a higher-than-the- 
average national cost per placement of $6,508.
Important factors in determining the costs per participant 
and per outcome include the ratio of nonskill to skill train 
ing, the average length of training, the occupational mix, the 
institutional mix, the client characteristics, the dropout rate, 
and the extent of local subsidies. Costs per placement or 
costs per positive termination depend, of course, upon the 
characteristics of the participants, the state of the local 
economy, and the availability of positive alternatives to 
placement. According to national data, the positive termina-



































































































































tion rate of all prime sponsors averaged 67 percent. All 12 
prime sponsors studied had a better record than the national 
average by the positive termination criterion, but In 
dianapolis and North Carolina fell below the national 
average in placement rates. The prime sponsors studied con 
sistently reported higher outcomes to the researchers than 
were found in the national data source. The national average 
cost per placement was more than double the outlay per 
positive termination, but only three of the 12 prime sponsors 
exceeded that ratio.
Nationally, costs per participant in classroom training ex 
ceeded OJT costs by 18 percent, but half of the 12 prime 
sponsors expended more funds per OJT than per classroom 
enrollee. The presumed OJT cost advantage was offset in 
many places by the locally subsidized and sometimes tuition- 
free use of public training institutions. Public community 
colleges, technical institutes, and area vocational schools are 
generally eligible for the same average daily attendance fund 
ing whether the student is matriculated or not, and, if tuition 
is not completely free to enrollees, then the cost to the prime 
sponsor is minimal except for the stipend. Another offset 
against the apparently low comparative costs for on-the-job 
training are the promotional costs; because there may be one 
trainee per employer, the staffing requirements for either 
prime sponsor or contractor associated with OJT may exceed 
that of classroom training.
The costs obtainable from national data sources often dif 
fer from data obtained directly from the local level. The 
following locally obtained data are examples of the wide 
variations in costs. At the Baltimore skill center, costs per 
trainee ranged from $1,169 for clerical training to $3,344 for 
construction trades. Individual referral costs were uniform 
at $2,858 because the schools charged the same tuition rates 
for different occupations. When allowances are added, the 
total cost range grew from $2,041 for clerical to $4,696 for
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computer and office machine repair, which involved training 
of longer duration than the construction trades course. Most 
were open entry-open exit programs, and therefore costs are 
determined by the amount of time the average trainee takes 
to complete the programs (or to drop out) rather than any ar 
bitrary, maximum course length. Since individual referral 
courses were fixed in length and tended to be longer and in 
higher skills than skill center courses, the average total cost 
rose to $5,173 including allowances, despite subsidized tu 
ition.
In Tucson, for example, a skill center and a private pro 
prietary school provided occupational training alternatives. 
The annual average cost per slot at the skill center was $3,324 
in 1980. However, costs per enrollee averaged $351 and costs 
per completer were $640, ranging from $95 per trainee 
receiving only adult basic education or job search training to 
$4,144 for a full year of skill training as a licensed practical 
nurse. Also, included in the mix were 2-week pre-OJT basic 
skill courses for electronic assemblers and an 8-week course 
for bank tellers. The private trade school charged a tuition of 
$5,200 for an academic year but, since CETA enrollees were 
automatically eligible for basic education opportunity 
grants, the cost to CETA was $2,000 per enrollee for the 
academic year. That private school advantage was lost in 
early 1981 when enrollees at the skill center became eligible 
for BEOG grants in consequence of the center becoming a 
unit of the community college. Because the private school 
was highly selective in its entrace requirements, the prime 
sponsor decided to put all its fiscal year 1981 classroom 
training funds into the skill center, whereupon the private 
school unsuccessfully sued. Where the classroom training 
program was accomplished primarily in public post- 
secondary vocational and technical training institutions, 
either through individual referral or in class-size groups (as 
in North Carolina), CETA pays only the heavily subsidized
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tuition any individual student would pay, thus shifting 
substantial costs to the state.
Indianapolis is an example of a program that has operated 
classroom training totally on an individual referral basis. 
One private college charged $1,690 per slot for tuition and 
books for two academic quarters, while a cosmetology 
school charged $1,890 for 1,500 hours of training over a 
9-month period. At one technical institution, the cost by oc 
cupation ranged from $1,500 to $1,800 per academic year, 
while another charged $4,283 for a 1,000 hour program, and 
a truck driving school charged $2,675 for 10 weeks. These 
costs did not include the allowances, which were paid direct 
ly to the enrollees.
Montgomery County relies primarily on class-size courses 
at private and public institutions. The Penobscot prime 
sponsor obtains basic education at no cost and occupational 
skill training at subsidized tuition rates at public institutions 
but pays full tuition costs, less BEOG's, at private institu 
tions. By carefully selecting its enrollees, Montgomery 
County negotiated $3,000 tuition costs for 26-week high- 
technology programs at a private university and a private 
technical school, while a CBO had been charging $4,000 for 
training in much lower-skill occupations. Occupational 
training at a community college was obtained for $1,000 per 
enrollee, while non-skill training consisting of English as a 
second language, basic education, and assertiveness training 
for women ranged from $800 to $1,800 per person.
In general, costs appeared in line with costs of occupa 
tional training outside CETA. Allowances were the major 
additions over the costs considered standard to training in 
stitutions. They were a necessity for many of the low-income 
clientele, but some of the non-family heads probably could 
have managed tuitionless training without stipends, had such 
allowances not come to be expected. However, Montgomery
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County had tried nonstipended training and had ended by 
serving non-family heads from households at the upper 
socioeconomic levels of CETA eligibility. Dallas had manag 
ed a compromise, paying stipends at an hourly rate that was 
an average of 80 cents below the federal minimum. A per 
suasive case can be made for changing the allowance struc 
ture to prevent those stipends becoming a major incentive 
for enrollment. A major cost for CETA has been the deci 
sion to set the training allowance at the minimum wage for 
the hours attended, plus add-ons for training expenses and 
dependents. Those training for low-skill occupations may ac 
tually have a higher take-home pay during enrollment than 
after placement, making many reluctant to leave the shelter 
of the program. Since total allowance costs are determined 
by duration of training, whereas training costs fluctuate to 
some extent by occupation and by institution, allowances 
vary from about 40 percent to about 60 percent of total 
training costs. Because length of training is the major deter 
minant of both training cost and occupational level, the 
highest-cost training tends to prepare enrollees for the best 
jobs.
3. Quality of Training
There are no simple criteria for measuring the quality of 
training; in fact, there is much mystique in the concept. Ef 
fectiveness might be conceptually easier to measure, but the 
data do not exist. Placement does not measure effectiveness 
unless compared against controls because the state of the 
local labor market may be the more critical determinant.
Many factors enter into an assessment of training quality: 
the adequacy of facilities, equipment, and curriculum; the 
competence of the instructors; the appropriateness of the 
training occupations; the adequacy of training duration; and 
the quality of the needed supportive services provided. The 
characteristics of the clients and the supportive services they 
require also affect the quality of training provided. The 
management of training, including the linkages among ser 
vices and with employers, may affect outcomes no less than 
the training itself. Of course, costs are both a determinant of 
quality and a yardstick against which to measure effec 
tiveness.
Institutional Capacity
Because of the limited resources available to them, the 
prime sponsors included in this study were dependent upon 
the quality of the training institutions in existence. They were 
in no position to create new ones. Prime sponsor staff could 
only demonstrate acumen in choosing between alternatives 
of higher and lower quality. The quality of the available in 
stitutions in rural Maine, Michigan, North Carolina, and 
Utah was generally good, and the prime sponsors utilized the
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available resources. In some isolated areas of these states, 
however, there were no training institutions available. In 
those situations, the choices were to rely on work experience 
or on-the-job training (though potential host employers were 
also scarce) or to pay costs of transportation and lodging at a 
distant site. In each of these cases, at least some moneys were 
allocated to institutions of lesser quality for political 
reasons, to maintain a range of alternatives, or because of 
the particular attachments of institutions to race, sex, or 
other groupings among the eligible population.
The types of training institutions have been described but 
can also be ranked according to quality. The best institutions 
were those that were created to appeal to the broader, non- 
disadvantaged population in the community. Private pro 
prietary trade schools depended upon a combination of high- 
quality training and good placement rates to maintain a 
clientele and make a profit. Attractive facilities, up-to-date 
equipment, high-quality staff, sound and motivating cur 
ricula, and high placement rates were all necessary to con 
tinue to attract tuition-paying customers. However, this 
quality came at high cost to CETA, both in budget dollars 
and selectivity of enrollees.
Few CETA enrollees could meet the entry requirements of 
proprietary schools on an individual basis. Pressures from 
the Federal Trade Commission to advertise their placement 
rate make such schools reluctant to accept the hard-to-place. 
The Montgomery County experience of screening 1,100 
CETA eligible applicants to find 33 persons acceptable to a 
technical school for a biomedical technician program has 
been noted. On the other hand, the San Francisco experi 
ment with placing a class-size project in a private business 
school, where the instructional and administrative staff was 
never able to establish rapport, illustrates the difficulties for 
such a school in seeking to adapt itself to an unfamiliar 
clientele.
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There are, however, private institutions capable of serving 
a broader portion of the CETA population, as illustrated by 
the ABC Trade School in Tucson and the Beal and Hudson 
Colleges in Maine. For the CETA-eligible persons who can 
qualify, these appear to be good investments because they 
train for the mainstream labor market, their training lasts 
for longer periods of time, and they provide access to jobs 
that pay enough to assure economic independence. But selec 
tion must be made with care, and the prime sponsor should 
maintain a liaison with and access to external supportive ser 
vices to increase the chances of enrollee survival.
Community colleges, technical colleges, and area voca 
tional schools rank next in quality. In recent years these in 
stitutions have experienced a vast expansion and qualitative 
upgrading. The facilities and equipment are generally of high 
quality, and the occupational offerings tend to be broader 
than at the proprietary schools. Some CETA prime sponsors 
may be overly attracted to such institutions because of the 
comparatively low cost. Most CETA enrollees can gain en 
trance, but the challenge is to survive. The institutions have 
adapted to the needs of the average high school graduate. 
They rarely have available remedial adult basic education, 
English as a second language, close counseling support, and 
other supportive services likely to be needed by the CETA 
population. CETA referrals who can survive in that setting 
are likely to be brought into contact with the primary labor 
market. Most such schools have informal and formal 
employer contacts. The enrollee emerges from a mainstream 
institution rather than from a stigmatized federal program. 
The enrollee may well be inspired to a higher self-image as 
well.
As the case studies illustrate, some of the survival prob 
lems for CETA enrollees in these mainstream institutions 
can be minimized by the prime sponsor staff working closely
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with the training institutions. The options are to persuade 
the institution to mount its own supportive services ac 
tivities, allow the stationing of agency personnel at the train 
ing institution to provide the social services, or arrange to 
provide access to supportive services external to the training 
institution. North Carolina has attacked the problem with its 
8-week human resource development program, given prior 
to enrollment in occupational skill training.
The third institutional tier appears to be the skill centers. 
They are typically designed around an open entry-open exit 
concept in which an enrollee can enter regardless of 
background, obtain remedial education and advocacy 
counseling, enter individualized training without waiting, 
progress through a modularized course sequence, and seek 
employment upon attainment of a skill. They may also leave 
when they have reached their learning capacity or upon 
becoming financially pressed. All the necessary remedial and 
supportive services, including placement services, were 
designed to be available onsite from skill center staff or 
outstationed staff of other agencies. The survival chances of 
the less-qualified CETA eligibles are enhanced in the skill 
center environment. However, the facilities suffer in quality 
and tend to be limited to occupations in which entry for a 
disadvantaged person can be attained in 6 months or less of 
training.
The training provided by community-based organizations 
offers the fourth tier in quality. As usual, there are excep 
tions. As noted above, the Seattle OIC occupies modern 
training facilities and provides superior training. That is a 
unique case, however. CBOs generally operate out of 
haphazard facilities, just as skill centers do, and, although 
high quality training can occur in a substandard facility, 
there is at least an image handicap. The comparative advan 
tage of a CBO is racial and ethnic identity. The few CBOs 
that offer occupational training tend to depend upon the
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charisma and commitment of staff, but the overall perfor 
mance is spotty.
Contracting with CBOs for CETA services involves more 
than straightforward judgments of training quality. Aside 
from political considerations, which may be controlling, 
CBO personnel can provide the enrollees with a sense of 
identity and can offer the program greater visibility in the 
community. In some localities this may be sufficient reason 
for funding groups that mix training with a good dose of ad 
vocacy. In general, the messages of these case studies suggest 
that it is best to leave to CBOs the primary functions of 
outreach and intake, remedial components, and affirmative 
action sponsorship on behalf of their particular clientele. 
Since these activities are generally new to everyone in the 
community, a CBO can mount them as effectively as any 
other available institution. Also, the CBOs are more likely to 
be aware of the needs of the eligible population, and they 
have greater flexibility than the educational institutions. Oc 
cupational training is, however, at its best when assigned to 
schools or employer settings with satisfactory facilities and 
recognized competence.
The case studies demonstrate that the paucity of funds for 
facilities and equipment is a distinct obstacle to CETA train 
ing. The institution acting as contractor to provide training 
normally furnishes its own facilities and equipment. DOL 
pressures are against providing sufficient funding to upgrade 
facilities and equipment, and prime sponsors are reluctant to 
use scarce funds for these purposes. Private schools, of 
course, charge enough for their training to cover amortiza 
tion. Public educational institutions provide a substantial 
subsidy to CETA through free use of facilities and equip 
ment as well as through tuition charges that are well below 
costs. Skill centers and CBOs must negotiate with prime 
sponsors for sufficient funds to improve their facilities and
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upgrade their equipment but have had to overcome prime 
sponsors' resistance to cost increases.
As noted, prime sponsors lack the resources to provide 
training in areas where no effective training institution ex 
ists. The differences were critical in two of the three 
Penobscot consortium counties, in some of Utah's isolated 
areas, and in Ottawa County. The choice left to the prime 
sponsor in these areas was to make do with the available in 
stitutions, limit the program to work experience, or train ap 
plicants at some far-away institution involving travel ex 
penses and living costs.
Curricula and Staff
The quality of occupational skill training curricula ap 
peared to be generally good, though each institution was be 
ing forced to adapt materials prepared for the mainstream. 
A system of sharing curriculum within CETA training circles 
would have been of considerable value.
Curricula for remedial adult basic education are now 
reasonably well developed and available "off the shelf" 
from several commercial publishers and educational 
systems. English as a second language is approaching that 
status with an informal network of exchange among practi 
tioners. Fortunately, a separate curriculum does not seem 
necessary for each language. San Francisco, where all ESL 
instructors share community college certification, has its 
own multilingual informal interchange, while ELS materials 
for Spanish-speaking trainees have been circulating since 
MDTA began. Vocational English as a second language 
(VESL) seems to be the code term for this growing multi 
lingual interchange. San Francisco, Seattle, and Tucson of 
fered the best training noted in this field, although no case 
study author identified ESL as an area of curriculum 
weakness. The anxiety of the immigrant enrollees for pro-
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gress and the ethnic identification of the instructors are un 
doubtedly positive qualitative factors.
In contrast, limited curriculum material seems to have 
been designed for orientation, motivation, and various cop 
ing skills such as grooming, personal finance, and how to 
gain access to public services. The goals of orientation are 
not clear nor do we know how to motivate employees, as the 
experience of high-priced consultants to industry clearly il 
lustrates. Job search training is too new to have developed a 
widely acceptable curriculum. Most of the literature in the 
field, developed in support of career choice and access to 
professional jobs by college graduates and displaced ex 
ecutives, has limited relevance to a CETA-eligible popula 
tion. Consulting firms have begun to compete vigorously for 
assignments from CETA prime sponsors, but many 
unresolved methodological and conceptual issues concerning 
curriculum approaches remain. Quality at this point is likely 
to rest more with the charisma and good sense of the 
workshop leader than with curriculum content.
Staff development seemed to be a serious problem in the 
CETA training system. For institutions outside the training 
mainstream, including skill centers, there is ordinarily no re 
quirement for preservice teacher training and no linkage to 
ongoing inservice teacher training and staff development 
systems. There are no funds or provisions in CETA contracts 
for upgrading contractor personnel. There is none of the 
leisurely pace of public education. Instructors are paid by 
classroom hour and have no built-in incentives for self- 
development. The generally high quality of instruction must 
be attributed to personal dedication rather than to institu 
tional incentives. Formal staff development ought to make it 
even better. North Carolina went furthest of the 12 case 
studies in attempting to meet that need but the full potential 
effectiveness of its state-financed Employment and Training 
Institute was thwarted by political infighting. Still, it is a
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model worth consideration, since it is close enough to the 
local level to allow general staff attendance and onsite 
assistance, yet has a large enough scope for economies of 
scale.
Occupational and O JT Quality
The training occupations available to CETA enrollees are 
limited by the policy of keeping per-capita costs low and, 
therefore, training of short duration. The average classroom 
course length is 5.5 months, although the law permits pro 
grams of up to 2 years. Nonetheless, all of the prime spon 
sors indicated the imposition by regional officials of more 
stringent de facto limitations, which prime sponsors tend to 
enforce in response to pressures for maximum enrollments. 
In effect, therefore, CETA training is limited to 1-year pro 
grams even though some prime sponsors, notably 
Penobscot, enrolled their participants in 2-year programs, 
with the understanding that they had to pay their own way 
the second year. The availability of basic education oppor 
tunity grants facilitated this approach, and the grants were 
used extensively in several locations to reduce the cost of the 
initial support. Enrollment of 1 academic year or less in a 
low-tuition occupational program in a public institution 
seemed to be generally available for those meeting both 
CETA eligibility and the institution's entry requirements, 
but the number who could qualify was limited, except in San 
Francisco, Seattle, and Utah—areas with a generally high 
average level of education—which generated waiting lists of 
qualified applicants.
Occasionally prime sponsors attempt to generate class-size 
CETA projects within mainstream training institutions. Ex 
amples include Montgomery County's biomedical technician 
program, electronic technician, computer operation and pro 
gramming courses in North Carolina, Penobscot, Worcester,
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Baltimore, and Dallas. Most of these advanced projects were 
funded under the skill training improvement program, which 
had its own separate, more-generous funding and less- 
restrictive eligibility standards than the run-of-the-mill 
CETA training.
The skill center programs offer occasional departures 
from the standard meager menu because of the special and 
temporary employer need, but the pressures for short train 
ing time, low costs, and immediate placement create a cen 
tripetal force back to the basic grouping. Tucson's elec 
tromechanical assembly and bank teller programs, air condi 
tioning installation courses in Dallas, and Seattle's addition 
of maritime trades to the skill center's offerings are examples 
of efforts to meet special local needs. The difficulties of 
recruiting and retaining a sufficient number of eligible 
enrollees qualified for the training outside of the customary 
clerical, health, automotive, welding, machine operations 
and food and building service are illustrated by the class-size 
computer programming and operation courses in Baltimore 
and at the Dallas QIC.
Little is known about the quality of on-the-job training. 
CETA prime sponsors are usually one additional step remov 
ed from OJT employers. As noted, the prime sponsor con 
tracts with a CBO, the local public job service, or the Na 
tional Alliance of Business chapter to contact employers and 
place CETA-eligible enrollees with them. Some subcontrac 
tors make periodic visits to employers and some do not, and 
prime sponsor staff also make spot checks. But the staff 
making these checks are not training experts. OJT can range 
from formal inplant courses to working under the watchful 
eye of a supervisor or being assisted by a fellow employee. 
The first issue is, did the employer hire a CETA-eligible per 
son because of the training subsidy rather than an employee 
not eligible under CETA who would otherwise have gotten 
the job? The payoff is whether the enrollee is retained in an
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unsubsidized job. The fact that such retention occurs in most 
cases undoubtedly explains the highly attractive benefit-cost 
ratio documented in the national review.
Supportive services are an essential ingredient of CETA 
training that affects its quality. MDTA pioneered in the 
development of client assistance—child care and transporta 
tion—to ease participation in occupational skill training. 
CETA continued to provide these services, although other 
programs have shared in the responsibility for their funding. 
Even more than MDTA, CETA has emphasized acquiring 
the personal attributes of employability, whether or not the 
client participates in occupational training.
Counseling remains a supportive service whose value is 
taken on faith in the absence of any strong evidence about 
the extent to which it makes a difference in participant out 
comes. The same applies to training for job search, which is 
a more recent development without an articulated common 
curriculum and to orientation and motivation activities, 
which are too diverse and amorphous to make assessment of 
these approaches any more than a matter of faith.
Need for transportation assistance was significant only in 
Dallas and Penobscot. Most child-care facilities and services 
were provided by non-CETA agencies and did not appear to 
be a serious problem to prime sponsors. In general, the non- 
training supportive services have been taken over by other in 
stitutions during the past decade, while the nonoccupational 
labor market skills such as job search have exceeded them in 
importance within the CETA program.
Linkages and Sequence
A significant consideration in assessing the quality of a 
CETA training program might be the degree to which it is 
linked with other CETA components, with programs in
47
mainstream education institutions, and with employing 
organizations. The scarcity of such linkages was one of the 
disappointing findings of the study. An advantage of decen 
tralized administration should be the ability of the prime 
sponsor to orchestrate passage of the eligible enrollee 
through a sequence of locally available services, starting 
from the enrollee's initial need and completing with having 
attained employability and a job. Such sequencing was rare, 
however. Only three of the 12 prime sponsors centralized 
their total intake, and two others did so for part of their 
clientele. The norm was for a service deliverer to be responsi 
ble for its own recruitment, selection, and assessment of 
clients whose access was limited to the services provided by 
that contractor. The general tendency was to make one pro 
gram referral per enrollee and provide nothing further, ex 
cept perhaps placement services after completion.
There is no legal or regulatory obstacle to starting an in 
dividual in ESL and adult basic education at one institution, 
moving to skill training at another, followed perhaps by an 
on-the-job training stint and job search training from 
another institution, as needed. The obstacles are conceptual, 
logistical, and financial. Prime sponsor staff generally lack 
interest in and capability to design comprehensive delivery 
systems, to chart client flows, and to generate realistic and 
meaningful employability development plans. A systematic 
client tracking system is necessary to monitor the enrollee's 
progress, and it is difficult to assign accountability and 
measure contractor performance in an interdependent 
system. Reporting requirements further discourage mixing 
components. The financial drawback is the amount of 
money to be spent per individual. The longer amount of time 
necessary to traverse the complex programmatic terrain in 
creases the amount spent for allowances.
The standard practice of the prime sponsors studied was to 
provide no employment and training services directly. Only
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the skill centers and the North Carolina community colleges 
and technical institutions provided both nonoccupational 
and occupational training within the same training institu 
tion. Most other institutions performed only one or a limited 
range of services. Absent centralized intake centers, there 
were no means of arranging a needed sequence of services to 
be supplied in turn by service deliverers. Each contractor had 
every incentive to keep its applicants inhouse and little or no 
incentive to refer them to other institutions for alternative or 
supplemental services. But centralized intake is not enough. 
There must be some means of assessment to determine 
enrollee capability and need.
There were some exceptions to these generalizations about 
sequencing and relations with the education community. 
Penobscot operated its own intake and assessment centers 
and tried to develop a realistic employability development 
plan for each participant. It was able to determine who need 
ed adult basic education, refer them to that service, and then 
on to occupational skill training when the desired level had 
been achieved. Through the assessment process, only those 
with good work habits were referred to OJT. PSE was 
visualized as being OJT in the public sector with persons 
referred there first to learn and practice skills and then to be 
referred to either classroom training or private sector OJT. 
Penobscot was the only prime sponsor studied that seemed 
to be able to use the employability development plan as an 
instrument for sequencing individuals through multiprogram 
involvement.
Despite operating its own intake centers, there was little 
attempt in Baltimore to provide sequential services beyond 
the first referral. Dallas had contracted with a CBO for a 
centralized intake and assessment center but there was no 
continuing linkage between that center and the organizations 
to which the individuals were referred and no arrangement 
for later sequential referrals. The Washington state employ-
49
ment service operated a well-staffed assessment center to 
recommend choices among OJT, individual referral, the skill 
center, and occupations within them. Tucson had con 
siderable movement of individuals from adult basic educa 
tion and ESL and other nonoccupational activities at CBOs 
into occupational training at the skill center. This was ac 
complished by allocating a fixed number of slots at the skill 
center to each CBO that assumed the responsibility for 
allowance payments and placement efforts on behalf of 
those individuals. The skill center then provided vocational 
assessment to help in the choice of training occupation. 
Beyond these examples, assignments were based upon 
availability of openings or enrollee choice.
Except in Seattle, all skill centers studied were units of the 
public education systems. Yet the latter invariably treated 
their skill centers as stepchildren and established few, if any, 
linkages.
Tucson and Baltimore seemed to have the most significant 
linkages with the employer community. In Tucson, a joint 
and overlapping economic development council, prime spon 
sor advisory council, and private industry council was a 
useful device for program planning and for development of 
linked classroom and O JT programs but not for direct place 
ment. Baltimore, more than the other sponsors, seemed to 
have worked out effective continuing program planning and 
marketing relationships for direct placement with 
cooperating employers.
By and large, CETA appeared to be a mechanism for plac 
ing resources into the hands of training institutions and 
channeling eligible individuals into training programs. 
However, with the possible exception of Penobscot and to a 
lesser degree Tucson, nowhere did any of the 12 prime spon 
sors studied develop the institutional arrangements that are 
necessary for a sequential training system.
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The Quality of Evaluation
The 12 case studies indicate that federal administrators 
displayed little concern about training quality and few prime 
sponsors appeared to have staffs qualified to assess the 
quality of training offered and to recommend improvements 
in it. The only prime sponsor staff with a continuing assign 
ment for direct onsite observation are the program monitors, 
but theirs is an entry level position characterized by high 
turnover—either up or out—which prevents the accumula 
tion of experiences upon which to make valid judgments. 
Training quality appeared to be more often an accident of in 
stitutional availability. Fortunately, the accident happened 
more often than not, so that one can report favorably on the 
general quality level of CETA training, including the 
facilities, equipment, curricula, and staff.
But what about the results? Regrettably, the information 
does not exist to measure accomplishment at the local level. 
Not one of the prime sponsors studied could produce reliable 
and comprehensive statistics proving the long-run results of 
their training efforts. All maintained placement and positive 
termination rates and pre-entry/postparticipation wage rates 
because those were required by the DOL reporting system. A 
few maintained followup data for up to 6 months after train 
ing, but most did little f ollowup. Baltimore had the most ex 
tensive evaluation program of the 12, with a separate office 
of program evaluation and research to carry it out. Rather 
than evaluate on a contract-by-contract basis, the evalua 
tions were structured around service components in order to 
ascertain which are most effective for whom. However, the 
evaluation effort necessarily relied upon measures of short- 
run rather than long-run gains. Dallas is an example of a 
prime sponsor which contracts for 3-, 6-, and 12-month 
followup, but obtains no information on program impact. 
The purpose is to assess contractor performance but not to
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test the worth or outcomes of the program. Penobscot 
follows up its enrollees but does not record results separately 
for each service component.
Completion rates were generally reported by the prime 
sponsors to be in the 80 and 90 percentiles, a remarkably 
high achievement if the data are correct. Placement rates 
typically were reported to range from 65 to 85 percent, but 
was the determining factor the quality of the training pro 
gram, the state of the local economy, or the competence of 
the job development and placement functions?
No prime sponsor had conducted any controlled study to 
determine how the gains to the participants fared compared 
with those experienced by a like group of nonparticipants. 
Only San Francisco had attempted to calculate cost-benefit 
ratios to be used as a management tool for the allocation of 
funds among contractors and services. Participant costs were 
compared to the annualized first postenrollment placement 
wage. In some of the ESL programs particularly the gains 
were spectacular, but hardly surprising considering, for ex 
ample, a Cambodian pre-entry wage compared with a San 
Francisco post-participation wage. Since the ESL placement 
rates were consistently over 80 percent and retention rates 
even higher 6 months later, there is no reason to doubt the 
positive thrust of the findings.
Even excluding the unique San Francisco situation, the 
average wage gains were significant, considering that many 
participants had to settle for jobs in secondary labor 
markets. The boosts in average hourly rates from $3.36 to 
$3.97 in Dallas and from $3.60 to $4.25 in Baltimore are 
typical examples.
The natural concern of a prime sponsor is the relative ef 
fectiveness of service alternatives—does classrom training, 
on-the-job training, work experience, or some other alter 
native service provide the most placement per dollar of ex-
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penditure? Whether the unserved did as well as the served 
was a question which they felt no obligation to answer. In 
volved as they are in day-to-day operations, prime sponsors 
do not place high priority on determining whether the 
benefits from CETA services exceed the costs of those ser 
vices. Process evaluation of the CETA system is con 
siderable, perhaps too much so. Outcomes evaluation at the 
local level is rare and the national system, though thorough, 
involves long-term lags. Because they were limited to im 
mediate placement data, prime sponsors are often led into 
less than cost-effective strategies. Work experience and 
short-duration training produce equal immediate placement 
rates at lower costs in comparison with longer-duration 
training, which is nonetheless shown by the national 
longitudinal data to have the greater ultimate payoff.
4. The Management of Training
The CETA system involves a partnership of federal, state, 
and local governments, with advice from other labor market 
participants, for the delivery of services designed to improve 
the employment and training experiences of eligible 
unemployed and economically disadvantaged persons. While 
this study focuses on training, it is necessary to assess how 
training fares in this milieu. Understanding and appraising 
the system in which training decisions are made requires an 
examination of the decisionmaking process.
The Decisionmakers
The CETA decisionmaking process involves elected of 
ficials, prime sponsor staff, advisory bodies, contractors and 
subcontractors, client groups, and the public at the local 
level, all interacting with state officials and agencies, federal 
Department of Labor officials, and, ultimately, the Con 
gress. Each has varying impact on the nature and quality of 
the training delivered, but not necessarily on the outcomes.
Elected Officials
Few elected officials were deeply involved in the dozen 
cases under scrutiny. Some ignored CETA's existence. Some 
asked for periodic briefings to assure that no unforeseen 
political dangers were lurking within CETA's complexities. 
Only one, the mayor of Baltimore, perceived CETA as play 
ing any significant role in his plans for his jurisdiction and 
administration. For him, CETA was a key resource for ser 
vices to his constituents, a welcome linkage between social
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services and economic development activities, and its direc 
tor was a valued lieutenant in his administration.
Most chief elected officials were satisfied to leave the 
management of the prime sponsorship to the staff, provided 
that CETA operations did not cause political embarrass 
ment. In the two cases where the governors were the chief 
elected officials, their role was even less than that of mayors 
and county officials. Since decisionmaking was largely 
decentralized to associations of government in North 
Carolina and Utah, the systems may simply have been too 
amorphous for the governors to have means for participa 
tion. In Utah, the previous governor had resolved to shift 
from intense personal involvement to extreme decentraliza 
tion, and the incumbent governor had not reversed that 
trend. In North Carolina, CETA has often been a political 
issue, but no governor has been much concerned with its 
substance. Two-thirds of the North Carolina county com 
missioners involved would have preferred the abolition of 
CETA, which seemed also to be the preference of the Dallas 
city council.
The finding that the elected official's involvement is not 
crucial to effective CETA administration does not mean that 
the role does not exist. Elected officials were interested and 
evident where political sensitivities were at stake. They occa 
sionally overruled their directors after counting political 
costs. That meant, however, that their interest level was like 
ly to be high in relation to public service employment and 
low in relation to training.
The Staff Directors
The key decisionmaker in a local CETA system is the 
prime sponsor staff director. This official is most often the 
prime determinant in deciding how the local prime sponsor 
ship will respond to the local political, economic, and
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demographic conditions in the usage of CETA funds. From 
the 12 case studies, it is possible to derive a profile of the ef 
fective staff director. Yet there is no evidence linking that 
profile with outcomes of the program, as measured by 
employment and income gains of participants. Of the 12 
prime sponsors, four stood out as the most effective leaders, 
whereas two others were so new that there was inadequate 
evidence of their eventual effectiveness. What marked the 
leadership effectiveness of these four was their ability to con 
ceptualize the CETA system for their locality, derive a set of 
objectives consistent with the local economic and political 
mix, design a realistic program consistent with those objec 
tives, and then direct the human and financial resources of 
the prime sponsorship toward the achievement of those 
directives. The conceptualization might not be that which 
was in the minds of CETA congressional authors, and the 
objectives might not be those espoused by the national and 
regional offices. However, survival demands objectives and 
approaches that are realistic and desirable within the local 
context.
Considering the long-run interests of the CETA-eligible 
population, an effective program is one in which (1) ap 
propriate priorities are made for specified reasons among 
those eligible for service; (2) the barriers impeding the 
employment of individuals in the target groups are identified 
as clearly as available data make possible; (3) a mix of ser 
vices is explicitly selected which takes into account the needs 
of the target group, the capabilities of potential service 
deliverers, and the realities of the labor market; (4) service 
deliverers are chosen on the basis of their ability to deliver 
quality service; and, (5) the outcomes are as favorable as the 
state of the labor market and the nature of the employment 
barriers allow. The staff director must be sensitive to outside 
pressures and constructively accommodate the prime spon 
sor's objectives with the mix of political interests dominant
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on the local and national scene. Effectiveness in each situa 
tion must be judged in relation to alternatives that the prime 
sponsor might have adopted. Cross-prime-sponsor com 
parisons are of limited value because of the widely varying 
circumstances.
Baltimore, San Francisco, Penobscot County, and Tucson 
are examples of prime sponsors operating under strong and 
effective leadership. Sex certainly was not the determining 
factor. Two of the four more-effective leaders were women 
and two were men. All four have a clear vision of what they 
believe CETA objectives to be, how much can be ac 
complished within their political, economic, and budgetary 
constraints, and are aggressive in pursuing their aims.
The stability or the strength of the political leadership does 
not create the staff leadership. Only Baltimore of the four 
cited prime sponsors could claim an elected chief executive 
concerned enough with the employment and training arena 
to contribute to the creation of a leader in his own image. 
The San Francisco staff director had served under three 
mayors, none of whom were especially enamored of CETA 
or deeply involved with it. The Penobscot director served 
under a corporate leadership of nine county commissioners, 
none of whom loaned substantial strength to the CETA 
operation. One Tucson mayor spanned the entire CETA ex 
perience, supported his staff director, but did not involve 
himself in CETA affairs. Except in Baltimore, the chief 
elected official never added to or subtracted from the effec 
tiveness of the staff director. The Baltimore staff director 
could undoubtedly carry the load by herself but has been aid 
ed by the strengths of her mayor.
On the other hand, political leaders established a climate 
in North Carolina and Dallas, Texas in which no strong 
leader could have or would have persisted. Eight successive 
directors served the former, usually until abruptly removed.
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The pattern of the latter was to view the role as a temporary 
assignment to be moved beyond as soon as possible. In other 
cases, the political environment was essentially neutral.
Leadership can drag a program down as well as build it 
up. Both the Utah and Seattle prime sponsors began under 
nationally recognized leadership and their programs were 
considered among the best in the nation. The original Utah 
leadership left when the governor backed away from support 
of a strongly centralized state program. The Seattle director 
left because he felt the Congress and the incoming ad 
ministration in 1977 was unduly restricting local autonomy. 
He has not been replaced by leaders of equal stature as the 
Seattle program subsided into mediocrity.
Concern has been expressed about the staff director's 
stability of tenure. However, these case studies should be 
reassuring. No strong and effective staff director was replac 
ed as a result of a lost election, though some were removed in 
internal political squabbles. On the other hand, those with 
effective leadership in the small group of cases have never ex 
perienced a change of political party in an election or have 
been protected by a consortium structure in which all of the 
principals did not change simultaneously.
Academic credentials appear to be irrelevant and ex 
perience seems to be paramount. All four of the most im 
pressive leaders preceded CETA passage in their manpower 
program involvement. Typically, the less-effective leaders 
were more recent entrants, leaving one to wonder whether 
experience built strength or only the strong survived.
Salary and job security are not the explanation of strong 
leadership, though they may often encourage its absence. 
CETA directors and staff seem more responsive to challenge 
than to salary. But why would an effective leader accept the 
CETA assignment? The rewards are totally in a sense of ser 
vice. CETA salaries are usually no more than and often less
58
than those for comparable jobs in state and local govern 
ments. Why would persons give up other alternatives to 
function in the unstable and uncertain world of CETA? The 
motivations appear primarily intrinsic and often seem to in 
volve a commitment to improve social conditions and con 
tribute to the alleviation of unemployment, poverty, and 
discrimination. The answer may have to come from a 
psychiatrist, but even in these cynical times dedicated people 
can still be found.
That leaves a conundrum: How can a program attract 
strong leadership? Must it remain a happy accident? The 
search must be for independent spirits with sound ad 
ministrative skills. They will always be scarce but not nonex 
istent. Ultimately, for a system to survive, the extrinsic 
motivations must be strengthened to support the intrinsic 
ones.
Staff
Conventional wisdom has it that one of CETA's major 
problems is the high turnover of prime sponsor staff. The 12 
case studies do not support that generalization. Of the 12, all 
but two, Dallas and North Carolina, had in fact experienced 
remarkable stability, considering the limited access to the 
customary devices for job security. In fact, the Dallas CETA 
staff were city merit-system employees and that seemed to 
contribute to, rather than minimize, turnover. Two prime 
sponsors, Montgomery County and Seattle, had each ex 
perienced a substantial one-time turnover consequent to 
changes in directors but had experienced staff stability 
before and after. Utah experienced a major turnover in the 
leadership of its pioneering state manpower planning effort, 
but that was on the eve of CETA passage and stability had 
prevailed since. All of the others had experienced continued 
stability in all of the key management and technical levels. 
Turnover of lower-level and nonpolicy staff occurred but did
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not significantly affect policy or operation. Possibly one ma 
jor contribution to staff stability has been the fact that over 
the first 6 years, CETA was a growth industry and able staff 
members had ample opportunity for upward mobility within 
the system.
Dallas reflected a hostile political environment where 
political leaders apparently wished that CETA went away, 
and at least on one occasion the city council narrowly 
defeated a proposal to refuse CETA funds. A CETA assign 
ment was just another job to staff who expected to be pro 
moted and transferred soon, and many were. There was no 
noticeable commitment to the CETA mission. North 
Carolina has suffered from fluctuating political perceptions 
of what CETA could and should be and failure of anyone to 
visualize a consistent and viable mission for the sprawling 
balance-of-state structure. Yet the high turnover was limited 
to the director with the staff experiencing no higher turnover 
than typical in state and local government.
On the other hand, stability existed in situations with and 
without merit-system protection, with low pay and high. 
Two situations seemed to contribute to staff stability: (1) ef 
fective staff directors and an organizational sense of mis 
sion—being part of an effective and committed organization 
was apparently attractive enough; and, (2) an abundant sup 
ply of the college-educated who depended upon CETA for 
scarce job opportunities. Utah and Ottawa County were ex 
amples. The living environment was attractive and there 
were few alternatives for college-educated people without 
technical and professional skills. That does not mean these 
staffs lacked competence. They were able people but without 
a notable sense of mission. Dependence of staff stability on 
leadership strength and agency commitment is in some ways 
a disappointing, though not surprising, finding. Putting in 
place higher salaries, job security, or a training program for 
staff development is much easier than finding and develop-
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ing competent leaders or generating from the top down a 
sense of mission.
Not turnover but accretion had been the staffing problem 
of the 12 prime sponsors. All the prime sponsors report rapid 
increases in staff following the passage of the Youth 
Employment and Demonstration Projects Act in 1977; it was 
not unusual for the prime sponsor staffs to increase fivefold 
or more within several months of enactment.
Advisory Councils
The case studies were reassuring as to the role and con 
tribution of the advisory councils mandated by CETA law, 
again in contrast to what has been reported from other 
CETA studies. In about half of the prime sponsors studied, 
staff followed the advice of the advisory councils on most 
issues. In fact, a council vote was considered the final word 
by several prime sponsor staffs. The conditions that divided 
the prime sponsors into two groups on this issue are instruc 
tive. The effective leaders seemed to put the greatest respon 
sibilities on their advisory councils, and advisory councils 
seemed to respond when they had decisionmaking power.
Councils did not generally work well where the CETA 
operations were spread beyond the local community lines, as 
in Ottawa County, North Carolina, and Utah. However, the 
Penobscot staff director had been able to develop a useful 
council role by having three councils, one for each county in 
the consortium, and some of the separate advisory councils 
to substate planning regions have worked effectively in 
North Carolina. Advisory councils also did little where their 
function was not considered important by the chief elected 
official and staff, or where their advice was ignored, or 
where little of significance was happening under CETA.
Council subcommittees were active in recommending the 
relative priority to be given to the various target groups and
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in reviewing and ranking program proposals, but had no 
means for judging quality by other than gross outcomes. 
They supplied a buffer for the staff in a politically sensitive 
function. They tended to show sound judgment and firmness 
in choosing and rewarding contractors and programs 
capable of demonstrated effectiveness, as measured by costs, 
placements, and other outcomes. They were not sufficiently 
knowledgeable to judge the quality of program content and 
conduct.
By design, the case studies paid little attention to youth 
programs and the youth advisory councils established by the 
1977 law. In general, it appears that these councils had not 
found a meaningful role, Private industry councils had a 
more programmatic than advisory role, but were relatively 
new when the case studies were prepared. A problem was the 
lack of rationale for three councils per prime sponsor. The 
Tucson model, which effectively combined the prime spon 
sor advisory council and the private industry council with the 
local economic development advisory council, seemed to 
have the most to offer.
A persisting controversy in CETA has been whether 
representatives of service delivery agencies should be allowed 
to serve on advisory councils, which make recommendations 
concerning choice among service delivery agencies. This con 
troversy involves particularly the job service and 
community-based organizations. To avoid conflict of in 
terest, federal regulations forbid representatives of organiza 
tions that deliver services to vote on decisions affecting their 
own funding, but membership on advisory councils is not 
forbidden. Most of the prime sponsors studied had taken 
steps to limit the proportion of service deliverers among ad 
visory council membership, and at least one relegated them 
to nonvoting status. However, the restriction did not prevent 
the representatives of service deliverers, particularly private 
contractors, to affect decisions by lobbying council members
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and elected officials. The job service and the public educa 
tion officials were sometimes not sufficiently interested to 
pursue a role aggressively, or in other cases appeared to con 
sider such pursuit demeaning.
In general, private service deliverers, by aggressive lobby 
ing, were able to preserve roles for themselves as long as they 
were at least moderately effective in performing their respon 
sibilities. Eventually, all the prime sponsors in the cases 
studied tended to "bite the bullet" and dumped clearly inef 
fective contractors, despite political pressure. Marginal con 
tractors, however, were often continued rather than do 
political battle over debatable issues.
The Feds
The prime sponsor perception of the federal role in CETA 
ranged from highly to mildly negative. Few favorable com 
ments were heard concerning any federal decision. That 
many of the decisions complained about were products of 
congressional action, not the U.S. Department of Labor, did 
not appear to be recognized by many at the prime sponsor 
level. However, it appeared to be universal judgment that the 
department's regulation writers tended to compound con 
gressional restrictions. The national office was perceived as 
having no concept of the impact of its administrative deci 
sions at the service delivery level. Meddling threats—rarely 
carried out, but disruptive of operations—rather than 
technical assistance appeared to the prime sponsors to be the 
preferred remedy for any apparent transgression.
Judgments as to national office competence and intentions 
were no less harsh in Labor Department regional offices than 
in the offices of the prime sponsors: "They don't know what 
they want or what life is like outside of Washington." A par 
ticular complaint of regional staff and a source of derision 
from prime sponsor staff was that any subscriber of the na-
63
tional reporting services knew of Washington decisions days 
to weeks before the word reached officially the regional of 
fices, and the latter could not (or would not) take action until 
informed through formal channels. Then, higher regional 
levels were perceived as compounding the delay by rewriting 
the national directives into regional directives before sending 
them on to the field, often, it was claimed, distorting the 
meaning and compounding the confusion in the process.
One must interpret such complaints with care. It is to be 
expected that subordinate agencies and staff will complain 
about those who set the rules and hold the purse strings. It is 
also to be expected that national oversight agencies will con 
sider the subordinate as insubordinate and incompetent, 
especially to the extent those who oversee have more respon 
sibility than authority. Nevertheless, there does appear to be 
a real problem in contrast with the past. In pre-CETA days, 
a substantial number of federal operatives at regional and 
national levels had "come up" through the federal-state 
employment service and through state vocational education 
agencies, which were also the major providers of federally 
mandated services. No important national office positions 
are currently held by former members of prime sponsor 
staffs. The same is true, by and large, at the regional level, 
though a few are beginning to emerge at the lower levels 
there. Thus, the federal staff is responsible for functions 
they have never performed and that are foreign to their ex 
periences. When the alternatives are remedial technical 
assistance or threats, they are incapable of offering the 
former and resort to the latter.
For the prime sponsor, the visible test of federal com 
petence is the regional office field representative—in CETA 
parlance the "fed rep." This individual, who is expected to 
provide onsite supervision and technical assistance is at the 
bottom of the regional office hierarchy, rarely has any 
previous relevant experience, and is given little helpful train-
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ing. In the 12 case studies, only one "fed rep" gained 
praise—from the North Carolina observer—as a consistently 
positive influence on the prime sponsor. Two other prime 
sponsors felt encouraged that after a long series of bad ex 
periences, new fed reps appeared more helpful than those of 
the past. Significantly, in one of the latter cases, the federal 
representative had come to that post after several years with 
a competent prime sponsor. Otherwise, the strongest praise 
was "he doesn't bother us very much."
After North Carolina, the most sanguine of the prime 
sponsors in their attitudes toward the fed reps and the 
regional offices were the Baltimore, San Francisco, and Utah 
prime sponsor directors. The first two both had the security 
on the local scene and the reputation nationally to feel in 
vulnerable to regional criticism. Both also were sufficiently 
close to the national scene to realize that Congress and the 
Washington officialdom were the source of unwise decisions 
rather than the regional staff. In Utah, the state CETA of 
fice shielded the associations of government, responsible for 
program operations, from direct federal contact.
Just where the balance of truth lies in the federal-local and 
national-regional relationship may be difficult to ascertain, 
but the relationship is clearly not a productive one. The 
Dallas case study provides a summary of intergovernmental 
relations that characterizes well the frustrations of the cur 
rent situation.
A study made from the prime-sponsor and national-office 
levels can provide little insight into the congressional deci- 
sionmaking process. However, it may be useful to contrast 
apparent congressional perceptions of the local decision- 
makers with those gained by knowledgeable observers mak 
ing indepth studies. Common complaints against Congress 
included: (1) overloading the system with too much public 
service employment too fast before the prime sponsor system
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was securely in place; (2) adding to that overload a continu 
ing stream of complex new programs; (3) compounding pro 
gram complexity by the detailed 1978 legislative re 
quirements; and, (4) being invariably late with its appropria 
tions.
The latter presents a serious obstacle to businesslike opera 
tions. A prime sponsor must plan for a year's service delivery 
without ever knowing within even a reasonable range what 
the funding levels will be. To have contracts in place by Oc 
tober 1, the start of the federal fiscal year, a prime sponsor 
must begin the planning process by January or February. 
The Labor Department promises budget estimates and na 
tional policy constraints by May 15 but almost never delivers 
on that promise. When the funding estimates arrive, they are 
no better than a prime sponsor could do from reading the na 
tional reporting services.
The Labor Department appropriation is almost never in 
place before the start of the fiscal year, with continuing 
resolutions governing for one, two, or three quarters or even 
through an entire fiscal year. But that is not the end of fiscal 
uncertainty. Deobligations of unspent funds make 
redistribution possible throughout the year. New congres 
sional initiatives often provide supplemental appropriations. 
The Labor Department persistently vacillates over whether 
and how much of the carryover funds from the previous year 
the prime sponsor will be allowed to spend. Only after the 
fact can the prime sponsor determine how much money has 
been available.
Planning and Performance
This does not mean that CETA planning does not exist. 
Planning is the management function that sets the direction 
for future activities of the organization. Like Moliere's hero 
who spoke prose all his life and did not know it, prime spon-
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sors must and do plan whether they know it or not. But it is 
contingency planning, fraught with uncertainty and laden 
with frustration. In addition to the delays in key data 
elements, the compliance review system and the geographical 
scope of the prime sponsorship present formidable obstacles 
to prime sponsor planning.
Ironically, the formal planning document submitted to the 
regional office may have little relation to the prime sponsor's 
realistic intention. A persistent complaint is that the Labor 
Department denies itself any meaningful oversight of pro 
gram substance by fractionalizing the programs. At the 
regional office, pieces of the local planning document are 
distributed for checking on compliance, but not for its 
coherence or substance. It is inevitably approved condi 
tionally and then frequently rejected for some procedural 
technicality. Meanwhile, the prime sponsor's real plan has 
been written into the contract documents with service 
deliverers, which specify who is to be served, what services 
are to be delivered, and what the performance criteria are to 
be.
The Montgomery County case study provides an example 
of a situation in which the regional office failed to take of 
ficial notice year after year not only of poor plans but also of 
poor performance. As long as the form was observed, the 
substance was ignored. Only when the prime sponsor failed 
to spend its full allocation because it was incapable of serv 
ing the more-disadvantaged population mandated by the 
1978 amendments did the regional office blow the whistle. 
Then, rather than offer technical assistance to solve the pro 
blems, the response was a punitive restriction of funding 
flows, which made planning and administration even more 
difficult and certainly did not help the population entitled to 
the services.
The experience seems not to be uncommon. The regional 
office reviews annually the operations of each prime spon-
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sor. The published "report cards" offer a revealing assess 
ment of what is deemed important by the national ad 
ministrators. The fiscal 1980 Title IIBC review revealed that 
28 prime sponsors experienced "serious problems," involv 
ing "major barriers to the accomplishment of program 
goals." Seattle and Ottawa were included in the list. The lat 
ter rural county was found guilty of not assigning a staff per 
son to perform EEO functions—not discriminatory ac 
tion—and for not having taken "corrective action regarding 
outreach, training and advancement of the handicapped." 
Seattle was cited for having "difficulty in operating the 
eligibility verification system . . . ." Nationally, training 
quantity was mentioned as a source of difficulties in five 
cases. Of these, three prime sponsors had not spent 15 per 
cent of Title IID funds on training. Another was faulted for 
inadequate IIB performance reporting; and the fifth prime 
sponsor was apparently guilty of underutilizing vocational 
education setaside funds. By comparison, inadequate EEO 
compliance systems (again, not necessarily lack of actual 
performance) were mentioned nine times, and 21 of the 28 
sponsors were cited for inadequate monitoring or eligibility 
determination systems. The quality of training was not men 
tioned as a serious problem for any prime sponsor.
The priority concerns of the Department of Labor are 
reflected in the point values assigned in the 1981 assessment 
package for IIBC:
Management
Independent monitoring unit 6 
Eligibility determination, verifica 
tion, and tracking 6 
Financial management 8 
Planning (composition of council
and process, only) 4 
Subagent management 8 





Recruitment and selection of 
participants (says nothing 
about assignment) 7 
Assessment and employability
development plans 7 
Job development and transition
services 7 
Services to youth 4 
Program activities (assess two 
categories) 18 
OJT (9) 
Classroom training (9) 
Upgrading and retraining (9) 
Work experience (9) 










The message the prime sponsor receives is that quality, 
especially of training, as well as long-run results, has a 
relatively low priority and may not even enter into the deter 
mination of the report cards that the feds issue to the prime 
sponsors. The possibility of negative local publicity is more 
of a driving force than any available rewards for good 
management or quality programming. Yet advance in 
dicators of training quality are not readily available or easily 
derived. To prescribe input measures would limit diversity. 
Ultimately, long-run outcomes will have to be the basis for 
judgment.
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Geographical Scope and Economies of Scale
The original CETA legislation provided a bonus to en 
courage adjacent jurisdictions to combine into labor- 
marketwide planning units. It is not working and the studies 
document some of the reasons. One is simply the value of the 
incentive. Tucson City and Pima County, Arizona lost less 
than 2 percent of their combined budget when they split up 
as a consortium. It was not a sufficient threat to dissuade the 
county supervisors from seeking control of their propor 
tionate share of the remaining funds. Money is power, and 
the exercise of power is what politics is about. If consortia 
are desirable, the incentives must be commensurate with 
their worth. Baltimore County and Snohomish County (ad 
jacent to Seattle) both withdrew from consortia even though 
surrounding counties remained in. The benefits of consortia 
were not enough to outweigh the attraction of autonomy. 
The Labor Department claims to be neutral as to the choice 
between consortia and individual prime sponsors, but the 
labor market planning concept would require positive en 
couragement of consortia.
San Francisco, Seattle, Worcester, Baltimore and In 
dianapolis came nearest to having jurisdiction over entire 
labor markets. The results seemed positive for the first two, 
but of no particular significance for the others, which made 
no special efforts to adapt their operations to special local 
conditions. Tucson and Montgomery County had jurisdic 
tion over less than a labor market. The loss did not seem 
serious in the case of Tucson, which drew enrollees from the 
city but prepared them for jobs in the suburbs as well. 
However, it unduly limited Montgomery County, which had 
to compete for access to jobs, training institutions, and 
employers with other prime sponsors in a complex 
metropolis encompassing the District of Columbia and a 
dozen political jurisdictions in Virginia and Maryland. The
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Penobscot consortium administered jointly and planned 
separately for each of three rural counties, and the results 
were impressive. Ottawa lacked training institutions and a 
budget to offer adquate training.
The two statewide operations made no attempt to plan for 
or administer programs for the areas covered. They 
delegated most planning and administration to local associa 
tions of government, which left too few and fragmented 
resources to obtain optimal results. Apathy at the highest 
state levels appears to be the primary explanation for the 
unimpressive performance by Utah. The North Carolina 
balance of state just seemed too massive and complex to be 
manageable, even had there been the will to do so.
Planning and related decisionmaking is another matter. A 
state, at least those as geographically large and diverse as 
North Carolina and Utah, is not a labor market. No single 
plan is likely to rationalize such diversity. Since the balance- 
of-state concept eliminates the major employment centers, 
employment and training planning is unlikely to produce a 
basis for sound decisions. Breaking up the less populous 
areas into labor market watersheds surrounding major 
employment centers might be more effective. Such an ap 
proach could probably be accomplished with adequate con 
sortium bonuses and encouragement, T>ut state staffs would 
have to develop the necessary expertise to provide sound 
guidance.
Related to the issue of geographic scope are potential 
economies of scale in staffing, planning, evaluation, 
management information systems, public relations and other 
functions. In 1980, 77 percent of prime sponsors received 
less than $5 million in Title IIB funds, 75 percent had less 
than $3 million of Title IID funds, and 82 percent received 
less than $5 million from Title VI. Of the remaining prime 
sponsors having higher funding, half were balance-of-state
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prime sponsors with some of the problems noted above. 
More aggressive promotion of consortia would help meet the 
economy-of-scale criteria as well as further the concept of 
labor market planning.
The Decisions
So much for the decisionmakers and the decisionmaking 
process. What can be said about the quality of the decisions 
themselves? As noted, those can be generally categorized as: 
Whom to serve; what services to deliver; and, to whom to 
assign service delivery responsibility.
Whom to Serve?
The whom to serve decision is resolved through an interac 
tion of law, regulation, politics, and objective judgments, 
probably in that order. The legislation confines eligibility to 
the "economically disadvantaged," representing a persistent 
tradeoff between concentrating resources on those most in 
need at the cost of imposing a negative image on some pro 
grams. Department of Labor regulations do not direct 
priorities among the "significant segments" eligible to be 
served by CETA, nor do the feds direct priorities for fund 
allocations for the groups who should share in the distribu 
tion of those funds. Among the prime sponsors studied, the 
aggressiveness and power of target-group members in the 
pursuit of services was a major factor in determining the 
racial and ethnic mix of trainees.
Since they were a higher proportion of the CETA-eligible 
population, minority groups were overrepresented in all 
cases. However, how high their enrollment was in relation to 
their proportions of the eligible population seemed to be 
dependent primarily upon the effectiveness of the organiza 
tions representing each group. CETA staffs seemed to re 
spond to groups that applied pressure, thereby leaving less
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resources for those that did not. In Worcester, for example, 
black enrollments in IIB exceeded the proportion in the 
population by a factor of 10. Since no one represented the 
nonminority poor, they received less than a proportionate 
share of the resources. Seattle, early in its CETA history, 
designed a system based on relative need and probability of 
success, but the effort was abandoned with changes of staff.
In most cases, local chapters of national organizations car 
ried the battle for allocation. For poorly organized groups 
such as native Americans and, in some locations, Asian 
refugees, other organizations with service-delivery ambitions 
often pursued the fight. San Francisco is a unique example 
of a CETA scene dominated by homegrown community- 
based organizations without national affiliation—as 
evidenced by the success of gays and lesbians, as well as 
foreign language groups, in gaining special attention. Ag 
gressive and sophisticated, these local CBOs have been ex 
traordinarily effective both politically and as service 
deliverers, and the system has responded accordingly. Seattle 
also had effective homegrown CBOs, but they were less 
numerous and, therefore, less obvious than in San Fran 
cisco. Advisory councils, in most prime sponsorships, were 
involved in conflicts over the distribution of slots among the 
eligible populations, and settled potential political conflicts 
in a setting shielded from the public gaze.
Youth everywhere obtained a high proportion of the 
available program resources. However, this was not a func 
tion of organizational pressures, but of legislation and 
federal regulation. Youth had all of Title IV to themselves 
plus a federal regulatory requirement that the proportion of 
youth prevailing in Title II before the passage of the Youth 
Employment and Demonstration Projects Act of 1977 be 
maintained. Since youth unemployment had been recognized 
at the local level as a serious problem before the passage of 
the youth legislation, prime sponsors had been allocating
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resources heavily in that direction. Most were therefore lock 
ed in with around one-half of their IIB slots reserved for 
youth. In general, the experience had been that expensive in 
vestments in training for youth below age 18 were not 
justified by their placement and retention rates. Therefore, 
the tendency was to relegate them to work experience pro 
grams, absorbing IIB resources that would probably have 
otherwise been spent on training.
There was a wide range of responses to selectivity by 
education. Areas like Utah and California with relatively 
high proportions of high school graduates tended not to use 
education as a selection criterion except in occupations 
where course content or licensure seemed to require educa 
tion. In contrast, Baltimore, with a relatively low average of 
high school completers, was the most selective for its 
classroom training programs. The intent was to train those 
most likely to profit from the expenditure, relegating the 
less-educated to a work experience program containing its 
own remedial training components. As a result, classroom 
training concentrated on a higher level of skills. In general, 
however, the tendency was to spread the training across the 
educational range, referring the high school graduates in 
dividually to ongoing vocational and technical training pro 
grams and to OJT, with the lesser-educated concentrated in 
class-size projects. Given the additional need and cost of 
remedial education and the propensity of this population to 
drop out, this policy tended to restrict the deficiently 
educated population to short-term, entry-level preparation.
In line with legislative requirements, it appears that prime 
sponsors carried out the intent of the law and drew enrollees 
from low-income families, although violations occasionally 
occurred and were played up in the media. With its generally 
favorable labor market, Dallas was most notable in concen 
trating its CETA training efforts on an extremely hard-to- 
employ population. It was also apparent throughout the
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range of prime sponsors that the causes of disadvantage were 
many and that a wide range of competence and motivation 
existed among the eligible populations. It was no surprise to 
find that immigrants were most likely to combine income 
eligibility with potential for labor market success. It takes 
more careful screening to find that combination among the 
broader CETA population, but there are people who need 
only a boost to become economically independent.
The Service Mix
The prime sponsor has discretionary authority to allocate 
Title IIBC funds for training, work experience, or supportive 
services. None of the 12 prime sponsors utilized all the train 
ing funds allocated under the public service employment 
titles. Vocational education allocations through the gover 
nors' offices were a significant factor in promoting training, 
but no use was being made of the upgrading options of Title 
IIC. Since no separate funds were available for that purpose, 
there was no incentive to use the existing pool for upgrading 
the employed in preference to training the unemployed. The 
targeted jobs tax credit was also not popular in the 12 areas 
studied, though the Penobscot private industry council pro 
moted it aggressively during the summer of 1980. Lack of 
understanding by employers was the usual explanation of the 
neglect.
The need for minimum reading ability and arithmetic 
comprehension made it essential to include adult basic 
education as an integral part of IIB training. The flood of 
immigrants into many of the jurisdictions was the major fac 
tor for the growth of ESL. The need to provide a transition 
service for PSE enrollees as shrinking funds led to termina 
tions, as well as the low costs and high placement rates 
associated with job search training, served as the motivations 
for the addition of that component.
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Throughout, however, the prime sponsors, while declaring 
their preference for employability development, seemed to 
feel obligated to maintain balance among the full range of 
alternative services. They were under more pressure to 
spread the funds among familiar service deliverers than to 
adjust the service mix either to client need or to 
demonstrated effectiveness. Few prime sponsors had 
developed the technical capability to defend any other alter 
native.
Most of the prime sponsors tended to be more responsive 
to enrollee need than to labor market demand. Baltimore 
was the notable exception. Through an extensive system of 
employer advisory councils, demand was determined and 
training planned accordingly. The underlying rationale was 
that there were more eligible applicants than training slots 
and that no one can profit from training in an occupation 
that is not in demand by employers. Therefore, the CETA- 
eligible population is best served when employers are best 
served.
The high proportion of clerical and health care occupa 
tions in the training mix of all prime sponsors was probably 
both a symptom and an explanation of occupational choice. 
Since such jobs were available, planners tended to choose 
those occupations in making training decisions. However, 
the high proportion of women applicants also pushed plan 
ners in the same direction. Efforts to place women in non- 
traditional jobs were few and limited to special projects for 
that purpose. Little success could be claimed. Training for 
male oriented jobs seemed to be more strongly supply- 
centered. That is, there appeared to be a greater tendency to 
search out occupations in which men might be trained and 
placed because there were fewer occupations where the de 
mand for men was obvious.
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The Service Deliverers
Prime sponsors must choose among a variety of deliverers 
of a variety of services. This report is concerned only with 
the choice among deliverers of training-related services. For 
classroom training, the prime sponsor usually has few op 
tions. No CETA prime sponsor has the necessary funding to 
create training insitutions. If a skill center is left over from 
MDTA days, it is used. If not, or in addition, individual 
referral occurs wherever there are institutions willing and 
able to accept CETA eligibles at reasonable cost. Where 
there are CBOs with any political clout, they are used unless 
they prove to be incompetent. Use of for-profit firms 
depends upon their costs and their aggressiveness. Never 
theless, within the limits of the availability of institutions, 
the studies demonstrate that prime sponsors do drop in 
competent service deliverers and continue on a small scale 
and at the margin to add and test new deliverers. They re 
spond to political pressures, but persistently they tend to ex 
pand use of the most cost-effective and shrink use of the op 
posite (to the extent they have dependable measures), all the 
while sensitive to the need to maintain diversity in offerings 
and institutions.
The most marked changes have been the strong shift to in 
dividual referral and to private proprietary schools. Another 
marked change has been the enlarged training role of 
organizations that are not schools. For the most part, this is 
both a cause and a consequence of the growth of nonskill 
training. Community-based organizations and consulting 
firms live or die by their ability to sell their services. They 
tend to be much more aggressive than tax supported institu 
tions or proprietary schools, which appeal to a broad 
population. They push their wares by resorting to lobbying 
and salesmanship, thereby expanding their role beyond what 
sheer competence would have won for them.
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The on-the-job component has undergone little change. 
Few employers have ever been interested in participation. An 
intermediary is necessary—a job service office, a 
community-based organization, or a prime sponsor 
itself—to contact employers and persuade them to accept the 
subsidy of one-half the enrollee's wages, which has become 
standard. Favorable responses generally come from small, 
struggling employers to whom the subsidy is attractive and 
larger firms who use CETA OJT as a recruiting source to 
meet affirmative action requirements. Whether the establish 
ment of private industry councils will be able to generate 
more OJT remains problematic. Based on early experience, 
there is little reason for optimism.

5. Lessons Learned
The purpose of the case studies was to gain insight into the 
CETA system, not to evaluate the performance of the 12 
prime sponsors. The studies illustrate a fascinating diversity. 
Penobscot showed the co-existence of strong staff leader 
ship, minor political involvement, effective advisory par 
ticipation, a weak economy, and limited service options, in 
ducing the prime sponsor to expand its training capacity. 
Worcester was characterized by prosaic leadership in a 
revitalized high-demand economy, but with a modest place 
ment record despite the favorable economic environment. 
Baltimore offered strong political and staff leadership, 
responsible for holding on to a consortium and making good 
use of generally mediocre service institutions in a redevelop 
ing economy. Montgomery County was in transition from 
strong but misdirected leadership to a more promising com 
bination in an economy of plentiful jobs usually requiring 
credentials.
North Carolina had a sprawling service area and diverse 
administrative problems too challenging for its politically 
burdened leadership, but was helped by the availability of 
sound training institutions. Dallas had a most favorable 
economic situation with a potential for becoming a CETA 
showcase, but was thwarted by political leadership that just 
wished CETA would go away. Indianapolis was putting 
itself back together after an initially mismanaged and dif 
ficult period, but was still operating at high unit costs. It 
relied almost totally on individual referral to community and 
private colleges to do so. Ottawa County lacked the training
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institutions to provide a comprehensive program. Utah was 
characterized by unaggressive leadership, but a strong 
economy and sound institutional support shored up the 
agency.
Tucson had strong continuous leadership and sound in 
stitutional support in a low-wage economy. Despite effective 
training, it was unable to demonstrate success measured by 
earnings gains for lack of evaluation followup. San Fran 
cisco had enjoyed strong staff leadership over the years, was 
highly politicized, but by organizations that were also 
capable service deliverers. It had a favorable job market for 
women but not for men. Seattle had based a strong, but ex 
pensive, program on individual assessment by the state 
employment service, individual referral to community col 
leges by one CBO, and classroom training at a skill center 
run by another CBO.
The System in Capsule
To the extent these prime sponsors are representative, the 
CETA system clearly can and does serve its clienteles 
reasonably well and has generally adapted its operations to 
local social, political, and economic conditions. Yet a 
number of shortcomings reduce the total payoff. There is 
considerable operational planning in the use of each year's 
budget, but not much strategic planning relating the use of 
CETA resources to the broad and long-term needs and ob 
jectives of the areas served. However, the uncertain annual 
funding process makes the operational planning also con 
tingency planning, as prime sponsors are forced to live with 
uncertainty and adapt to changing priorities directed from 
Washington.
Political and administrative pressures lead to minimizing 
per-enrollee costs, despite evidence that longer-duration 
training tends to pay off better than that of shorter duration.
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Based on immediate postenrollment observations, results of 
work experience compare favorably with those from training 
programs, yet national longitudinal data disclose that the 
former has long-run negative, and the latter positive, results 
in cost-benefit terms. OJT payoff is generally highest in the 
long run but the prime sponsor is rarely aware of this fact. 
The available evidence of short-run social benefits and in 
dividual gains is not sufficient to overcome marketing dif 
ficulties and to attract employers.
Local decisionmakers are prone to perceive the weaknesses 
in the system as being primarily federal in origin. It is true 
that the federal managers of CETA lack the necessary exper 
tise to provide guidance and technical assistance to prime 
sponsors and have tended to emphasize bureaucratic pro 
cesses rather than encourage creativity and provide substan 
tive leadership. A more concerted effort is needed to ex 
change federal and prime sponsor staff to familiarize each 
with the other's roles and problems. It is also essential that 
persons with training background be brought into the deci- 
sionmaking system at both levels.
As the intergovernmental system is presently structured 
and functioning, the regional office has no meaningful role 
to play in the system. Its personnel have little policy discre 
tion, even if they knew what was best for the program. 
Regional offices are merely a poor link in the communica 
tion chain from the national to the local level since there are 
so many routes for information in both directions that 
bypass the regional office.
At the top levels of the Labor Department's Employment 
and Training Administration, CETA administration began 
under the guidance of leaders who understood and were 
committed to the philosophy of the system. National leader 
ship dissolved into confusion and was just beginning to get 
itself together again when the 1980 election results introduc-
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ed uncertainty not only about the future directions of the 
program, but its very survival.
The Congress appears to be committed to local decision- 
making only in its rhetoric. It wants to handle the helm and 
leave the locals to respond, disregarding the administrative 
consequences of its constantly changing priorities.
Local Staff Development
The key determinant of CETA effectiveness is the strength 
and ability of the prime sponsor staff director. The attention 
of the elected officials can never be held for long, and when 
they do focus on the employment and training programs 
their primary interest is to avoid political embarrassment. 
Capable staff is essential but an effective leader will attract 
and develop a competent and stable staff. However, the 
measure of a leader in the prime-sponsor context is the abili 
ty to accommodate a wide range of diverse social, political, 
economic, and personal interests, not all of which are consis 
tent with maximum payoffs in terms of employment and in 
come gains for the CETA client population.
Of course, good management can be assisted to become 
better, and staff development can be institutionalized to 
speed and improve its effectiveness. Labor Department 
regional training centers have been useful occasionally in 
providing logistical support for recordkeeping and com 
pliance with (frequently unnecessary) regulations, but they 
have not been conducive to sound management, planning, 
and policymaking. Universities, on their own initiative or in 
response to institutional grants, have put together degree 
granting programs for preparing entrants to the field, but 
opportunities during recent years have been too plentiful in 
human resource activities, especially in managerial roles, for 
large numbers to enter the CETA system. Even where they
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did, preentry preparation can never obviate the need for on- 
site staff development.
The National Association of Counties' manpower unit has 
played a significant leadership and staff development role, as 
have the national mayoral and gubernatorial associations to 
a lesser degree. Attachment to these local and state associa 
tions has impeded the emergence of a CETA-wide profes 
sional association, which could set professional standards 
and promote their attainment. There is badly needed a 
mechanism through which experience can be shared, 
technical assistance can be provided, and staff can be 
developed by the only ones who know how—those who have 
been through the mill and have learned their lessons.
Experimentation is currently underway of a prime 
sponsor-to-prime sponsor technical assistance and training 
system. This approach has promise for training prime spon 
sor managers. The rising stars, trained by effective 
managers, are the most promising source for leadership in 
lagging prime sponsorships. The process already works to 
some degree. Efforts to institutionalize such relationships 
should be encouraged.
The federal officialdom needs training no less than the 
prime sponsor staffs. The feds are caught between Congress 
and the locals without the competence to respond adequately 
to either. There is need for a more effective focus for joining 
key prime sponsor staff with the federal executive staff in 
setting overall national directions consistent with local 
challenges. Only a national/local consensus on mission goals 
and objectives can serve as a lasting framework for local 
decisionmaking and as a basis for assessing prime sponsor 
performance. The compliance issues could be presented to a 
CETA-wide professional leadership group who could design 
means of accomplishing the goals without interference with 
performance. The Employment and Training Administra-
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tion sponsors a CETA director's work group which is con 
vened as a sounding board. Orchestrated by the feds, the 
local administrators are invited to listen to what is going to 
happen, but are not invited to suggest alternatives. Congress, 
too, could be more effectively educated and influenced by 
such an organized body. There is need to work upon and 
develop the inherent common professional interests that ex 
ist between national and local staff, substituting it for the 
adversary relationship which has emerged during the CETA 
years.
Curriculum Development
Sorely missed on the CETA scene is the federally con 
tracted but privately operated technical assistance and staff 
training system, which once developed and disseminated cur 
ricula throughout the MDTA system and trained local staff. 
Times have changed, and different arrangements are needed 
to take the place of this defunct institution. A possibility to 
be explored is a computer-assisted and computer-managed 
instruction being successfully promoted in general education 
and in Job Corps centers. Terminals linked to national or 
regional sources could offer access to common curricula in 
remedial education, English as a second language, and voca 
tional instruction related to "hands-on" training. But that 
would meet only part of the need. Person-to-person relation 
ships are also essential. Whatever approach proves best, 
there is a crying need for a positive technical-assistance-and- 
guidance approach to replace the adversary relationship, 
which has grown between prime sponsor and federal agen 
cies.
Such a system need not reduce local autonomy and discre 
tion. Unlike regulations handed down from above, technical 
assistance is neither arbitrary nor compulsory. Prime spon 
sors remain free to accept or reject. But given the hunger for
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leadership and direction, most prime sponsors would accept 
help without considering it a threat.
Management Information
Related is the need for a common, computer-linked 
management information system. Prime sponsors could feed 
in day-to-day operational data allowing constant monitoring 
of the system's inputs and outputs without the burden of 
useless reports. Performance standards and records of in 
dividual progress could both be incorporated. The local 
operators could call up national comparative data to test 
their own performance, as well as storing their own informa 
tion for future recall. The same facilities could serve the cur 
riculum and management functions at lower long-run costs 
than the current inadequate information flows.
Structure and Planning
Judging from the 12 cases, prime sponsors cannot respond 
solely to the needs of either the local labor markets or the 
CETA clientele. Rather, there must be a delicate balancing 
of the political needs of the chief elected official, the direc 
tives of the federal funding source, the needs and desires of 
the eligible population, the demands of the organizations 
that represent (or claim to represent) the clients, the 
marketing pressures from the alternative service deliverers, 
the limited cooperation available from employers, and the 
personal predilections of the prime sponsor staff. Judged, 
however, against the complexities of the environment, the 
fact that 12 prime sponsors could respond with acts that do 
accommodate the diverse, and frequently conflicting, in 
terests and still achieve benefits that exceed the costs, is little 
short of remarkable. But that does not deny that there are a
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number of potential improvements suggested by the data, 
which can provide promise of improved performance 
without denial of any legitimate interest.
The key problem remains that of setting priorities among 
competing objectives in an uncertain environment with 
numerous special interest groups demanding attention. Only 
strong, well-trained, and secure management can meet this 
challenge. Elected officials seem to play a limited role, but 
since the alternative within a decentralized system is a rigid 
and arbitrary bureaucratization, there appears to be no bet 
ter alternative than the present delegation of authority. 
When given the opportunity, advisory councils can become 
active and positive forces. However, three separate advisory 
councils are too much of a good thing and there is a need for 
consolidation. More important is the need to organize prime 
sponsors to cover complete labor markets rather than on the 
basis of a fragmented political jurisdiction. The consortium 
incentives need strengthening until they outweigh the 
political temptations to fragmentation.
The state level organization is inherently troublesome. 
While state participation in policymaking makes sense, most 
states are too diverse for the planning and delivery of ser 
vices to local labor markets. The balance of state is a residual 
concept with no rationale to support it and every experience 
to cause doubt about its effectiveness. An alternative ap 
proach might be to assign states the responsibility for helping 
political subdivisions to deliver CETA services on a labor- 
market basis. This would require subdividing states into 
areas surrounding major concentrations of population for 
program delivery, but maintaining a state role in coordina 
tion among these units. No simple block grant can encom 
pass the complex relationships between local and state 
governments.
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A Two-Tiered Training System
There are and will probably always be more eligible disad- 
vantaged workers willing to be trained in a stipended pro 
gram for low-level entry occupations than there will ever be 
funding to support. There will also be a continuing flow of 
those who, at low per capita cost, can be made more 
employable by remedial education, English as a second 
language, and job search training. Many of those may not 
have the capability, endurance or resources to undergo more 
extensive training for high-level occupations. Yet there is 
evidence that there are many within the currently eligible 
population who could and would profit from the more ex 
tensive training, and at higher social benefit-cost returns.
Involved are two sets of institutions, or at least two sets of 
institutional services. Some eligible enrollees are capable of 
undertaking occupational training. Others need a remedial 
stage to prepare for the advanced training. These latter, as 
well as those only capable of entry-level work, need the 
variety of supportive services described earlier, which are not 
readily available in mainstream training institutions.
There should be a two-tiered system. The system would 
provide short-term remedial and entry-level training accom 
panied by supportive services available to all who need them. 
This entry/remedial stage could be affected either by 
specialized or mainstream institutions. The equivalent of 1 
academic year, 36 weeks, should be generally sufficient for 
this stage. The second-tier of the system would offer the op 
portunity for extended career training to those initially ready 
for it or who successfully complete the entry level. It would 
be offered in mainstream institutions and would require only 
an additional year's tuition to implement the 2 years now 
legal, but never provided.
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Closely related is training allowance reform. Training 
allowances at the minimum wage level distort the incentives 
of training participants. Who is enrolled for the training and 
who for the stipend? Training allowance might be divided in 
to three components: (1) reimbursement of training-related 
expenses; (2) a subsistence stipend based on family income; 
and (3) a motivational component based on performance.
On-the-Job Training
OJT is the most effective of all for those who have access 
to it. Increasing that access depends upon attracting more 
employers by reducing their reluctance to hire CETA-eligible 
applicants. Aggressive marketing that places the enrollee on 
a "tryout" basis should be explored to encourage employers 
to hire disadvantaged applicants. During this period of 3 to 6 
months, the prime sponsor would provide a stipend to the 
employer in lieu of wages.
Future Directions
The CETA training activity, in general, seems to be an ef 
fective amalgam of the MDTA inheritance, the local voca 
tional training system, the inputs of community-based 
organizations, and the coordination and direction provided 
by local and state prime sponsors. It is strong in some places 
and weak in others, but there is no reason to think any cen 
trally derived pattern could work more effectively than the 
local designs. It is not the whip but guidance that prime 
sponsors need. There is no indication of reluctance to accept 
knowledgeable and positive direction. Technical assistance 
from successful prime sponsors could strengthen the locally 
weak systems. Some staff development and technical 
assistance can be centrally provided, but much will have to 
be brought to the local scene. Centrally developed curricula 
could be locally adapted without reducing local discretion.
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Centralized information does not necessarily threaten local 
initiative. Specific problems can only be solved at the local 
labor market level.
The temptation for radical surgery as part of CETA's 
reauthorization in 1982 should be resisted. One luxury 
CETA has never enjoyed is stability. There is no need to 
change the basic structure of the system, though there is need 
to delineate the roles and relationships of the players and the 
parameters of their managerial responsibilities. That does 
not preclude changing the service mix or eligibility criteria, 
but the basic delivery system relationship should remain in 
place long enough for capacity building to take place in a 
relatively orderly environment.
As a national policy, there needs to be more thought to a 
human capital development approach to CETA training. 
Concern for productivity, energy, and "^industrialization" 
are refocusing attention on developing and upgrading the 
work force. The rapid fall-off in the number of youth enter 
ing the labor force during the 1980s will make each new en 
trant that much more valuable. If they turn out to be sup 
plemented by a continued immigrant flow, the latter, too, 
will require an increased investment.
There are other systems for other components of the 
human resource pool. CETA was designed to aid the disad- 
vantaged, but overall national objectives are best ac 
complished when the disadvantaged enter the mainstream. 
The prime sponsors in the 12 case studies experimented with 
a number of approaches, including a hard-nosed selection 
process that relates the abilities of the potential enrollees to 
the requirements for training in particular occupations, and 
a lengthy sequencing of remediation skill training and low- 
or high-support on-the-job training. Each of these ap 
proaches appeared promising depending on local situations. 
Prime sponsors or their successors should be encouraged to
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continue with their efforts since ultimately programs will 
have to be developed for upgrading the labor force in their 
communities. The federally funded GET A system or its 
replacement can play a major role in achieving this goal.
However, since the study was completed, the federal 
government has opted for cutting fiscal 1982 CETA training 
funds by more than a third, while totally eliminating PSE as 
a training option. The record of the training in the 12 prime 
sponsorships, as well as the national evidence of participant 
income gains, does not justify the cut. On the contrary, when 
the national productivity growth has almost ground to a 
halt, a program that returns $1.14 on every dollar invested in 
institutional training and several times as much on OJT is a 
wise investment worth preserving and nourishing.
We should have learned from 20 years of employment and 
training experience that institution building is a slow and 
painful process. In many ways, demographic and economic 
developments are recreating the issues out of which MDTA 
emerged in 1962. Technological displacement and plant clos 
ings were major motivations for the legislation, which was 
directed toward "retraining." All of today's robots and 
computers were on the horizon, but the entry of the baby- 
boom generation and their mothers into the labor force 
made available an ample supply of low-wage jobseekers, en 
couraging more labor-intensive processes. Now the 
economic and demographic conditions portend a swingback 
to a more capital-intensive level.
Intensified international competition and technological 
advances again threaten increased plant closings and the 
need for worker relocation. All the signs are for continued 
influx of immigrants. Geographical barriers will become 
more, not less, serious for central city residents, even as their 
numbers decline. Youth entering the labor force, though in 
shrinking numbers, will require more, not less, training. At
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the other end of the age spectrum, delayed retirement will be 
more likely to involve second careers and retraining than 
continuation of the old jobs. The displaced homemaker has 
not disappeared from the scene.
Clearly, the demographic portents of the 1980s are for in 
creased training needs if we are to revive the growth in pro 
ductivity and prepare the labor force for the inevitable 
changing technology in the years ahead. Disbanding a system 
which took 20 years to build, inadequate as it still is, is likely 
to prove in a few years to have been shortsighted and costly.

A Review of CETA Training
Robert Taggart
Youth Knowledge Development Project
Alternatives for the "Leftovers"
There are, at a minimum, four million persons age 16 and 
over whose employment and earnings problems are so 
serious that they cause economic hardship. The structural 
problems of these low earners, totally and intermittently 
unemployed, involuntarily part-time and discouraged 
workers, are only modestly alleviated by economic growth 
and tight labor markets. Millions of individuals lacking 
education, skills, experience, equal opportunity or good for 
tune will be "leftovers" under any reasonable economic pro 
jections for the foreseeable future.
There are several options for dealing with these 
"leftovers." They can be ignored and left to make do with 
what is available in the labor market and income 
maintenance programs. Alternatively, the "safety net" of 
transfer programs can be improved to reduce the hardship 
resulting from their employment problems. Financial incen 
tives and appeals to corporate conscience may be used to en 
courage employers to reach further down the labor queue. 
Job placement and economic development strategies might 
try to better match these workers with available jobs. Sub 
sidized jobs may be created for them. Finally, training may 
be provided in order to improve their ability to compete in 
the labor market.
Job Creation and Training Levels
Since the Great Society, and particularly under the Carter 
administration, active efforts to address the causes and
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alleviate the symptoms of these structural problems increas 
ed exponentially. Employment and training activities have 
been a major growth area of social welfare policy. In con 
stant 1980 dollars, total expenditures rose from next to 
nothing at the beginning of the 1960s to the billion dollar 
level in fiscal 1965; they doubled again within the next year; 
redoubled by 1972; and then tripled between 1972 and 1978, 
before dropping precipitously at the close of the decade. 
Training expenditures rose, in constant dollars, from near 
zero at the start of the 1960s to $650 million in 1968 and to 
$1.9 billion in 1980.
The relative emphasis on training and employment ap 
proaches has fluctuated, but training has declined as a pro 
portion of combined expenditures, representing the 
predominant activity until the War on Poverty, declining to 
63 percent in 1969 and to only 15 percent of expenditures in 
1978. Despite the rapid growth of real training expenditures 
and the multi-billion dollar pricetag, remedial efforts for the 
"leftovers" in the labor market represent only a small share 
of our nation's total education and training activities and 
reach only a small portion of the universe of need. Public ex 
penditures for higher education and vocational education in 
1980 were twenty-five times those targeted to persons at the 
end of the labor queue. In 1980, new participants in targeted 
training represented only 1 percent of the labor force. The 
average monthly enrollment in training programs 
represented less than 5 percent of average unemployment.
Training Approaches
The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act is the 
legislative umbrella for most of the employment and training 
programs for the disadvantaged. Under a complex array of 
separate categorical authorizations, it provides funds by for 
mula to states and localities for activities they design and 
manage within the framework provided by federal law,
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regulations and oversight. It also funds national programs 
for special needs groups, as well as the Job Corps, a 
nationally-operated residential training program for severely 
disadvantaged youths. GET A provides four categories of 
training: (1) Job Corps is a structured program of vocational 
instruction, basic education, work experience, counseling, 
health care, and living experiences in a residential center; 
(2) local classroom training is a full-time activity, which in 
cludes occupational instruction as well as basic education 
and other remediation in an institutional setting; (3) on-the- 
job training is a full-time activity, where a participant is 
hired by an employer and trained primarily at the worksite, 
with public funds covering the extra costs of supervision and 
training; and (4) supplemental training is a part-time or 
short-term activity enhancing subsidized work experience or 
a limited intensity service to help in the transition into the 
labor force.
Job Corps is the most comprehensive and intensive pro 
gram and focuses on the most disadvantaged among those in 
need—young school dropouts from poor families. It cost 
over $13,000 a training year in fiscal 1980. Local classroom 
training, which is nonresidential and deals with a somewhat 
more employable group, had a cost of $8,000 per year. On- 
the-job training serves the most employable of those in need 
and had a cost of $6,000. Supplemental training for par 
ticipants in subsidized public service employment (PSE) cost 
$2,700 per training year. Transition services—largely for in- 
school youth—averaged $800 per service year.
The Nature of Training
CETA training is typically short-term, aimed to prepare 
the participant for entry level occupations or to provide basic 
educational credentials or English competency. Job Corps is 
most ambitious, with an average duration of stay for com- 
pleters of 1.2 years. However, there is a high early dropout
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rate with 40 percent of participants leaving before 90 days 
and another 30 percent leaving before full completion, so 
that the average duration of stay is 6.0 months. Local 
classroom training averages 5.5 months for completers, but 
because of early dropouts, the average duration of stay is 
around 5.1 months. On-the-job training averages 4.3 
months.
Job Corps vocational training is concentrated in the con 
struction trades, automotive and machine repair, health and 
food services, and clerical occupations. Local classroom 
training is predominantly in the clerical, craft, and service 
fields. Local on-the-job training is mainly in the clerical, 
operative and nonconstruction craft occupations.
All Job Corps participants receive basic education or GED 
preparation along with vocational training and a comprehen 
sive array of manpower and supportive services. A fifth of 
local classroom trainees are exclusively in education ac 
tivities and another fifth are in a combination of vocational 
and educational activities. There is very little preparatory 
work for OJT, since the training mostly occurs at the 
worksite. Half of classroom trainees and a smaller portion of 
OJT participants receive a much more limited level of such 
services.
Who is Trained?
Job creation receives priority over training under CETA. 
Classroom training was available for less than a fifth of new 
enrollees in local programs in fiscal 1980, or three in ten ex 
cluding the summer program, while OJT was available for 
less than one in twenty, or 8 percent excluding the summer 
program. Enrollments in Job Corps accounted for only 5 









PSE training 250 
Transition services 116
Job Creation
Summer youth employment 705 
In-school and out-of-school
youth employment 330 
PSE 870 
Adult work experience 400
The chances of assignment to a training component rather 
than a work component vary significantly among different 
groups in the CETA eligible population. Local classroom 
training is most often used for persons of the most limited 
employability. Females, Hispanics and "other" minorities, 
dropouts, single parents and persons with inadequate 
English-speaking ability, have above average chances of 
assignment to classroom training, while younger and older 
participants, whites, males and high school graduates are 
more likely to receive other assignments. In marked contrast, 
on-the-job training slots are more likely to go to the most 
employable among the CETA population—whites, males, 
graduates, and parents in two-parent families. Job Corps is 
restricted to poor youth age 16 to 21 who are from deprived 
backgrounds so that they need residential treatment. To 
some extent, Job Corps is the "program of last resort" for 
youth who have dropped out of school (85 percent of 
enrollees), been rejected by the military (one of every four) 
or had trouble with the law (two of every five). Those new 
enrollees in Job Corps in 1980 who had less than a high 
school diploma represented one-third the enrollments of 
poor dropout youth in all CETA local programs.
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Earnings Impacts
Studies of the categorical programs which preceded CETA 
generally found that classroom training increased the post- 
program earnings of participants, typically between $250 
and $300 in the year after termination. Studies of OJT usual 
ly estimated a high payoff, typically ranging between a $400 
and $900 increase in annual earnings. Past assessments of 
Job Corps reached very mixed conclusions, while studies of 
adult basic education documented increased earnings.
New evidence is available concerning the post-program 
earnings relative to control groups for 1977 Job Corps par 
ticipants and fiscal 1976 local CETA participants. 
Classroom trainees earned $350 more in the year after leav 
ing than a comparison group, an increase of 10 percent in an 
nual earnings. On-the-job trainees gained $850, an 18 per 
cent increase. These post-program earnings gains were in 
contrast to the patterns for fiscal 1976 work experience par 
ticipants who, at best, broke even relative to like nonpar- 
ticipants.
Social Security Reported Earnings Levels
Relative to Comparable Nonparticipants
(Fiscal 1976 Entrants Terminating in Calendar 1976)
Change 
1977 to 1978 
1977 1978 (adjusting for inflation)
Classroom Trainees $347 $442 + 18%
On-the-Job Trainees 839 574 -36
Public Service Employment 
Participants 261 326 +16
Work Experience Participants -149 -187 -17
Participants in Combina 
tions of Activities 356 164 -57
The procedures for selecting the comparison groups and 
for measuring post-program earnings using Social Security 
records were as rigorous as possible and generally conser-
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vative so as not to exaggerate impacts, yet there are many 
technical issues inherent in the ex post facto matching of par 
ticipants with nonparticipants, and in the use of Social 
Security data to estimate earnings. Nevertheless, the results 
are confirmed by follow-up interviews of the participants in 
different components. Comparing second-year post- 
program earnings for second-half fiscal 1975 CETA en 
trants, and adjusting for differences in measurable 
demographic characteristics and pre-program experiences, 
classroom trainees gained $588, and OJT participants gained 
$965 relative to adult work experience participants, or 
roughly the same relative magnitudes as estimated for 1978 
by matching 1976 participants with controls. It appears, 
then, that earnings impacts are substantial for both 
classroom training and OJT, and that they increase over time 
for classroom training while declining for OJT.
Estimates of Job Corps impacts are more rigorous because 
the comparison group could be more carefully selected. Job 
Corps increased the civilian earnings of 1977 participants by 
$209 above those of the comparison group in the first post- 
program year and $487 in the second year. This represented 
an 8 percent earnings increment in the first year and a 13 per 
cent increment in the second. Job Corps also increased 
military enlistment substantially, so that the total earnings 
impacts were even greater.
Who Benefits From Training?
Based on the evidence for 1976 local CETA participants, it 
appears that all race, sex and age groups benefit significantly 
from on-the-job training when compared to like nonpar 
ticipants. Female participants, persons with low or no earn 
ings before entry, and middle-aged participants did par 
ticularly well in classroom training. The measured gains 
from classroom training increased substantially between the 
first and second post-program years, particularly for
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females. All groups gained more from OJT than work ex 
perience, and all except minority females gained more from 
classroom training than work experience (although this judg 
ment about the relative payoffs of work vs. training is hedg 
ed somewhat by technical issues about the measurement of 
earnings of work experience participants getting jobs in the 
public sector).
Female Job Corps participants gain more than males in 
terms of earnings, although males gain slightly more in terms 
of hours of employment. Females without children do 
somewhat better than females with children.
The Anatomy of Gains
Increased employment rather than increased earnings rates 
account for most (though certainly not all) of the real earn 
ings gains. For fiscal 1975 classroom trainees, over four- 
fifths of the increase in real annual earnings from the year 
prior to entry to the first year after termination resulted from 
a rise in the percent time employed. Comparing the pre-entry 
to the second post-termination year, increased employment 
accounted for three-fourths of the real gain. Approximately 
half of classroom trainees with employment before and after 
participation had lower real hourly wages in the second post- 
termination year than in the year before entry. For fiscal 
1975 OJT participants, increased employment accounted for 
all of the real earnings gain in the first year and four-fifths of 
the gain between the pre-entry and second post-termination 
year. Among on-the-job trainees, however, two-thirds with 
previous earnings kept ahead of inflation in their hourly 
wages. Fiscal 1977 Job Corps participants earned 11 percent 
more than controls in the first two post-program years but 
worked 16 percent more hours; in other words, all their gains 
















































































of many individuals moving up in wages, some moving 
down, with a greater likelihood that more marginal par 
ticipants will find employment but at low wages. It appears 
that employment gains are more pronounced immediately 
but then lead to higher earnings rates gains as individuals 
prove themselves or use their skills in their new jobs.
The -increase in employment, in turn, appears to result 
more from increased labor force participation than from 
reduced unemployment. Among local classroom trainees in 
second half fiscal 1975, the increase in the percentage of time 
in the labor force from the pre-entry to first post-program 
year equaled two-thirds of the increase in percentage time 
employed for all trainees, while the increase from the pre- 
entry to second post-termination year accounted for half the 
employment time increase. Three-fifths of the net increase in 
time employed from the pre-entry to second post-program 
year for classroom trainees was accounted for by individuals 
who had zero earnings in the pre-entry year. For OJT par 
ticipants, two-thirds of the employment gains in the first 
year were also explained by increased participation, and zero 
earners before entry accounted for 45 percent of the net in 
crease in percent time employed from pre-entry to the second 
post-termination year. For 1977 Job Corps participants, in 
creased labor force participation over the two post-program 
years also accounted for two-thirds of the increase in 
employment.
Success Factors
The impact of institutional training is determined by the 
duration of stay and placement. All of the post-program 
earnings gains for 1976 classroom trainees were accounted 
for by the group entering employment on terminating the 
program. While it is not surprising that those immediately 
employed had higher near-term earnings relative to controls 
or relative to other participants not placed, it is significant
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that the differentials remained substantial two years later, 
even after refined adjustment for most of the observable dif 
ferences between those placed and not placed.
The earnings impacts of training increase more than pro 
portionately with its length. The estimated annual earnings 
gains of 1976 classroom trainees staying one to 20 weeks 
were only one-sixth those of participants staying 40 or more 
weeks.
1978 Earnings Gains 
of 1976 Classroom Trainees
Stayed 1-10 weeks $ 83
Stayed 11-20 weeks 224
Stayed 21-40 weeks 832
Stayed over 40 weeks 1377
Placed 1209
Not placed 8
Job Corps males who stayed less than 90 days, and those 
who did not continue to completion were earning the same as 
controls during the period 12 to 18 months after termination; 
in contrast, those completing a vocational program earned 
$1,250 more on an annualized basis. Early female dropouts 
gained $300 on an annualized basis, partial completers $750, 
and full completers $1,500.
Trainees who stay longer are also more likely to be placed. 
Several factors are involved which cannot be clearly 
separated. Sorting occurs in that those who stay longer have 
measurable characteristics that are predictive of post- 
program success. The sorting is greater in Job Corps, where 
only three of ten participants are full completers, compared 
to local classroom training where three in four complete the 
usually shorter duration assignments. Yet for both Job 
Corps and local classroom training, the effects of duration 
of stay and placement remain significant after adjustment 
for the differences between dropouts and completers.
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Moreover, the dropouts and short-stayers earn much the 
same as their controls over the long-run, so that sorting of 
the "winners'* and "losers" is not an explanation of the 
substantial gains of completers. Completion itself appears to 
be a substantial factor. Those completing local classroom 
training have a high probability of being placed whatever 
their duration of stay. Those who complete Job Corps train 
ing gain substantially more and are more likely to be placed 
than participants who stay as long but do not complete. 
Corps members who secure a GED earn more than matched 
individuals who do not. Finally, the effect of duration of 
stay is strong even when placement is used as an additional 
control variable in regression analyses of earnings gains. All 
this supports the conclusion that training increases human 
resource endowments and employability, and that those 
trained longer are more likely to obtain certification which in 
turn improves the chances of finding employment or being 
placed.
Training Occupations and 
Occupational Mobility
Training tends to move individuals from the secondary 
labor market and irregular jobs into low level but more 
regular jobs. Among 1976 classroom trainees with previous 
experience, a fifth had worked primarily as garage atten 
dants, transportation operatives, laborers, farm workers or 
private household workers. Only a tenth of trainees with 
work after termination held such jobs. The share working as 
craftsmen and welders increased from 11 to 17 percent, while 
clericals rose from 20 to 27 percent.
Among on-the-job trainees, over a third were placed in the 
same broad occupational categories in which they had 
previously worked, while over a fifth were assigned to train 
ing positions in a lower occupational level. Comparing the 
occupational distribution before and after training, the pro-
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portion working as laborers, transportation operatives, 
garage workers, farm laborers and private household 
workers actually rose from 13 percent to 15 percent.
A third of Job Corps entrants have had no regular work 
experience and the remainder have largely worked in menial 
"youth" jobs. Job Corps training helps them secure entry 
level "adult" jobs although only one in seven participants 
ends up as a completer with a training-related job. The bulk 
of "placements" are in manual, entry clerical and entry 
health jobs secured by the participants mainly through their 
own initiative.
Little is known about the "best bets" for training. Most 
females in local classroom training are in clerical and service 
occupations (usually health). While 17 percent of all 1976 
classroom trainees with a job before entry worked in female 
clerical occupations, 35 percent of trainees were in female 
clerical occupations and 25 percent of those with a job after 
training remained in these occupations. Three-fifths of par 
ticipants trained in clerical work who subsequently got jobs 
ended up in training-related work, as did two-thirds of those 
trained in service jobs. The rates of training-related employ 
ment were much lower for trainees in other occupations. For 
instance, nonconstruction crafts are a frequent training 
cluster for males, but the batting average of this training ap 
pears low in terms of subsequent training-related employ 
ment. While OJT participants are more likely to find 
employment in the occupation of assignment, those "train 
ed" as service workers, laborers, garage workers, farm 
workers and transportation operatives are less likely than 
other OJT participants to stay in the same occupation, prob 
ably because they are able to find something better on their 
own.
In Job Corps, the best bets for completion, placement, 
and higher wages for males are manual occupa-
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tions—forestry, gardening, construction and industrial pro 
duction; for females, forestry, gardening, construction and 
health are the best bets. Over the longer run (12-18 months 
post-termination), however, persons trained in these occupa 
tions are less likely to register gains relative to controls than 
those trained in some other occupations including transpor 
tation and service for males and the clerical field for females. 
In other words, the training that looks good in the short-run 
does not look as good in the long-run. Also, some occupa 
tions such as construction increase wages but not employ 
ment, while health occupations increase employment but not 
wages.
Educational Competencies and 
Employability Skills
In addition to occupational training, the other ingredients 
in local classroom training and in Job Corps include 
remedial instruction, basic life skills training and attitudinal 
or motivational improvement activities. Even less is known 
about the effectiveness of these efforts than about occupa 
tional training. While the measurement tools for assessing 
maturity, socialization and job readiness are crude, it ap 
pears that changes do occur, at least in programs for youth 
(who may be most malleable to such interventions).
The "intangibles" are a major factor behind the Job 
Corps' success. Tests of social and attitudinal changes, 
health care, and job-related knowledge and behavior suggest 
that participants in Job Corps for over 90 days experience 
significant gains along all the social-attitudinal dimensions. 
These measured changes are reflected in a dramatic drop in 
arrest rates over the first year out of Job Corps (10.9 per 
hundred compared to 16.7 for controls according to the 
follow-up of 1977 participants), delays in marriage and 
childbearing, reduced out-of-wedlock births, increased 
mobility, and increased matriculation in college and post-
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secondary training. However, Job Corps achieves these 
changes by creating a 24-hour a day structured environment 
away from other influences. The supported work program 
that provided well-organized and well-run full-time employ 
ment opportunities for youth, but did not remove them from 
home environments and did not include counseling, recrea 
tion, motivation, student government and the like, did not 
produce positive changes in criminal behavior or drug abuse, 
nor did it significantly increase post-program employment 
constancy.
School-based programs aiming to improve "employability 
skills" through instruction and activities designed to expose 
youth to work settings and requirements are able to change 
tested vocational attitudes, job knowledge, job holding 
skills, work relevant attitudes, job seeking skills, and sex 
stereotyping in career goals (although not, apparently, 
changing self-esteem). However, these attitudinal and skill 
gains do not alter post-program labor market or educational 
behavior except when combined with substantial job 
development activities so that employers recognize that the 
changes have occurred, and unless the activities are targeted 
to youth who plan to immediately enter the full-time labor 
market after graduation rather than continuing their educa 
tion. Moreover, gains are not realized in summer programs 
which have about half the treatment hours, suggesting that 
intensity and continuity are necessary to change attitudes 
and skills. On the other hand, short-term interventions that 
provide a helping hand at the point of job search can 
substantially increase the immediate chances of employment 
with little or no effect on measured employability.
Education gains are easier to measure. There is clear 
evidence that a variety of alternative methods can increase 
the functional academic competencies of even the most 
educationally disadvantaged, with learning rates far ex 
ceeding school norms for such individuals. Participants in
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Job Corps, who have an average tested reading level of 5.6 
years at entry, gain 1.5 years in 90 hours of instruction and 
2.2 years in 150 hours. The key is a self-paced, individualized 
approach with the flexibility to be delivered a few hours daily 
in combination with other activities. Few of the disadvantag- 
ed and dropout participants are seeking or wishing to accept 
full-time academic instruction. Computers simplify delivery 
of these self-paced, individualized materials, increasing the 
gain rates, helping to standardize curricula, reducing paper 
work, and facilitating delivery in a variety of settings.
Finally, CETA eligibles can benefit from more advanced 
education but will not participate unless extended a helping 
hand. In May 1981, 2,000 of the 42,000 Job Corps members 
were enrolled in post-secondary institutions with the help of 
Job Corps. The retention rate of those enrolled the previous 
year was 70 percent. These youth would not be in college 
without this assistance. Less than half a percent of a com 
parison group for 1977 Job Corps participants were in col 
lege in 1979. In a structured experiment to test a GI-Bill 
voucher approach as an alternate treatment strategy for 
CETA-eligible youth, only half of the control group attend 
ed college the next year, compared to nine-tenths of those 
provided tuition and expenses, as well as counseling and 
other assistance. Among the experimentals, four-fifths of 
those who attended college were still enrolled through three 
semesters compared with only half of the controls who 
originally matriculated. Those experimentals who were in the 
cohorts receiving educational and personal counseling had 
better retention than those simply provided financial sup 
port.
Work as Training
One justification for work experience is the claim that a 
period of subsidized, sheltered employment might serve as 
preparation for later unsubsidized employment, resulting in
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increased post-program earnings. The evidence suggests that 
this is only true for certain target groups and only if the work 
experience is structured in certain ways. The post-program 
earnings of 1976 adult work experience participants were ap 
parently no higher than those of matched nonparticipants, 
while participants in public service employment experienced 
a gain between $250 and $750 in 1977. The differential be 
tween PSE and work experience outcomes is explained by the 
relative likelihood of post-program employment in the 
public sector. All of the increase in employment from pre- 
entry to the first year post-termination for 1976 PSE par 
ticipants was due to increases in unsubsidized work in the 
public sector.
The supported work experiment carefully tested the im 
pacts of well-operated work experience projects structured to 
provide increasing responsibility, close supervision and peer 
support. It found little or no post-program earnings effects 
for dropout youth, drug addicts or ex-offenders, but a 
statistically significant impact for long-term AFDC recip 
ients, which resulted entirely from increased post-program 
employment in the public sector.
The Ventures in Community Improvement experiment 
used worksites as a classroom for training in construction 
trades, with journeymen instructors, linkages to unions, and 
structured skill progressions. Even though there was also 
substantial output from VICI projects, the aim was to teach 
as much as to produce, and those participants who did not 
accept the "real-life" performance requirements were more 
likely to be terminated than in most youth work programs. 
The resulting placement rates in construction, in unions, and 
in high wage jobs far exceeded those for comparable work 
projects that did not emphasize training, even though there 
were very modest differences in positive termination and 
placement rates.
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Where participants receive work and training combina 
tions, they appear to benefit more than from work ex 
perience alone but less than from classroom training or OJT. 
In fiscal 1976, only 6 percent of participants in nonsummer 
local CETA activities (excluding direct referral) received se 
quences of primary activities such as work and then 
classroom training or work and then OJT. The net gains for 
multiple-activity participants equaled the weighted average 
of the impacts estimated for the separate components, sug 
gesting that when work and training are combined, the post- 
program earnings effects will be largely determined by the 
amount of training provided.
Summer employment for disadvantaged teenagers modest 
ly increases the likelihood of returning to school and the pro 
bability of part-time employment in school. The employ 
ment effects are concentrated among the 14 and 15 year-old 
participants, particularly minorities and females, i.e., those 
least likely to secure employment in the absence of the pro 
gram. On the other hand, there are no measurable gains in 
job knowledge, vocational attitudes, jobseeking or job 
holding skills, relative to control groups. Apparently, a first 
work experience provides a "taste for earnings" or helps to 
overcome fears about work without markedly altering at 
titudes or employability skills.
In summary, work experience can be useful for young peo 
ple in advancing workforce entry. It can be combined with 
training activities in a sequence, with benefits roughly pro 
portional to the degree of training. A worksite may be struc 
tured as a training site and can yield some of the benefits of 
classroom and on-the-job training while producing useful 
output, but this model is the exception rather than the rule in 
local work experience programs. In most other cir 
cumstances, the subsidized work will only have post- 
program impacts if it serves as a try out or on-the-job train 
ing mechanism for an existing unsubsidized job in the public
Ill
or nonprofit sector. This does not mean that work ex 
perience and public service employment are bad investments. 
If $1.00 in output is produced for every $1.00 in cost, then 
any post-program earnings increases or in-program benefits 
(such as reductions in crime) represent a positive return on 
the outlay. However, if the aim is to alter future employment 
prospects, work is only effective when properly targeted, 
designed or linked to unsubsidized employment.
The Return on the Investment
The public investment in training for persons of limited 
employability is profitable, as best this can be judged by 
benefit-cost analysis. According to the most reasonable (and 
purposefully conservative) assumptions about the fade-out 
of earnings gains measured in the two post-program years, 
about the dollar value of nonearnings impacts, and about the 
appropriate discount rate, Job Corps provides social benefits 
with a current value of $1.39 for every $1.00 invested. Utiliz 
ing the same assumptions and the estimated post-program 
earnings gains for 1976 local classroom trainees, CETA 
training returns $1.14 in benefits for every $1.00 invested. 
The estimates for OJT are less precise (because of a more 
complicated estimation methodology); but the range is from 
a low of $1.26 to a high of $5.93 in benefits for every dollar 
invested, with a "best" estimate of $2.18. Thus, on-the-job 
training pays off most, Job Corps ranks next, and local 
classroom training follows. Obviously, the three interven 
tions serve different client groups and produce different pat 
terns of benefits. Job Corps has noticeable earnings impacts 
but the "socialization" effects are equally significant. In 
deed, the reduction in crime is so substantial during par 
ticipation and in the year after, while the costs of crime and 
its treatment are so great, that the present value of the crime 
cost savings is about equal to the present value of the earn 
ings gains per participant from local classroom training.
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Even though the increase in post-program earnings per 
dollar of investment is greater for classroom training than 
for Job Corps, the total payoff is less because there are 
minimal effects on crime or dependency.
The "public" includes participants as well as the taxpayers 
who pay for the program. Social benefit-cost calculations ex 
clude transfer payments from costs and count as benefits all 
increased earnings. From the taxpayer perspective, transfers 
are included among costs and the benefits are not the post- 
program earnings gains, but rather the taxes they generate as 
well as the resulting reductions in dependency. Taxpayer 
benefit-cost ratios are, therefore, lower than social benefit- 
cost ratios, and though the latter are a more appropriate con 
sideration from a social policy perspective, the former will 
more likely concern the voters in a period when taxes are a 
major concern. Job Corps has the highest taxpayer benefit- 
cost ratio because the crime reductions are a savings to tax 
payers; there is a return to the taxpayer of $.91 for every 
$1.00 invested according to the most reasonable, albeit con 
servative, assumptions. The intermediate estimate for OJT is 
a return of $.72 for every $1.00 invested. Local classroom 
training returns $.60 for every dollar. Such recondite 
analysis hardly figures in the political equation, but it cer 
tainly justifies the solid political support for Job Corps and 
the preference for more OJT in the local activity mix.
Benefit-cost analyses of pre-CETA institutional and on- 
the-job training programs generally found that benefits ex 
ceeded costs. Estimates for Job Corps varied considerably, 
with several suggesting benefits less than costs (in part 
because they excluded the substantial crime and dependency 
reduction benefits and in part because they looked only at 
the short-term earnings which are depressed during the tran 
sition period immediately after termination). Using stan 
dardized assumptions which focus only on earnings effects, 
the benefit-cost ratios calculated from current impact studies
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of Job Corps and CETA classroom training are in the high 
range relative to past estimates, while the ratios calculated 
from recent OJT impact experience are in the mid-range 
relative to past estimates.
An Interpretation of the Evidence
The Role of Training
If all persons available and looking for work were ranked 
into categories based on prior experience, education, 
previous training and other measurable characteristics used 
by most employers in setting job requirements and in rank 
ing applicants, CETA enrollees would be concentrated at the 
low end of the distribution. The same standards used to 
establish eligibility for CETA, and the same problems which 
lead applicants to choose this option, are among those used 
by employers to rate individuals as high risks. Nevertheless, 
there is very significant diversity in employability among 
CETA participants. At one extreme, CETA may serve a 
single mother with a college degree reentering the labor force 
or a machinist displaced from a job in a one-industry town; 
at the other extreme, the participant may be a mentally 
retarded young person who has never held a job, or a school 
dropout who has spent the last five years in prison. Each set 
of characteristics can be assigned "batting averages" which 
are statistically valid predictors of outcomes in most settings. 
The mother and the machinist are good bets for training and 
for subsequent placement. The dropout or the handicapped 
youth are poor bets. Yet there is also much unexplained 
variance reflecting chance but also the wide range in poten 
tial among individuals sharing any set of characteristics. 
Some dropouts may be both motivated and intelligent, hav 
ing left school because of family responsibilities. Others may 
have dropped out because school was too slow and
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regimented, although they have now matured. Some may 
have very serious behavioral problems which are not record 
ed. Most failed in school because they simply were not as 
good in academic areas as those who passed. Five years in 
the future, these subgroups among the dropout population 
are likely to have quite different average success rates int he 
labor market. But it is impossible or at least difficult to iden 
tify the differences in potential which will produce these dif 
ferences in outcome. The differences emerge only when the 
individuals are "tested" by some common experience.
Employers must make hiring decisions based on 
characteristics they can measure and on the "batting 
averages" for persons with these characteristics. Available 
jobs at any point can be ranked into categories according to 
their hiring requirements, i.e., how much prior experience, 
education, previous training and other desirable 
characteristics the employers require. The distribution on the 
supply side of the labor market ranking the available 
workforce in terms of employability, is paralleled on the de 
mand side by the distribution of available jobs according to 
the minimum employability they will accept in applicants. 
Some jobs are always available for even the most unskilled, 
but generally there are more available workers in the low 
employability categories than there are jobs willing to 
employ such workers. Hence, the most disadvantaged in 
dividual could usually get a job if he or she really tried, but 
the rewards are meager relative to the effort, and all such in 
dividuals could not find employment if they looked at the 
same time.
Among jobs with equal hiring requirements, there is wide 
diversity in career potential. Some entry jobs are dead-ends 
while others can be first steps on career ladders. For the 
available worker entering the hiring door or reading the want 
ads, it is in many cases impossible to distinguish between 
jobs with career potential and those which lead nowhere.
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The labor market functions by iterative matching of 
workers and jobs. An individual with low potential hired in 
to a job may soon be fired or quit, or will be satisfied with 
menial work. One with high potential will either retain the 
job or look for another that provides more career opportuni 
ty. Eventually, he or she will find a career ladder and will 
move up, stay with a job long enough to be considered more 
employable, or acquire a credential in college or appren 
ticeship which documents to employers a set of skills or 
characteristics they desire. This individual will, then, move 
up the queue at the next point of availability for employ 
ment. Whether bouncing from job to job or remaining in 
dead-end employment, he or she will become identifiable as 
a "loser," moving down the queue in the eyes of employers 
at the next point of availability for employment.
Classroom training can impact on employment chances in 
several distinct ways: First, the training can serve as an ex 
periential sorting mechanism, not improving skills or creden 
tials, but rather identifying those participants with more 
potential and motivation. Employers will want to hire them 
instead of others with the same external characteristics 
because they know them to be better risks. Second, the train 
ing activity may serve as a way of gaining access to jobs 
without necessarily improving skills or credentials. This may 
occur through the institutional leverage of the delivery agent 
or by helping participants to find employment. Third, the 
training may be able to sort both individuals and jobs, 
matching persons who have been identified as having greater 
potential with entry jobs identified as more promising. 
Fourth, the training may improve potential by increasing 
motivation, employability skills or academic competencies, 
without providing credentials that employers will accept in 
the labor market. Fifth, the training may provide a 
demonstrable skill or a certification which is accepted in the 
labor market. The distinction between these effects is of
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more than academic interest. For instance, the second im 
pact process may produce measured gains in earnings 
relative to nonparticipants, but will do so largely by reducing 
the chances of the nonparticipants. The process will have no 
impact on skill shortages and the participants will benefit on 
ly to the extent their job search is shortened. The fourth pro 
cess increases performance in a job once secured, but does 
not increase either the chances of employment or the quality 
of the first job. Only the fifth process fills skills shortages 
and improves employability as assessed by employers who 
have no link to the training activities and are not leveraged 
by the delivery agent.
The Impacts ofCETA
The evidence suggests that local classroom institutional 
training for those at the end of the labor queue functions in 
all these ways. In general, however, the training is not of 
long enough duration to increase competencies to the point 
where they can be certified and documented. Only a small 
proportion of participants get a GED, sheepskin, or cer 
tificate indicating the completion of apprenticeship. There 
are very few occupations where skills can be taught in short 
order than can be certified or tested at the hiring door, and 
where a large number of jobs are available. Clerical training 
is one of these occupations, and it tends to work best where 
those who are trained are mature and have adequate 
academic competencies. Judging from the concentration of 
earnings gains among 30-44 year-old classroom trainees, 
women, and those previously out of the labor force—i.e., 
the groups most likely to be assigned to clerical train 
ing—there is little doubt that this occupation accounts for a 
substantial portion of the total gains from training. In some 
other occupations such as welding, basic skills can be taught 
quickly but lead to jobs for only a minority of trainees. For 
most occupations, long-term training is needed to gain useful
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skills or certification that is recognized in the labor market. 
Only the few classroom trainees who stay long-term acquire 
these skills and certifications, so that they need the place 
ment leverage of prime sponsors in order to realize gains.
Likewise, just a small proportion of Job Corps par 
ticipants complete advanced training or get a certification of 
competency (for instance, 5 percent complete a GED). Place 
ment assistance is concentrated on this minority, with little 
help provided to noncompleters. The overall gains produced 
by the program are largely the result of improved 
"potential" manifested in greater stability of labor force at 
tachment and employment, i.e., changes in motivation and 
socialization are rare, achieved in less intensive and less 
targeted local classroom training. The jobs which are secured 
by Corps members, most often by their own initiative, do 
not pay more and are not much different than those which 
could be secured without participation.
The sorting that occurs in local classroom training appears 
to be modest as judged by measured characteristics, but cer 
tainly the most employable within those entering training are 
likely to complete. Those who are placed among those who 
stay longer or complete are even more employable. It is im 
possible to determine how much the sorting identifies the 
persons with greater potential within any set of measured 
characteristics. It is likely that this occurs, but probably 
more through the placement process than the enforcement of 
completion standards. Those placed are the "best" both 
because they include individuals with initiative to get a job 
and those who are helped by the delivery agent. The fact that 
the impact of placement continues over time suggests that 
these individuals placed are indeed "better" after controlling 
for measurable differences and/or that jobs accessed for 
them are "better" in terms of stability and career potential. 
The gains registered by those placed who do not have long- 
duration training and have not, therefore, received certifying
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credentials, are probably a combination of these two factors. 
The converse of this observation is that sorting does not oc 
cur that will be accepted by the labor market in the absence 
of CETA leverage. The distinction between completers and 
noncompleters is not very specific in local classroom train 
ing, and only a minority of participants even know if they 
complete. An employer is not likely to give much credit to 
participation alone without knowing the standards for com 
pletion and whether these standards are enforced.
Job Corps sorting is much more significant because com 
pletion standards are competency based, the educational and 
vocational achievements are documented and the residential 
experience itself tends to separate the mature from the im 
mature. Those employers regularly hiring from Job Corps 
know the difference. Some use the achievement records. But 
the completion standards and the competency measures are 
not recognized by most local employers unfamiliar with the 
program, so that if a youth does not get a job through the 
program, he or she is unlikely to get credit and must prove 
himself or herself once hired.
The primary impact on local classroom trainees, par 
ticularly on those staying less than 90 days, is to help them 
get a job either by providing job search assistance, a staging 
ground, or actual job access or leverage. The modest gains 
for short stayers could be explained by just a few finding 
jobs more quickly than they would without participation. It 
is important to stress that the short stayers in local classroom 
training include a disproportionate number of dropouts, so 
those scheduled for short training are averaged in with the 
dropouts. The evidence suggests that short-duration job- 
search assistance and "hand-holding" for both in-school 
and out-of-school youth can increase short-run employment 
chances. It is likely, then, that such activities combined with 
traditional labor market exchange functions may work to 
modestly increase post-program employment chances
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without really improving the types of jobs secured, the par 
ticipants' skills, or their long-term prospects.
On-the-job training involves these same processes, but 
their relative importance is different. Sorting is much more 
predominant. The CETA decisionmaker can and does screen 
more candidates than a typical employer interviewing for a 
job, since all CETA applicants are assessed and usually the 
most employable are assigned to OJT. Because OJT is rarely 
a "piggyback" on other treatments, the sorting must occur 
basically on measurable employability characteristics rather 
than potential as demonstrated in prior participation. Judg 
ing from the wage change patterns, the occupational 
distributions and mobility patterns, it does not appear that 
there are wide gaps between experience and job requirements 
in the OJT match-ups of workers and jobs, or that extensive 
training is necessary, but the gaps may still be greater than 
usually exist for entry employees. Rather, the try-out period, 
then, offers an opportunity to determine whether the 
somewhat higher risk trainees, particularly those who have 
been outside the labor force and those who have lost their 
last employment and therefore may be of uncertain quality, 
will adjust to the job and normal entry instruction. This may 
mean the chance at more stable and better paying jobs for 
those whose careers have been disrupted, or an opportunity 
for entrants and reentrants into the workforce—albeit those 
with more education credentials—to get a chance to prove 
themselves. From this perspective, OJT is more of a screen 
ing device than a training ground. The one of three par 
ticipants who are not hired permanently are those who fail in 
the try-out or find that the assignment does not meet their 
expectations. Yet, the decline in the earnings gains from the 
first to the second year after termination, in contrast to the 
increase for classroom trainees, suggests that some of the 
OJT participants lose their jobs and the "training" is not 
transferrable, while the control group of equally employable
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individuals is able to eventually secure its own jobs with 
time. The provision of an immediate job is particularly im 
portant to reentrants or entrants who are more likely to re 
main in the labor force when they immediately get work than 
when they must search for their own employment.
Implications of the Interpretation
The interpretative framework, and its component con 
cepts such as sorting, credentialing, job access, and try-outs, 
as well as documented vs. potential employability, are im 
portant because of their broader policy implications. First, 
these concepts suggest why OJT is so hard to market to 
employers. Participants are referred and the employer must 
choose among them on the basis of documented employabili 
ty dimensions, i.e., they are risky to the extent that on 
average they have characteristics which would usually rank 
them below normal entry employees and their potential is 
uncertain because they do not follow the normal entry 
routes, for instance, being recommended by other 
employees. With the hire, the employer assumes the risk that 
the individual cannot "pick up the job" in the way normal 
hires do, and the subsidy must cover this risk. To the degree 
the job requires substantial training as opposed to mere 
orientation, the employer assumes an even greater risk. To 
overcome the employers' reservations, the delivery agent is 
inclined to screen participants as much as possible so that 
they meet the usual employability requirements of the job. 
Unless the best of the referrals is within the "risk range" 
covered by the OJT subsidy, the employer will not even par 
ticipate. But given the difficulties of finding OJT slots and 
the clear evidence that they help participants, the delivery 
agent may not want to jeopardize future placements and may 
provide referrals well within the risk range—providing wind 
falls to the employer—in order to assure future cooperation 
and to get immediate results for their participants.
121
If the public accepted the initial risk by payrolling the par 
ticipant during a limited try-out period, the employer would 
have to be subsidized only for extra training costs rather than 
the hiring risk. The extra training costs for the individual 
could be better determined because there would be some ex 
perience. It would be possible to take greater risks. It would 
also be easier to piggyback on experiential sorting in work or 
classroom training programs, since the delivery agent would 
not have to convince the employer that prior sorting had oc 
curred, but rather could let him see for himself during the 
try-out. This approach would also permit a better identifica 
tion of what was actually occurring on the worksite in terms 
of training and relative to the capacities of each trainee.
Second, the placement effect differs but is important 
under all these processes. If classroom training does not lead 
to credentials or measurable skills, like typing speed, that 
can be tested by employers prior to hiring, its effectiveness 
rests on placement leverage as well as the training 
institution's reputation, which in the short-run may be af 
fected by publicity and linkage efforts, but over the long-run 
depends on the performance of the trainees that are placed. 
If there is no sorting of completers and noncompleters based 
on demonstrated acquisition of specific skills, then over the 
long-run the placement leverage and reputation will erode 
and individual participants who perform most effectively in 
training will not be able to translate their hard work and 
ability into commensurately better jobs.
Improving potential but not documented employability 
will help when and if the participant gets a job, but pays off 
more certainly when there is placement, particularly when 
this accesses jobs with career potential where the individual's 
abilities and newly acquired skills can be fully utilized.
Placement should become less necessary to the degree that 
training can provide accepted credentials or measurable
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skills; however, these are likely to be discounted unless the 
individual shares the characteristics and experiences usually 
associated with these credentials and skills, or has other im 
pediments to employment. This will be particularly true 
where an individual makes a "quantum leap"—for instance, 
the dropouts who entered Job Corps and were trained as 
customer engineers. It may be necessary even if there has 
been substantial sorting, training and certification, to pro 
vide for a try-out or to exert a special effort to secure place 
ment so that the skills and credentials are accepted at face 
value.
Third, credentials require longer training than is usually 
provided, and more sorting as well. In order to avoid hurting 
those who lack the potential for a major advance, the ob 
vious solution is to use a base-level training activity to pro 
vide worthwhile aid to large numbers while identifying par 
ticipants with the greatest potential for long training in a se 
cond tier of activities. Placement in the first tier, for the ma 
jority not moving on to the second, would continue to find 
"better" jobs for those who are "better" but not good 
enough for advanced training, while helping the remainder 
to simply find employment more quickly. In the second tier, 
where the number of entrants and completers would be much 
smaller than in the first tier, substantial placement efforts 
would and could be exerted to assure employment in 
training-related jobs in order to assure that the intensive in 
vestments paid off.
Fourth, improved skills mean little if not recognized and 
utilized by employers. Recognition depends on identification 
of competencies acquired, documentation of the quality of 
the inputs which went into the preparatory experience, proof 
that standards were maintained, and recognition that the 
skills and competencies needed for specific jobs were, in 
fact, provided. If there are no "graduation" standards, if 
the certification is nothing more than a claim that some
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training occurred, if the quality of the training is suspect, or 
if the competencies taught bear little relation to what 
employers really want, the payoffs of training will be reduc 
ed, particularly over the longer-run when jobs will depend on 
acceptance of the credentials rather than the leverage of the 
CETA hiring subsidies and placement efforts.
Fifth, the future implications of these interpretations are 
even more significant. The size of the available workforce at 
any point in time, especially at the lower end of the 
employability distribution, is largely determined by the 
number of entrants and reentrants into the labor force. This 
number will decline dramatically relative to total employ 
ment as the post-war babies age into the prime working years 
and the participation rate of women levels off. The annual 
rate of growth of the civilian labor force age 20 to 24 is pro 
jected to fall from the 2.7 percent annual growth rate for 
males in the 1975-1979 period to -.1 percent annually be 
tween 1979 and 1985, then declining -2.9 percent annually in 
the 1985 to 1990 period. For all women, the rate of increase 
in the labor force will decline from 4.1 percent to 2.9 percent 
and then to 1.9 percent. Employment grew 2.7 percent an 
nually over the second half of the 1970s, and 2.1 percent over 
the entire decade. Anything close to this job growth would 
drastically exceed the 1.9 percent total labor force growth 
projected for 1979 to 1985 and the 1.3 percent rate for 1985 
to 1990.
The impacts will be greatest at the entry level. While there 
may be large numbers of relatively well-educated thirty-year- 
olds and women competing for mid-career advancement, the 
pressures at the career entry door will be reduced, as well as 
the competition for menial and casual jobs. Illegal or legal 
immigrants may fill the latter need, but they are unlikely to 
be allowed full access to the career-entry opportunities. The 
result is that many employers whose hiring policies are now 
structured to take advantage of the excess supply of entry ap-
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plicants will either lower their usual entry standards, 
regularize the career ladders so that the promise of a future 
can be used to attract entry workers, initiate their own inten 
sive preparatory programs, work more closely with public in 
stitutions, recruit from areas with excess workers, increase 
the pirating of trained employees and further protect their 
own workers by compensation provisions and advancement 
opportunities tying them to the firm. Past experience during 
the tight labor markets of the 1960s and current experience 
of industries and labor markets having trouble meeting man 
power needs, suggests that a combination of all these 
strategies will occur if labor market conditions change in the 
expected directions.
If more firms provide their own training and have to reach 
into the high-risk pool, they will be much more responsive to 
preparatory activities by public institutions that screen and 
provide some of the basic skills. More firms will be willing to 
specify their requirements and work with institutions to 
develop training programs targeted specifically to their 
needs. Since they will have to take more chances in hiring, 
they will be more receptive to a try-out approach which pro 
tects them from some of the risk. Persons who are trained 
and credentialed are more likely to find jobs at higher levels 
and have their credentials accepted even if they lack some of 
the other characteristics now expected in applicants for these 
better jobs. As more firms train, there will be an increased 
concern with other firms stealing their employees, and a 
desire to limit this if possible.
The degree of change depends on many things including 
immigration policies, military manpower needs, 
technological change, foreign competition, and national and 
world economic conditions. There is no crystal ball which 
can accurately project these developments. But all else being 
equal, the labor supply changes that can be projected with 
some certainty are massive. Employers will not alter their
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behavior overnight, and the degree of change will vary by in 
dustry, region and type of firm. But the market is enormous 
ly adaptable and the directions of change should work in 
favor of training which sorts and improves potential as well 
as more ambitious efforts to provide quantum leaps in 
documented skills. On the other hand, training that simply 
accesses low-level, menial jobs will be relatively less 
necessary or useful.
Management, Delivery and Decisionmaking
Local Variability
The local delivery system which accounts for nine-tenths 
of trainees and more than seven-tenths of training expen 
ditures under CETA is characterized by enormous diversity. 
There were 481 state and local jurisdictions designated as 
"prime sponsors" for CETA in fiscal 1980, that is, receiving 
funds by allocation, planning for the use of these funds, con 
tracting and managing activities, monitoring compliance, 
and reporting to the federal government. Under the "com 
prehensive" component of CETA (Title IIBC) which 
finances most local OJT and classroom training, prime spon 
sors have broad discretion to choose the types of participants 
and the types of services.
There is substantial variability in how they exercise this 
discretion—particularly in choosing between job creation 
and training—as well as in the results they achieve. The stan 
dard deviation measures the variation around the mean; 
there is a two in three chance that any point in a given data 
set will fall within a standard deviation on either side of the 
mean. The coefficient of variation is the ratio of the stan 
dard deviation relative to the mean and is an indication of 
the relative dispersion of different data sets. A higher coeffi 
cient implies more relative variability in one data set than 
another. For almost all statistically measured dimensions of
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prime sponsor decisionmaking and performance, the coeffi 
cients of variation are large.
Coefficient of
Standard Variation Among 
Average Deviation Prime Sponsors
Classroom trainees as share
Title IIBC participants 50% 22% 43% 
OJT participants as share
Title IIBC participants 11% 8% 74% 
Total trainees as share
Title IIBC participants 64% 21% 34% 
Classroom training cost
per participant $1328 $580 44% 
OJT cost per participant $1130 $697 42% 
Percent Title IIBC participants
entering employment 40% 14% 35% 
Cost per placement Title IIBC $6308 $4572 70%
The enormous variability in prime sponsors' emphases on 
training is not explained by the variability in economic con 
ditions or in the participants who are served. The two factors 
expected to have the greatest impact on local decisions would 
be the unemployment rate (which should affect the 
availability of OJT assignments, the jobs which could be 
secured through classroom training, and the relative attrac 
tions and need for job creation) and the youth share of Title 
IIBC participants (since youth are usually offered short-term 
subsidized jobs and are underrepresented in local classroom 
training and, even more so, in OJT). Regression analysis 
provides a way of determining how much one factor is af 
fected by changes in another variable when the remaining 
factors are held constant. It also provides a way of assessing 
the amount of the variance in the one factor which is explain 
ed by the variability in all the other factors within a data set. 
Regression equations which measure the relationship be 
tween the emphasis prime sponsors place on classroom train 
ing (as measured by the ratio of trainees to total fiscal 1980 
Title IIBC participants) and their unemployment rates and 
youth shares reveal that prime sponsors with significantly 
above average unemployment rates or significantly above
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average youth shares are slightly less likely to emphasize 
classroom training. But these two factors together explain 
little of the variability in classroom training emphasis. 
Neither do these variables have much relationship to, nor ex 
plain much of the variability in, classroom training expen 
ditures as a share of total expenditures, O JT participants as a 
portion of total participants, or combined OJT and 
classroom training enrollments as a share of total 
enrollments. To the degree a relationship exists, prime spon 
sors with higher unemployment rates tend to undertake more 
OJT and more total training (hence less work experience) 
than those with lower unemployment. By the same token, 
the unit costs of OJT and classroom training are only 
marginally related to unemployment rates or youth shares. 
Prime sponsors with high unemployment rates do not have 
to pay substantially more to access jobs for OJT, and the 
duration or intensity of classroom training which is related 
to the cost per participant, is not substantially greater in high 
unemployment areas nor substantially lower when more 
youth are served.
The factors which do seem to make a difference, even 
after regression controls for unemployment rates and youth 
shares, are the type of governmental unit making the deci 
sion, its size and regional location. Smaller prime sponsors 
with a labor force of less than 200,000 and state government 
sponsors are more likely to emphasize OJT under Title IIBC. 
Smaller primes (100,000 or less labor force) and the large 
cities (500,000 or more labor force) are more likely to em 
phasize classroom training, while states are less likely to use 
this approach. Expenditures for training as a portion of Title 
IIBC expenditures are lowest in the South and Northwest. 
The cost per participant in classroom training is highest in 
large cities, counties and consortia, reflecting cost-of-living 
differences probably as much as intensity differences. OJT 
costs are lowest for the smallest prime sponsors and for
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states. Prime sponsors which place a heavy emphasis on 
training under Title HBC also emphasize training under their 
structural public service employment and youth programs.
Differences in participant mix and in economic conditions 
are much more powerful in explaining the variability in out 
comes than the variability in training emphases and costs. 
Differences in participant mix—age distribution, race, sex, 
and welfare recipient shares—differences in area condi 
tions—unemployment rates, economic growth rates and quit 
rates—and differences in activities—on-the-job and 
classroom training shares, average lengths of stay and costs 
per enrollee—explained almost two-fifths of the variance in 
prime sponsor placement rates under Title IIBC in fiscal 
1980. Of these factors, the activities dimensions—training 
shares, lengths of stay and unit costs—had the least impact. 
For instance, more OJT contributed to higher placement 
rates but a standard deviation increase in the OJT share was 
associated with less than a fifth of a standard deviation in 
crease in the placement rate. In contrast, a standard devia 
tion increase in the unemployment rate was related to a stan 
dard deviation decrease in the placement rate. Yet the fact 
remains that the placement success of a prime sponsor is not 
foreordained by participant characteristics, economic condi 
tions or service patterns. Three-fifths of the variance in 
placement rates was not explained by detailed regression 
equations including a diversity of variables, suggesting that 
much may depend on the management of and emphasis on 
placement at the local level.
The Delivery Level Perspective
From the prime sponsor's perspective, the benefits of 
classroom training vs. work experience are not as apparent 
as the national impact studies would suggest. Prime sponsors 
do not undertake long-term follow-up, nor do they attempt 
to secure comparison groups in order to measure net im-
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pacts. They focus, instead, on short-term outcomes and the 
gains from entry to exit. Immediately at exit from CETA, 
the employment rates for 1976 work experience participants 
were higher than for classroom trainees (52 compared with 
29 percent). At the three-month follow-up, the differential 
was still in favor of work experience (52 to 46 percent). Even 
though the work experience group was more likely to be 
employed a month before entry, its gains from entry to exit 
were significantly greater than for classroom trainees, and 
from entry to three-month post-termination they were about 
the same. Work experience is also shorter and less costly per 
person year, so more people can be served by the work ap 
proach. At the same time, the public gets back a useful social 
product and locally-financed transfer payments may be 
reduced during the period of participation since wages offset 
welfare benefits while allowances do not. In other words, the 
benefit-cost calculus is different at the local level, and the 
emphasis on work experience is rational even if not socially 
optimal.
Likewise, the case for long-duration training is not as 
compelling from the local perspective. In the first quarter 
after termination, the percent of time employed for second 
half fiscal 1975 classroom trainees who stayed between half a 
year and a year was 46 percent, compared to 43 percent for 
those staying 30 to 90 days. The differential was 57 vs. 47 
percent over the entire post-termination year and 66 vs. 54 
percent in the second post-termination year. In other words, 
a 90-day follow-up would not show the greater relative gains 
made by the longer-term trainees. Based on prime sponsor 
placement rates for trainees of varying lengths of stay, and 
assuming costs proportional to length of stay, the cost per 
placement recorded by the prime sponsor for the 30 to 60 day 
training would be three-tenths that of training activities of 
over half a year's duration. With local pressure to serve more 
individuals, and Department of Labor pressure to reduce
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unit costs, it is not surprising that shorter training is em 
phasized.
Federal Rules and Oversight
The prime sponsors operate within the framework of 
federal regulations and federal oversight. The "feds" review 
the activity plans prepared each year by prime sponsors, but 
leave to local decisionmakers the choice among allowable ac 
tivities and among different subgroups in the eligible popula 
tion, as long as specified procedures are followed. The ex 
ception is the youth share requirement. The Youth Employ 
ment and Demonstration Projects Act of 1977 required that 
prime sponsors maintain youth service levels under Title 
IIBC at the pre-YEDPA level. Guidelines were introduced to 
enforce maintenance of effort, and these reduced the 
downtrend in youth shares which had been occurring each 
year since the implementation of CETA. The regression 
results suggest, however, that there is very little statistical 
relationship between prime sponsor youth shares and their 
overall emphasis on classroom or on-the-job training, and 
the impact results provide no reason why jobs should be 
preferred over training for youths. There is still significant 
local choice in the degree of emphasis on training.
The Department of Labor seeks to achieve year-to-year 
improvements in placement rates and unit costs in 
negotiating plans, but prime sponsors may justify exceptions 
in the plan or may seek modifications during the year. Ap 
parently, there is not too much pressure since the planned Ti 
tle IIBC placement rate approved for fiscal 1980, after the 
modification process had occurred, was below the level in 
fiscal 1979 and only 1 percentage point above the level in 
fiscal 1978. The variance in planned placement rates or the 
training shares is almost the same as the variance in actual 
placement rates and training shares.
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The stick necessary to give leverage to the annual plan ap 
proval and goals-formulation process is the performance 
review at the end of the year. After a top-to-bottom assess 
ment which considers goal attainment in the previous year, 
prime sponsors are rated as either eligible for immediate 
funding, as needing corrective actions over the next year, or 
as having serious problems that must be solved before fund 
ing. Unfortunately, the quality of training is given minimal 
weight in this assessment and no prime sponsor in 1980 
received a serious problem rating because of training. The 
only enforcement occurred when vocational education set- 
asides were grossly underspent or training requirements 
under IID not met, i.e., quantitative requirements establish 
ed in the law; but such issues involved only three of the 69 
prime sponsors rated overall as having significant problems. 
Process issues such as equal opportunity enforcement and 
monitoring procedures have been the major concern of end- 
of-year reviews and thus receive predominant attention by 
prime sponsors.
The federal regulations do not preclude long-term train 
ing. The regulations suggest that length of training should be 
determined according to guidelines provided in a Bureau of 
Labor Statistics publication detailing requirements for dif 
ferent jobs. This source suggests that six months is the 
minimum training period for almost any occupation in 
which classroom or on-the-job training occurs under CETA, 
and even in these cases there is a presupposition of basic 
competencies which are frequently lacking for CETA par 
ticipants and which would require extra time in addition to 
the vocational preparation. Since less than 1 percent of fiscal 
1976 classroom training entrants stayed in CETA for more 
than 450 days, the two-year limitation of training introduced 
in 1978 (which allows for six months further of unstipended 
training) cannot be considered an impediment to longer 
courses.
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The regulations do limit on-the-job training. In terms of 
costs, outcomes and public perceptions, OJT is desirable 
from a local perspective. While prime sponsors have varying 
success in securing employer cooperation, even the most suc 
cessful would probably like to do more. If a standard pro 
portion of IIBC participants in OJT were increased by a 
standard deviation, i.e., to a level now achieved by the best 
one-sixth of prime sponsors, there would still be less than a 
fifth of Title IIBC participants in OJT. The problem, then, is 
not so much the management of the component, but its 
design. Quite simply, the payments to the employers do not 
compensate for the risk in hiring someone of less certain 
qualifications and the paperwork involved. An experiment 
with alternative subsidy levels for the hiring of disadvantag- 
ed 16-19 year-old students has demonstrated that employers 
are responsive to higher subsidy levels, and that the response 
rate escalates when the participant is payrolled from CETA 
for a try-out period rather than hired first by the employer. 
The evidence strongly suggests that a redesign of the OJT 
regulations would be productive.
Federal Leverage Mechanisms
The federal measures which have most affected the level 
and duration of classroom training are the supplemental 
vocational education set-aside (6 percent of Title IIBC 
funds), the legislatively mandated training requirement 
under public service employment (which was 15 percent of 
Title IID PSE expenditures in fiscal 1980), and the HIRE 
and Skills Training Improvement Programs (STIP) which 
provided funds for on-the-job training and long-duration 
classroom training respectively, but only to those prime 
sponsors who could use the money and meet requirements. 
The increase in the vocational education set-aside from 5 to 6 
percent in the 1978 amendments, the operation of the STIP 
program (supported with discretionary funds) and the PSE
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training requirements, also implemented in 1978, accounted 
for all of the increase in local classroom training activity be 
tween fiscal 1978 and fiscal 1980. The Private Sector In 
itiatives Program which established local Private Industry 
Councils (PICs) and set aside funds for "private-sector" 
oriented activities has increased the share of funds going to 
training, simply because work experience is deemphasized in 
the funds allocated for PICs. The early results suggest that 
the PICs are not having an easier time marketing OJT than 
prime sponsors, and, hence, turn to classroom training and 
transition services. The expectations that business participa 
tion in decisionmaking and the intermediation of a business 
oriented group in the delivery process would make OJT more 
attractive, placement easier and employer cooperation much 
more likely were unquestionably exaggerated. PICs may do 
marginally better than prime sponsors, and the increment 
may be worth the cost, but more fundamental changes in 
policies and practices will be necessary to improve the effec 
tiveness of local programs in private sector placement.
Lessons from Job Corps
The Job Corps, operating under national direction and 
drawing participants from all areas of the country, offers 
several important lessons for the design and management of 
training activities:
First, intensive investments per individual are only likely 
when there is clear authorization and are only justified when 
the clients are extremely disadvantaged and are provided op 
portunities for significant gains. To achieve these ends, it is 
necessary to clearly specify both the service mix and the 
eligibility focus in the law and regulations, and to shift more 
responsibility to the national or perhaps state level rather 
than locally, where there are so many pressures to both dilute 
service intensity or to "cream" whenever significant oppor 
tunities are provided. The demography of Job Corps par-
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ticipants has changed hardly at all over the years and the 
legislative stipulation of services has thwarted the attempts 
by budget cutters and critics of intensive investments to trim 
the sinew and bone rather than the fat from the program.
Second, one of the most important factors behind the Job 
Corps' impact is mobility. The program draws individuals 
from areas of greatest need—usually where institutions are 
overburdened or nonexistent—and provides exposure to 
alternatives as well as a sense of independence. The number 
of intercity moves for job-related reasons is more than twice 
as high for Job Corps participants as for controls in the 18 
months after termination. Job Corps is the only CETA pro 
gram which is not localized. Most "national" programs 
funded under Title III of CETA provide extra service and 
delivery options which augment local activities but involve 
neither recruitment from multiple prime sponsors nor 
mobility of participants.
Third, three-fifths of Job Corps centers are operated on a 
contract basis by private corporations or nonprofit organiza 
tions. Competition provides options. Where a contractor 
performs poorly, another can be selected. In contrast, it is 
extremely difficult to suspend decisionmaking and manage 
ment authority of a local government unit. It is particularly 
difficult to fire the local bureaucracies directing the pro 
grams. And where the same government units are responsi 
ble for decisionmaking and management, they are likely to 
choose the approaches which are easiest or safest to manage, 
rather than what may be best for participants. Private sector 
management per se is not necessarily more effective—at least 
this has not been the case in Job Corps, where nonprofit and 
public managers of contract centers have done as well as 
private corporations—but the competition provided by the 
contract approach, the flexibility to hire and fire, the separa 
tion of program decisionmaking and program management, 
have all proved beneficial. By the same token, there are
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economies of scale and the potential for specialization of 
staff and standardization of management approaches which 
result where private or nonprofit contractors operate multi 
ple sites. Operation of the larger Job Corps centers is as com 
plex as management of local employment and training ac 
tivities (the annual budgets are larger for some Job Corps 
centers than for many prime sponsors), and the option is cer 
tainly one that should be utilized where local public sector 
management has been deficient.
Fourth, the Job Corps system provides a complete spec 
trum of opportunities ranging from special aid to the learn 
ing disabled all the way to college options for Corps 
members who advance rapidly, from vocational training in 
janitorial work for persons unable to perform any other jobs 
to multi-year training as computer customer engineers. If in 
dividuals cannot be served appropriately at one center, they 
can be moved to a component at another. Instruction is in 
dividualized and self-paced, while achievements are recorded 
and rewarded. The standardized educational programs are 
based around a diagnostic, prescriptive and progress 
measurement system. Most available public and private sec 
tor materials have been screened and cross-referenced to this 
system, so that there are a number of options to suit the in 
terests and needs of each individual. Likewise, training of 
ferings are based around competency-based achievement 
standards for each vocation, with a record of progress for 
each individual. Thus, enrollees are placed according to 
ability or interest, can advance as rapidly as possible, and 
can compete for advanced opportunities available within the 
system based on performance within the system. Financial 
and nonfinancial incentives based on measured ac 
complishments increase the effort of Corps members. This 
approach is in marked contrast to CETA which offers a 
"one-shot" treatment in most cases, with few incentives for 
performance, no record of achievement, and limited oppor 
tunities for "quantum leaps."
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Fifth, all activities in Job Corps operate under detailed na 
tional standards dictating minimum qualitative and quan 
titative inputs. On-site reviews can then assure that input 
standards are met. The use of a standardized competency 
assessment and progress systems for the vocational and 
educational components allows comparison across centers. 
Because there is the same essential mix of services from 
center to center, enrollee surveys can be and are used to iden 
tify potential problems in components. Most critically, with 
costs negotiated and itemized by detailed component, and 
with components relatively standardized, outcomes relative 
to national norms can be used to assess performance. 
Because the service mix and intensity of local CETA opera 
tions is so variable and because there are no qualitative stan 
dards, it is difficult to get the same torque on performance 
measurement systems. Not surprisingly, the coefficients of 
variation in Job Corps outcome measures from center to 
center are far smaller than those for prime sponsor opera 
tions. The poor performing center operators have few ex 
cuses, and hence low performers are subject to greater 
pressures and are more likely to improve over time.
Sixth, recruitment and placement are the weak links of 
nationally-directed programs such as Job Corps, and they re 
quire more attention. Job Corps recruits through its own 
system of contractors, usually state Job Services. Few prime 
sponsors use Job Corps as a treatment alternative on a 
regular basis. Some enrollees could be better served in local 
programs, while many participants in local CETA activities 
should be in Job Corps. Job Corps also has its own largely 
separate placement system that works in getting completers 
into jobs, but does not help dropouts and partial completers 
for the most part (in contrast to local classroom training 
where placement is more often provided to participants 
whatever their duration of stay). As a result, many Corps 
members have depressed earnings during the first month or
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so after termination even though they eventually break even 
or surpass like nonparticipants. This transition could be 
eased if local prime sponsors had the responsibility of plac 
ing individuals sent off to Job Corps for training and subse 
quently returning to the locality without a job, and if they 
were notified immediately or even before scheduled exit. In 
other words, local activities must be better linked with 
nationally-operated programs. They must begin to operate in 
tandem as a system rather than as isolated activities.
Improving Policy and Programs
Needed Directions of Change
The detailed analysis of all the facts and figures on train 
ing and its impacts reduced to some rather simple conclu 
sions: CETA (or its successor) should be putting more 
emphasis on training rather than work experience or job 
creation. On-the-job training, in particular, needs to be ex 
panded and the duration of institutional training should be 
extended. Placement efforts should go hand-in-hand with 
this training, with a focus on training-related placement, 
particularly when there are substantial training investments. 
Competency attainment should be emphasized and stan 
dards should be maintained for participants. Career oppor 
tunities should be available for those who prove themselves 
in the system.
The CETA system is not now designed or managed to 
achieve these ends. This is a statement of fact, not a critique. 
CETA's mission over the last decade has been, first and 
foremost, to create jobs, which was probably appropriate as 
the economy strained to absorb the exponentially increasing 
numbers of youth and female labor force participants. 
Evidence in support of new missions and approaches has not 
been available until recently. The decline in the number of 
labor force entrants which will provide the imperative for
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change are only beginning to occur. Yet if past patterns are 
justified, they also offer clues concerning the changes in 
policy and practice most likely to move the system along the 
paths which are, in light of new evidence and emerging labor 
market trends, now more appropriate.
Guidance for Local Decisions
Decentralization and decategorization were initiated under 
GET A in the belief that decisions about services, delivery 
agents and participants could best be made at the local level 
in response to local conditions. Diversity was both expected 
and desired. A planning system and procedural rules were 
formalized to assure a fair and reasoned set of decisions, 
placing primary reliance on an analysis of labor market con 
ditions as a guide to local decisions. It would be expected, 
then, that areas with similar economic conditions or similar 
target groups would tend to adopt similar choices among in 
tervention alternatives. Recognizing the crudeness of area 
data as well as participants, service mix and outcome 
measures, it is still surprising that the service patterns which 
vary so markedly bear little relation to either area unemploy 
ment rates—the primary consideration in planning and 
allocation—or to the proportion of youth served—the par 
ticipant mix variable expected to have the largest impact on 
the choice of local service strategy. The local factors which 
seem to affect decisions most are the structure of the deci- 
sionmaking unit and the historical patterns rather than the 
problems which are addressed. Certainly the findings 
eliminate many of the most common excuses of prime spon 
sors, i.e., that training does not occur because the "feds" 
force too many youth to be served or that below average 
OJT enrollments are necessitated by high unemployment, or 
that placement rates cannot be improved because of the par 
ticipant mix or area conditions.
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A basic issue is whether local decisionmakers know best 
what should be done in light of local conditions, and whether 
priority should be placed on adapting to these conditions 
rather than helping to move people where jobs and better 
training are available. A rational local decisionmaker con 
scientiously assessing placement rates, costs and three month 
follow-up results might rationally decide to emphasize work 
experience, or to put two people through 20-week training 
rather than offer one participant 40 weeks of training. From 
the local viewpoint, the effectiveness differentials do not 
square with those estimated by the "ivory tower" national 
impact studies. If the rational decision based on local 
evidence is also expedient—for instance, helping to meet 
public needs and reducing local payrolls through an em 
phasis on work experience rather than training—all the bet 
ter! If residents must be placed in local jobs and if these are 
scarce, the training options or payoffs may be limited so that 
job creation and short training for menial positions is most 
effective. It is not a condemnation of the quality of local 
decisionmakers to suggest that they may not know best in 
certain contexts because their perspectives are in some cases 
too limited, and the contexts may not be most appropriate 
for the individuals who are served.
Refocusing Federal Oversight
Because of the difficulty in pinning down activities, ser 
vices, or outcomes, much less the interrelationships between 
them, performance monitoring has been basically a ritual ex 
ercise. Where the diversity is so great because of local flex 
ibility and the lack of federal standards, it is difficult to 
second-guess any local decision or to judge local outcomes. 
Unlike Job Corps, where one center is very much like 
another, and the activities are defined by a set of detailed re 
quirements for each element, the descriptors for local ac 
tivities which are used in the federally-mandated manage-
140
ment information system are not very specific and the con 
tent standards for activities are almost nonexistent. 
"Classroom training," even in a single prime sponsor, may 
range from a few hours of motivational and character 
development activities to full-time occupational training for 
a year or more. Outcome measures are not even tied to these 
broad categories nor are the individuals identified who par 
ticipate in any specific activity. The outcome measures are 
also so vague that they tell very little about performance; it is 
doubtful whether a "positive termination" really means 
anything and impossible to tell whether a "placement" is 
training related. Without the ability to measure what ac 
tivities are occurring, without standards about what should, 
as a minimum, go into each of these activities, and without 
outcome measures available by characteristic of participants 
and services received, it is impossible to make judgments 
about whether the activities are adequate or the outcomes 
appropriate. Hence, the federal oversight system focuses 
neither on inputs and their quality, nor on outputs and their 
meaningfulness, but rather on processes. Acceptable pro 
cesses do not guarantee and in fact may not even promote 
wise decisions or positive results. For instance, the summer 
programs operated by prime sponsors were acceptable until 
recently as long as plans were filed and the numbers of par 
ticipants counted. Yet inadequate worksite activities, poor 
supervision, and slack worksite standards were found in 
recurring assessments by the General Accounting Office. 
Beginning in 1978 the Department of Labor began to specify 
standards about what was required in worksites, provided 
models, demanded specification of activities in worksite 
agreements and used these agreements as an instrument in 
massively expanded on-site monitoring. There were substan 
tial improvements in the quality of worksite activities as a 
result of this emphasis on quality and on-site monitoring. 
These improvements were documented by the GAO but were 
no more visible in the management information collected by
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the Department of Labor than were the earlier shortcomings. 
In fact, unit costs rose noticeably as a result of increased 
management and monitoring efforts and more enrichment of 
worksite activities.
In a system which focuses on aggregates, and on quantity 
over quality, there is little incentive for the prime sponsor to 
develop high quality, intensive components. If these served 
only a small proportion of participants, their effectiveness 
would be completely hidden in a mass of numbers under the 
current management information system. Likewise, the 
"feds" could not easily assess intensive investment programs 
locally. Despite the massive paperwork requirements on 
local systems, the management information system does not 
collect the right information needed to support local or 
federal management, or to promote either long-term training 
or the progression of individuals in an orderly way through 
the system.
The "bogeyman" of the heavy-handed federal govern 
ment squelching local creativity and dictating decisions turns 
out to be a pussycat. There is no evidence that the federal 
regulations or the federal oversight restrict the amount or 
duration of classroom training undertaken by prime spon 
sors. The law clearly allows for two-year training courses, 
but local pressures result in the broadest distribution of 
limited resources. OJT is restricted because what is allowable 
is difficult to market, but federal oversight is certainly not 
the reason many prime sponsors do so little OJT. Yet if the 
federal presence is largely neutral concerning the exercise of 
local discretion over activity mix and design, the oversight is 
not benign. It focuses attention on ritual processes while pro 
viding no direction as to what is important. If the "feds" 
cannot or do not say what works or what the standards 
should be, nor do they review quality, neither can the local 
decisionmakers when dealing with politically connected local 
delivery agents. Why create new training institutions or ap-
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preaches when existing deliverers are clamoring for support 
and there are no incentives and few performance or impact 
standards for justifying alternatives? Why concentrate 
resources when low costs and services for more participants 
are favored by both local politicians and federal monitors? 
Why worry about relocation (which usually results in an out 
cry from some local residents and politicians) when planning 
is focused on local opportunities, and procedural re 
quirements are focused on choosing between local delivery 
agents? It takes all the ingenuity and resources available to 
the prime sponsor to avoid the process pitfalls that will be 
scrutinized in federal review, and to generate the plans and 
modifications that have little to do with operational realities.
If more and longer classroom training is needed as well as 
more OJT, past experience provides examples of how this 
can be accomplished—to a large extent simply by ar 
ticulating what is wanted in sufficient detail, utilizing perfor 
mance measures which can identify whether it is being ac 
complished, and providing funds specifically for the desired 
purposes. More classroom training can be accomplished by 
expanding the state set-aside or targeting local resources that 
can only be spent on training (i.e., the PSIP approach), by 
requirements for training under work experience as in PSE, 
or by an overlaid competitively-funded program such as 
STIP. Longer training can be accomplished by duration 
specifications for these earmarked and extra dollars, by em 
phasis from the federal level, and by the use of management 
information system descriptors that identify costs for 
specific types of services so that false economies are not 
achieved by simply shifting to less intensive activities within 
broad service descriptors. Marginally more OJT can be ac 
complished by guidelines, set-asides or competitive funding 
to areas able to move OJT dollars, but the real answer is to 
change the formula to provide for "try-out" employment 
before a hiring decision or training contract is signed with 
the employer.
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These actions would focus federal policy, but would not 
represent a reduction in local control, since there are already 
copious set-asides, categorical titles, minimum spending re 
quirements and the like. The key is to align these re 
quirements so that they achieve a coherent policy and pro 
vide clear guidance.
The real issue, then, is whether a consistent national policy 
can be developed and sustained. Currently the local CETA 
system tries to do everything it is told to do, and make the 
most rational decisions based on the evidence at hand, but 
the directions are not clear and the locus of decisionmaking 
inappropriate. The answer is not a new program model, or 
more vigorous performance monitoring, or redistribution of 
decisionmaking authority, although all these steps may be re 
quired. The need is rather to determine what we are trying to 
achieve, to set long-range goals, and to choose the next steps 
that will, with the least rupture to the present system, move it 
in these directions.
The dramatic decline in labor force entrants projected for 
the next two decades will create shortages of entry workers, 
increasing the importance and potential of training. The 
ends and means of the CETA system or its successor should 
be reoriented in light of future prospects and the evidence 
that long-term training pays off most. Training rather than 
job creation should receive priority. Where jobs are provid 
ed, they should be combined with and lead into training. 
Participants willing and able to make a "quantum leap" 
should be provided the opportunity. Placement must be em 
phasized, particularly for long-duration training. 
Mechanisms are needed to facilitate mobility from high 
unemployment and poverty areas.
Sagging productivity during the 1970s and the decline of 
our relative economic growth taught us the dangers of short- 
term perspectives, inadequate and erratic investments in
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capital and equipment, and wasteful use of scarce natural 
resources. The lessons are equally applicable to human 
resources. The future of the economy and the social fabric 
depends in great measure on our willingness to initiate and 
sustain policies which will develop of those who have tradi 
tionally been discarded and ignored, but who will be needed 
more in the coming decades.
At least on this one issue, the prescriptions to achieve equi 
ty and efficiency are coincident. Those who preach the 
supply-side Gospel, as well as those concerned with 
mitigating the inequalities which have proved resistant to 
short-duration interventions, should be able to find common 
ground in support of more intensive training investments for 









The most important theme to emerge in the last decade of 
evaluation and research centered on employment and train 
ing programs is that the nuts and bolts of delivery 
mechanisms can be as important as program design in deter 
mining the ultimate usefulness of labor market interven 
tions. To be credible, an analysis of training programs needs 
to examine what happens as well as why and how it happens. 
This point has been driven home again in evaluations of 
labor market programs operated by local prime sponsors 
under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act 
(GETA). The variations in outcomes between different train 
ing strategies that labor economics has taught us to expect 
have been swamped by variations in management styles and 
a host of environmental factors.
This evaluation of CETA training in the Baltimore 
Metropolitan Area Manpower Consortium attempts to 
analyze the context in which training is done and the rela 
tionship between that and the quality of training.
The Baltimore Metropolitan Area Manpower Consortium 
is almost legendary in the short history of CETA. It has a 
reputation for competence, effectiveness, and innovation. 
On closer inspection, this author finds some blemishes, but is 
convinced that the federal employment and training system 
has a showcase in Baltimore that offers some valuable
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lessons for other GET A prime sponsors. Accordingly, this 
report does not consider details of every aspect of the prime 
sponsor's training operations. The scope of the description 
and analysis was narrowed where it was logical and did not 
jeopardize the important themes.
The report focuses on "adult" training, which is to be 
distinguished from training provided under separate CETA 
youth programs. Although the report recognizes the broad 
definition of "training" that Baltimore uses—a definition 
that encompasses almost every activity allowable under 
CETA—the main emphasis is on occupational skill training; 
the important exceptions are noted. Finally, the report looks 
primarily at only the consortium-wide programs, excluding 
certain smaller programs run within individual counties.
The author is grateful for the cooperation given by the 
consortium managers and the various service delivery staffs; 
it was essential. He is especially indebted to Marion Pines, 
Director of the Mayor's Office of Manpower Resources, and 
her staff—Mark Horowitz, Joel Lee, and Marguerite Walsh 
in particular.
The Prime Sponsor Area
The Baltimore Metropolitan Area Manpower Consortium 
comprises Baltimore City and four surrounding counties: 
Anne Arundel, Carroll, Harford, and Howard. The prime 
sponsorship serves an area of about 1,646 square miles and a 





Anne Arundel County 361,200
Carroll County 92,500
149
Harford County 146,200 
Howard County 116,600
An estimated 12 percent of the population was eligible to 
receive CETA services in fiscal 1979. Nearly 8 percent of the 
population was receiving AFDC, state or local public 
assistance, and approximately 13 percent of the population 
in the area was from families whose income was less than the 
OMB poverty guideline. A quarter of the total population 
was nonwhite, while slightly more than half of the city's 
population was nonwhite. No figures were available for the 
Hispanic population.
The Economy
The city of Baltimore and northern Anne Arundel County 
are heavily industrialized and Howard County is becoming 
increasingly developed with light industrial parks. Carroll, 
Harford and southern Anne Arundel Counties are still large 
ly rural and mostly bedroom communities. The overall 
character and well-being of the economy, however, is a func 
tion of Baltimore.
It has experienced a renaissance in the last decade, thanks 
to creative and energetic local leadership and a massive infu 
sion of federal money for mass transportation, urban 
renewal, community development and manpower develop 
ment. It is no boomtown by sunbelt standards but in com 
parison to other large northeastern industrial cities, its 
economy has been doing well. Unlike those other north 
eastern urban areas, Baltimore's growth over the last 30 
years has been steady and positive.
Baltimore's steady growth in labor market opportunities 
belies the dramatic shifts in the composition of the labor 
force, however. In the last thirty years, employment has 
shifted away from manufacturing towards more service and
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government dominated occupations. This trend, which mir 
rors national patterns, is expected to continue.
Political Governance
The relationships among the different political jurisdic 
tions comprising the Baltimore Metropolitan Area Man 
power Consortium are fairly typical of the kind of relation 
ships found in other CETA consortia. However, the institu 
tional setting of the city's manpower operations, which is in 
tegral to the nature of the consortium's managment, is 
atypical.
Baltimore City is the political hub of the manpower con 
sortium. While the resources available through CETA are 
important to Anne Arundel, Carroll, Harford, and Howard 
Counties, the programs are not as visible nor are they of as 
much strategic importance to the local political decision- 
makers. Representatives of the counties participate on the 
advisory council to the consortium and are especially active 
on the council's steering committee. But, by virtue of the 
agreement under which the consortium was established at the 
inception of CETA, the counties grant a great deal of 
authority to the Mayor's Office of Manpower Resources 
(MOMR) in the day-to-day operations and in longer term 
planning and direct contact with the Department of Labor. 
Each of the counties receives a share of services and in 
dividual allocations from the consortium's pot of money. 
But, whether it is because the counties want to avoid the 
potential embarrassment of running CETA programs, or 
because manpower development simply is not high on their 
local agendas, the counties' manpower administrators and 
executives are willing to stay out of the limelight.
The consortium balance of power that has been dictated 
by the formal agreement of delegation of authority has not 
been without costs. Baltimore County withdrew from the
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consortium at the end of fiscal 1979 after years of concern 
over equitable distribution of funds and disagreement over 
MOMR decisionmaking practices, strategies, policies, and 
programs. But so far, the other counties seem to be content 
with the status quo.
One question raised by the Baltimore Consortium's ex 
perience with the internal balance of political power is 
whether consortiums can work when more than one par 
ticipating jurisdiction has an aggressive CETA agenda. 
Although MOMR staff argue that the views and policies of 
all jurisdictions are accommodated, Baltimore County's 
withdrawal from the consortium at the end of fiscal year 
1979 indicates that there are limits to how well the consor 
tium can accommodate more than one jurisidiction with 
clear ideas on how to spend CETA dollars. If this is true of 
other consortia, it certainly raises questions about the merits 
of independent consortium management relative to those 
models dominated by a single jurisdiction, and tradeoffs be 
tween interjurisdictional peace and strong leadership.
CETA Funding
In 1979 only six other non-balance of state prime sponsors 
received CETA allocations exceeding the Baltimore Consor 
tium. The consortium received a total of $82,899,520 in new 
obligational authority under formula allocations and 
$1,112,918 in discretionary funds. The consortium has also 
received more than $42 million in obligational authority to 
operate a 21/2 year guaranteed job program for in-school 
youths and high school dropouts living in certain areas of the 
city. Baltimore also receives money from the governor's of 
fice for individual referrals to programs outside the usual 
training network (Table 1).
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Table 1 CETA Funding for Fiscal 1979, Baltimore Metropolitan Area 
Manpower Consortium
Source




























Governor's money 429,048 1,112,918
Skill training 
and improvement 
program (STIP) 3,558,219 0 1,156,279





a. $42,826,314 total obligational authority through September 30, 1980; $22,000,000 spent 
as of September 30, 1979.
Influences on CETA Operations
Two sets of variables affect training policies and practices 
in Baltimore: those external to MOMR and beyond its con 
trol—mostly relating to governance—and those internal to 
MOMR and within its control—those relating to planning, 
development, and implementation.
External Factors
Some of what is good about the Baltimore training opera 
tions could not be transplanted to other prime sponsors 
because it reflects a combination of governance ar 
rangements that are rare, if not unique to Baltimore. Prob 
ably the single most important factor is the consortium's
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locus of political power, which is based squarely in the city 
of Baltimore. MOMR, exercising administrative and 
representational powers liberally delegated by the four coun 
ties in the consortium, is most directly accountable to the 
mayor of the city of Baltimore, an activist committed to im 
proving the quality of life in Baltimore. This works to the ad 
vantage of MOMR because Baltimore has a "strong mayor" 
system of government granting the mayor authority over all 
city agencies, including the public schools. The mayor also 
virtually controls the "independent" city agency responsible 
for approving all contracts. The mayor is interested in the 
employment and training programs and is not about to let 
them be subordinated to narrow political interest, and sees 
more political mileage in well-run programs. While the 
governance arrangements in the Baltimore consortium work 
to MOMR's advantage, for sponsors where similar condi 
tions of political control and accountability could never be 
achieved, this fact may simply underline the influence of 
politics on the effectiveness of CETA. Moreover, this very 
strength in Baltimore could also be its Achilles heel. MOMR 
operates at the pleasure of the mayor and his goodwill 
undergirds MOMR's operations. But, just as MOMR has 
benefited from the good graces of what might be termed a 
benevolent despot, it could suffer badly at the hands of a less 
enlightened city leader. The enormous degree of flexibility 
which permits MOMR to capitalize on creative thinking and 
dynamic leadership could also lead to swift disintegration 
following a change in local political conditions.
The Baltimore area political environment's influence on 
MOMR also highlights the tradeoff between organizational 
fluidity that permits rapid adaptation for good or ill and in- 
stitutionalization that may rigidly preserve the good with the 
bad. MOMR's organizational fluidity has served it well dur 
ing its evolution. However, it is not so clear whether
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MOMR's ability to change will make it resistant to the 
vicissitudes of the Baltimore City political agenda.
Other aspects of the governance arrangements also affect 
the stability of the Baltimore Metropolitan Area Manpower 
Consortium, although the relationship is not so clear. The 
consortium, which was set up at the inception of CETA, 
depends heavily on the Mayor's Office of Manpower 
Resources having a dominant central role. On one hand, 
Baltimore City's interest in participating in the consortium 
seems to be premised largely on MOMR's having the 
authority generously given it under terms of the delegation 
of authority agreement signed by consortium members. On 
the other hand, it is not clear how viable MOMR would be 
were it not for the resource base available to it, thanks to the 
consortium. In other words, the critical mass of ad 
ministrative resources (staff, money, political discretion) 
have required a scale of operation that is feasible only with 
the involvement of other jurisdictions, which have been will 
ing to give up administrative resources and a degree of 
authority over how "their" share is spent, in return for the 
savings and convenience of having someone else do the lion's 
share of the work associated with running CETA programs. 
This raises another question about the value of the consor 
tium in Baltimore or any prime sponsor area, and the forces 
which hold it together.
Consortia have been encouraged by the Congress and the 
Department of Labor because it has been assumed that, 
though political jurisdictions are not necessarily conter 
minous with labor markets, federal labor market interven 
tions would be more effective if they were. Creation of con- 
sortia are encouraged as a way, therefore, of encouraging 
delivery of CETA services on a labor market-wide basis. 
Economic theory, however, has not provided the glue to 
keep corsortia together. Consortium bonuses and a readiness
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on the part of some jurisdictions to sacrifice some degree of 
control for the sake of administrative convenience are just 
two factors that appear to be instrumental in holding 
jurisdictions together. The implication is that if national 
policymakers consider changes in consortium incentives, 
they should not underestimate the importance of either of 
these factors, especially the latter, in contributing to consor 
tium stability.
The idea of the necessity of a "critical mass" of ad 
ministrative capacity makes it more desirable for federal 
policymakers to rethink the system of incentives for forming 
consortia. Amendments to CETA have consistently increas 
ed administrative burden without always increasing the 
resources to shoulder that burden. Since the scale of much of 
that burden has not been related to size (all sponsors must 
establish independent monitoring units and meet the same 
reporting requirements, for example), economies of scale are 
likely within consortia. Lacking a dramatic reduction in ad 
ministrative burden, federal policymakers might attempt to 
create more compelling incentives for jurisdictions to form 
consortia, or at least differentiate administrative burdens ac 
cording to prime sponsor size. This might include, for exam 
ple, scaled down or less frequent reporting requirements.
Internal Influences
Many other variables internal to MOMR and under some 
degree of MOMR control are more instructive about what 
makes for effective prime sponsor training policies and prac 
tices.
The MOMR Management Style. MOMR's style of control 
and policy is perhaps the most pervasive ingredient in 
MOMR's overall operations: there is a reason for practically 
everything that is done and the way it is done. The planning, 
contracting, and general management procedures and the
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organizational structure have evolved to serve particular pur 
poses. When changes are made, results are evaluated. If they 
are not what was expected and are not wanted, more changes 
follow. Where there are unanticipated spillovers, they are 
considered and the original decision may be reevaluated. 
What is important is that a deliberative process is followed 
before decisions are made; there are procedures for ex 
ecuting decisions and there is follow-up to assure implemen 
tation and assess consequences.
Management Amid Crisis. The difficulties that prime spon 
sors encounter in planning are practically germane to CETA. 
Uncertainties and delays associated with authorizing legisla 
tion, appropriations, and publication of regulations all 
create a climate in which it is defensible and occasionally 
prudent for local administrators to make no decisions or 
defer them until the latest possible moment. MOMR must 
live with the same vicissitudes, but managers cope better 
than most other prime sponsors by preparing contingency 
plans and hedging bets. It is a riskier style of operation than 
the wait-and-see approach found in more conservative spon- 
sorships, but it has the support of the mayor, no doubt part 
ly because it has not yet led to any major calamities.
Yet MOMR is the exception that proves the point that 
uncertainty in the CETA system must be reduced. MOMR is 
able to cope only because of somewhat extraordinary staff 
competence, a supportive political environment, and prob 
ably, luck. Taking away any ingredient leaves a situation in 
which CETA can become a political liability that is tolerated, 
and whose damage is minimized by keeping it at an arm's 
length from the political center of power. To the extent 
CETA is used as a countercyclical tool, life for prime spon 
sors is likely to be as uncertain as the economy. But stability 
is possible in other areas—as observers have stated 
repeatedly—through multi-year funding for the non-cyclical
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CETA activities and a greater sensitivity in Washington to 
the perils of playing "Crack the Whip" with changing 
regulations and budgetary brinkmanship.
The Importance of a Local Sense of Direction. Local control 
(and good management sense) is not enough, though. 
Another important factor in MOMR's training operations is 
substantive policy content. MOMR's sense of mission goes 
beyond either narrow political interests or compliance with 
the plethora of mandates from USDOL. Organizational 
goals and policies provide a frame of reference for inter 
preting mandates from both local and federal authorities. 
The Baltimore prime sponsorship does not have a reputation 
for being responsive to whims of the USDOL regional office 
because there are in-house agendas that also must be met. 
By the same token, the prime sponsorship has been able to 
withstand certain local pressures by countering them with 
well-articulated policies and procedures.
Not only are there reasons for resisting outside pressures, 
there are also means. MOMR is staffed and led in a way that 
encourages decision and policymaking on the basis of merit. 
Staff is enormously important in permitting this because it is 
well-qualified and experienced. Half the senior staff have 
worked together in the Mayor's Office of Manpower 
Resources since before enactment of CETA. Individually 
they almost all have firsthand experience in administration, 
planning, and direct client services. There is fairly good 
stability at lower staff levels as well. The reasons given for 
the stability are interrelated and might be both causes and ef 
fects of stability; they include good morale, competitive 
salaries, opportunities for career development, and a sense 
of professionalism.
These are not the kinds of ingredients that can be 
transplanted readily to other prime sponsors. But they are 
worth noting because they go hand-in-hand with the kind of
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institutional stability that is possible only over time and only 
in an accepting political climate. Federal mandates can help 
buy stability with stable funding. But to the extent the 
federal hand causes institutions to be out of step with local 
priorities, local political support is jeopardized, and with it, 
the opportunity for institutional continuity.
Aside from the style and philosophy of MOMR's manage 
ment, other factors especially important in affecting the 
prime sponsor's performance include: what training is of 
fered, who provides it, who receives it, and how those deci 
sions are made; curriculum; job placement; and relationship 
with the Department of Labor (Table 2).
Table 2 Enrollments for Fiscal 1979, Baltimore Metropolitan Area 
Manpower Consortium__________________________
Cumulative new Enrollees
enrollment carried over 
On board fiscal year from previous 
Source____Sept. 30,1979 1979______year

































a. As or September 30, 1979.
b. Includes enrollments since start of program in early 1978.
Training Decisions
MOMR's training decisions revolve around three ques 
tions: what training is to be provided, who is to provide it,
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and who is to be trained? At any one time MOMR offers 
training in roughly 25 occupational areas as well as in basic 
educational skills and job search/retention. The list of oc 
cupational areas has approximately doubled since the incep 
tion of CETA, partly in response to shifts in the occupa 
tional mix of the Baltimore labor force. The Skill Training 
and Improvement Program (STIP) and the private industry 
council (PIC) spending CETA Title VII money have been in 
strumental in permitting MOMR to extend the occupational 
skills repertoire into new and growing occupational areas by 
providing net new funds for training and increasing 
MOMR's contracting with for-profit training firms.
MOMR has expanded its training offering into higher 
technology occupational fields in response to changing labor 
market demand, a management philosophy that has en 
couraged flexibility, and federally imposed incentives which 
have encouraged training in occupational areas where 
placements are more likely. The continuing high placement 
rates experienced by MOMR trainees—usually exceeding 75 
percent—reflect the quality of training programs' curricula 
and placement efforts. But the direction of change is 
necessarily requiring more highly qualified trainees. It also 
seems likely to be pushing MOMR more directly into a posi 
tion of duplicating training offered by proprietary institu 
tions. The increasing presence of such institutions as training 
subcontractors to MOMR bears this out. One implication of 
this trend is that if MOMR is not providing services that are 
unavailable otherwise, it becomes more important that 
MOMR assure that the services go to clients who might 
otherwise not receive them.
Another lesson from MOMR's experience is the impor 
tance of new money in producing change. Even in a system 
as flexible and receptive to new ideas as MOMR, the expan 
sion of occupational offerings has been the product largely 
of new money. Net additional funds available under STIP,
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Titles VI, and VII, for example, have provided the resources 
which have permitted new kinds of training without cutting 
back training in more established areas.
What Training is Needed?
In deciding what training to provide, staff utilize the usual 
sources of labor market information such as the Employ 
ment Service and the Bureau of Labor Statistics to determine 
the occupational areas in which labor market demand 
justifies training. Another important source of intelligence 
on labor market conditions is the network of labor market 
advisory committees which represent, among others, 
employers, unions, and trainers. Those committees—one for 
each occupational area or clusterings of related occupational 
areas—advise on the nature of the market demand for new 
workers and the kind of training that is appropriate. Since 
the introduction of the Skill Training and Improvement Pro 
gram (STIP) and the increase in private sector involvement 
through Baltimore's private industry council, changes in 
MOMR's offerings of occupational training have needed to 
be more open-ended to branch out into new occupational 
areas. To meet this need, MOMR has turned to rely increas 
ingly on requests for proposals to stimulate new ideas from 
the training community, instead of approaching possible 
training contractors on the basis of a pre-established agenda.
Though federal pressures for greater use of requests for 
proposals were not a credible framework for justifying new 
policies (and different deliverers), it is not unlikely that the 
use of such open bidding processes can also ease the pressure 
for reconsidering established policies.
Who Should Train?
MOMR contracts with private nonprofit, private for- 
profit, and government agencies (including community col-
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leges) to provide training. There is no evidence of MOMR at 
taching a great deal of weight to the type of deliverer, perse, 
but because of certain other MOMR policies, the bias at the 
margin favors for-profit deliverers. In a machine skills pro 
gram, for example, MOMR made a point of contracting with 
a private firm because it is a major employer in the Baltimore 
area. More generally, though, the bias favors for-profit 
deliverers because they dominate the training field in the 
newer, "high-tech" occupational areas into which MOMR is 
trying to expand.
From year to year, the choice of service deliverers is 
premised on the assumption that unless evidence based on 
MOMR's performance indicates otherwise, trainers can be 
assured of continued business. The funding level is not 
guaranteed; but the assurance of continued funding at some 
level—contingent on satisfactory performance—helps build 
stability and continuity into the training infrastructure.
Who Should be Trained?
In certain respects the choice of who to train is given the 
most attention in MOMR. Enrollment in the occupational 
training program is selective; would-be trainees must meet 
entrance criteria for reading and math skills as well as some 
specialized criteria needed for particular training programs. 
MOMR takes pains to assure that the criteria are valid and 
relevant to the particular training regimen. But, in fact, be 
tween the criteria and the fact that trainers can screen out 
half of the qualified clients referred for training, the occupa 
tional skill training programs prove to be fairly selective in 
who they accept. Clients in the occupational skills training 
programs have higher levels of educational achievement 
from those in other activities and better work histories 
(measured in terms of length and wages of previous employ 
ment).
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There are three reasons for the selective enrollment 
policies that MOMR practices in its occupational skills train 
ing programs. First, MOMR managers will not in 
discriminately enroll anyone in skill training; would-be 
trainees cannot learn new skills if they are functionally il 
literate, for example. Second, MOMR is selective because it 
uses performance contracting for most of its occupational 
skills training. When contractors are paid on the basis of ab 
solute performance—placement of trainees in jobs—and not 
relative performance—gains in skill performance, for ex 
ample—they have a compelling interest in "creaming" refer 
rals to select the most qualified, motivated, and job-ready. 
The Department of Labor's emphasis on absolute outcome 
measures reinforces MOMR's performance standards. 
Third, MOMR's willingness to be selective about who gets 
into occupational skills training also stems from its efforts to 
please employers, because such training is geared more to 
meeting employer needs than to meeting clients needs.
MOMR compensates for selectivity in the occupational 
skills training programs by referring some clients with low 
skill levels to PSE jobs that can impart skills. The rationale is 
that the PSE jobs have training content which, though less 
structured, is better adapted to the needs and capabilities of 
clients functioning at low levels of educational achievement. 
Other clients with low levels of educational achievement or 
barriers to employment are referred to job search/retention 
and basic educational training. But the clients referred to 
training other than occupational skills training clearly are at 
a disadvantage. MOMR's own evaluations show that these 
clients do not fare as well as those going through the 
classroom training and on-the-job training. Moreover, 
MOMR has no systematic approach to channeling the lower 
achieving clients into occupational skill training, once they 
have had more basic assistance and are capable of learning 
more sophisticated job skills.
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Though plans call for providing a sequence of activities 
for more MOMR clients, certain factors work against it. 
Both work experience and public service employment are 
now integral components in MOMR's overall training offer 
ings because they are important developmental steps that 
provide progressively more structured training to clients 
needing the most help. Unfortunately, statutory restrictions 
on length of client enrollments in these activities prevent 
their use as one link in a long term training plan. Conse 
quently, MOMR can offer only a limited sequence and dura 
tion of developmental services; this might be satisfactory for 
clients close to being job-ready, but it is likely to be insuffi 
cient for clients with multiple barriers to employment. Fur 
thermore, the USDOL's use of per-enrollee and per- 
placement costs as the basis for evaluating costs favors 
minimization of those costs and hence discourages long term 
participation by the most disadvantaged clients.
MOMR's policies regarding what kinds of clients receive 
what kinds of services can be seen as a rejection of the 
popular assertion that CETA is for the worst-off. In fact, 
while MOMR's policies do not hew to the rhetoric associated 
with CETA, they are very responsive to the incentives and 
disincentives built into DOL's management of CETA. If the 
Congress and Department of Labor are serious about CETA 
serving clients with severe or multiple barriers to employ 
ment, both statutory and regulatory changes are needed to 
permit prime sponsors to choose between providing limited 
services to large numbers of eligibles, and providing more in 
tensive services to smaller numbers. At a minimum, limita 
tions on duration of participation must be relaxed when ser 
vices are provided as part of a planned developmental se 
quence. At the same time, the basis for evaluating prime 
sponsor costs should be changed from per-enrollee to a per- 
period of service basis. Client outcomes should also be 
evaluated in terms of relative gains and not absolute out 
come measures, as they presently are.
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'Twixt the Cup and the Lip: The 
Matter of Execution
Planning in MOMR is more effective and useful than 
usual because it is articulated with operations. The top 
managers' experience in both functions has prevented "plan 
ning" from becoming an isolated function; plans are turned 
into a contract package which becomes the basis for 
negotiating services and monitoring deliverers' performance. 
This arrangement has more firmly institutionalized 
MOMR's past planning efforts to unify planning and pro 
gram development in a way that forced program implica 
tions to flow from what otherwise could have been rather dry 
and abstract plans. Finally, MOMR's use of performance 
contracting creates a "market" for training program output; 
by making payment contingent on successful completion by 
trainees and placement in jobs, MOMR is able to reinforce 
the connection between planning and implementation.
It is hard to argue with the success of MOMR's planning 
and development practices. For that reason alone they 
deserve scrutiny. But they are also noteworthy because they 
are somewhat at odds with much of the conventional wisdom 
about what constitutes "good" CETA management.
First, MOMR's planning is mostly incremental, accepting 
previous policies and practices unless there are compelling 
reasons for changes. But the policy of minimal change does 
not reflect a lack of affirmative policymaking. Rather, it at 
tempts economy of motion in a state of local CETA practice 
in which fine-tuning rather than massive overhaul is more 
appropriate. MOMR top management deliberately avoids an 
annual top-to-bottom review of all aspects of operations 
because it is felt that labor markets, contractor capacity, and 
resource levels will not change dramatically from year to 
year.
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After the federal government's bad experiences with an 
nual top-to-bottom planning under zero based budgeting, 
public administrators have learned that incremental planning 
does have some virtue. For example, the 1978 CETA amend 
ments relaxed requirements that had required a complete an 
nual plan from prime sponsors; now a more limited annual 
plan is submitted to indicate significant operational objec 
tives and amend, if necessary, a more permanent master 
plan.
But MOMR's experience is not an unqualified endorse 
ment of incremental planning. Rather, it indicates that in 
cremental planning works when a sound, long term plan and 
underlying objectives are in place. A danger that both prime 
sponsors and DOL officials overseeing prime sponsors 
should be aware of is that incremental planning in a badly 
designed system can be nonproductive or counterproductive 
when it merely fine-tunes a dysfunctional system.
A second feature of planning in MOMR that is somewhat 
at odds with "good" CETA management is the lack of at 
tention given to developing the advisory capacity of its plan 
ning council. The formally mandated planning council is not 
ignored, but the staff do not see it as a valuable institutional 
asset, and members of the council do not see it as the best 
forum for influence. MOMR has chosen instead to rely 
primarily on its labor market advisory committees and its 
private industry council as sources of input from outsiders. 
MOMR's network of labor market advisory committees 
predates CETA, although the number of occupational areas 
on which committees advise has increased. The advisory 
committees have served a number of valuable purposes. 
They have served as a means for corroborating information 
on labor market demand collected from more traditional 
sources (the Employment Service and the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, for example) and as a source of information on
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occupation-specific training and experience requirements for 
would-be workers. The committees also provide a forum for 
a number of community voices where they can advise on the 
issues in which they are well-versed. Finally, the committees 
provide a mechanism by which participants—private 
employers, in particular—can have a sense of ownership in 
MOMR's programs. Because of the success MOMR has had 
with its advisory committees, the Department of Labor's 
regional office has not been insistent about getting the plan 
ning council more actively involved. Although Baltimore's 
private industry council has not been in place for long, the 
PIC has effectively carved out an active advisory role for 
itself and is also assuming responsibility for private-public 
sector bridge activities.
Experience so far with the CETA advisory councils, 
documented elsewhere, clearly indicates that their role needs 
to be re-thought. Requirements for the councils were written 
into the law as a way of forcing state and local government 
officials to give voice to members of the community that 
might be ignored otherwise, and to create a channel for the 
flow of outside ideas for CETA officials to consider in plan 
ning and evaluating their operations. Yet analysts studying 
CETA have delivered a virtually unanimous verdict that the 
councils are ineffective relative to the time, effort, and 
resources invested in them.
MOMR's experience is instructive on two counts. First, it 
shows that in even a relatively well managed prime sponsor, 
an advisory council is of limited usefulness. Second, it shows 
that an outside advisory group representing a cross-section 
of interests can play a real and useful role in the context of a 
more structured decisionmaking environment.
The main lesson from Baltimore with respect to advisory 
councils is that, at the very least, Washington policymakers 
ought to permit a variety of advisory council models.
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Operational Components in MOMR
MOMR goes to great pains to assure that there is a full 
range of training services to meet the range of client needs. 
Yet, though MOMR managers argue that client needs can be 
met by the range of services offered, other factors build in 
biases that can work against easy client access to services. 
Almost all the occupational skills programs and virtually all 
the job search/retention and basic educational skills pro 
grams are run on fixed cycles with pre-established starting 
and completion dates. MOMR's fixed curriculum approach 
is not costless. Managers point out that individual assistance 
is possible, but self-paced learning in the occupational skills 
program is not feasible on a full-scale basis. The fixed cur 
riculum makes it all the more imperative that would-be 
trainees be screened to assure they have the requisite abilities 
to keep up with the training program. Furthermore, while 
fixed cycles and starting dates make it easier to manage the 
programs, it means that clients may have to be put "on 
hold" until a new training course starts. The fixed schedules 
also make scheduling participation in different programs 
more difficult. MOMR's job search/retention and basic 
educational skills programs are designed to accommodate 
more self-paced learning. They, too, have fixed starting 
dates and schedules for completion, but the curriculum is 
better adapted to meeting particular client needs and actual 
completion time varies from client to client.
To the extent MOMR and other prime sponsors may find 
themselves, in the future, under pressure to serve more 
severely disadvantaged clients, sponsors may find themselves 
trying to serve a less homogeneous clientele, making it less 
feasible to run fixed cycle training programs because the 
trainees will require a wider range of individualized attention 
and services. It is not possible to compare the merits of fixed 
cycle programs to open entry-open exit programs in
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Baltimore because the latter are used in only a few cases of 
employability skills training. To better evaluate this 
tradeoff, Washington policymakers ought to determine 
whether fixed cycle training is more effective than open 
entry-open exit; if it is, any mandate to serve a wider cross- 
section of client needs ought to take account of changes in 
the cost-effectiveness of training.
Placement is another important feature of MOMR's train 
ing programs. The occupational training programs (in 
cluding on-the-job training) have the highest placement rates 
of any of MOMR's employment and training activities, with 
about three-fourths of all trainees being placed. Placement 
rates for persons in less structured training activities, such as 
public service employment jobs, are lower, though still better 
than the national average. A large part of the success of the 
occupational training program can be attributed to the fact 
that placement is done using a "client-based" approach in 
which training program instructors and counselors—the peo 
ple who know the trainee capabilities best—contact 
employers and develop jobs. This approach capitalizes on 
the extensive contact many of the skill trainers have with the 
employer community. Until fiscal 1981, clients in the other 
training activities (including those transitioning out of PSE 
jobs) were placed in jobs by means of a centralized job 
development and placement office that scoured the employer 
community for vacancies and then referred clients against 
those vacancies. Because it put distance between the job 
development and placement functions, that style of place 
ment was not well-suited to "negotiating" with employers 
about bona fide job requirements, providing employers with 
an accurate profile of client skills and experience, or 
matching client and employer interests. Starting in fiscal 
1981, all job development will be modeled after the client 
based approach used in occupational skills training pro 
grams.
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MOMR's experience with job development offers impor 
tant lessons to those prime sponsors struggling with finding 
jobs for completing trainees. MOMR has tried both a 
"client-based" approach that more fully accounts for client 
needs first, and a job-based approach that focuses on job re 
quirements. It has found the former approach is more likely 
to keep both the trainees and employers hiring them happy. 
But MOMR has also capitalized on the access to the 
employer community that a broad spectrum of contract 
training institutions provides. This means that training 
deliverers should be judged not just on their training capaci 
ty but their likely access to the job market.
The Response to Changing 
Economic Conditions
According to conventional economic theory the best time 
to do occupational skill training is during economic lulls, 
because the economy does not have to sacrifice production in 
the short run for increased future productivity. But in the 
world of CETA, the dictates of economic theory are 
swamped by the intrusions of a less than perfect world and 
the sometimes heavy hand of the U.S. Department of Labor.
Theory fails partly because MOMR (and other CETA 
prime sponsors) is training clients who are not likely to be 
sacrificing productive time to engage in training; they ex 
perience unemployment and underemployment even in the 
best of times. The premium that USDOL puts on placing 
trainees in jobs penalizes skill training during economic 
downturns. The effect of this factor would be mitigated if 
USDOL did not try to compress training and placement into 
a short period of time (within a year). But the time horizons 
for CETA prime sponsors as well as trainees in need of 
employment are necessarily short. MOMR evidence cor 
roborates other evidence that trainees do not want to get in-
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volved in long term training programs because they need im 
mediate employment. MOMR avoids long contract cycles 
because of newly imposed limits on enrollment in work ex 
perience and public service employment—major components 
in many MOMR training programs. Because of the way the 
regional office enforces regulatory limits on carry-over from 
one fiscal year to another, MOMR is also limited in writing 
contracts that straddle fiscal years. Consequently, the 
natural preference is to steer training resources into short 
term training in occupational areas in which the current de 
mand for new workers is strong.
In the opinion of observers, diversification of the 
Baltimore economy makes it more resistant to cyclical swings 
than most cities. When there is a softening of demand in cer 
tain occupational areas, MOMR responds by cutting back on 
training capacity in the affected areas and may relax the job 
placement goals that training deliverers must meet in order 
to get paid. For example, MOMR cut back on welding train 
ing when Bethlehem Steel, the largest area employer, began 
laying off workers. More recently, some of the building 
trades projects have encountered great difficulty in placing 
trainees in jobs, and are pressing for lower placement stan 
dards.
It is hard to use the effects of the last recession as a basis 
for judging MOMR's training policies during recessions 
because the organization has changed so much since then 
and because of the enormous build-up in public service 
employment that was also going on at that time. It is argued 
that the 1976-1977 build-up of public service employment 
diverted energies in MOMR away from gearing up training 
programs in anticipation of the economic recovery, and 
towards the more pressing problems of developing public 
service jobs and placing clients in them.
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Because the CETA countercyclical programs so far have 
been in the form of increased job creation, the question of 
how much training MOMR would undertake with non- 
categorized countercyclical funds is largely academic, 
leading to more speculation than solid policy proposals. The 
question of what to do with expanded training funds (with 
no option to fund public service employment) is less 
academic, and there is specific MOMR experience as a basis 
for speculation.
Net new training money has had two identifiable effects in 
the Baltimore Consortium: stimulating new programs and 
spurring institutional change. One important determinant of 
the effects new money has is the pace at which it must be 
spent. For sudden surges of new money—like that occurring 
under the 1977 Economic Stimulus Act—the imperative is to 
spend quickly, leaving little opportunity for development. 
MOMR managers feel that the best contingency plan for this 
kind of new money is to rely on the training infrastructure 
already in place. This includes expansion of existing pro 
grams and start-up of new programs already "on the shelf" 
with much of the developmental work already done. This 
kind of expansion occurred recently when one of MOMR's 
youth program allocations was increased and a limit was im 
posed on carry-out, thus forcing increases in spending rates. 
Under both the Skill Training and Improvement Program 
and the Private Sector Initiatives Program (Title VII), there 
was both more time and a mandate to broaden the local in 
frastructure. Under the former, institutional changes occur 
red in the form of new training contractors being added to 
the training infrastructure; in the latter, change occurred in 
the form of increased private sector participation in planning 
certain CETA activities.
MOMR managers would like to attempt expansion of 
upgrading and retraining. They feel that upgrading and 
retraining programs, where they work, can spur important
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structural changes within corporate job ladders. Yet, in 1980 
only 16 enrollees were served under Title IIC. Part of the 
reason for underutilization of Title IIC may be a slack 
economy. Retraining during a recession may be socially op 
timal, but it is not optimal at corporate-level profit centers. 
Underutilization of IIC probably also has much to do with 
the restrictive regulations governing it. MOMR managers 
feel that although Title IIC is intended to improve produc 
tivity through retraining and upgrading, the regulations 
thwart that purpose by restricting eligibility to clients in 
dead-end entry level jobs. Title IIC retraining is restricted to 
employees with bona fide layoff notices and little prospect 
for recall, circumstances in which employers are likely to 
have little interest in new skills. Furthermore, employers in 
terested in government subsidies for retraining activities can 
get 50 percent of a new employee's wages paid for under an 
OJT contract, while they can get only 40 percent paid under 
IIC. Finally, IIC enrollments might require different intake 
procedures. Although some counties in the Baltimore Con 
sortium rely on the employment service for intake, there is 
no systematized procedure in the counties, nor an intake 
system in the city, for identifying employees on layoff, or 
those in low level, dead-end jobs. These administrative im 
pediments could be eliminated by MOMR. But the other 
problems associated with IIC and its accompanying regula 
tions require action by the Congress and USDOL.
What Can Really Make CETA Work?
Without a doubt, the single most important force driving 
MOMR is the organization's own sense of purpose. MOMR 
is a local creature serving a local agenda. If it could not, the 
political base in the Baltimore mayor's office and the sur 
rounding counties would erode. But this has implications for 
the influence of the U.S. Department of Labor. The cases in 
which federal initiatives produced positive changes seem to
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have been accompanied by net increases in funding. Both the 
Skill Training and Improvement Program (STIP, Title III) 
and the Private Sector Initiatives Program (Title VII) helped 
broaden the MOMR training infrastructure and introduce 
training in different occupational areas. But regulatory 
changes without additional money have, not surprisingly, 
been accepted grudgingly. The requirement for the indepen 
dent monitoring unit, for example, while not far astray from 
certain MOMR interests in oversight, specified compliance 
in a way that produced some friction between MOMR and 
USDOL; that friction appears to have done nothing to im 
prove the effectiveness of the IMU. Similarly, the idea of in 
dividualized development plans was not alien to MOMR, but 
the regulatory requirements for such plans were not readily 
compatible with (nor an improvement on) MOMR's own ar 
rangements. Federal initiatives in this form are probably 
more objectionable simply because they limit MOMR's flex 
ibility, while initiatives like STIP or PSIP may come with 
their own rules, but because they represent additional 
resources, increase MOMR's flexibility.
If the experience in Baltimore is to be instructive about 
anything, it is on the way Washington should view the rela 
tionship between the national agenda and the multitude of 
local agendas present in any federal grants-in-aid program. 
To the extent "CETA works" in the Baltimore area, it is not 
because MOMR is a handmaiden to the Department of 
Labor. Rather, it is because MOMR has a local agenda that 
is being pursued in a way that is compatible with the Depart 
ment of Labor's own agenda.
Congruence between federal and local priorities is not 
necessary for CETA to be effective; compatibility is. The im 
plications of this can be enormous. It means that, in fine- 
tuning CETA, the federal focus should be on: 1) helping 
prime sponsors develop a local agenda, and 2) evaluating 
any federal changes with respect to whether they increase or
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decrease the ability of CETA to accommodate two sets of 
objectives. In the case of the first point, the Department of 
Labor and the Congress must be willing to move away from 
requiring plans that are uniform in format and respond only 
to the terms of the federal notions of what CETA should do. 
Prime sponsor plans should, for example, be able to 
legitimately incorporate institutional self preservation goals 
as well as service delivery arrangements that are mutually 
beneficial to both prime sponsors and other city government 
agencies. Plans and modifications could then be judged 
against the interaction of two sets of priorities, not just one 
set of federal priorities.
Obviously, this means that the Department of Labor needs 
to have the capacity to oversee individual prime sponsor 
operations carefully enough to evaluate individual prime 
sponsor plans in a way that accounts for the entire context of 
prime sponsor operations.
Unfortunately, the Department of Labor has been ill- 
prepared to do such a careful job. It has neither the needed 
number of staff nor depth of experience. Yet without that 
support only two courses of events seem possible.
In one course of events, the Department of Labor and the 
Congress could back off their agenda, letting prime sponsors 
do what they want with minimal regard for federal goals. In 
the other course of events, the federal establishment could 
steamroller over local priorities, squeezing them out as a 
consideration as the Department of Labor implements 
CETA. Under this approach, Washington would mandate 
cookie-cutter plans that would be the same for all prime 
sponsors.
The first case is tantamount to leaving money on the 
stump and running. The second case requires prime sponsors 
to serve as simple extension of the Department of Labor. 
Neither scenario is politically acceptable. But one or the
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other seems likely if there is not a federal commitment to 
make the CETA partnership the symbiotic relationship it 
was intended to be.

Dallas, Texas 
The Burdens of Prosperity
Robert McPherson
University of Texas
In fiscal year 1980, the City of Dallas will spend a little 
over $10 million in CETA funds providing training, public 
service employment and related services for eligible clients 
living within its corporate boundaries. Because of the 1978 
CETA amendments and the city's own interest in targeting 
on those most in need, program resources are focused on the 
low-income unemployed; however, this emphasis is not 
matched by an appropriate mix of training and related ser 
vices to equip the clients to compete effectively for the 
semiskilled and skilled jobs available in the area's labor 
market. Though Dallas enjoys an environment free of many 
of the familiar institutional constraints affecting CETA pro 
grams in most urban settings, it operates a program not 
significantly different from that of other cities with much 
less favorable conditions. Rather than providing long term 
quality training programs to develop the knowledge and 
skills of the hard-core unemployed the city serves, it con 
tinues to fund short term, low-cost training programs to 
serve as many individuals as possible. Why has Dallas not 
used its flexibilities under CETA to develop a training pro 
gram that's more beneficial to their clients and to employers 
in the community?
The Local Environment
City government in Dallas is a textbook example of the 
strong manager-council model. The mayor and members of 
the city council are the elected representatives responsible for 
making the policy decisions; however, the city manager, as
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the chief executive officer, runs the city. He is in the pivotal 
role of making recommendations to the council and im 
plementing their decisions. The current manager has been in 
the job nearly eight years and is recognized as one of the 
most powerful figures in city government. Under his leader 
ship the city has gained a national reputation as one of the 
best managed in the country. The council and manager take 
pride in their successful application of private sector 
management practices to city government.
The Dallas Citizen's Council (DCC), an organization com 
prising some of the most wealthy and influential business 
leaders in the country, makes the major policy decisions for 
the city. Its primary objective is creating a local environment 
where the large corporations can prosper and continue to 
grow with a minimum of interference from government. The 
current mayor and a majority of the council members were 
dependent on the DCC for endorsement and financial sup 
port for election and remain responsive to the wishes of the 
special interest group. The underlying values of the leaders in 
the local power structure are apparently very conservative. 
Their economics is laissez-faire, and there is a strong em 
phasis on individual self-sufficiency.
Economic growth in the Dallas area suggests that the city 
fathers may have the right approach. Since the mid-1970s 
recession, real per capita income has grown at about 3 per 
cent a year, when the national economy was stagnating. Over 
the past decade the city's population, currently estimated 
from 865,000 to 900,000, has not expanded as fast as the na 
tional average, but the small cities adjacent to Dallas have 
grown 10 times the city's rate. About 33 percent of the city's 
population is minority, with blacks at 25 percent and 
Hispanics making up about 8 percent of the total.
According to Texas Employment Commission (TEC) 
reports, the Dallas labor force has grown at an annual rate of
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over 5 percent since 1975, and the growth in employment has 
more than kept pace. The unemployment rate for 1978 was 
just over 4 percent; for 1979, only 3.6 percent. Though the 
rate in the summer of 1980 is again over 5 percent, it is not 
expected to stay at the high level.
While these statistics reflect a strong and expanding 
economy, the benefits of growth are not distributed equally. 
According to the city's CETA plan almost 17 percent of the 
city's population are members of families with incomes 
below the poverty level. Over 40 percent of the blacks live in 
poverty. Unemployment rates for minorities are more than 
twice those for whites, and for particular subgroups of the 
unemployed, like youth, the differences are even wider.
Overall, however, the economic picture is bright, and the 
demand for workers remains strong. Labor market informa 
tion from the TEC and the North Central Texas Council of 
Governments identifies shortages over a wide spectrum of 
occupations. In construction, manufacturing, and the ser 
vice industries there are acute shortages in occupations such 
as draftsmen, engineers, bricklayers, machinists, computer 
programmers, electronics technicians, nurses, secretaries, 
and typists. Help-wanted ads in local newspapers also reflect 
a strong demand for unskilled workers for jobs in the secon 
dary labor market.
Local employers aggressively compete for good 
employees: billboards on major highways leading into Dallas 
invite workers to call Texas Instruments for a good job; 
help-wanted posters are displayed in the windows of 
businesses; and major corporations advertise outside the 
area—and sometimes outside the country—to attract 
semiskilled and skilled workers. The general feeling on the 
street, from cab drivers to lawyers, is that anyone wanting to 
work can find a job in Dallas.
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The CETA program in Dallas, especially after the 1978 
amendments, is seen as a federal program with more poten 
tial liabilities than benefits for city government. As a CETA 
prime sponsor the city sees itself responsible for a controver 
sial program fraught with continuing accusations of poor 
management, fraud, and abuse. With private employers ac 
tively recruiting workers, subsidized training and public ser 
vice jobs programs are viewed as competing for the available 
labor supply and therefore contributing, rather than helping 
alleviate, problems in local labor markets. In July 1979 the 
council seriously considered terminating the city's involve 
ment in the program. Apparently, a rash of negative 
publicity—mostly directed at the management practices of 
minority based organizations having CETA contracts with 
the city—was too close for comfort. Only after lengthy 
deliberations where city staff made major commitments to 
improve program management and contractor performance 
did the council defeat a resolution to terminate the city's 
CETA grant from the Department of Labor by a vote of six 
to five.
Over the past year the media and the city council have 
given less attention to the program. City staff have taken 
steps to improve management, and recently hired a public in 
formation officer to create a positive image for CETA. The 
present calm, however, should not be interpreted as any 
groundswell of support from the council for the human 
resources objective of the program.
In this environment the city manager is primarily in 
terested in making sure that CETA funds are efficiently 
managed. Apparently, for the CETA staff in Dallas this 
means developing elaborate systems and procedures for pro 
cessing federal funds through city government to agencies 
under contract to provide services; keeping the manager in 
formed so that he is never surprised; making sure that there 
are no mistakes; and keeping things relatively quiet.
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Program Planning and Operations
Management of the CETA program in Dallas is divided 
between the city and its program deliverers. The city council 
and manager make the major policy and program decisions 
while the Office of Human Development (OHD)—organiza 
tionally a part of the city manager's office—is responsible 
for program planning, contracting, monitoring and evalua 
tion. The city contracts with other public, private, and non 
profit agencies to provide program services.
For fiscal 1980, the city had $19 million available under a 
variety of CETA titles and programs. About $14 million was 
programmed, and of that amount, little more than $10 
million will be spent (table 1).
Almost all of the CETA funded training is in the adult and 
youth components funded under titles II-B and IV. Two ex 
ceptions supported by public service employment resources 
amount to approximately $600,000: a work experience pro 
gram including limited vestibule training—that the city inap 
propriately calls pre-apprenticeship training; and a career 
development program providing job-search training (table 
2).
CETA eligibility criteria, combined with the target groups 
set by OHD planners have definitely focused program 
resources on the low-income unemployed. High school 
dropouts, disabled veterans, public assistance recipients, ex- 
offenders and the handicapped are identified as special 
groups to be served by the city's programs.
The training delivery system is made up of over 20 
organizations funded to provide a wide range of training and 
related services including outreach, intake, referral, basic 
education, training, work experience, support services, job 
placement, and follow-up. Private non-profit agencies—11





Adult employment and training3
Youth employment and training15
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Public service employment (title II-D)
































a. Excludes sect. 204 vocational education funds and program activity.




Table 2. Adult and Youth Training Plan Under CETAa, by Activity, Fiscal 
































a. Figures exclude the summer youth employment program and two training programs 
funded from public service employment resources.
b. Figures will not match those on the previous table due to differences between numbers in 
the prime sponsor's plan and those in agency contracts.
of the 20—dominate the system accounting for 54 percent of 
the $4.5 million available for contract services in 1980. Five 
public agencies—other city departments and two school 
districts—receive 36 percent, while four private for-profit 
firms have only 10 percent of the funding.
The city is attempting to centralize some service deliveries. 
Outreach for all CETA funded training programs is provid 
ed by a single agency—the Dallas Urban League (DUL). In 
take, assessment, and referral services for the system are now 
centralized through a contract with the city's Martin Luther 
King Center (MLK). Organizations such as Operation SER, 
Opportunities Industrialization Center (OIC), and Dallas In 
dependent School District's (DISD) skills center provide 
classroom training, job development and placement services, 
serve as additional intake and referral centers and conduct 
30-day followup on all their enrollees. The American GI 
Forum has a contract for longer term followup of par 
ticipants at 3, 6, and 12 months after they leave the program 
(table 3).
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Table 3. Major Service Deliverers3 and Activities Under CETA, Fiscal 
1980: City of Dallas
Delivery agent Funding Activity
Operation SER $589,583
Opportunities Industrialization 516,461 
Center (QIC)
Dallas Housing Authority13 500,000
Dallas Independent School 460,698 
District (skills center)
Martin Luther King Center 414,000
Dallas County Community 300,000 
Action Agency
Basic education 












assessment and referral 
Support services 
Work experience
a. Agencies with service contracts of $300,000 or more.
b. OHD staff call the DHA's program a pre-apprenticeship program; however, it is more 
appropriately classified as a work experience program which includes some vestibule train 
ing.
Three types of training are available for CETA enrollees: 
basic education, vocational training and career development. 
Basic education, career development, and most of the voca 
tional training are provided in a classroom setting with more 
than 75 percent of the participants served by two school 
districts, OIC, Operation SER, and the city's personnel 
department. The other classroom training enrollees are 
spread among six smaller contractors, including the four 
private for-profit firms. For 1980, nine agencies are pro 
viding classroom training in more than 15 occupational areas 
(table 4). The remainder of the vocational training is provid 
ed through on-the-job training with contractors such as the
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National Alliance of Business (NAB) and Goodwill In 
dustries.
Table 4. Classroom Training Under CETA, Fiscal 1980: City of Dallas
Delivery agent
Number to 









City of Dallas 
(personnel department)
Nurse's Aide Academy 
American Trades Institute
Home and Apartment 
Builders Association
Assessment and Assignment 
Unit of Dallas
275 Basic education
400 Bilingual basic education
480 Clerical
Auto mechanics 













140 Bilingual clerical 








a. Figures will not sum to the number shown on table 2 due to the termination of one 
deliverer and difference between the numbers planned by OHD and those in agency con 
tracts.
186
Management reports for the third quarter of fiscal year 
1980—the latest cumulative information available—show 
the program operating well below planned expenditures 
(table 5).
Table 5. Actual and Planned Expenditures for CETAa Through the Third 





























a. Excludes prime sponsor administration, centralized services and vocational education 
services funded under sect. 204.
With the exception of public service employment, where 
recent hiring brought enrollments to 97 percent of plan, 
CETA program enrollments reflect the same pattern as ex 
penditures while positive terminations and placement are on 
ly half of those planned. Job placements—at 81 percent of 
the positive terminations—reflect the city's high placement 
goals, the availability of jobs in the area, and unattractive 
options such as going back to school or entering military ser 
vice.
Clients in the city's program are young, relatively 
uneducated and primarily black with the distribution among 
various program components about as expected. Youth pro 
grams serve higher percentages of women and blacks without 
basic education credentials, while public service employment 
serves slightly more white, older and better educated per 
sons. Similarities in the demographic characteristics of par-
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ticipants reflect stricter eligibility requirements in the 1978 
GET A amendments, the city's emphasis on targeting on 
those most in need, and the kinds of people applying for ser 
vices. GET A enrollees in Dallas tend to be people with 
several barriers to employment who cannot hold a job even 
in a tight labor market. They need extensive help to over 
come their cultural, psychological, physical, transportation, 
and child care problems.
For adult and youth training components, expenditures 
and enrollments, though closer to plan, reflect the same pat 
tern as the CETA program as a whole. Classroom and on- 
the-job training are lagging, while the small and often 
maligned work experience program is operating at 97 percent 
of planned expenditures and 90 percent of planned 
enrollments. In contrast, classroom training programs are 
operating with expenditures at 71 percent and enrollments at 
61 percent of those planned for the third quarter. Based on 
this performance, the costs of positive terminations from 
classroom training are averaging over $4,600, and the cost 
per placement is $5,300, much higher than anticipated by the 
city.
While contractors are likely to meet their enrollment goals 
for 1980, they will not achieve their planned numbers of 
positive terminations and placements.
The Quality of Training 
and Related Services
OHD reports provide information on the number of 
enrollees, positive terminations and placements by occupa 
tional training area and on average wage gains and retention 
rates of terminees by training contractor. While all of this 
data is potentially useful for measuring the level of training 
and the relative efficiency of the city's contractors, it does
188
not provide insight to the quality, appropriateness or effec 
tiveness of the training.
There are also technical and methodological problems 
with the Dallas training system and with the way information 
is gathered and organized that limit efforts to assess pro 
grams. For example, wage and retention data is not available 
by occupational training area for QIC and the skills 
center—the two largest deliverers of vocational training. For 
these agencies, the information is also not related to the 
characteristics of the clients in the various training areas. A 
second problem relates to the absence of any kind of a con 
trol group for comparing post-program experiences of the 
trainees in the Dallas program. Without comparing the in 
come and employment experience of the clients with their 
counterparts not receiving training, it is impossible to 
measure program effectiveness. Without relating wages at 
placement and retention data to client characteristics and oc 
cupational training areas, it is impossible to make valid com 
parisons among various kinds of training for the different 
client groups served.
Several of the occupational training areas apparently do 
not have quantified training objectives, and, except for 
minimum reading and math skills, clients are not pre-tested 
to determine their knowledge and skills. It is difficult, 
therefore, to objectively evaluate the quality of training in 
the Dallas CETA program.
With these limitations one cannot go beyond making sub 
jective judgments about the apparent quality of the training 
inputs—facilities, equipment, curriculum materials, instruc 
tional staff and length of time a client spends in train 
ing—and related services. A June 1980 on-site review of 
seven of the 13 agencies providing training revealed the 
following:
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• The quality of training and related services provided by 
OHD contractors varies widely.
• The training is short term, providing some enrollees ac 
cess to entry-level jobs that are, for the most part, in the 
secondary labor market.
• With the exception of clerical, auto mechanics and 
nurse's aide, the training areas are far below their goals 
for expenditures, enrollments, positive terminations and 
placements. Pressures on contractors to make their 
goals are adversely affecting the quality of training.
Variations in the quality of training are best illustrated by 
three agencies providing classroom training: the Nurse's 
Aide Academy (NAA), the OIC, and the Dallas Independent 
School District's skill center.
The Nurse's Aide program is the best small training pro 
gram. Through effective outreach, it surmounted problems 
of underenrollment. The five-week program provides 
classroom training in combination with clinical instruction in 
a nearby hospital. The facilities and equipment are modern, 
and the instructors are qualified registered nurses. Instruc 
tional materials are well-written and adapted to the student's 
educational level and procedures and equipment used in the 
training. According to OHD reports, almost 90 percent of 
the trainees were placed in jobs, and about 75 percent were 
still employed a year later. Average hourly wage gains at 
placement were 95 cents—from $2.75 to $3.70 per hour.
In contrast, the OIC program provides open-entry/open- 
exit training in three skill clusters: a computer cluster with 
keypunch and programming, a clerical cluster with clerk- 
typist and secretarial training, and an automotive cluster 
with auto mechanics and body repair. Basic education and 
career development classes are integrated with each skill 
cluster to provide training-related reading and math, GED 
preparation, English as a second language (ESL), consumer
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education, communications, and orientation to work. The 
average length of stay in training is about 12 weeks.
QIC training is done by qualified and dedicated staff in a 
converted trucking facility with only minimum renovation. 
The staff are partially demoralized by reductions in funding, 
their physical surroundings, and the limitations of the pro 
gram; but they remain committed to providing quality train 
ing for enrollees. Except for the clerical cluster, the classes 
are not full. The center appears to be operating 70 or 80 per 
cent of potential.
The ready availability of jobs requiring no training, low 
training allowances, and minimum levels of support services 
for enrollees all make recruitment and retention difficult. 
Many enrollees will not stay in training long enough to be 
counted as positive terminations. OIC dropouts are averag 
ing more than twice the level expected, while placements are 
at only 53 percent of the goal. In addition to its goal for in 
direct placements, the city required OIC to make an addi 
tional 325 direct placements with no increase in funding. 
OIC soon discovered that few job-ready individuals were to 
be found in the eligible population without a massive recruit 
ment effort, which would detract from its training objec 
tives. OIC probably will meet enrollment goals for the year, 
but not those for positive terminations and placements. 
Average wage gains reported for those employed were 77 
cents from $3.26 to $4.03 per hour.
Although the quality of OIC's training varied, they have 
attracted severely disadvantaged clients and adjusted the 
training curriculums to their educational level. Thus, the 
training is relevant, but its short duration and the lack of 
modern equipment do not equip enrollees to compete effec 
tively for jobs in the primary labor market, though some 
trainees undoubtedly gain access that may allow upward 
mobility over time.
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The Dallas Independent School District's skills 
center—the designated vocational classroom 
facility—provides training and related services in six voca 
tional clusters: clerical; auto paint and body repair; auto 
mechanics; welding; production machine operation; and air 
conditioning, refrigeration, and heating.
The skills center is the best equipped multipurpose training 
program in the CETA delivery system; has qualified staff, 
modern equipment, and well-designed curriculums. 
However, like OIC, it has underenrollment and low place 
ment rates. Through the third quarter of fiscal year 1980, the 
center achieved only 85 percent of its planned enrollments 
because of recruitment problems and high dropout rates. 
Positive terminations and placements are far below expecta 
tions with cumulative placements for the period at 57 percent 
of the goal. Average wage gains at placement were 61 
cents—from $3.36 to $3.97 per hour.
Relatively, the quality of training provided is good. The 
skills center has the potential for an excellent program, but is 
limited by both the city's concern with numbers and low 
average costs and a disadvantaged clientele unprepared for 
more sophisticated training. With the exception of the 
clerical cluster, the center appears to be operating at only 50 
to 60 percent of its potential. No goal except cumulative 
enrollments is likely to be met.
MLK and each of the training deliverers are responsible 
for providing training related services such as intake, assess 
ment, referral, counseling, and support services. However, 
beyond listing the services to be provided in agency con 
tracts, the city has no standard specifications concerning the 
nature and extent of the services. As a result, the amount and 
quality of the services are very uneven. For example, 
counseling services vary from three full-time social workers 
and one employment counselor at the skills center, to infor-
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mal family-style counseling in the nurse's aide program, to 
no services at all at the National Alliance for Business* 
(NAB) on-the-job training program. At NAB there is strong 
emphasis on self-reliance. If situations arise that demand 
counseling, participants are referred to MLK.
Overall quality of training and services a client receives 
depends primarily on the efforts of individual contractors to 
overcome the city's apparent lack of concern and the limita 
tions it imposes on the delivery system. This environment 
pushes community-based organizations without other 
sources of support against the wall. They meet enrollment 
goals, but the quality of instruction suffers. Without outside 
support, they are forced to offer the same or fewer occupa 
tional areas each year. Under the Dallas system, they cannot 
use CETA funds to buy training equipment or renovate 
facilities to expand training. Staff are underpaid, existing 
facilities are inadequate, and equipment needs updating. 
Training in some of these organizations resembles the pover 
ty programs of the 1960s—the commitment is there, but the 
resources are missing. In spite of good attitudes of the staff, 
the environment does not engender feelings in the trainees 
that things are going to get much better. Quality tends to be 
found either in training components with low investment 
costs—basic education, OJT and the nurse's aide pro 
gram—or in programs that are partially subsidized by other 
sources, such as the skills center or QIC's computer cluster 
supported by IBM.
As for the relevance and effectiveness of the training, most 
of the contractors have adjusted their program materials and 
instruction to accommodate the education, skill level and in 
terests of the clients. However, because of the city's interest 
in short term low-cost training, they are unable to spend the 
time required to provide the knowledge and skills in occupa 
tional areas allowing their graduates to compete effectively
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for the semiskilled and skilled jobs available in the Dallas 
labor market. The city's plan for fiscal year 1980 proposed 
that, of the 1,900 to receive classroom training, 800 were to 
be enrolled in occupational areas where the length of training 
is five weeks or less, and only 150 were to receive instruction 
in areas requiring 24 weeks or more. The occupational train 
ing areas funded bore little resemblance to the list of priority 
occupations identified early in the planning process. Of the 
16 top-rated occupations, only two were proposed for fund 
ing; several of the lower-rated occupations were included, 
but the majority of the training was planned for occupations 
not ranked.
Major Influences on Training
The nature and quality of CETA training in Dallas is a 
function of decisions made by the federal government, the 
prime sponsor, and the contractors providing training. 
Responsibility for success or failure, therefore, cannot be 
assigned to any one level of government or single agency; it 
must be shared by all. Under the arrangement there are 
several major factors affecting training programs in Dallas: 
the nature of federal-state-local relationships; city manage 
ment of the program; and the nature of the local delivery 
system.
Federal-State-Local Relations
By design, CETA formalized a new set of intergovernmen 
tal relationships significantly increasing the authority of 
state and local governments to plan and operate programs. 
Although there was a major power shift, the federal govern 
ment retained responsibility for setting broad program ob 
jectives, developing regulations, approving local plans, 
monitoring, and evaluating program performance. There 
are, however, several problems in the CETA version of
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federalism affecting the nature and quality of local training 
programs.
• From the beginning the roles and relationships of the 
major actors—federal, regional, state, and local govern 
ments—were never adequately delineated.
• Legislative amendments and administrative changes 
have kept the delivery system in a constant state of flux.
• The Department of Labor has not maintained a consis 
tent policy framework that sets priorities among pro 
gram goals and establishes the relative importance of 
program effectiveness, administrative efficiency, and 
regulatory compliance.
• With the exception of its emphasis on low-cost 
placements, the Department of Labor focused on 
developing compliance and process-oriented goals, per 
formance criteria, and rewards systems rather than 
output-oriented systems.
• Few prime sponsors had the critical management 
capability to accept the responsibilities and take advan 
tage of the opportunities available under block grant 
funding.
• Before the delivery system was in place, CETA became 
the avenue for massive countercyclical public jobs pro 
grams and a series of new categorical initiatives.
The CETA system is primarily a federal-local one, leaving 
prime sponsors with few incentives for developing working 
arrangements with the states. Managing the CETA program 
in Dallas involves minimal contact with three state agencies: 
the Department of Community Affairs (DCA); the Texas 
Education Agency (TEA); and the Texas Employment Com 
mission (TEC). In each case the relationship is the result of a 
legislative requirement or financial incentive. OHD staff see 
all of the relationships as detracting from, rather than con 
tributing to, quality of local training programs. They must 
be continued to comply with CETA requirements and access
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funds from the state agencies; however, staff feel that the 
less the state agencies and State Manpower Service Council 
know about local programs, the better.
The coordination of CETA with other training and 
employment activities, beyond the legal requirements, has 
not occurred. The state is in a weak position relative to the 
local prime sponsors; the governor's discretionary funds 
have been used largely to fund a variety of special projects; 
and the state agencies operate autonomously, using the 
CETA money they control to their own ends.
The city's relationship with the federal government, par 
ticularly the Employment and Training Administration 
(ETA), is primarily influenced by the ever-changing CETA 
legislation, regulations, and administrative directives for im 
plementing the program. With major system changes in 
1976, 1977, and 1978, program funding became more 
categorical, leaving local prime sponsors with less flexibility 
to design and deliver programs. In an attempt to make the 
new categorical initiatives fit in local CETA systems which 
emphasize horizontal planning and integrated service 
delivery, ETA has issued volumes of regulations and direc 
tives. As a result, the system is currently not being planned 
and managed as originally envisioned. Staff at all levels are 
filling out forms, processing paper, and building 
bureaucratic processes for complying with the latest re 
quirements. The city's current relationship with ETA, 
primarily the regional office in Dallas, revolves around the 
basic information requirements guaranteeing the continued 
flow of federal funds—review of annual plans, periodic 
monitoring visits, frequent special requests for information, 
and the annual assessment of program performance. If the 
Department issues directives that conflict with the local pro 
gram initiatives, OHD fends them off by pointing out con 
tradictions with previous policies or arguing points of pro-
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cess. From experience, they have learned that the first and 
best response to a new directive is to do nothing. More than 
likely the directive will change several times and things will 
end up back where they were in the first place. This ap 
proach, of course, represents dysfunctional behavior in the 
management system, which causes even more directives to be 
issued.
In the regional office, staff members working with the 
CETA prime sponsors feel powerless and frustrated and 
display resignation. They know that the major decisions are 
made elsewhere in the system—in Washington or at the local 
prime sponsor level. In this environment, federal represen 
tatives function as little more than intermediaries who pro 
cess information. For the most part they continue to ac 
quiesce to the program mix determined by local sponsors 
and, therefore, have not bothered to learn much about the 
content of programs. More recently, they have further 
disassociated themselves from the management and program 
decisions made by their own organization, yet they continue 
to exhibit an unfailing commitment—going through the mo 
tions and pushing the paper to comply with the instructions 
from above.
Staff members of the city agency try to help the federal 
representative do his job with a minimum of effort on their 
part. OHD staff and the federal representative have arrived 
at an equilibrium of peaceful coexistence in which they try to 
be accepting and accommodating. Both recognize that they 
spend time on issues of form and process that have no rela 
tionship to program quality. Prime sponsor's plans are 
nothing more than compliance documents, and the annual 
assessment is designed to measure efficiency in terms of costs 
per numbers served, positively terminated, and placed, and 
to document that established systems and procedures are 
consistent with federal requirements. Recognizing the futility 
of these and other similar exercises, the federal represen-
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tative and the prime sponsor's staff work together closely to 
avoid creating any undue problems for each other. Obvious 
ly, both are co-opted in the process and federal management 
of the system breaks down.
City Management of the Program
The City of Dallas did not take advantage of the oppor 
tunities available in the early years of CETA. Apparently, 
program staff were unable: (1) to clearly set program pur 
pose and direction; (2) to develop a rationale for the pro 
gram that was relevant to local conditions, of interest to the 
city council, and acceptable to ETA; (3) to define the ap 
propriate roles and relationships among city officials, staff, 
the advisory committee, and contractors in the decisionmak- 
ing process; and (4) to build a delivery system that satisfied 
existing institutional biases and met local needs. In the 
absence of such a management structure, the city funded ex 
isting community-based organizations to continue providing 
the same kinds of training as that available under the pre- 
CETA categorical programs.
Beginning as early as 1974, there were major changes tak 
ing place in CETA. A series of legislative amendments began 
recategorizing the delivery system and large increases in 
funding for public service jobs and youth made the program 
more complex and more visible to elected officials and the 
general public. Selected cases of poor management, fraud, 
and abuse drew national attention to issues of program 
management throughout the system. In Dallas the increased 
interest in CETA resulted in a change of directors at OHD. 
Under new leadership the office began focusing on develop 
ing efficient systems for securing and disbursing federal 
funds and building administrative procedures and controls 
to satisfy the process-oriented standards set by ETA. Consis 
tent with the conservative values of the local power structure 
and the council, OHD funded short term low-cost training
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programs offering minimum assistance to provide clients ac 
cess to entry level jobs. After that, further progress was up to 
the individual. Administrative efficiency and low-cost train 
ing became top priorities of the agency. Even though the 
1978 CETA amendments further targeted program resources 
on the hard-core unemployed, OHD priorities have not 
changed.
While the emphasis in the Dallas program is a legitimate 
option under CETA, there are several problems with this 
management approach that affect the nature and quality of 
training.
• The CETA program lacks a clear statement of purpose 
and goals. OHD sees itself as an administrative agency 
responsible for writing grant applications, allocating 
funds, managing contracts, staffing advisory commit 
tees, and responding to the city manager and council. 
Beyond administrative efficiency and low cost training, 
the agency apparently has no substantive program mis 
sion—no reason for existence—of its own. Issues of 
quality and effectiveness of training are not high 
priorities at OHD. Moreover, there is no sense of long 
range direction, either in terms of objectives for the pro 
gram or in the design of the local delivery system.
• The responsibilities and relationships among city of 
ficials, OHD staff, the three citizen advisory commit 
tees, and the training contractors remain unclear.
• OHD has developed a number of impressive manage 
ment systems and procedures, but they are not in 
tegrated. Except for the solicitation, review, and selec 
tion of contractors, the various systems do not work 
together. Planned and actual program performance dif 
fer widely. The planning process emphasizes the selec 
tion of efficient contractors, and monitoring and 
evaluation systems stress review of administrative 
capability, fiscal procedures, and program performance
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in terms of numbers enrolled and positive terminations. 
OHD's followup system gathers information on the 
post-program experience of participants; however, these 
systems are not managed to achieve the program objec 
tives as stated in OHD's plan to ETA. Moreover, they 
do not support the development of effective training 
programs.
• Local incentives do not reward time and attention to 
program quality. The efforts of OHD are directed to 
satisfying the city manager and the council; that is, 
keeping the program out of the newspaper and making 
sure the city manager is never surprised. Accuracy is not 
as important as speed, and the quality of the training 
and the nature of the delivery system are not nearly as 
important as producing a high number of low-cost 
enrollments and positive terminations. Through the 
planning and contracting process this emphasis is clearly 
transferred to the delivery system.
• OHD continues to experience high turnover among staff 
and frequent reorganization, which hurt staff morale 
and direct attention away from program issues.
Thus, OHD functions as an administrative clearinghouse 
for federal funds, resembling a local version of the regional 
office. Top management has learned to effectively transfer 
the responsibility for unpopular decisions and management 
or performance problems to citizen's advisory groups, con 
tractors, or ETA. A new level of bureaucracy has been built 
into the delivery system without realizing many of the ex 
pected benefits envisioned by the framers of the original 
CETA.
The Nature of the 
Local Delivery System
Several features of the Dallas delivery system affect train 
ing: the absence of an integrated delivery system; duplication
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of front-end services; the lack of effective working relation 
ships among the contractors; wide variation in the level of 
financial support, skills, and experience among the training 
deliverers; and OHD's overriding concern with inexpensive 
training.
• Apparently, OHD either does not recognize or does not 
understand the interdependence between the city and its 
contractors. Given the decision to contract for service 
delivery, the city's overall performance depends on the 
combined product of its delivery agents. Yet, there 
tends to be a strong "us" and "them" attitude among 
OHD staff. Contractors are given goals and told to 
perform. There is no feeling people are working 
together to produce the desired outcomes, and when 
there are performance problems, OHD does not accept 
responsibility.
• There is duplication of front-end services that creates 
confusion for contractors and an obstacle course for 
program applicants. Most likely because of their in 
creased liability for ineligible participants, the city is at 
tempting to centralize intake, assessment, counseling, 
and referral services through a single contractor—the 
Martin Luther King Center; however, training contrac 
tors are also still required to provide most of these same 
services. MLK staff provide assessment and referral, 
but do only limited testing, and the two employability 
development plans they prepare are not used to guide 
clients through a mix of training and services. Conse 
quently, nearly all of the training contractors test and 
assess clients prior to their enrollment. There is similar 
confusion with outreach and counseling services. Get 
ting into the system is thus a frustrating process involv 
ing a number of referrals back and forth among the con 
tractors. Only those applicants with strong motivation 
and few alternatives are likely to survive the process.
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• There are few effective relationships among training 
deliverers in the system. Because OHD has not built an 
integrated system, linkages facilitating client flow 
among the training agencies are informal and weak. 
This limits movement among contractors, and tends to 
restrict the training options available to the clients.
• There is a wide variation in financial stability, skills, 
and experience among the training deliverers. In its 
quest for inexpensive training, OHD has funded a broad 
range of agencies. Some have a sound financial base 
with support from other sources, while others are 
dependent on CETA funding for survival. Staff salaries 
and the level of management and program skills vary 
widely among the group. OHD has not set minimum 
standards for the quality of training and services to be 
provided. In an effort to get a contract or, later, to meet 
performance goals within cost constraints set by the 
city, training agencies have cut the quality of services 
and the length of training.
• OHD's emphasis on efficiency and low costs precludes 
long term quality training. OHD policy limits the train 
ing contractors* administrative costs to 10 percent of 
their contract. In addition, training allowances are set at 
$2.30 per contact hour—80 cents below the 1980 
minimum wage—and the CETA-funded support ser 
vices system is designed to encourage self-reliance. In 
this environment, most of the training agencies cannot 
afford to offer long term training, and if they did the 
participants most likely to benefit could not afford to 
stay long enough to complete.
Dallas has not taken advantage of its opportunities under 
CETA to develop long term quality training programs for 
the hard-core unemployed because it has no motivation to do 
so. ETA—through grant review, monitoring, and the annual 
assessment—encourages the city to produce as many low-
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cost positive terminations and placements as possible, but 
offers no extrinsic rewards for doing so and levies no 
penalties for failure as long as the city plays the game well 
enough to stay out of the bottom quartile of performers in 
the annual assessment process. None of the quantitative 
measures of program performance relate to content of train 
ing or quality of outcome. This encourages prime sponsors 
and their contractors to play the numbers game.
The city's reward structure reinforces that of ETA. In 
these kinds of systems training programs will be well design 
ed only where exceptional local staff are intrinsically 
motivated to develop and defend such training for the hard 
core unemployed.
Potential for Expanding Training
The management systems at OHD can handle a larger 
training program, but whether the local delivery system can 
do so is a separate question. There are two options for ex 
panding CETA-funded training in Dallas: (1) increasing the 
level of activity with the current contractors, and (2) bring 
ing new deliverers into the system.
The city's major training contractors—QIC and the skills 
center (with the exception of the clerical and auto mechanics 
clusters)—are operating at 70 to 80 percent of their max 
imum enrollments. These existing training areas could be ex 
panded quickly. While these deliverers would tend to offer 
more of the same kinds of training, they would produce 
quick results. For community-based organizations such as 
OIC and SER, expansion would require funding for improv 
ing facilities and updating equipment in addition to the 
amounts normally allowed for training.
The second option is to bring new deliverers into the 
system. Many public and private agencies in the city are anx-
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ious to demonstrate their capabilities to provide quality 
training in a large number of occupational areas. These 
organizations, however, have had little or no experience with 
federal programs or with serving the populations currently 
eligible under CETA. Adding some of these agencies to the 
system would rapidly expand capacity but not output. Prob 
lems associated with administering their first federal grant 
and learning how to deal with CETA clients would adversely 
affect output in the short run.
The issue in Dallas is really more one of the city's response 
to a new training initiative rather than to local capacity. The 
city has repeatedly underspent formula allocations for train 
ing and has chosen not to participate in special initiatives 
such as the Skills Training Improvement Program. Would it 
respond differently to a new training initiative? If it did ac 
cept the funding, it probably would simply fund more of the 
same kinds of short term training currently offered. The 
capacity is there, but the commitment to relevant training for 
the hard-core unemployed should be questioned.
Recommendations
CETA has not evolved into an effective system for manag 
ing federal training and employment initiatives. Currently, 
the delivery system is overburdened with rules, regulations, 
reporting requirements, investigations, and a backlog of 
unresolved audits. There is little evidence that the program is 
being effectively managed at any level. With CETA 
reauthorization on the congressional agenda in 1982, there is 
an opportunity to make changes to improve the quality and 
effectiveness of the program.
• The goals and objectives of training and employment in 
itiatives need to be better focused at the federal level. 
This requires going beyond statements of what is to be 
accomplished to maintaining a consistent policy
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framework for setting priorities among the goals and 
objectives included in the authorizing legislation. 
The intergovernmental delivery system needs to be 
restructured to correct present weaknesses. There are 
several interrelated issues that deserve special attention: 
the state's role, elected official involvement, citizens' in 
put, and determining local service areas.
The State's Role. States do not easily fit in the current 
federal-local structure of the CETA system. In many 
cases, balance of state is an area made up of leftovers 
after all of the local prime sponsor arrangements have 
been negotiated. It's difficult to define local labor 
market areas or to do planning for such areas from the 
state capitol. Program decisionmaking should be decen 
tralized to sub-state planning boards. Another state 
issue has to do with the Governor's discretionary money 
under CETA. Rather than funding special training pro 
jects, this money should be earmarked for investment: 
to develop and demonstrate new programs and to 
enhance the capability of people working in the policy 
area.
Elected Official Involvement. The concept of a single 
entity responsible and accountable for management of 
the local program is valid; however, the decision to 
make state and local governments prime sponsors 
should now be questioned. In most cases, the benefits 
realized—increased political accountability, com 
prehensive planning, program coordination, and in 
tegrated service delivery—do not approach the costs of 
attaching training and employment programs to govern 
ments primarily concerned with fire, police, and capital 
expenditure programs financed from local revenue. 
There is little evidence of local elected officials identify 
ing training programs for the hard-core unemployed as 
high priority on their local agenda. For the most part,
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they have hired staff to run programs designed to shift 
the heat from their office and to keep the peace. Their 
interest in CETA has been limited to the fiscal relief and 
political benefits of the public service jobs program. 
With the 1978 amendments setting average wages and 
stricter eligibility criteria, the attraction to CETA has 
largely disappeared.
Citizens' Input. The three citizens' advisory committees 
now mandated under CETA do not appear to be mak 
ing significant contributions to the quality of local pro 
grams. It's too early to predict the future influence of 
the private industry council, but the other councils ap 
pear to be going through the motions to satisfy federal 
requirements. If local councils are to be a part of the 
system and to be effective, they must be made more 
responsible and accountable for program results.
Determining Local Service Areas. Using the boundaries 
of local political jurisdictions to determine service areas 
and set residency requirements for program participa 
tion runs counter to the concept of labor market plan 
ning. In some cases under CETA, there are five or six 
prime sponsors operating independently in the same 
labor market area.
A possible solution to several of these systems problems 
might be the creation of local labor market boards or com 
missions. These boards—made up of elected officials, local 
citizens, and representatives of business and labor—would 
function as prime sponsors responsible for area-wide labor 
market planning, contracting, monitoring, and evaluation. 
But in contrast to CETA prime sponsors, they would not 
deliver services. The board's labor market planning respon 
sibility would include looking at the participation of all the 
supply-demand institutions in the area. Funding available to 
the board would be used at the margin to fill identified gaps
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and complement labor market services provided by the 
myriad of other federal, state, and local organizations.
• The roles and relationships among the major actors in 
the delivery system must be clearly delineated. It is not 
enough to identify the primary recipients of funding, or 
to say that all levels in the system are responsible for 
monitoring and evaluation. Each level in the manage 
ment hierarchy must have well defined limits of authori 
ty and responsibility. Once established, these basic rela 
tionships must be maintained over time to reduce the 
confusion and uncertainty in the system.
• Incentives—rewards and punishment—must be built in 
to the system to achieve the stated goals. Under CETA 
the rhetoric encourages one set of responses; however, 
performance measures, assessment criteria, and incen 
tives reward different behaviors.
• Major attention must be given to developing the 
capabilities of people working in the delivery system. 
Few people in the system demonstrate the knowledge of 
the policy area and the management skills to successful 
ly implement programs. In a decentralized delivery 
system, the commitment and competence of the deci- 
sionmakers ultimately determine the nature of the quali 
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Introduction
The Indianapolis CETA operation can properly be 
characterized as a program in transition or reorganization. 
Although CETA has been operated under the jurisdiction of 
the Indianapolis city government since its inception, the ex 
tent to which the program has been viewed as an integral part 
of local public services is somewhat questionable. Because of 
the major reorganization efforts that were initiated in 
1978-79, it is necessary to view the Indianapolis CETA pro 
gram in a pre- and post-reorganization context. Prior to the 
current administration and pre-reorganization, the In 
dianapolis program was characterized by a lack of continuity 
in leadership, inadequate management systems and lack of 
direction, and adverse publicity regarding program opera 
tions.
Prior to the 1979-80 period, the Indianapolis program was 
fraught with a wide array of management problems that im 
pacted adversely on both the scope and quality of the prime 
sponsor's employability development and training activities. 
In general, the program was loosely operated, and manage 
ment systems were not adequate to assure proper controls or 
decisionmaking. Perhaps the major problem was in the 
financial management area, where there were insufficient 
controls and reports were frequently inaccurate or 
unavailable. In short, it appears that the financial manage 
ment had lost control of the system. Serious problems were
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also evident in the program's Management Information 
System (MIS). Reports from this unit were not reliable, 
client records were incomplete, and inadequate information 
was being generated for management purposes. Other func 
tions of the Indianapolis program were also deficient. The 
intake-assessment-referral function did not generate a 
smooth client flow to the various employment and training 
components. Monitoring and evaluation of contractors' per 
formance and compliance were all but absent. Prior to the 
beginning of fiscal 1979, the Indianapolis program was all 
but bankrupt, and the Division of Employment and Training 
was under fire from the regional office of the Employment 
and Training Administration and from many groups in the 
Indianapolis community.
The above comments and this report are not an expose of 
the Indianapolis CETA program. On the contrary, the sum 
mary of management and program problems is intended to 
provide a contrast with the current organizational approach 
and to illustrate that it would be highly inappropriate to 
assess the Indianapolis program on the basis of historical 
performance. In the broadest sense of the word, the In 
dianapolis CETA system was reorganized during fiscal 1979. 
The reorganization included changes in the organization 
structure of the Division of Employment and Training; a 
major change in the Division's reporting relationship to the 
city's elected officials and administration; and changes in 
policies affecting funding allocations, program design, and 
contractor operations.
The Prime Sponsor Area
Demographic and Economic Features
The jurisdiction of the Indianapolis CETA program 
covers the Indianapolis-Marion County area, inclusive of
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five separate general purpose muunicipal governments. At 
the beginning of 1970, the balance of Marion County and the 
City of Indianapolis were consolidated into a single govern 
mental unit, with a population base of 728,344. The prime 
sponsor serves an area of 402 square miles which is 
characterized by a basically flat terrain with no major water 
ways or unusual geographic features.
The total population of the prime sponsor's jurisdiction is 
770,300, with approximately 72 percent of the total being 
white. The minority population in the area is predominantly 
black, and there are relatively small Hispanic and Asian 
population groups. Slightly over 5 percent of the population 
of Marion County was estimated to be eligible for CETA in 
fiscal 1979. A similar proportion of the population was 
estimated to be from families whose family income is below 
the federal poverty guidelines. Less than 2 percent of the 
total population is estimated to be receiving Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children, state, or local public assistance. 
Of the total estimated CETA eligible population, 30 percent 
is 19 years or younger and 64 percent is nonwhite.
The Indianapolis economy is quite well diversified and 
contains over 1,200 industries. The City of Indianapolis is 
recognized as a service sector economy and is the home for 
more than 70 insurance companies. Indianapolis is also a 
major warehousing, distribution, and office center for In 
diana and the region. In 1979, the total nonagricultural wage 
and salary employment was approximately 410,000, with 
manufacturing employment accounting for 27 percent of the 
total. Nonmanufacturing jobs represented 60 percent of the 
total jobs, and the government sector accounted for the re 
maining 13 percent. Within nonmanufacturing, finance and 
insurance companies, wholesale and retail trade, and services 
account for the majority of the job opportunities.
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CETA Allocations
As shown in Table 1, CETA allocations for fiscal 1979 ex 
ceeded $31,000,000, with 77 percent of the total targeted for 
public service employment. Although a rather sizable fund 
ing was realized for fiscal 1980 with the phase down in public 
service employment, over $25,000,000 was allocated to the 
Indianapolis prime sponsor. Given the sizable CETA alloca 
tions, the participant enrollment figures are relatively low. 
However, the Indianapolis prime sponsor was in a 
reorganization phase, and actual client activity lagged con 
siderably behind planned levels of service.


























a. Adjusted allocations as released by the Employment and Training Administration.
Prime Sponsor 
Organization and Operations
The CETA program in Indianapolis-Marion County is ad 
ministered by the city's Division of Employment and Train 
ing (DET). The current organizational structure appears to 
be well-formulated, and the top management staff is both 
technically competent and acclimated to planning and 
managing CETA programs. The director of DET reports 
directly to the Indianapolis deputy mayor. Under the current 
organizational structure, all DET staff members are
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employees of the city and fall under the city's merit and per 
sonnel system. A total of 195 staff positions are authorized, 
although only 149 are filled. An additional 66 temporary 
positions are authorized under a "supplemental work force" 
program, a type of work experience activity run by DET.
Management Structure
The Indianapolis prime sponsor is organized along func 
tional lines. In addition to the staff functions pertaining to 
the entire organization (personnel, Equal Employment Op 
portunity, legal services, and independent monitoring), three 
deputy administrators for "line" operations report directly 
to the DET administrator. The two key persons reporting to 
the chief administrator are the EEO officer and the indepen 
dent monitoring unit (IMU) manager, both of whom are 
responsible for directing, supervising, and monitoring 
policies throughout the prime sponsor's program.
The three deputy managers have responsibility over train 
ing CETA administration (planning, Management Informa 
tion System, and fiscal management) and employment ser 
vices. The deputy for training services is responsible for the 
overall direction of client services, adult work experience, 
youth services, and training services. Client services include 
intake, assessment, counseling, supportive service, and the 
"client pool." The latter function is basically a referral ac 
tivity which matches individuals to open training positions. 
Training services encompass prevocational and vocational 
training as well as monitoring and supervising training 
subgrantees. In addition, this unit is responsible for contract 
negotiations and development with service delivery agencies. 
The adult work experience unit is concerned with short term 
work assignments for CETA clients stationed with either 
public or private-nonprofit employers. The youth program 
unit is responsible for the Title IIB youth work experience 
program and the Title IV youth activities.
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The deputy administrator for employment services is 
responsible for the public service employment programs 
funded under Title II-B and VI. In addition, this unit has 
responsibility for job search programs which involve 
classroom training in how to locate and obtain jobs, 
simulated experiences in job application and interviewing, 
and self-directed job search activities.
The deputy for administration supervises the MIS, the 
planning and evaluation function, and the financial manage 
ment system. The MIS unit maintains all participant data 
and operates the client tracking system. Total planning and 
program evaluation for all titles is performed by the Plan 
ning Unit, and financial management and internal auditing 
for all CETA activities are under the financial services 
manager.
The senior management staff of the Indianapolis prime 
sponsor are highly qualified in management and experienced 
in manpower programs. Although the program was 
characterized by relatively high turnover prior to the new ad 
ministration, this does not appear to be a significant prob 
lem, at least among the top management personnel. Perhaps 
the most important change made by the current ad 
ministrator is the hiring of qualified managers who have the 
capabilities of managing both systems and personnel. Fur 
thermore, a greater emphasis is being placed on recruiting 
persons who are technically competent in areas such as client 
management information systems, accounting, and financial 
management. As implied earlier, this represents a major 
departure from past personnel practices that involved the 
hiring of individuals whose qualifications were suspect at 
best. Another important personnel change that will likely im 
pact favorably on the Indianapolis program in the future is 
that "political appointments" to the CETA staff have been 
eliminated. The impression is that individuals are selected on 
their merits, and the decisions of the CETA administrator
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are supported by the deputy mayor. In short, the current ad 
ministrator has introduced a much higher level of profes 
sionalism throughout the prime sponsor staff.
All prime sponsor employees are covered by the In 
dianapolis civil service system. Also, all positions have been 
classified by the City Personnel Department. These 
classifications are consistent with the system used for all city 
employees. Job descriptions exist for each position within 
DET, and the majority of these descriptions had been up 
dated and were consistent with the management structure 
under the CETA reorganization.
In general, the CETA staff salaries are comparable with 
those of other city government divisions. Yet, it should be 
noted that not too many of the DET positions are com 
parable with other public service jobs in the local govern 
mental structure. A few of the positions may be rated slightly 
higher than in other divisions for this reason. From all in 
dications, the salary levels are also comparable with those of 
nonprofit and community-based organizations in the area. If 
anything, the salary ranges may be somewhat higher than the 
prevailing nonprofit pay structure. When comparisons are 
made with the private sector, the only classification that ap 
pears to be comparable is the secretarial and clerical area. 
Although it was difficult to compare the prime sponsor's pay 
structure to prevailing levels in the private sector, it appears 
that the CETA salaries for management and professional 
personnel are around 20 percent below private sector ranges.
The relatively low pay scale does present problems in 
recruiting top-grade management personnel. It also presents 
a challenge to the prime sponsor in terms of employee reten 
tion. Several of the key personnel indicated that they did not 
view their work with CETA as a long term career because of 
the prospects for higher incomes in other organizations. To 
date, however, the prime sponsor has been successful in
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pirating competent personnel from the Indiana Balance-of- 
State program and has been moderately successful in retain 
ing key personnel. The prime sponsor's office has also avoid 
ed having a union.
Management Systems
As part of the reorganization, the CETA administrator in 
itiated the development of an automated Management Infor 
mation System (MIS) that would satisfy Department of 
Labor reporting requirements as well as provide program 
managers with internal management reports. The client in 
formation system is currently functioning on a manual basis. 
Most of the attention to date has been placed on dealing with 
the backlog of incomplete or missing client records and in 
making procedural changes that lead to improvements in the 
flow and quality of primary client records. Revisions were 
also required for the intake documents to assure that all of 
the required information was being obtained from ap 
plicants. Prior to late 1979, the intake documents did not 
capture such key information as complete education and 
school dropout status and complete family status 
characteristics. Also, changes were required in those sections 
of the forms that deal with family income and displaced 
homemaker status.
The client system is now operating efficiently enough to 
generate the required quarterly reports on participant 
characteristics and to publish a monthly management report 
that details client activity by title. This latter document, ti 
tled a "Planned versus Actual Output" report, details plan 
ned and actual termination data by type of termination (e.g., 
"entered employment," "other positive," "nonpositive," 
etc.). In addition, a monthly "participant flow" report is 
generated. The purpose of this reporting procedure is to in 
dicate the planned and actual enrollments for each title and 
selected programs such as adult work experience, prevoca-
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tional training, vocational training, self-directed job search, 
and other similar programs. Although this particular report 
ing procedure has not been fine-tuned, it is judged to be an 
effective management tool. The report could be more 
valuable if the program areas could be further disaggregated 
and if supplemental reports could be prepared for individual 
program operators. The MIS manager hopes to be preparing 
reports on individual contractors by the end of the fiscal 
1980 program year. In the meantime, however, it has been 
difficult for the management team members to get much of a 
handle on how specific programs and operators are function 
ing either with regard to planned performance or program 
outcomes.
After considerable time and effort, the financial manage 
ment system has been restructured to provide fiscal control 
and to generate accurate information. There are still prob 
lems in meeting internal reporting requirements on a timely 
basis. However, there is little question that this unit can meet 
all routine information needs. The present accounting 
system was developed in large part by an outside consultant 
during the first nine months of 1979.
The monitoring and evaluation of specific programs and 
contractors under the Indianapolis CETA system is a two- 
tiered approach. Project coordinators with the responsibility 
of overseeing contractors are supposed to monitor program 
operations on a continuing basis. The monitoring activities 
at the project coordinator level, together with information 
from the MIS and fiscal units, provide the basis for program 
evaluation by the planning and evaluation unit. However, 
the success of the monitoring and evaluation efforts at this 
second and higher level depends heavily on the scope and 
quality of performance monitoring conducted by the project 
coordinators and the MIS. The current program and perfor 
mance monitoring system has very limited usefulness. 
Because of vacancies that exist at the section chief and pro-
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ject coordinator levels, there are obvious gaps in contract 
supervision. This problem is further exacerbated by the lack 
of in-depth training available to the front-line supervisory 
personnel. As a result, monitoring and evaluation remain 
quite ineffective. It was also noted that technical assistance 
to subgrantees and even planning and arranging for training 
programs were suffering because of staff vacancies and in 
adequate or nonexistent staff development and training. The 
most recent quarterly assessment by DOL noted that many 
of DET's front-line staff were not properly trained. DET 
was given until September 1980 to take corrective action. 
The Labor Department's primary concern was the DET 
staffs ability to monitor contracts vis-a-vis compliance and 
performance standards.
Decisionmaking
For most of 1979, the Indianapolis program was in the 
process of restructuring its entire operation, from 
philosophy and policies to strategic and operational systems. 
At the time of this study, considerable progress had been 
made in the planning and decisionmaking area, but the for 
mal process was far from being totally debugged, and 
changes were still being initiated. The underlying 
"philosophy" or policies regarding the purpose of employ 
ment and training programs are fundamental to the formal 
decisionmaking process in the Indianapolis CETA program. 
Under this approach, all CETA programs were oriented to 
the structurally unemployed. The idea was to utilize the most 
restrictive eligibility requirements under CETA and apply 
these requirements to applicants in all titles. The intent was 
to create a "comprehensive program design" that could 
utilize all CETA funds as though CETA were a bloc-grant 
program. All training and employment activities and all 
resources would be directed toward achieving the policies ar 
ticulated earlier in this chapter. The next implicit, if not ex-
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plicit, policy that guides decisionmaking is that given the 
orientation to assisting the structural unemployed, 
employability development services and training are viewed 
as the primary vehicles for dealing with structural 
joblessness. A third guiding policy is that the goal of prac 
tically all manpower services and programs is to provide the 
structurally unemployed worker with the skills and ex 
periences that will enable him to obtain unsubsidized 
employment in occupations where there is sufficient demand 
for workers in the area.
Most decisions regarding policies, planning procedures, 
and selection of training activities are made by the DET 
staff, while the CETA advisory council exercises a review 
and advisory role. Other groups do not seem to exercise un 
due influence over decisionmaking. The Department of 
Labor's representative apparently was more concerned 
about getting the program cleaned up and back on track than 
anything else. He emphasized, according to those persons in 
terviewed, adhering to the CETA regulations. The federal 
representative did not get too involved in decisions relating 
to training policy, especially to the types of training to be 
provided.
The program operators do not influence decisions to any 
great extent. However, it appears that they do not approve 
the concept of selecting training areas on the basis of occupa 
tional demand. Their position was characterized as "wanting 
to spend the money" for their existing programs. From all 
indications, it was difficult to bring the program operators 
into a new program design because they failed to match 
client needs with training programs that will likely lead to 
unsubsidized employment.
The governor's special CETA grants also do not have any 
appreciable impact on decisionmaking. For example, the 
supplemental vocational education funds go directly from
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the governor to the State Board of Vocational and Technical 
Education. In turn, these funds are distributed to prime 
sponsors on a formula basis. According to one DET staff 
member, the prime sponsor has considerable flexibility to 
spend the money in any manner desired. Apparently, the 
state is not even concerned if the funds go to accredited 
educational and training institutions. In the Indianapolis 
area, the supplemental vocational education funds are used 
for tuition, staff instructional cost, and supplies. The only 
limitation is that allowances cannot be paid with the funds. 
Twenty percent of the supplemental funds are taken out for 
administrative purposes and the rest is blended into the 
prime sponsor's other training programs.
Training Policies and Decisions
The policies and decisionmaking process for training ac 
tivities are consistent with the prime sponsor's overall 
philosophy regarding employability development services. In 
essence, training and subsidized employment are viewed as 
vehicles for providing CETA clients with the skills to obtain 
unsubsidized employment. A wide array of employability 
development services are available to CETA clients in the In 
dianapolis program, including a sizable number of prevoca- 
tional projects, vocational and skill training, subsidized 
work, and self-directed job placement.
The overall policies and planning assumptions of training 
activities are very straightforward. Training activities must 
be consistent with the requirements of local occupations that 
exhibit sufficient net labor demand. Characteristics and 
dimensions of jobs for which training is to be provided are 
identified in advance, and the programs are designed to 
prepare new entrants to meet all of the job specifications.
These training design policies are supported by the prime 
sponsor's policies in the allocation of funds to training pro-
219
jects and activities. Under these policies, the Indianapolis 
program attempts to allocate a portion of available CETA 
resources to prevocational training activities whose explicit 
objective is preparing the "most in need" client population 
for vocational and skill training activities which culminate in 
unsubsidized employment. The prime sponsor's ad 
ministrator also articulated another basic policy approach 
which was to make the maximum feasible allocation each 
program year to projects that result in unsubsidized and self- 
sufficient employment.
One of the major components under the Indianapolis pro 
gram is prevocational training which encompasses a wide 
range of programmatic efforts including basic and remedial 
education, English as a second language, motivational/at 
titude training, and the introduction of nontraditional jobs 
to women. However, the objective of all of these efforts is 
the same—the preparation of "hard-to-employ" CETA 
clients for vocational training. Under the original program 
design, this was an experiment whose primary objective was 
to reveal how to serve the most disadvantaged CETA par 
ticipants. For clients who enter prevocational training, the 
prime sponsor attempts to design an employability develop 
ment plan that will lead to an upgrading of the 
"characteristics" that can qualify them for skill training. 
This component is designed to serve as a "feeder" system for 
all vocational training activities. The training policies in 
dicate that clients who complete this activity have three op 
tions—vocational training, temporary work experience, and 
placement into the best available permanent, unsubsidized 
employment slot for which they qualify. The latter is intend 
ed for those who are not successful in attaining the objectives 
of their prevocational employability development plan.
The purpose of vocational training is to provide clients 
with the capabilities of obtaining unsubsidized employment. 
This activity is the core of the Indianapolis CETA program,
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since training policies envision skill development as the single 
most important service under CETA. The prime sponsor's 
staff is charged with designing, developing, and implemen 
ting individualized training plans for clients by selecting an 
appropriate occupation for each person from the list of high 
net demand occupations approved for CETA training. After 
completing vocational training, clients are to go directly into 
permanent, unsubsidized jobs. If job opportunities are not 
available, the client may be placed in a temporary subsidized 
job.
The prime sponsor provides training under each of the 
CETA titles, although the training activities under the 
Private Sector Initiative Program (Title VII) are determined 
by the Private Industry Council with little, if any, considera 
tion given to the prime sponsor's policies. Title II-B is 
primarily oriented to prevocational and vocational training. 
The public service employment programs, Titles II-D and 
VII, also are vehicles for providing prevocational and voca 
tional skills to CETA enrollees. Clearly, training in its 
broadest definition respresents the primary service delivery 
thrust of the Indianapolis prime sponsor.
The criteria for determining the mix of training activities 
include a number of factors. As noted earlier, the selection 
of skill areas is based in large measure upon the analyses and 
selection of net positive demand occupations. The entry level 
wage rates for occupations is another key factor in the deci- 
sionmaking process. The service delivery capabilities of 
training agencies and institutions in the community and the 
quality of their programs also influence the training activities 
authorized by the prime sponsor. Based on the training in 
vestment policy of the prime sponsor, occupations that re 
quire more than nine months will generally not be initiated.
Informally, other factors influence decisions regarding 
program mix. In the prevocational training area, the
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previous program mix plays a strong role in determining the 
programs that are funded. The influence of this factor on 
vocational programs is not as apparent. To some degree, the 
influence of past programs on current training is due to 
" political" considerations of the role of key agencies in the 
community. However, political considerations are not 
thought to be necessarily negative. It is more a matter of hav 
ing specific prevocational activities in the Indianapolis area 
funded for specific client constituency groups such as blacks, 
Hispanics, and women.
The assessment and counseling unit is responsible for 
deciding which clients are referred to specific prevocational 
and vocational training activities. In performing this func 
tion, the prime sponsor's participant policies provide very 
specific guidelines and steps for client referral decisions. 
During 1979, the emphasis was shifted from a "first-come, 
first-served" basis to limiting access to those who satisfied 
the training profiles for the specific prevocational and voca 
tional programs. The assessment and counseling unit works 
with each client in establishing occupational training objec 
tives that are consistent with the CETA program offerings. 
The underlying requirement is that the program design is 
basically job- and thus employer-oriented. This approach 
assumes implicitly that clients are willing to work and want a 
job and that they can select a training area for which they 
can qualify by meeting basic training entry requirements. 
The key in this process is the role of the assessment and 
counseling unit in assisting clients to identify occupational 
choices vis-a-vis the high net demand jobs identified by the 
prime sponsor's planning unit.
Clearly, there have been problems in attracting a sufficient 
number of clients who meet the standards set for some of the 
programs. The major problems have centered on the 
relatively low math competence of most clients, poor at-
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titudes about training and employment, and poor problem 
solving skills.
In reality, the decision process for assigning clients to 
training components does not follow the procedures outlined 
above. In addition to targeting clients to training areas for 
which they are qualified, the availability of vacant slots and 
programs and enrollment shortfalls have a major influence 
on who gets trained in specific occupational areas. Because 
of the pressure to increase enrollments to planned levels and 
because the assessment function is far from being fine-tuned, 
clients are targeted in some instances to training components 
where they simply cannot succeed.
In large measure, the selection of service delivery agencies 
under the Indianapolis program is now performed in a 
depoliticized manner. Formal requests for proposals are 
issued for all programs under all CETA activities—II-B, 
Public Service Employment, Youth Community Conserva 
tion and Improvement Projects Program, Youth Employ 
ment Training Program, and the Summer Youth Employ 
ment Program. Though a number of individuals and groups 
are involved in various stages of the selection process, the 
prime sponsor's management staff clearly exercises the most 
influence in the decision of delivery agencies. A comprehen 
sive evaluation and rating instrument guides the prime spon 
sor in selecting subgrantees for training and other programs. 
Under this procedure, point values are applied to specific re 
quirements or program elements. The points actually award 
ed any given element are determined by calculating the 
average rating of scores given by members of the prime spon 
sor's Education and Training Selection Committee. For 
those program elements that do not carry a point value, a 
majority of the committee must agree that the proposal 
response meets a minimum level of acceptance. If any 
response falls below the minimal acceptance level, the pro 
posal is automatically rejected.
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Training Administration
Training, in its broadest context, is authorized under all of 
the CETA titles in the Indianapolis area. Primary emphasis, 
however, is placed on a broad array of prevocational train 
ing activities. The majority of the training expenditures for 
fiscal 1979 were authorized under Titles II-B and IV. Ap 
proximately 44 percent of all Title II-B expenditures were for 
training activities. As noted, the bulk of these outlays was 
for classroom training. Two-thirds of the total expenditures 
under the Youth Employment Training Program were 
targeted to classroom and on-the-job training programs. 
Relatively high proportions of the total outlays under the 
PSE titles were also targeting toward training and 
employability and development services—20 percent under 
Title II-D and nearly 10 percent under Title VI.
Internal management reports for the first six months of 
fiscal 1980 indicated that the prime sponsor increased the 
relative expenditures for training under Title II-B, but train 
ing and service expenditures for the other titles were lagging 
behind the relative amounts recorded during fiscal 1979. 
Training programs accounted for 68 percent of the total Title 
II-B outlays during the first six months of the year, but 
represented only 16 percent and 10 percent of the Title II-D 
and VI expenditures, respectively. (Classroom training alone 
accounted for 40 percent of the expenditures. Also, all train 
ing activities and employability development services 
represented 62 percent of the total Title II-B outlays.)
In contrast to the emphasis placed on classroom training, 
the Indianapolis prime sponsor has accorded on-the-job 
training (OJT) a very low priority. OJT programs have en 
countered considerable difficulty in Indianapolis since the 
inception of CETA. During the second quarter of 1980, 
there were no OJT enrollees, and the prospects for initiating
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a viable OJT activity did not appear too favorable. The 
reasons for not using OJT relate to the program's past ex 
periences, particularly its history of adverse newspaper 
publicity and charges of fraud in previous programs.
On-the-job training has declined in importance in com 
parison to both the early CETA years and the pre-CETA 
period. One of the prime sponsor's management staff 
members noted that OJT is perceived by some as "the 
answer'' to the training of the disadvantaged, but that the 
program is a "sham" to a certain extent. It is one of those 
activities that looks good on paper, but in actual practice 
does not work well. The design and incentives for OJT pre 
sent a dilemma. In most instances, the financial incentives 
under the program do not appeal to large employers who 
have the expertise and facilities to provide training compati 
ble with OJT's program design and philosophy. As a result, 
the employers to whom OJT appeals are generally small and 
frequently cannot provide a viable training function. In fact, 
in many instances, the primary incentive for these employers 
is a "wage subsidy" that facilitates their staying in business. 
In short, OJT is far from a panacea for the training prob 
lems of CETA clients in Indianapolis.
Actual client service patterns in training activities tend to 
support the prime sponsor's client targeting policies. With 
the exception of the Youth Community Conservation and 
Improvement Projects and Title VI programs, service to 
females was greater than that to males in all titles. The pro 
gram participation rate for women ranged from a high of 60 
percent for Title II-B to a low of 20 percent in the YCCIP 
program. It was not possible to collect characteristic data for 
separate training components in the various titles. However, 
because Title II-B is predominantly a training program, 
client characteristics under this program can be contrasted 
with those under the Public Service Employment programs. 
Clients who were enrolled in training activities under Title II-
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B tended to be younger, less educated, and more dependent 
on some form of public assistance than clients who possessed 
PSE jobs. Two out of every five Title II-B enrollees were 
high school dropouts in comparison with only 21 percent of 
the Title II-D enrollees and 32 percent of the Title VI 
enrollees. Exactly half of the training enrollees were under 22 
years of age. In contrast, only 25 percent of the II-D clients 
and 31 percent of the Title VI clients were in this age 
category. Furthermore, almost half of the II-B enrollees 
were recipients of some form of public assistance while ap 
proximately one-fourth of the PSE clients were public 
assistance recipients.
Service to nonwhites was approximately the same for all 
titles. The participation of black and other minority group 
members was extremely high for all titles, ranging from a 
low of 73 percent in Title II-D to a high of 88 percent in the 
YETP program. There are a number of factors that may ex 
plain the relatively high incidence of service to blacks. First, 
inner-city Indianapolis is about 80 percent black, and this is 
where most of the intake centers for the CETA program are 
located. Second, outreach and intake are not aggressively 
pursued in the out-county area for a number of reasons, in 
cluding the lack of advocacy groups, logistical considera 
tions, and the fact that the CETA eligible population in the 
out-county area is very dispersed. A third possible explana 
tion may be that the program is perceived by the intake staff 
as being black-oriented.
Training Quality
The analyses of the quality of alternative training activities 
in the Indianapolis prime sponsor area are based on a 
number of sources, including opinions and perceptions of 
the prime sponsor's staff members and personnel associated 
with the training contractors, assessments of all available
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contract documents and performance reports, and the field 
researcher's personal observations derived from on-site visits 
at eight training facilities. The on-site visits covered the full 
range of both prevocational and occupational training pro 
vided under the Title II-B program. The four prevocational 
delivery agencies were training clients in basic and remedial 
education, GED preparation, English as a second language, 
career exploration, world of work orientation and the in 
troduction of nontraditional employment opportunities to 
women. The vocational training agencies offered skill train 
ing to CETA enrollees in 17 separate occupational areas, in 
cluding health and office occupations, industrial trades, and 
basic electronics.
The prime sponsor's policies indicate that emphasis will be 
placed on open-entry, open-exit vocational training ac 
tivities. In reality, very few of the programs are designed in 
this manner. However, several of the prevocational and 
vocational activities are designed on a modular basis that 
facilitates client access. All vocational activities are provided 
on an individual referral as opposed to class-size format. The 
individual referral format is considered to be advantageous 
for several reasons. First, under a class-size program CETA 
clients are generally segregated, and there is frequently a 
stigma attached to the CETA enrollees. Second, under the 
class-size programs, it appears that the instructors have 
lower expectations for the enrollees. Also, according to one 
member of the prime sponsor's management staff, the class- 
size programs are usually taught by low-paid, part-time, un 
qualified personnel. Although the quality of training varies 
considerably among the different training agencies and even 
among different occupational areas within the same agency, 
the training curricula for practically all programs appear to 
be competency-based. In addition, the instructional staff 




The prevocational programs in the Indianapolis training 
system are basically designed to prepare clients in basic and 
remedial education, orientation to the world of work, and 
GED preparation. One such program, "Get Set," is 
operated by Indiana University/Purdue University at In 
dianapolis (IUPUI). This program is operated as an "open- 
entry, open-exit" activity with no minimum entry re 
quirements. The vocational assessment system used in the 
"Get Set" program is both comprehensive and continuous 
during the enrollee's tenure. The curriculum for this pro 
gram is highly individualized and is competency-based. The 
"Get Set" philosophy of learning is based on one key prin 
ciple—"who's an adult and who's not." The program staff 
places the responsibility for learning on the students, grades 
are not given, homework is not assigned on a required basis 
and no textbooks are required. Very few discipline problems 
have arisen, and it is apparent that peer attitudes influence 
the work habits and behavior of the enrollees. The program 
is clearly staffed by dedicated and competent personnel and 
is judged to be successful in meeting its objectives.
Another basic education program is operated by Lockyear 
College, a private, postsecondary, independent college. The 
success of this program is due in large measure to a well- 
trained staff and individualized training plans for each stu 
dent. In addition, the program is located in a modern, well- 
decorated, new office facility in park-like surroundings. 
Training for this activity generally runs for about five weeks 
during which there is an average increase of three grade 
levels. The program staff places a high priority on con 
tinuous reviews of the progress of each enrollee and prepares 
very detailed reports on individual progress.
The Lockyear program is clearly a first-rate approach to 
adult basic education. Strong emphasis is placed on atten-
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dance, promptness, and task orientation. However, in a 
strict sense, the Lockyear project is not prevocational since it 
does not provide enrollees with occupational awareness and 
career exploration.
The basic and remedial education program at the United 
South Side Community Organization (USSCO) is also a very 
high quality Adult Basic Education project. USSCO, which 
was established in 1968, is heavily oriented to satisfying the 
need for adult education among the transients and migrants 
from Kentucky who live on the south side of Indianapolis. 
Until recently, the agency was supported by the public 
schools, but at the current time most of its funds come from 
CETA. The agency has experienced considerable difficulty 
in working with the separate youth and adult components 
under CETA. Although the client populations overlap, 
USSCO must handle them under separate contracts. The 
primary training activity involves the teaching of reading and 
mathematics by using job-related materials. The curriculum 
materials seem to be rather standard reading tests for adults 
such as the Steck-Vaughn, Lakeshore of California, and 
Cambridge.
The trainees served under the USSCO program clearly 
need a great deal of assistance in a number of areas. Much of 
the staff time is spent on helping trainees solve or cope with 
chronic problems. The clients are frequently referred to the 
Southeast Multiservice Center which can provide employ 
ment services, food stamps, and other forms of assistance. 
As was the case with the Lockyear College program, the 
training at USSCO does not involve career exploration and 
occupational awareness.
Vocational Training
The vocational training activities funded under the In 
dianapolis program cover a wide array of occupations.
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However, the largest programs are operated by the In 
dianapolis Opportunities Industrialization Center (OIC), the 
Indiana Vocational-Technical College (Ivy Tech), and Lin 
coln Technical Institute. OIC has the largest skill training 
contract under the Indianapolis CETA program. A total of 
100 individual referral skill training positions and 90 
prevocational slots are funded at $617,532. Skill training is 
provided in the following occupations: secretarial and key 
punch, health careers, industrial skills, basic electronics, and 
dental lab technology. Perhaps the most unique activity 
under this contract is the industrial skills class that is taught 
at an International Harvester (IH) plant. Current production 
models of IH gasoline and diesel engines are used to teach 
assembly, disassembly, troubleshooting, blueprinting, and 
basic tool skills.
The quality of training at OIC covers a fairly wide range. 
The clerical and keypunch programs appear to serve the 
literate and motivated clients satisfactorily. However, there 
is much to be done before the dental lab and the nurses aide 
programs reach full efficiency, and even more is needed in 
the electronics program. At the other end of the continuum, 
the industrial skills program at International Harvester is an 
exemplary model of a training program for the CETA 
population. Its emphasis and training design are oriented at 
just the right level for many of the CETA clients who require 
training services.
Ivy Tech provides occupational training in eight separate 
areas, with 25 slots available at any time for each occupa 
tion. Training is available for industrial maintenance, auto 
service, auto body repair, machine tooling, heating and air 
conditioning, industrial drafting, general clerical, and 
secretarial. Although most of these programs are considered 
to be adequate, most of the training areas need considerable 
updating of equipment. In general, the Ivy Tech staff is ex 
tremely well-prepared, with strong teacher training plus oc-
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cupational and teaching experience. Curriculum materials 
are well-prepared and are readily available.
Individual referral training is also sponsored in both 
automotive technology and diesel and truck technology at 
Lincoln Technical Institute. Fifty training positions are 
available in each area, and the program provides for a total 
of 1,000 hours of training for each area. The Lincoln pro 
gram is modular and operates on a five-week cycle.
LTI is located near Lockyear College, but the setting is 
completely different. It looks like the transportation-related 
school that it is, with an attached service facility and parts 
department which sells both to students and the general 
public. The building is well-maintained, modern and func 
tional for the training activities that are sponsored by the 
organization.
The equipment is typical of that found in a modern dealer 
ship or truck repair facility. The staff is well-qualified, with 
considerable occupational experience and teacher training. 
About a third of the instructors taught similar courses in the 
military. Instructional materials are designed, particularly in 
the more advanced courses, to prepare the trainees for condi 
tions in the world of work. In general, the course outlines 
and tests are well-prepared and are used effectively by the in 
structional staff.
The administration of the Lincoln program is very proud 
of its placement record, and it is not interested in training a 
large number of hard-to-place persons. The obvious 
preference is to enroll no more than 3 to 5 percent of its 
trainees from CETA, and even those need to be screened 
very carefully on the basis of their ability and motivation. 
The Lincoln Tech administration does not like class-size 
CETA programs because it believes that such programs lead 
to low expectations and labeling of trainees. In the opinion 
of the training personnel, individual referral trainees learn
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more, in part because of the example of and help from other 
capable students. Another factor affecting the administra 
tion's attitude is the Federal Trade Commission order that 
each potential student be provided placement rate data for 
the occupations in which the institution offers training.
Conclusions
Several first-rate training projects in both the prevoca- 
tional and vocational areas are being operated under the In 
dianapolis CETA programs. The basic and remedial ac 
tivities sponsored by USSCO and Lockyear College are very 
high quality programs. The prevocational component that is 
run by IUPUI for both Title IV and Title II-B is a very well- 
designed and executed program. In the occupational training 
area, there is a fairly wide range of quality among the dif 
ferent programs. Nonetheless, a good array of skill training 
is available to CETA participants, and in most instances, the 
programs are considered at least to be adequate. The pro 
jects offered by Lincoln Technical Institute and Ivy Tech are 
first-rate. However, neither of these institutions is especially 
oriented to the "most in need" among the CETA popula 
tion. The usefulness of these programs is heavily dependent 
upon the prime sponsor's interest in and ability to select 
clients who can succeed in the training. If there is not a will 
ingness to exercise more selectivity in the referral-to-training 
process, only limited results will materialize.
Because of the major restructuring efforts that have been 
initiated by the prime sponsor, it is probably too early to at 
tempt to render a final assessment of training policies and 
programs for the Indianapolis CETA program. However, 
there are a number of factors that appear to be impacting 
negatively on the quality of the prime sponsor's training ef 
forts. For the most part, the training policies appear to be 
well-designed, and the planning system has the potential of
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generating very workable and comprehensive strategic and 
operational plans. The difficulty, at this stage, is that opera 
tional units are far from able to implement effectively these 
policies and plans. The assessment, counseling, and training 
units are not adequately staffed, either in actual numbers or 
in personnel who have the skills and experiences to imple 
ment a complex program design. Staff development and 
training at this level is imperative. In addition, more em 
phasis should be placed on attracting highly qualified per 
sonnel who could perform the "front-line" functions consis 
tent with the philosophy and policies of the prime sponsor. 
Immediate attention should also be placed on upgrading 
both the contracting and project performance monitoring 
functions. In both instances, there should be a focus on 
developing measurable objectives for performance stan 
dards, learning objectives, and outcome goals. These 
measurements should be incorporated as key elements in 
each prevocational and vocational contract, and the project 
coordinators should assess progress on a monthly basis.
Another fundamental problem is that there may be a 
serious inconsistency between the prime sponsor's client and 
training policies. Without doubt, the CETA program is be 
ing targeted, either as a matter of policy or as a result of the 
intake and referral process, to clients who have a wide range 
of service needs and who may be characterized as seriously 
disadvantaged. Yet, many of the occupational skill training 
programs are quite sophisticated and have relatively high en 
try standards. Unless there is an attempt to screen more 
deliberately the clients who are referred to skill training, 
many of the training activities will probably continue to ex 
perience only modest success. This problem has undoubtedly 
been exacerbated because the client employability develop 
ment function has not been finalized and implemented in the 
manner intended by the prime sponsor.
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As a final observation, the major factor that may be miss 
ing in the Indianapolis program is an effective "bridge" be 
tween the prevocational and vocational skills programs. An 
implicit assumption seems to have been made that a trainee 
falls into one of two categories—ready for vocational train 
ing or not ready. The overwhelming majority of the In 
dianapolis CETA clients fall within the latter category. The 
training model that may be more consistent with the clients' 
needs is one that provides concurrent vocational training and 
basic education, with the latter design built on the needs of 
the vocational activity.

Montgomery County, Maryland 
A Born-Again Prime Sponsor
Marion W. Pines
Baltimore Metropolitan Manpower Consortium
Montgomery County, Md., located directly north of 
Washington, D.C., is one of the wealthiest counties in the 
nation. The suburban home of many of the nation's most in 
fluential policymakers, it is also the new home of growing 
waves of Asiatic and Hispanic immigrants who constitute a 
new CETA constituency. Although the minorities and the 
poor are less than 5 percent of Montgomery County's 
600,000 population, their problems are often exacerbated 
because they are dispersed throughout the most affluent 
Maryland subdivision.
Montgomery County is part of the Washington standard 
metropolitan statistical area (SMSA), which also includes 
three cities and four counties in northern Virginia, the 
District of Columbia and two other Maryland counties. 
Although these areas are part of a geographically integrated 
labor market, no move has been made to encourage joint 
labor market planning. Montgomery County CETA 
managers have gone it alone although the 1970 census in 
dicated that almost half of the area labor force worked out 
side the county of residence. This mobility has been aided by 
an effective highway network and the opening of parts of the 
100 mile rapid rail METRO system. Until the METRO 
system is extended, however, the more remote pockets of 
need in northern Montgomery County remain isolated and 
underserved.
In 1979, local CETA officials were faced with the 
challenge of designing and managing a manpower delivery
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system to meet the needs of a diverse and dispersed target 
population (very old and very young; rural black and new 
immigrants). In addition, they are preparing this population 
for an economy that seeks professional, managerial and "hi- 
tech" workers. At the same time, national policy changes in 
creased their resources from $1.9 to $8.5 million in five 
years. Obviously, these local economic mismatches and na 
tional policy fluctuations produced serious management 
challenges and raised fundamental issues for the local CETA 
system. However, a review of the Montgomery County 
prime sponsorship provides some illustrative insights into 
some practical as well as policy issues for the employment 
and training system as a whole.
A brief recap of Montgomery County employment and 
training history helps to frame the issues.
Insulated organizationally within a social service umbrella 
department, the focus of our attention, the Division of 
Labor Services is one of four units in the agency, three 
reporting echelons removed from the County Executive. 
There is growing evidence that under new political leadership 
(elected in 1979), closely followed by new CETA leadership, 
much needed accommodations are developing to enhance in- 
teragency linkages and reduce local bureaucratic snags. 
There is growing awareness that the exigencies of CETA ad 
ministration make political access, immediate response and 
quick signatures a necessity.
The initial response of the first CETA directorate to its 
new responsibilities under the decentralized system was to 
emulate the public employment service model—"only 
better," as one Montgomery County staffer modestly 
described the operation. All comers were welcomed, as long 
as they had been unemployed a week. A fairly effective per 
sonalized jobmatching activity ensued. The pursuit of train 
ing was left to the individual. No participant allowances were
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paid, so the motivated and interested enrollee was free to 
seek training from any of the proprietary schools operating 
in the greater Washington, D.C. area. The 33 schools subse 
quently selected were then reimbursed by voucher paid by 
the prime sponsor. Placement services after training were 
haphazard and outcome information was largely anecdotal. 
As can be imagined, the target population reached through 
this kind of a service/training buy-in system was generally 
well educated, white, and female. During the early CETA 
years in Montgomery County, management accountability 
systems were largely undiscovered and relationships with the 
regional office of the Department of Labor were comparable 
to the "Bickersons."
The quadrupling of resource allocations under the 
economic stimulus package in May 1977 ("We were OK at 
$1.9 million—but kinda blew apart at $8 million"), closely 
followed by the constraining CETA amendments of 1978, 
brought the Montgomery County CETA system to a crisis.
Lack of fiscal controls had produced serious cost overruns 
in Title II-B; negligent monitoring resulted in severe 
underenrollments and underexpenditure in Title II-D; and 
general management deficiencies caused poor marks on the 
annual regional office assessment resulting in month-to- 
month funding. This pressure cooker finally exploded. Pro 
tracted debates and vitriolic exchanges with the regional of 
fice culminated in a threat to deobligate $400,000 in unex 
pended public service employment funds. The newly elected 
county executive and congressional representatives were call 
ed into a rescue mission and promply escalated negotiations 
to the national level. The low profile CETA system was sud 
denly thrust uncomfortably to front page news. Obviously, a 
new county executive was not overly pleased with this kind 
of notoriety. Not unexpectedly, the local CETA leadership 
toppled—and a new experienced team recruited from other
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prime sponsors and other county agencies was assembled to 
restore peace, tranquility and order, and to create CETA in a 
new image for Montgomery County. The team was headed 
by a former local senior CETA planner who had intimate 
knowledge of the weaknesses and was able to chart the im 
mediate work plan for the team with precision.
• Within six months, position and slot control systems 
were in place for public service employment manage 
ment.
• Disbursement approval was linked to activity progress 
reports.
• Expenditure controls and fiscal reporting systems were 
established.
• The management information system was redesigned to 
provide the required participant tracking and STOP 
date warnings.
• An independent monitoring unit (IMU) was created and 
proceeded to initiate the concept of performance con 
tract management.
By any standards, this evidence of administrative com 
petence is impressive.
While the new team was attempting to get control of 
runaway expenditures, new enrollee intake was slowed to a 
trickle throughout fiscal 1980. The team concentrated first 
on building sound management systems. It next turned to the 
delivery system and made decisive moves to accommodate 
new CETA requirements mandated in the 1978 amendments.
These amendments to the original 1973 CETA legislation 
retargeted almost all CETA resources to the structurally 
unemployed. Strict eligibility requirements were established 
which factored in income as well as unemployment status. 
Managerial mandates were clearly articulated and included 
requirements for eligibility verification systems, client track 
ing systems, and independent monitoring units. Limitation
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of enrollee participation to a fixed number of hours, weeks 
and months in various CETA-funded activities seriously 
hampered local decision-making authority and program 
designs. However, the new Montgomery County team made 
a conscientious effort to refocus the program to begin to 
serve the structurally unemployed.
Allowances are now available to all enrollees, making it 
possible for Montgomery County's truly poor to participate. 
The active involvement of the private industry council (PIC) 
has influenced training policy. Training offerings are based 
on local labor market needs and are offered in class-size 
modules. The concept of training has been broadened to ac 
commodate the full range of employability development 
needs of a new group of enrollees. English as a second 
language, basic remedial education, motivational training, 
survival skills, and carefully chosen occupational skill train 
ing are now available. A new training infrastructure is 
developing as well. Local colleges, women's advocacy 
groups, proprietary schools, community-based organiza 
tions, private vendors, and the public schools are playing im 
portant roles. Training is taking place in plush office suites, 
store fronts, church basements and university laboratories.
In attempting to assess the training system funded by 
CETA in Montgomery County, quality guidelines were 
established. Apart from organizational design, intergovern 
mental relationships and other "esoteric" factors, it is 
generally agreed that faculty, curriculum, equipment and 
facility are key contributors to the overall quality of a train 
ing program.
In examining the six different examples of CETA-funded 
training in Montgomery County, careful attention was paid 
to the quality of the training staff. Did they display en 
thusiasm? Were they combat-weary? Did they know their 
field of instruction? Did they display concern and a sense of
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responsibility for what happens to trainees "after training?" 
Both technical competencies and interpersonal skills were 
reviewed as well as field-tested in live training settings.
Good instructors need worthy program content in order to 
get results. Curriculum materials were examined with par 
ticular sensitivity to their relevance to the population being 
trained as well as relevance to the labor market to be served. 
Special note was taken when "canned" materials were 
employed or when and how new curriculums were tailored.
Where relevant to the training, the age and quality of 
equipment utilized were carefully noted. Broken or outmod 
ed training equipment does not afford trainees transferable 
skills. Moreover, use of such equipment often sends a subtle 
negative message to trainees. Recent donations of useful 
equipment by employers often denoted close involvement 
and interest by the private sector.
The facility in which training is offered is not the key to 
ensuring good quality, but it certainly enhances the offer 
ings. Two other more subtle factors were considered in mak 
ing value judgments about Montgomery County's training 
programs: the "atmosphere" engendered at the training 
sites; and any administrative constraints or incentives im 
posed by the prime sponsor that might affect the quality or 
results of training.
Basic Educational Training
Montgomery County Public Schools (Department of 
Adult Education) is the contractor for an intensive program 
of English as a second language, serving 75 clients in each 
cycle. The program coordinator depends upon word of 
mouth for staff recruitment and has successfully tapped the 
rich source of foreign service government workers and their 
families revolving through the Washington area to yield a 
team of ESL specialists with at least master's degrees. In ad-
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dition, the program activity recruits volunteers to assist in in 
dividualized instruction. An intensive curriculum planning 
session including a full week of orientation precedes the 
startup of the year's activities.
The contract makes a stab at establishing performance 
goals for the program. For example, it stipulates that 
enrollees will successfully complete the program by achieving 
one of the following:
1. English language proficiency commensurate with 
"enrollee's individual employment goal."
2. Placement in permanent, unsubsidized employment for 
seven continuous days or longer.
3. Enrollment in non-CETA funded academic or voca 
tional training.
Behavioral Science Associates provide the adult basic 
educational services for the Montgomery County prime 
sponsor. The relationships and responsibilities between the 
contractor and prime sponsor in regard to referral, counsel 
ing and termination services are identical in all Montgomery 
County programs so the detailed interrelationship will not be 
described again. Suffice it to characterize those services as 
absentee in nature. The current Behavioral Science contract 
calls for service to 120 new participants over a 12-month 
period, with 24 at any given time. Actual enrollment levels 
have ranged from 6 to 31.
The small staff team meets regularly to work on tasks, 
solve problems and handle educational objectives. The train 
ing materials include the Jamestown series for reading ver 
satility, supplemented by Bloomenthal, Wiley and 
McGraw/Hill materials. The staff also develops specialized 
supplementary materials to enhance their instructional ac 
tivities. The staff tries to specialize, with one instructor 
focusing on math, the other on reading, although both are
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responsible for both areas. The coordinator oversees the 
overall quality of instruction.
According to program staff, this instructional program 
has resulted in dramatic improvements: 80 percent of the 
enrollees have increased their reading skills by two grade 
levels in two months! Unfortunately, no independent evalua 
tion corroborates this achievement.
Occupational Training
Both the George Washington University and the Capital 
Institute of Technology exhibit characteristics consistent 
with quality skill training programs. For example:
• Both had very close ties to the private sector and had 
solicited advice and recommendations in the process of 
developing curriculums.
• Both had consciously attempted to assign staff that 
would tailor their training activities to reflect private 
sector requirements closely.
• Both were able to identify quickly the barriers to suc 
cessful completion of training offered to CETA clients 
and recommended and implemented the solutions to 
remove these barriers.
• Both were conducted by institutions which had educa 
tional activities as their major institutional focus.
Although the prime sponsor had established no formal 
mechanisms to insure the quality of skill training offered, 
each of these programs had developed its own mechanisms 
to ascertain the requirements of the private sector and to in 
corporate those requirements into the curriculum. Both had 
moved far beyond contractual requirements to supply sup 
plementary supportive services needed by the clients to com 
plete the training successfully. Both fully recognized that oc 
cupational skills alone would not enable trainees to obtain 
and retain unsubsidized employment.
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Neither of these programs was contractually required to 
place the trainees upon completion of the course. Both, 
however, were active participants in the placement process, 
again as an unpaid supplement to the Servicenter. By 
capitalizing on the involvement of employers throughout the 
training continuum, the trainers have developed responsive 
resources for job placement.
Because both training institutions provide educational ac 
tivities as their major business, a valuable resource of ex 
perienced practitioners in curriculum development, testing, 
etc., is available on an as-needed basis to modify, improve, 
and redesign curriculums, teaching techniques and testing 
materials used by the GET A funded programs.
The George Washington University sponsored biomedical 
training program was spawned in the midst of a full-scale in- 
tragovernmental furor described earlier.
The full curriculum is developed around a work study 
model: two semesters in the classroom, one semester in a 
public or private sector field placement and the last semester 
back in the classroom. Each semester of work earns four 
credit hours. The students are required to use job search 
techniques taught in the course to develop a resume and 
secure their own paid field placement position for the third 
semester. This field placement in many instances leads to 
full-time unsubsidized employment upon completion of the 
course. The George Washington University has a strict atten 
dance policy which entails a graduation requirement of 90 
percent attendance during the course. In addition, if the stu 
dent is absent 10 percent of the class period, he is considered 
absent for the entire period and forfeits his training 
allowance for the entire period! Counseling sessions around 
this policy focus on teaching students how to evaluate the 
important activities of life, and how to organize their time to 
complete those activities. After the third absence, the student
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must have a conference with the program director before be 
ing readmitted to class. The program staff intends that the 
students transfer this discipline to other aspects of their lives.
The standards for admission to the program are extremely 
high and require a high school diploma or GED and 
demonstrated high math, reading and vocabulary levels of 
achievement. It is little wonder that the Montgomery County 
prime sponsor had to screen 1100 applicants to find 33 for 
the biomedical technician course!
During the fall 1979 semester, GWU enrolled a number of 
foreign-speaking students. In recognition of their special 
needs, the trainer requested and received a contract 
modification from the prime sponsor to provide 10 hours per 
week of ESL tutoring on a one-to-one basis.
Thus, incrementally, this training program was ap 
proaching the total service package that is of maximum 
benefit to the CETA enrollee. However, because of the ex 
tremely high entry requirements, a very select sector of the 
CETA-eligible population receive this high quality service 
package.
The Capital Institute of Technology (CIT) is a recognized 
technical institution which provides accreditation from the 
certificate level through college degrees in electronics. It is 
located in the Gaithersburg/Rockville corridor along Route 
270 which, as described earlier, is one of the fastest growing 
electronics markets in the country.
Time is allotted for students to work on individual or team 
projects in the laboratory facilities. The students are able to 
explain in precise technical terms the purpose of their pro 
ject, the methodology they are using and the results they ex 
pect. CETA enrollees also participate in tutoring sessions 
conducted in preparation for examinations. These sessions 
are conducted by a former student who is currently working
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part-time while studying for her A.A. degree at CIT. The 
students exhibited a working knowledge of the technical 
terms employed in the electronics field and were eager to ex 
plain complicated electrical circuits to visitors.
Background investigation revealed that in early 1979, 
Wider Opportunities for Women (WOW) approached the 
Montgomery County prime sponsor asking for funding to 
emulate a program model previously funded by the DOL of 
fice of national programs in which "life instruction" was 
coupled with math, communication skills and occupational 
training. The model was intended to enhance the entry of 
women into non-traditional occupations. The prime sponsor 
agreed. A contract was negotiated with WOW that stipulated 
a third-party subcontractual role for the Capital Institute of 
Technology to fulfill the occupational training function. The 
contract language spells out WOW's oversight respon 
sibilities for both quality of training and job placement, but 
the WOW staff interviewed appeared to be unaware of these 
responsibilities. Unfortunately, in the absence of a viable 
field monitoring system, the prime sponsor puts no real 
pressure on WOW to fulfill these significant responsibilities.
Motivational Training
Although Wider Opportunities for Women's role was 
described above in conjunction with the occupational skills 
training at CIT, the major thrust of WOW's involvement 
with that skills training program focuses on attitudinal 
change and motivational training. The techniques employed 
by WOW staff are individualized counseling and peer 
pressures as well as peer counseling. Interestingly, although 
the initial intent of the training program was to provide non- 
traditional training for women, only 31 percent of the 
enrollees are females. It appears that the passion for non- 
traditional jobs is often more fervent among professional ad-
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vocacy groups and government agencies than among the 
potential bricklayers, truckdrivers, and electronic techni 
cians!
The National Center for Economic and Community 
Development (NCECD) has extensive corporate experience 
in motivational team building and organizational develop 
ment activities. The original design of its activities calls for 
agency staff and participants to spend the course time in a 
live-in facility—a hotel or condominium—where the degree 
of external interference can be controlled. This design had 
been modified for the Montgomery County CETA contract 
and had added job search "training."
The structure of the course is devoted to individual and 
group exercises. Small group interaction is used extensively 
to facilitate a support system for the development of job 
search skills. "Personal Growth" planning is divided into 
three sections—past, present, and future. Exercises are 
tailored to develop a set of likes and dislikes, experiences and 
skills which will lead to a "job action plan." Enrollees 
develop their own job descriptions and chronological and 
functional resumes.
The program staff stresses the "mentor" approach by its 
own instructors in the program, encouraging them to share 
their own life experiences with the participants. Problems 
developed by the participants are openly discussed in group 
sessions and group solutions are developed.
This program model and contractor were selected in direct 
response to the passage of the 1978 CETA amendments. The 
Montgomery County prime sponsor perceived that a "new" 
client group—perhaps less motivated than the prior 
caseload—would require additional massaging, but it has 
not integrated the program into any logical sequence in the 
training continuum.
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Overall, the quality of the training offerings reviewed in 
the course of this study was generally superior. Training 
staff members among all subcontractors displayed good 
technical backgrounds as well as interpersonal skills. 
Moreover, they seemed acutely aware that their respon 
sibilities were to train for employment. Their major frustra 
tion was the lack of information about what happened to 
"their" enrollees after they completed their training course.
Curriculums were developed with a sensitivity to the needs 
of participants as well as the labor market. Few "canned" 
programs were noted, and a great many innovative 
enrichments were being developed during the training 
period.
Technical equipment was modern, affording trainees the 
opportunity to learn skills that were immediately 
transferable to the work place. Much of the equipment used 
by trainees had been donated by the private sector, which ap 
peared interested in hiring the most successful trainees.
The major weaknesses are now being corrected. Few se 
quential links were noted among and between program com 
ponents, to enable an enrollee to move smoothly from an 
English as a second language class into an occupational skills 
program, for instance. And consistent feedback information 
is needed by all trainers so they can adjust curriculums based 
on the eventual employability of their trainees (not to men 
tion the psychological rewards to trainers based on student 
success or vice versa). A major step forward would be more 
specific contractual documents which clarify expectations so 
both vendor and purchaser can assess performance. In addi 
tion, effective contract management, consistent field 
monitoring and program evaluation also await implementa 
tion. Full scale outreach activities to new target populations 
for the complete 1981 bill of fare were as yet untested. The
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1980 partial freeze on new enrollments did not provide an 
adequate test of outreach to the structurally unemployed.
However, producing the accomplishments just described 
has been an all consuming task for the talented and ex 
perienced four top staffers who share 27 years of CETA and 
local government experience.
But the entire before and after study of the Montgomery 
CETA system and its often adversarial relationship with the 
Department of Labor raises issues that should be addressed 
before and during the CETA reauthorization debate.
Staff Development/Management 
Assistance Issues
No system, activity, or endeavor can succeed without 
qualified people at the helm who understand their mission 
and who have been trained to perform their task. The fabled 
high CETA staff turnover rates were not found in Mont 
gomery County with the exception of one noteworthy 
wholesale top leadership change in 1979.
But there is ample evidence that the gyrations in national 
manpower policy have overtaxed the administrative 
capabilities of a young decentralized system. It must be 
remembered that the system was barely six months old when 
Title VI, the first expanded Public Service Employment ac 
tivity, was legislated by the Congress and implemented in a 
rather taunting style by the Department of Labor. ("Decen 
tralization is being tested. Deliver or else.") The system was 
barely three years old when the economic stimulus package 
came forth in mid 1977, tripling resources and quadrupling 
paperwork. This was followed by the CETA amendments of 
1978 which, as mentioned before, mandated complex 
management and monitoring systems, sharpened the focus 
on target populations and put limits on program design op-
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tions. With virtually no outside technical assistance spon 
sored by the federal authorities, indeed with intermittent 
harassment, it has been very difficult to develop local exper 
tise to handle responsibilities of this scope. Whatever institu 
tion building and staff development that has occurred has 
been almost completely self-generated and self-nurtured.
CETA staff desperately needs a support system. Prime 
sponsor associations are gaining strength. They are taking an 
increasing interest in mounting prime-to-prime assistance ef 
forts. An encouraging development has been solid support 
for this development from the new Office of Management 
Assistance (OMA) in DOL's Employment and Training Ad 
ministration. There are offers to cover travel costs and in 
some cases, per diem, for traveling "helpers." Many prime 
sponsor associations are brokering the requests for 
assistance and the offers of help. This is an encouraging 
development but it alone obviously will not meet the 
challenge of management capacity building for the long 
haul. Nor is it intended to do so.
It must be supplemented by intensive management train 
ing for the CETA system decision makers delivered by, and 
if possible through the auspices of experienced prime spon 
sor staff. Those institutional grant university programs that 
have matured since their early DOL funded experiments 
might be linked to form a national academic resource net 
work. New prime sponsor directors, often hired in crisis, 
must be oriented and thoroughly trained in this most com 
plex and quixotic planning and management activity—called 
the employment and training system.
Certainly some local environments may be more 
hospitable than others for producing, attracting and retain 
ing the kind of quality staff needed. Local political stability 
is an important plus. The dilemma of close affiliation be 
tween the CETA director and a chief elected official and the
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resultant possible loss of dual leadership at the polls has 
caused serious problems of instability in some prime spon- 
sorships. On the other hand, many strong prime sponsor 
directors have managed to so professionalize themselves and 
their CETA operations that they have withstood two and 
three political changeovers of mayors, county executives, 
and governors.
Thus, a top priority for the CETA system must be the im 
plementation of practical and workable interventions to 
orient, train, assist, and support local managerial capacity. 
That is the heart of the system (and it is no place for the 
fainthearted), and that is the kind of capacity least likely to 
buckle under arbitrary political or administrative meddling.
Intergovernmental Relationship Issues
It has been suggested sometimes in jest that a massive in 
tergovernmental personnel exchange (IPA) program should 
be instituted for federal representatives, midlevel 
Washington bureaucrats, and prime sponsor staff. The time 
has come to think seriously about this. Thoroughly non- 
conversant with the prime sponsor system other than by 
anecdote, many staff in the Washington headquarters and 
the 10 regional offices of the Department of Labor have a 
deep seated distrust of and disregard for the capabilities of 
the local partners. The Montgomery County $400,000 caper 
is a classic case in point. Slower than planned enrollments 
and expenditures in the newly targeted Title II-D public ser 
vice employment programs created a potential "excess" 
carryover of dollars into the following fiscal year. In an at 
tempt to forestall reallocation, the prime sponsor entered in 
to a contract with a local university for a sophisticated and 
expensive technical training program. Some 1100 applicants 
were screened to produce 33 eligible trainees! Although the 
previously mentioned rescue mission finally bailed out the
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prime sponsor, serious intergovernmental issues and ques 
tions remain:
1. Why was the local government so unresponsive to the 
legislative mandate of Title II-D—the creation of public 
service jobs to reach Montgomery County's structurally 
unemployed?
2. Why was the absence of fiscal controls and monitoring 
of enrollment levels tolerated for so long by all levels of 
government?
3. Why did the regional office accept a prime sponsor's 
plan that showed no expenditures or enrollments pro 
jected in the first quarter of the fiscal year and then 
retort with a threatened deobligation three months 
later?
4. Why did the regional office offer no clear explanations 
to the prime sponsor of the difference between expen 
ditures and obligations in computing carryover funds? 
If such an explanation had been forthcoming in July 
1979, the prime sponsor may not have proceeded to 
develop a contract committing the funds in question.
5. How much staff time and energy was wasted and how 
much aggravation and diversion from requisite duties 
was created at all levels of government over protracted 
period on matters that could and should have been 
resolved by reasonable people willing to negotiate a sen 
sible solution in a 2-hour meeting?
In fact, the national and regional levels have little perception 
of interdependency in the CETA system. Interdependency 
implies trust, responsibility, and capacity to deliver. Because 
there is basic distrust of the locals, the federal and regional 
attempts to monitor and manage the system can most 
charitably be described as overkill.
Each side of the partnership needs exposure to the other's 
perspective. Policy decisions are being made with little con-
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cept or sensitivity to the problems of implementation. 
Reporting requirements are becoming more complex. Pro 
gram requirements are becoming more specific. For exam 
ple, in regard to proposed new youth legislation, there is 
serious talk of requiring every employability plan for every 
youth to be updated every month—and somehow report all 
this nationally. Even if it could be done (and obviously it 
can't), what would anyone at the regional or national office 
do with such information?
Federal officials desperately need a refresher course in 
high school "civics." At the same time, local prime sponsors 
need to be informed and sensitized to the deliberative pro 
cesses of the Congress, the pressures from the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), and the internal workings 
of the Department of Labor.
This interchange should be thought through, institu 
tionalized, and implemented in a systematic manner. In 
every case in which it has already taken place, greater 
understanding has resulted. But it needs to take place on a 
wider scale and in a sustained manner if it is really to affect 
policy development.
Intergovernmental Management Issues
By legislation, limited percentages from each CETA title 
grant can be earmarked for an administrative cost pool. 
Generally, staff paid from this administrative cost pool per 
form the planning, evaluation, monitoring, reporting, and 
managerial functions of the prime sponsorship. Because the 
percent of dollars available for the pool is fixed, the larger 
prime sponsors have a significantly larger resource pool for 
the requisite planning, administrative, and managerial func 
tions. Conversely, small prime sponsors with the same 
management and reporting requirements have a very shallow 
administrative resource pool to draw from.
253
Some analysis of resource distribution provides interesting 
insights. In fiscal year 1980, Title II-B allocations were 
distributed among city and county prime sponsors as 
follows: (balance-of-state prime sponsors not included)
77 percent received less than $5 million, 
8 percent received between $5 million and $10 million, 
2 percent received over $10 million.
Similar configurations were found in the distribution of 
funds among city and county prime sponsors for public ser 
vice job creation. In Title II-D:
75 percent received less than $5 million, 
11 percent received between $5 million and $10 million, 
3 percent received over $10 million;
and in Title VI:
82 percent received less than $5 million, 
5 percent received between $5 million and $10 million, 
1 percent received over $10 million.
Regions I, VI, and X had no prime sponsors funded at the 
higher levels, excluding balance-of-states, which are a special 
management problem.
This distribution means, for example, that in fiscal year 
1980 Montgomery County had an administrative cost pool 
of under $1 million. The Baltimore Consortium had an ad 
ministrative cost pool 10 times that, and New York City's 
pool is almost 10 times Baltimore's.
The point of this exercise is to illustrate rather dramatical 
ly where the dollars are to deal with the inordinately complex 
CETA management system. Those dollars are concentrated 
in a very small percentage of the prime sponsorships. Yet the 
demand for data, for the complex cross-tabulations, for 
weekly, monthly, quarterly, and ad hoc reporting, for multi 
ple plans, for endless modifications, etc., etc., are laid out
254
monolithically upon the system as if there were a uniform 
level of resources available to produce the response. This 
situation is totally unrealistic and yet largely unrecognized.
This monolithic set of demands and requirements imposed 
on a very diverse set of prime sponsors has been the source of 
continued havoc and has often had an effect diametrically 
opposed to its intent. With limited resources, as the focus 
shifts to regulatory compliance coupled with the new focus 
on audit and liability responsibilities, sponsors may well 
reduce the attention paid to training policy and implementa 
tion. Even talented staffs have limits on energy and creativi 
ty. The signals they are receiving from the Congress and 
from the Department of Labor are not addressing quality of 
training.
The need for information and the responsibility for over 
sight is fully acknowledged. But new procedures must be 
developed. A scientifically designed sample of larger prime 
sponsors and a set of smaller prime sponsors could be fund 
ed to provide the requisite cross-tabulations and detailed 
reporting, thereby relieving the rest of the system from this 
crushing burden. Undifferentiated management re 
quirements and continued adversarial relationships are slow 
ly strangling the decentralized CETA system.
Decentralization Issue: How Much?
Decentralization under CETA transferred the manage 
ment of thousands of manpower service delivery contracts 
from the DOL's regional offices to prime sponsors (political 
subdivisions of at least 100,000), freeing the regional office 
network of DOL to manage just the 470 odd prime sponsor 
grants. Theoretically, this change should have resulted in a 
responsive, streamlined, accountable system. The Mont 
gomery County case study produced much evidence to in 
dicate that the DOL has not developed this kind of respon-
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sive, consistent grant management system. Protracted 
debates and adversarial negotiations such as described in this 
Montgomery County story are not exceptions.
Unfortunately, the side, but important, effect of these bit 
ter encounters that is often overlooked, is the serious diver 
sion of staff attention, energies and time at every level of 
government from significant planning and management 
duties. These diversions are costly. Pressures build. Staff 
morale suffers. Turnover results. Important tasks like train 
ing the disadvantaged unemployed to become self-sufficient 
are often neglected in order to mobilize additional evidence 
for the issue at hand, thus sowing the seeds for additional 
future problems.
Equally at issue is the number of prime sponsors (growing 
every year) and the most practical and cost effective ad 
ministrative mechanism to manage this system. The federal 
government demonstrated its inability to manage the old 
federal system with over 10,000 contracts. It is under fire for 
its non-management of the quasi-federal/state employment 
service system. As it now functions, the intergovernmental 
CETA system is a bottlenecked system literally choking on 
the paper it generates. Nevertheless this observer would not 
vote for a refederalized system.
States, for the most part, have not distinguished 
themselves with their balance-of-state prime sponsorships, 
nor have Governors displayed much interest in employment 
and training strategies. States have shown a remarkable 
ability to create new layers of red tape and to require 
bureaucratic high jumps in their administration of the 
Governor's 6 percent CETA vocational education grants. In 
fact, Montgomery County's sole reason for negotiating with 
the State of Maryland's manpower office was its desperate 
need for additional training funds. But the arbitrary and 
rigid procedures established by most states discourages many
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prime sponsors. So there will not be any vote here for con 
solidation under state government.
But it is fairly obvious that individual contiguous subdivi 
sions operating in the same labor market should be ad 
ministering their grant as one. The previously described com 
plex administrative systems put in place so laboriously by 
Montgomery County staff to serve only 500-600 enrollees 
raises serious questions about cost effectiveness of the pre 
sent decentralized design. Certainly, these systems could 
serve neighboring Prince Georges County as well (at a 
minimum). Instead, a new Prince Georges County prime 
sponsor director is trying to learn the ropes and reinvent the 
management wheels for his subdivision. Suggesting a total 
Washington-SMSA consortium involving three separate 
authorities—Maryland, Virginia and the District of Colum 
bia—would probably be too radical in the current political 
climate.
However, if consortia were actively encouraged as a mat 
ter of policy, clusters of counties, and city/county combina 
tions would emerge that could probably reduce the number 
of prime sponsorships significantly. For the first six years, as 
the number of prime sponsors grew from 402 to 475, the 
DOL has been totally neutral in the face of consortia forma 
tion and dissolution. This is to suggest that a policy change is 
warranted in this area. Consortia should be actively en 
couraged. Incentive bonuses of at least 20 percent should be 
guaranteed and transmitted at the beginning of the grant 
year. Bonus payments have ranged from a high of 10 percent 
to a low of 2 percent over the first six years of CETA. Con 
sortia bonus funding often arrives 10 months into the fiscal 
year. When consortia threaten to dissolve, the DOL should 
play the role of active arbiter, seeking to redress grievances 
and assuage political egos. The payoffs could be high. A 
significant reduction in the number of prime sponsors means 
fewer master plans and fewer annual plans to produce and
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read, and fewer modifications to process, and fewer 
numbers of reports to complete. The potential impact on the 
paperwork crush is tantalizing.
In addition, there are cogent cost effective indicators that 
speak to prime sponsor mergers. We have mentioned the ef 
fect on management systems, and on the plans/modifica 
tions and requisite reports. The choice of vendors and the 
contracting process are another area of potential benefit. 
Often neighboring prime sponsors contract with the same 
vendor, paying double administrative costs and fielding dou 
ble monitoring teams. One contract, with a larger number of 
enrollees monitored by a single unit, would obviously be 
more cost effective and efficient.
Private industry councils are strong advocates of labor 
market planning and operations, recognizing access to 
broader job markets for applicants and a broader labor pool 
for employers. The trend toward multijurisdictional PIC's 
speaks to the logic of a free flowing supply and demand 
manpower system.
Accountability Issue: Whose?
The decentralized/decategorized CETA concept was in 
tended to allow local elected officials, supposedly most 
familiar with local labor market needs and local unemploy 
ment problems, to put together programs (with federal 
funds) to help address those needs and problems. It was and 
is intended that local officials be held accountable for 
results. But over the first six years, federal intervention has 
increased markedly, as indicated in the following directives: 
"If job placement is underway, use the services of your local 
Employment Service." Montgomery County's funding was 
help up until an agreement with ES was produced. "If ser 
vices are to be contracted out, give priority to community- 
based organizations"; ". . . if'job creation (PSE) is con-
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templated, get union approval of every job . . . and don't 
forget to meet with your planning council at least five times a 
year, your youth council everytime a youth activity or con 
tract is contemplated and your private industry council for 
approval of all Title VII expenditures (and a good look-see at 
other titles' expenditures as well." To top it off, the local 
elected official is held responsible for any and all audit ex 
ceptions and disallowed costs encumbered by these newly en 
franchised partners! It is time to stop playing political games 
with this decentralized system. If a decision is made to hold 
the local elected official accountable for funds and out 
comes, then he must be allowed to choose his instruments for 
local policy implementation based on locally demonstrated 
effectiveness. The CETA system has been overly tinkered 
with to suit every special interest group. As stated at a recent 
Governors' conference, "A rather fanciful form of 
federalism has emerged ... it has produced a situation 
where no level or set of officials is performing the functions 
it is best suited to perform."
Formula Funding Issue
The political price paid for the passage of CETA was 
guaranteed funding for every political subdivision, rich or 
poor, with 100,000 residents or more. This obviously diluted 
the impact that limited dollars could have on seemingly 
limitless needs. But just as current talk of a new rein- 
dustrialization policy implies targeting and supporting key 
industries for expansion and growth while acknowledging 
that others may fade, so we may need to develop the political 
courage to rework the CETA formula to maximize the im 
pact of scarcer dollars on geographic areas of greatest need. 
It may be less of a problem than in the early years, now that 
local officials have experienced the nightmare of CETA 
management problems, funding uncertainties, and audit 
problems. Some prime sponsors are voluntarily relinquishing
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funds. This may be a propitious time to rework and retarget 
the funding formula.
Expansion Issues: GET A 
and Economic Stabilization
As described earlier, most of the changes and expansions 
imposed on the CETA system exposed the fragility of the 
management structure. In addition, these changes were in 
response to immediate national economic problems; the 
recession of 1974 created Title VI; the lingering aftermath of 
the recession produced the economic stimulus package of 
1977. However, national policymakers have failed to con 
sider the time required to develop absorptive capacity at the 
local level. Adequate leadtime is an absolute necessity if a 
quality product is desired. The responsive training in 
frastructure that has developed in the CETA system is 
capable of expansion, without buckling. Montgomery Coun 
ty sees its greatest potential need in vocational English as a 
second language and regards its primary deliverer, the Mont 
gomery County schools, as capable of handling a quintupled 
enrollment! The new set of relationships with the private sec 
tor, immeasurably enhanced by the private industry council 
(PIC), has just begun to supply new training capacity that 
the Montgomery County staff feels could absorb at least 
doubling of resources in Title II-B (comprehensive man 
power service) and Title VII (private sector initiatives).
However, several administrative policies constrain CETA- 
funded training activities from their maximum use as a tool 
for increasing productivity. First of all, current performance 
indicators (soon to be standards) measure cost effectiveness 
in very gross terms. Total expenditures divided by total 
numbers who "enter employment" equal costs per place 
ment. Obviously, this provides little incentive for long term, 
highly skilled occupational training. It also provides no en-
260
couragement for the prime sponsor to seek out the most 
disadvantaged groups and expose them to a sequential array 
of costly training ranging from remedial education, survival 
skills and motivational reinforcement to skill training. The 
short term "quick fix" for the most employable groups 
within this target population will give the prime sponsor 
highest marks on the current report cards.
A second issue closely related to CETA as a tool for in 
creasing productivity deals with the overly cautious attitude 
in the Congress and the Department of Labor in regard to 
subsidies for the private sector. On-the-job training and 
upgrading training are the primary tools for interfacing with 
the private sector. Yet both of these program areas are 
overlaid with legislative and administrative constraints that 
prevent their reaching their full potential. For example, 
upgrading assistance can be offered only for entry-level, 
deadend jobs. A policy decision is needed that speaks to in 
creasing productivity at all levels. Flexibility is needed for 
on-the-job training reimbursements that recognizes the 100 
percent loss of supervisory productivity during the early 
weeks of training for inexperienced workers in many occupa 
tions.
The experience of the Montgomery County CETA system, 
reinforced across the nation, underscores the largely untap 
ped training potential in the private sector, if reasonably 
unfettered by excessive regulation.
Conclusion
In concept and in original design, the decentralized CETA 
system was expected to meet the employability needs of local 
citizens by determining local labor market needs and 
assembling a mix of activities delivered by competent local 
actors. The Department of Labor, charged with oversight, 
had responsibility for training its field representatives,
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establishing accountability measures and assisting the new 
prime sponsorship system in creating appropriate manage 
ment systems.
As documented in this study and elsewhere, all has not 
gone strictly according to plan. But much of significant value 
has been accomplished in six years.
Constructive and productive training activities and 
management systems are in place throughout the CETA 
system. There is a growing body of talented, experienced 
managers and operators. There is growing recognition within 
the leadership of DOL/ETA that intergovernmental 
management and communication systems must be 
dramatically improved and that management assistance to 
prime sponsors is of highest priority. The Congress gave 
birth to a decentralized manpower system over six years ago. 
To date, where strong local management and training 
capacity exists and flourishes, it appears to be an accident of 
birth, not planned parenthood. The issues for the 1980s that 
emerge from this study focus on more consolidation at the 
local levels, clearer definition of roles between the "feds" 
and the "locals," simplified intergovernmental management 
systems that encourage the focus on quality training, and 
building and supporting local management capacity.






The study occurred during a period of considerable tur 
moil within North Carolina's CETA management hierarchy 
and its balance-of-state (BOS) program planning and 
delivery system. At the time, it was clear that state CETA of 
ficials rarely concerned themselves with the quality of train 
ing because they were too busy resolving audits, enforcing 
compliance, reporting numbers, and reacting to criticism.
North Carolina's experience suggests that CETA may 
have asked too much, too soon, of a BOS system poorly 
prepared to handle the responsibilities thrust upon it. Thus 
far, management capacity has been inadequate to the 
demands of a ponderous system in which problems faced by 
local CETA sponsors are exacerbated by the scale and scope 
of the BOS service area, the plethora of program operators 
rendering CETA services, excessive federal expectations, and 
the administrative layering inherent in state government 
operations. Rather than being in position to articulate pro 
gram policies, refine decisionmaking procedures, and pro 
mote training quality, the BOS staff has struggled simply to 
function as grants broker and funding conduit for contrac 
tors numbering in the hundreds, and projects in the 
thousands.
At best, the federal influence on the quality of training in 
the BOS has been benign rather than constructive. CETA 
regulations have diverted attention at all levels from matters
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of substance to matters of form, and federal policymakers 
need to recognize that uniform regulations may not be ap 
propriate for sponsors of widely differing sizes and 
characteristics. Moreover, federal officials should perhaps 
consider upgrading and expanding their BOS technical 
assistance and staff development capabilities, while also 
assuming at least a share of the responsibility for strengthen 
ing substate CETA planning and service delivery capacity.
North Carolina Balance-of-State
North Carolina is the third largest state on the east coast, 
with 5.8 million people residing in 100 counties and three 
distinct geographic areas—the mountains, the Piedmont, 
and the coastal plain. For administering CETA programs, 
however, the state is divided into 13 prime sponsor jurisdic 
tions: twelve of these sponsors are units of local government, 
including North Carolina's five largest cities and seven coun 
ties with more than 100,000 inhabitants; the thirteenth 
CETA jurisdiction is the balance-of-state, or BOS.
BOS Area and Administrative Structure
The State of North Carolina serves as CETA prime spon 
sor for a 90-county BOS area covering 45,000 square miles 
and comprising 18 multicounty planning regions. Each of 
these regions covers a territory larger than any local CETA 
jurisdiction in the state, and annual CETA allocations and 
enrollments in the BOS are roughly twice those of the 12 
local sponsors combined. Other striking features of the BOS 
are its geographic and economic diversity, the dispersion of 
its 3.6 million residents, and its paucity of program planning 
and delivery infrastructures commony accessible to local 
CETA sponsors.
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The BOS is generally characterized as that area lying out 
side the state's major industrial, educational, and trade 
centers. A panoply of coastal villages, mountain resorts, mill 
towns, farming communities, and small-to-medium 
manufacturing and trade centers, the BOS contains two- 
thirds of the state's populace with a primarily overwhelming 
ly rural population. Other than the 12 localities already 
designated as GET A sponsors, fewer than half-a-dozen 
towns have more than 50,000 people, and nearly half the 
state's population resides outside the corporate limits of 
towns having 2,500 people or more.
After World War II, North Carolina began its transforma 
tion from a poor agricultural state to a poor manufacturing 
state, and its hourly industrial wage rates are currently the 
nation's lowest. Although the state now attracts more high- 
technology industry, fully half of its manufacturing jobs still 
are in the low-wage, declining employment fields of textiles, 
apparel, and furniture. And, with few exceptions, the more 
sophisticated industrial newcomers gravitate to the more 
populous Piedmont cities or to the half-dozen emerging 
growth centers in the mountains and coastal plain.
The 3.6 million BOS residents represent over 1.2 million 
households, of which 23 percent are nonwhite and 32 percent 
contain at least one CETA-eligible member. Demographic 
data show the incidence of socioeconomic distress to be 
greatest for minority families and for those headed by 
women; nearly half of all nonwhite and female-headed 




Rural North Carolina had no local infrastructure to ab 
sorb large-scale employment and training activities at the
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time of CETA's inception, although numerous program 
operators had emerged under federal manpower initiatives 
of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Creation of a state- 
financed manpower council in 1971 constituted the first step 
toward a statewide planning capacity for employment and 
training programs. Another significant event that year was a 
gubernatorial executive order designating in each of 17 (now 
18) multicounty planning jurisdictions a single regional agent 
to assist local governments in matters pertaining to state and 
federal grants. Until 1974, however, these lead regional 
organizations (LROs) played only a tangential role with 
respect to manpower programs, serving largely as informa 
tion brokers and advocates of better coordination among 
program operators.
In May 1974, just two months before CETA's implemen 
tation, North Carolina's first Republican governor since 
Reconstruction announced the consolidation, at the LRO 
level, of all responsibilities for federally financed programs 
concerned with family planning, child development, nutri 
tion, and services to the elderly—programs formerly 
operated by local community action agencies (CAAs) 
through contracts with state government. Consonant with 
the dismantling of OEO nationally, this 1974 state policy 
sought to eliminate most if not all of North Carolina's 
CAAs. In effect, LRO boards, comprising elected officials 
from member local governments, were given control over 
local "human services" programs. Moreover, LROs were 
assigned responsibility for planning CETA activities in the 
BOS and given the option to assume administrative duties 
for local manpower programs—many of which were 
operated previously by CAAs. The new policy, while making 
community-based recipients of federal funds more accoun 
table to local officials, carried no safeguards to protect either 
the quality of LRO planning or the credentials of LRO staff 
performing CETA assignments.
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Thus, CETA was implemented in July 1974 amidst swirl 
ing controversy—a class-action suit against the governor on 
behalf of 37 CAAs, and the delegation of CETA planning 
duties in the BOS to nongovernmental entities ill-prepared to 
handle them effectively. Ironically, the state policymakers 
who insisted on decentralizing the planning and administra 
tion of CETA's Title I programs in 1974 eschewed the op 
portunity one year later to approach the new Title VI public 
service employment (PSE) program in the same manner. In 
stead, they chose to administer PSE funds by negotiating 
directly with state agencies and local governments or by 
channeling funds to BOS program agents where required by 
law.
Although CETA staff and funding have grown immensely 
since 1975, the BOS system in place during this study remain 
ed much the same as it was then. The state sponsor serves 
primarily as funding conduit and program monitor; all ser 
vices under Title II-B (old Title I) are still planned by the 
LROs, and PSE programs are handled directly by local 
governments except in the growing number of localities 
where disenchanted elected officials have declined further 
CETA involvement. One major change, however, is that 
LROs no longer have the option to administer CETA pro 
grams. That experiment, which produced more problems 
than it solved, was terminated soon after a new governor 
took office in 1977. Practically every CETA program im 
plemented since 1974 has bypassed the LRO system, 
although BOS staff have recently begun reversing that trend 
by assigning LROs new planning and proposal review 
responsibilities for some youth programs under Title IV.
At the state level, CETA is administered by the depart 
ment of natural resources and community development 
(NRCD), a new state agency created in 1977 and headed by a 
gubernatorial appointee, one of the state's foremost black 
political leaders. Within NRCD, CETA functions are now
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lodged in the division of employment and training—a new 
unit created while this study was in progress, and one of nine 
NRCD divisions reporting directly to the department's depu 
ty secretary. When the study commenced, the BOS operation 
was supported by a staff of 190, and functioned in 
dependently of the state employment and training council 
(SETC), also housed within NRCD. In August 1980, 
however, state officials announced a major CETA 
reorganization, precipitated by extensive media criticism and 
the recognition of serious administrative deficiencies.
Under the new arrangements, BOS planning and field 
operations, SETC activities, and the state's independent 
CETA monitoring unit were merged into a single NRCD 
division under a new executive director of employment and 
training, while all CETA fiscal management, fiscal technical 
assistance, reporting, and property control functions were 
assigned to a new independent comptroller. Both the comp 
troller and the executive director now report to the NRCD 
deputy secretary.
BOS Funding and Enrollment Levels
Altogether, CETA various titles and special programs ac 
counted for almost $120 million in new BOS allocations in 
fiscal 1979, when over 70,000 persons participated in state- 
sponsored CETA programs. The BOS also looms large when 
enrollments are compared with those of the state's 12 local 
sponsors: of the 29,500 North Carolinians receiving Title 
II-B services statewide during the 1979 fiscal year, 18,000 
were in the BOS. Of the 41,370 Title IV youth participants 
statewide, the BOS served over 30,000. And among the 
state's 26,162 PSE enrollees in 1979, over 19,100 were BOS 
residents.
To implement its CETA programs, the BOS relies on a 
staggering number of contractors and local operators.
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Although the numbers vary almost daily, the April 1980 
count included 272 contractors, 1,665 programs, and 4,881 
separate program budgets in effect. This magnitude of 
CETA activity may explain, at least in part, why the BOS has 
a six-year history of grant underspending and chronic in 
completeness of its statistical reports to the federal regional 
office.
Prime Sponsor Operations
Owing to the size of its service area, the rapidity of 
CETA's growth, and the diversity of programs under its pur 
view, the BOS has had little choice but to assume the role of 
planning facilitator, grants broker, and compliance monitor. 
The state office has no direct operational role for any CETA 
program, but serves instead as contracting agent for all 
funds allocated to the prime sponsor. It is apparent, 
however, that the administrative approaches employed 
under various CETA titles are rarely unified and sometimes 
defy coordination at any level.
Planning and Decisionmaking
Although CETA provides all sponsors the statutory 
authority to plan their own employment and training pro 
grams, the BOS has seldom exercised its planning 
prerogatives—consistently opting, instead, to delegate deci- 
sionmaking authority to others. In essence, planning at the 
state level consists largely of devising ground rules and 
timetables for others to follow. Thus, while the BOS staff 
performs a broad grants planning function, it rarely engages 
in the more substantive conceptual and operational planning 
of local CETA activities.
The potential centerpiece of BOS planning (and perhaps 
the state's best hope for eventually building strong decision-
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making capabilities throughout its rural areas) is the decen 
tralized LRO planning process for Title II-B/C programs—a 
well-defined and conceptually sound sequence executed 
under the attentive guidance of state office coordinators. 
The product of six years' maturation and refinement, this 
process requires annual analyses of local needs and ultimate 
ly determines regional program mix and service delivery 
strategies. One limitation, however, is that the Title II-B/C 
funds planned in this manner account for only 20-25 percent 
of all CETA resources in the typical BOS region.
Planning formats for other CETA titles vary sharply in 
overall approach, coherence and depth: procedures for Title 
II-D and VI PSE programs are unrelated to those for Title 
II-B/C. Not only does Title IV youth planning differ from 
all other titles, but its program subparts each proceed on in 
dependent tracks. And Title VII private sector initiative 
planning resembles none of the above. Clearly, the tendency 
since 1974 has been to introduce each new federal initiative 
under its own special set of "house rules" and administrative 
approaches—a practice that frustrates the efforts of BOS 
staff, LRO planners, and local operators to coordinate their 
respective activities.
The record of BOS planning councils (and many of the 
substate regional advisory committees) generally has been in 
auspicious. Four BOS planning councils were appointed in 
CETA's first six years; each time, initial flurries of council 
activity gradually subsided into lethargy. The July 1980 
meeting of a reconstituted BOS council was its first meeting 
in more than a year, although three of its subcommittees had 
served as sounding boards for staff recommendations in the 
interim. At the LRO level, CETA advisory committees range 
from a highly active few to those that seem almost nonexis 
tent. One common characteristic, however, is that none 
engages in planning sufficiently comprehensive to embrace
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all, or even most, of the various CETA titles and program 
subparts. Instead, they have focused almost exclusively on 
Title II-B program mix decisions and, beginning in fiscal 
1980, on Title IV summer programs.
Overall, three sets of actors appear to wield greatest in 
fluence in BOS planning and decisionmaking—the state 
staff, LRO planners, and local operators. Their program 
planning efforts may be constrained, however, by an 
overabundance of federal CETA rules, regulations, and re 
quirements, by a detached BOS administrative style that 
seems at times to be systems-oriented almost to a fault, and 
by well-intended but somewhat inflexible management pro 
cedures which can, unless applied judiciously, cause the 
elimination of good programs on technicalities while failing 
to correct (or even to notice) serious operational deficiencies 
in others.
BOS Management Practices
Effective management has been thwarted by instability of 
BOS leadership and an absence of supportive guidance or 
policies from top state officials. Given the pressures of 
CETA's rapid growth, eight directorship changes in six 
years, and a half-dozen staff reorganizations, it is understan 
dable how management by crisis became the BOS norm. In 
some respects, internal systems for grant management and 
program oversight are quite sophisticated; key recordkeep- 
ing, verification, and monitoring systems are in place and 
function well. In other areas, however, the BOS clearly 
shows the effects of CETA growth that occurred before the 
state sponsor was prepared to accommodate it.
The state's management information system (MIS), for 
example, digests a plethora of fiscal, client, and operational 
data, and it cranks out reams of statistical reports. One 
possible flaw, however—aside from persistent problems of
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incompleteness that may be inherent in any system tracking 
1,700 programs and 70,000 people—is that data generated 
for DOL reporting purposes is rarely what BOS managers 
need to run CETA effectively. Aggregated data can often 
mask major problems that exist within certain regions or on 
the part of certain operators. For program managers to iden 
tify and correct emerging problems before programs become 
unsalvageable, however, would require a combination of 
better and more timely data (disaggregated by locality and 
program type), and greater familiarity with program pro 
cesses and specific operational idiosyncrasies than what is 
now routinely derived through BOS compliance monitoring 
activities.
The BOS monitors its programs rigorously, but the focus 
is on technical compliance to the near exclusion of program 
substance. One 30-page BOS monitoring guide, for instance, 
examines all imaginable aspects of Title II-B operations 
other than those concerning program process and con 
tent—two variables critical to the quality of CETA training 
activities. By stressing statutory and regulatory compliance, 
the monitoring process insures that BOS programs are clean 
and legal, but it does not permit policymakers to evaluate 
what works, what doesn't, and why. Evaluation, where at 
tempted at all, occurs only in a handful of regions where 
LRO planners have devised their own procedures with en 
couragement and financial help from the state.
Performance data and monitoring reports are incor 
porated into decisionmaking for some CETA titles through a 
new system called "demonstrated effectiveness"—a process 
that exempts proven operators from the competitive bidding 
required of other prospective contractors. This approach, 
while still being perfected, resulted from a commendable 
BOS staff initiative and should help to enhance future pro 
gram quality. One inherent danger, however, is that it tends
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to reflect the prime sponsor's propensity to manage yearend 
reports rather than programs in progress. BOS staff are now 
taking steps to insure that the process will accomplish more 
than simply to encourage turnover among program 
operators.
The independent CETA monitoring unit (IMU) establish 
ed in 1979 initially bore little relationship to other BOS 
monitoring efforts, dwelling instead on suspected cases of 
fiscal abuse. Recently, IMU was placed under a new state 
CETA director, where its activities can build upon and be 
coordinated with those of other BOS field monitors. This, in 
turn, should permit BOS field staff to place greater emphasis 
on the substantive, qualitative, and systemic problems faced 
by local operators.
Thus far, the BOS management environment has been one 
in which planners, managers, auditors, and data specialists 
communicated only rarely, and where each spoke a different 
language when discussions were attempted. These problems, 
however, seem largely attributable to an absence of stable 
leadership during most of CETA's history, and not to the 
presence of intractable problems among staff.
Organizational Staffing, 
Stability, and Development
In June 1980, the 190-member BOS staff included 16 ad 
ministrative executives, 105 professionals, 66 office and 
clerical workers, and 3 technicians. Overall, the staff was 52 
percent female and 27 percent nonwhite—much higher pro 
portions than in other divisions within the state department 
responsible for CETA.
The size of the BOS staff at mid-1980 was roughly eight 
times that during CETA's first year of existence. Problems 
predictable in any organization undergoing such rapid
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growth were exacerbated in North Carolina by leadership 
turnover, sagging staff morale, and the constraints of two 
personnel systems; the state merit system (of which CETA is 
a part) and the departmental system governing all divisions 
within NRCD.
Bringing CETA under the state's merit system in 1977 
reduced the incidence of patronage appointments to CETA 
jobs, but it also had the effect of depressing staff salaries 
while making it more difficult for BOS managers either to 
acquire new staff or to reassign those on board. Before being 
submitted for merit system action, however, all BOS staff 
changes now must also clear NRCD's own personnel 
hurdles, and the department has not always proved respon 
sive to urgent CETA requests. For example, a six-month 
departmental delay in refilling a key PSE grants manager's 
position—vacated in April 1980—forced a $30 million PSE 
program to be handled by others on a catch-as-catch-can 
basis. Other crucial actions, including the appointment of 
the new CETA director, have been delayed for many, many 
months.
To put CETA's salary scale into perspective, the current 
BOS director is responsible for an annual budget only slight 
ly less than that for the entire state community college 
system, but his $27,000 annual salary upon assuming the 
position in August 1980 was less than that of a high school 
principal in the Raleigh area. Typically, other senior ad 
ministrative positions range downward from the mid- 
twenties, while middle managers and other professionals 
earn from the mid-teens to low twenties.
While BOS staff salaries are generally beneath those for 
comparable jobs in many other state and local agencies in the 
capital area, they are far better than those for LRO planners 
and local CETA practitioners across the BOS. With LRO 
planners making as little as $12,000 annually and local pro-
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gram directors often earning barely more than PSE par 
ticipants, it is unrealistic to expect GET A to attract proven 
professionals into its vacant positions. Thus far, however, 
the state sponsor has had little influence on the regressive 
wage structures in many rural counties and community 
organizations, and has seldom attempted to resolve 
remunerative inequities at either the state or the local level.
Instability at the top, with eight acting or permanent direc 
tors in six years, accounts perhaps more than any other fac 
tor for the low morale and extensive internal fragmentation 
evident during this study. Since August 1980, NRCD of 
ficials have placed their CETA fortunes in the hands of a 
proven administrator hired from one of the state's local 
sponsors, and he has assembled a new management team 
capable of revitalizing what had become a catatonic BOS 
operation by mid-year. Given time and continued support 
from above, qualitative improvements are almost a certain 
ty.
Staff development has seldom been a BOS priority, either 
in the state office or at the substate planning and operational 
levels. A GET A-financed employment and training institute 
was created in 1978 to address this problem, but until recent 
ly it shunned staff development in favor of convening 
numerous CETA-related conferences. While state officials 
say that past communications problems were largely resolved 
in 1980, the institute has little credibility with BOS operators 
and its survival now appears to be in considerable doubt.
Planning and Service 
Delivery Infrastructure
While the basic Title II-B planning process is conceptually 
sound, BOS staff recognize that two essentials—CETA plan 
ning expertise and LRO organizational commitment—are 
sometimes lacking at the substate regional level. When the
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state delegated CETA planning to the LROs in 1974, it set no 
controls on the qualifications of regional planners or on the 
performance of quasi-governmental entities whose organiza 
tional philosophies tend to reflect rural southern conser 
vatism.
Although CETA pumps millions annually into each of the 
18 BOS planning regions, CETA's programs and services 
seldom receive high LRO priority, and CETA planning posi 
tions are often characterized by low pay and high turnover. 
In the absence of formal training or credentialing standards 
for new LRO planners, CETA expertise is something ac 
quired chiefly through trial and error. Once acquired, 
however, this regional expertise can also vanish with the 
departure of a single experienced individual, which suggests 
that the BOS planning infrastructure may lack permanence 
and stability. In many regions, the planning process still 
centers on program mix, and perhaps no more than half of 
the present LRO planners are sufficiently skilled to design 
sound programs or engineer cohesive delivery systems.
Service delivery arrangements vary widely from one region 
to another, but in most few "systems" exist for delivering 
CETA services. The BOS designates no presumptive 
operators of any CETA program, and contractors are 
selected either by competitive bidding or by certification as 
having demonstrated effectiveness. Despite the regional 
variations, however, three delivery agents predominate in the 
BOS; local offices of the state employment service (ES), 
local community colleges, and nonprofit community-based 
organizations.
Depending on regional preferences, programs may be 
operated by any or all of these organizations independently, 
one agency may be designated to contract for all programs 
(offering some services of its own and subcontracting for 
others) or, as in one region, counties may establish special
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departments to operate programs under all CETA titles. 
These latter arrangements, however, are rare; like most rural 
environs, the BOS area is seldom conducive to highly coor 
dinated delivery systems. Operators and population centers 
are generally too isolated from one another to relate in any 
significant way, even for programs under the same CETA ti 
tle. And, with the multiplicity of BOS administrative ap 
proaches to various CETA titles, the design of coordinated 
comprehensive CETA delivery systems has become a prac 
tical impossibility.
Political Climate
In 1980, CETA was a heated election-year issue in North 
Carolina. Grand juries investigated several contracts with 
clear political overtones, county commissioners tagged 
CETA as their least favored federal program in a special 
statewide poll, the challenger to the incumbent governor 
made CETA a central issue during his negativist campaign, 
and the state auditor (an independent elected official) releas 
ed several reports critical of the state's CETA programs.
Considerable attention focused on the secretary of NRCD, 
much of it deriving from CETA audits released by the same 
state auditor whose 1976 opponent was backed by the 
secretary. Press releases concerning the "resolution" of 
millions of dollars of questioned CETA costs came across in 
the newspapers sounding as if state CETA officials were 
forgiving sloppy program management as a matter of 
routine. And a programmatic audit of the 1979 summer 
youth program, performed by the state auditor's staff under 
contract with DOL's regional office, attempted to discredit 
CETA officials by alleging poor BOS management of a huge 
program which, to more informed observers, was an un 
qualified success.
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Politics, whether or not partisan in origin, have clearly af 
fected North Carolina's CETA programs almost from their 
inception. Not only must BOS administrators cope with 
political pressures inherent in state government, but they 
must also consider the preferences of 90 counties whose 
political leadership may or may not be attuned to federal and 
state CETA priorities. In the past year, for example, a 
number of rural BOS counties proved either unable or un 
willing to implement the new PSE training provisions under 
Title II-D. Thus BOS staff members found themselves with 
difficult political choices; i.e., to deobligate PSE funds in 
those counties, perhaps inviting clashes with local govern 
ments, or to risk more audit exceptions and negative publici 
ty by failing to meet the Title II-D training expenditure re 
quirements.
The Federal Influence
The BOS seems to enjoy excellent rapport with its DOL 
regional office representative, an individual who clearly has 
gained both the confidence and respect of state staff in the 
three years since his present assignment began. Even so, it 
appears that the relationship is limited. Transactions be 
tween state staff and their "fed rep" most often concern 
matters of technical compliance, federal priorities, and DOL 
timetables. They rarely extend to the thorny problems of 
BOS administration and almost never impinge on local pro 
gram planning or operations. To cover these areas adequate 
ly, however, would necessitate a greater commitment of 
federal field staff than the single individual who currently 
must divide his time between the BOS sponsor and other in- 
house DOL assignments.
State staff and the DOL representative both feel that na 
tional policymakers, in devising new programs and im 
plementation strategies, often have failed to give large state
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sponsors adequate consideration. In the BOS, a CETA 
system begun in 1974 was loaded heavily—overloaded, in 
fact—by successive federal initiatives introduced before the 
state had established its capacity to plan and manage effec 
tively. Moreover, an unending stream of regulations and 
directives from Washington has hampered BOS efforts to 
educate even its own in-house staff units, much less those of 
nearly 300 contractors in 18 substate regions.
Recent developments in the state office raise major ques 
tions about the adequacy and the effectiveness of federal 
oversight as it pertains to large state sponsors. Although 
DOL conducts annual assessments of BOS performance, 
these have consistently stressed compliance with new regula 
tions while rarely addressing issues of far greater conse 
quence. In 1980, for instance, DOL's formal assessment 
found that the BOS private industry council was improperly 
constituted, that efforts to remove architectural barriers for 
the handicapped were inadequate, that eligibility verification 
and enrollee grievance procedures were incomplete, and that 
inventories of potential PSE contractors were insufficient.
At the time, however, the state's CETA program was in 
considerable turmoil and receiving widespread media 
criticism over the mishandling of funds by an OIC affiliate 
and three private firms headed by the president of the state 
AFL-CIO. By coincidence, during the same week of the 
DOL assessment, a special investigative team from the 
governor's office was compiling its own report, identifying 
major flaws in BOS contract approval, fiscal management, 
fiscal technical assistance, and internal coordination pro 
cedures. These problems were the proximate cause for the 
subsequent dismissal of the seventh BOS director, the hiring 
of an independent CETA comptroller, and a complete 
reorganization of the state CETA office. None of these 
crucial points, however, were addressed by the DOL review.
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Federal officials may need to consider fundamental 
changes in both the frequency and scope of their formal 
assessments if DOL oversight is to become more than a 
hollow exercise. Experience suggests that one-week visits by 
unfamiliar teams are insufficient even to recognize substan 
tive problems, much less correct them. Of particular interest 
to this study was that DOL's assessments of the past four 
years fail to include a single reference to BOS planning, local 
service delivery, or the appropriateness and quality of CETA 
training activities. One problem, apparently, is that rigid in 
struments devised in Washington force their users to waste 
hours on trivia, while denying them the flexibility to pursue 
items of obvious import. Procedural refinements are clearly 
needed, but may also prove futile so long as DOL's 
assessments seek only to identify problems without showing 
CETA sponsors the means for solving them.
The reliability and usefulness of federal statistical reports 
also seems suspect. It was August 1980, for instance, before 
the BOS could provide final grant closeout figures on fiscal 
1979 expenditures, and these varied considerably from 
earlier estimates. In the rush to file required DOL reports on 
time, accuracy and completeness are sometimes unafford- 
able luxuries—as evidenced by the 7,500-person difference 
between BOS enrollments reported at the end of fiscal 1979 
and the final tallies of carry-forward enrollments later shown 
in 1980 quarterly summaries. Such major discrepancies are 
seldom reconciled, however, unless DOL officials compare 
new reports with those filed previously. And current federal 
reporting requirements now seem to give neither BOS staff 
nor DOL recipients enough time to reflect on old reports or 
to tabulate more accurate updates.
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Training Policies, Practices, 
and Potential for Expansion
To the extent that BOS training policies exist, they are 
policies implicit in the sponsor's commitment to decentraliz 
ed planning and program development. All major decisions 
on training under Title II-B are delegated to the LRO level, 
while most training decisions with respect to CETA's PSE 
titles are made at the county level. The BOS has no formal 
policy preferences regarding the role of training in the CETA 
services continuum, nor any concerning the alternative types 
of training provided to CETA's participants. As a result, 
decisions at the LRO and county levels may be influenced as 
much by past tradition as by formal planning, and by the 
needs of institutions as much as the needs of CETA clients.
The absence of coherent BOS policy perhaps also accounts 
for the fact that training is emphasized in some regions but 
receives low priority in others. Although training facilities 
abound in most regions, there are no policy imperatives for 
LRO planners and local program operators to link with such 
existing resources as the state's nationally recognized system 
of community colleges and technical institutes or the state- 
financed prevocational training programs offered by 47 of 
the 58 schools in that system.
Owing largely to the 1978 elimination of PSE as an 
allowable Title II-B activity (one instance in which the BOS 
did devise a clear policy before it became CETA law), the 
state has gradually increased its proportion of Title II-B 
dollars spent in support of classroom training and OJT ac 
tivities from 41 percent of all expenditures in fiscal 1979 to a 
planned 48 percent in fiscal 1981. By far, the preferred BOS 
training modes are those offering maximum flexibility in 
rural labor markets—individual referrals to community col 
lege vocational and technical courses, job readiness training 
of brief duration, and OJT.
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Course Selection and Duration 
of Training
Courses and skills training categories for Title II-B are 
normally identified during the annual planning process con 
ducted at the substate regional level, and occupational areas 
are generally limited to those in which there are known 
demands for additional workers. This process, however, re 
quires little specificity with respect to enrollee targeting or 
the relative emphasis to be placed on various occupations in 
on-the-job and individual referral training programs. Lists 
of permissible training categories are developed, but most 
LRO planners simply delegate to program operators the final 
determinations on who gets trained and for what.
Duration of skills training varies by planning region, train 
ing facility, and occupational area, but in no case is permit 
ted to exceed one year. Typically, class-size skills training 
ranges from 26 to 52 weeks, while individual referral training 
conforms to the regular semester or quarterly calendars of 
local community colleges—varying from as little as three 
months (for certificate programs, such as nurse aides) to a 
full year (for diploma programs in business, building trades, 
and other fields).
Relative Emphasis on Training 
Versus Other Activities
Despite the appearance of heavy fiscal commitments to 
training under Title II-B, only 30 percent of the 70,000 fiscal 
1979 CETA participants in the BOS were exposed to some 
form of training activity. Excluding the 6,200 youth who 
entered brief summer remediation programs, just 22 percent 
of other CETA enrollees were provided institutional training 
or OJT. By mid-1980, this figure had increased to 26 percent 
of all enrollments, largely as a result of gains under CETA's 
PSE titles. (Most PSE training, however, is of the ab-
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breviated job-search variety; although training of greater 
depth and duration is being contemplated in some BOS 
counties, this seems unlikely to occur extensively because of 
inherent limitations in using PSE as a training vehicle.)
Most BOS training occurs under authority of Title II-B; in 
fiscal 1979, over 41 percent of all expenditures under this ti 
tle were associated with institutional and on-the-job training 
programs. (By comparison, just 2.2 percent of all Title II-D 
PSE expenditures supported training activities that year, 
despite a 10 percent statutory requirement—a clear indica 
tion of the difficulty the BOS has experienced in implemen 
ting the new federal training provisions for PSE.) Viewed by 
cost category rather than by type of activity, however, a 
much different pattern emerges: Just 14 percent of all II-B 
expenditures in 1979 involved the purchase of instructional 
services and training materials, compared with 61 percent for 
enrollee wages and allowances, 16 percent for client services, 
and 9 percent for local administrative costs. Overall, 86 per 
cent of all Title II-B expenditures covered costs other than 




In several of the better-coordinated regions, CETA ap 
plicants have reasonable access to a number of training alter 
natives; elsewhere, however, both the type and the quality of 
training an applicant receives depend largely upon which 
operator's door the individual reaches first.
Concerning who gets referred to which programs, distinct 
patterns are evident. Blacks and women enter class-size oc 
cupational and prevocational training far more frequently 
than they enter OJT, where whites and males predominate. 
Veterans are concentrated in individual referral, OJT, and
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PSE programs. And, overall, the prime sponsor's PSE 
enrollees tend to be older, whiter, better educated, and more 
heavily male than its Title II-B trainees. It may or may not be 
the state's preference that most of its OJT and individual 
referral participants are white, while most prevocational and 
CETA class-size skills training participants are black. But 
this, apparently, is part of the price paid for decentralized 
planning in the absence of a BOS training policy framework.
Institutional Training Occupations
Because operations are decentralized and applicant selec 
tion decisions have been delegated to nearly 300 contractors, 
the BOS staff rarely has current information on how many 
people are being trained, for what, or by whom. Conscien 
tious regional planners and BOS field monitors may keep 
tabs on their respective substate territories, but there is 
seldom any state-level aggregation of training data and 
almost never any analysis. Nine months into fiscal 1980, 
neither the BOS staff nor the state department of community 
colleges (which provides most skills training) had generated 
summary information on fiscal 1979 CETA occupational 
training categories. Although the state employment service 
(ES) later compiled a list of occupational titles from its 1979 
allowance payment records, BOS managers had no such in 
formation until long after training had ended, thus raising 
the possibility that CETA training activities could, in the ag 
gregate, be inconsistent with BOS occupational growth and 
demand patterns.
According to ES, 7,212 individuals entered BOS 
classroom training in fiscal 1979. Of these, 3,135 enrolled in 
programs offering specific occupational skills, with over 
two-thirds entering the building trades (19.8 percent), 
secretarial and general office training (13.1), industrial pro 
grams (11.9), medical sciences (11.0), and automotive fields
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(10.5). As opposed to the 3,135 enrollees in specific occupa 
tional programs, however, the majority of BOS institutional 
trainees (4,077) entered short-term prevocational, remedial, 
and developmental activities. Steering 57 percent of all BOS 
trainees into employability development programs rather 
than towards specific occupational skills may have been en 
tirely consistent with the needs of disadvantaged applicants 
in rural labor markets; in the absence of a BOS training 
policy framework, however, this point remains unaddressed. 
And while enrolling over 3,000 CETA participants in skills 
training is no small accomplishment, that number represents 
but 0.1 percent of the state's labor force and only a tiny frac 
tion of its CETA eligibles.
Placement Results
Analysis of post-training placements revealed that only 25 
percent of all BOS institutional training terminees actually 
entered employment in fiscal 1979, while substate regional 
placement rates ranged from a high of 45 percent to a low of 
7 percent. Overall job accession rates for class-size and in 
dividual referral skills training terminees were 29 percent, 
compared with 27 percent for prevocational training ter 
minees.
Two factors, in particular, seemed to account for the low 
overall placement rates recorded in 1979—the slackening 
economy, and the fact that the CETA "count" of terminees 
entering employment was taken at the time a participant 
either completed or quit a given program. As a result, the 
placement percentages failed to include those terminees who 
obtained jobs within a few days or weeks after their official 
termination dates. The overall placement rate for institu 
tional training programs was further diminished by the fact 
that only 9 percent of all basic and remedial education ter 
minees entered employment; instead of moving directly into
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jobs, most of these were transferred to other CETA titles 
and programs.
OJT programs, by comparison, reported an overall 55 per 
cent placement rate, with substate regional levels ranging 
from 24 to 67 percent. The relatively greater placement suc 
cess under OJT, however, seems largely attributable to the 
fact that OJT completers are, by definition, already 
employed. Moreover, post-training retention by the OJT 
employer is a contractual requirement in the BOS.
Potential for Expansion
In effect, the CETA system in North Carolina has bought 
in on an existing vocational and technical training 
resource—the state's community college system, with its an 
nual state appropriations of over $140 million. The scale of 
this buy-in, however, has been miniscule: The 3,135 CETA 
individual and class-size trainees enrolled from the BOS last 
year barely exceeded the annual student enrollment at one 
school visited during this study, and there are 57 others in the 
statewide system. Typically, annual CETA enrollment at any 
one school represents no more than 5 percent of total student 
enrollment, while CETA accounts for only 2 to 3 percent of 
the school's annual operating budget.
Ironically, the state's fine system of community colleges 
and technical institutes, constructed at great public expense 
just 15 years ago, now finds itself strapped financially by 
state budgetary constraints on the one hand and spiralling 
operating costs on the other, while the state's CETA pro 
gram consistently finds itself unable to spend its annual 
allocations expeditiously. In short, federal money is abun 
dant in a CETA system unprepared to handle it, while the 
training system equipped to handle it is money-poor.
Clearly, there is great potential for expansion of BOS 
training activity. Little would be achieved, however, by
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simply increasing CETA budgets in community colleges 
without enunciating clear policy preferences with respect to 
target groups and training priorities. The prime sponsor 
should also reconsider current practices that permit dual 
standards of costs for training programs in nonprofit 
organizations versus those in mainline institutions.
Training Quality
Based on observations of eight training agencies handling 
over two dozen BOS training contracts, it appears that 
CETA thus far has had little influence on the quality of 
training rendered to its participants. Owing to service area 
size, federal compliance pressures, post-1978 diversion of 
staff attention from matters of substance to matters of form, 
and the administrative discontinuity associated with repeated 
BOS leadership changes, examining the quality of CETA 
training has generally been an unaffordable luxury for state 
staff.
Among the CETA vocational programs observed during 
this study, those operated in two community colleges were of 
consistently high quality—the norm for all programs on 
those campuses. Training curricula not only were thorough 
but also were developed by committees of local employers 
and other advisors. The schools, both of them formally ac 
credited, had numerous safeguards to ensure high quality 
standards. Facilities were both spacious and well equipped, 
and CETA applicants had access to a broad range of training 
options on each campus. In contrast, a third institution 
visited—a Job Corps center operated for DOL by a private 
firm which also holds a state contract for occupational ex 
ploration services in one BOS region—was poorly ad 
ministered and ill-equipped. The training environment was 
not only inappropriate for learning, but also threatening to 
enrollee psychological and physical well-being. Nevertheless,
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this program serving 10 participants received an annual 
CETA budget almost as large as that of a community college 
training 200 people annually in another BOS region.
Prevocational training programs were observed in one 
county where a state-financed community college program 
receiving no CETA funds was operating within a mile of an 
QIC-sponsored pre-job program serving essentially the same 
clientele. Even though the community college prevocational 
program in that county has a six-year history of successful 
programming, is financed under a performance-based state 
formula, operates with a staff of four, and could have been a 
tuition-free resource, it is not used as a CETA program. For 
whatever reasons, the QIC program was instituted two years 
ago as a special BOS project, is 100 percent CETA funded, 
has twice the staff and three times the budget, but clearly 
lacks the experience, staff expertise, and the instructional 
sophistication of the community college program.
Each of the OJT programs visited—one operated by a 
community-based organization, one by ES, and a third by 
the State Department of Labor—was of good overall quali 
ty. The strengths of these programs, however, derived not so 
much from attributes of the CETA system as from the 
caliber of the individuals staffing them. And, in each case, 
local staff cited aspects of the current CETA system that 
tend to suppress rather than enhance program quality. From 
conversations with these operators, it appears that the BOS 
system has not yet matured sufficiently to recognize and rec 
tify major systemic problems that may affect a number of 
substate regions.
ES, for instance, is sometimes ineffective as an OJT con 
tractor because CETA-financed staff in some local offices 
are constrained unduly by ES convention or diverted from 
OJT duties by local managers who give CETA low priority. 
A striking example was seen in one region where the same
289
two individuals handling a state DOL-sponsored OJT pro 
gram that is considered one of the best in the BOS had met 
little success while running that program under ES auspices 
until ES lost its contract two years ago. In another region 
where ES has an outstanding OJT program, an enlightened 
local office manager insists that CETA be a top priority of 
every employee in his office. He has discovered ways to 
make OJT and other CETA programs not only palatable to 
local employers, but attractive as well. In effect, he has built 
a competitive market for OJT contracts, and both his OJT 
placement and retention rates are consistently high. This 
manager noted, however, that he had received but one visit 
for a BOS staff member in the past five years. And, as a 
result, few ES administrators elsewhere have benefited from 
the lessons he has learned while spending over 500,000 
CETA dollars since 1975.
The OJT program run by a community action agency in 
another region also enjoys the reputation of quality pro 
gramming. Its staff indicated, however, that rigid BOS ad 
ministrative cost limitations have prevented them from 
maintaining their past effectiveness in the face of the sagging 
local economy. There are simply too few staff members to 
handle the increased employer contacts required to locate 
jobs during recessionary times, and staff who are available 
desperately need training in OJT marketing techniques in 
order to reach the larger employers traditionally hesitant to 
participate in the program. Thus far, however, training pro 
vided by the state has consisted of a single workshop to 
review federal OJT regulations for compliance purposes.
One obvious barrier to improving the overall quality of 
CETA training in the BOS is the historical absence of even 
rudimentary evaluative systems capable of comparing 
various contractors and their implementation strategies, fer 
reting out approaches that work and those that do not, and 
isolating the critical variables that seem to make a difference.
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Although BOS staff have recently made commendable ef 
forts to engender qualitative improvements through rigorous 
annual bidding and contractor selection procedures, the 
unintentional result to date may have been to promote 
greater turnover among local operators rather than better 
quality within existing operations.
Conclusions and Recommendations
CETA's legacy in the BOS is one of rapid growth, fre 
quent change, and chronic instability at its highest ad 
ministrative levels. Despite occasional expressions of interest 
and commitment from top state government officials, GET A 
thus far has not received their sustained active involvement. 
BOS administrators, besides coping with the managerial 
complexities of a CETA program of immense proportions, 
must also compensate for operational dispersion, ad 
ministrative layering, and other limitations seldom con 
fronted by local sponsors. And they must deal with political 
influences, partisan and otherwise, which raise issues 
distinctly different from those in most localities, while con 
forming to the same federal expectations, administrative 
guidelines, and compliance deadlines as local sponsors.
These and other factors may account for the ad 
ministrative style typifying BOS operations since 1974—a 
style that often left little room for attention to qualitative 
issues. In terms of CETA planning and decisionmaking, the 
BOS has performed commendably in designing and refining 
a decentralized planning process for programs under Title II- 
B, which supports the bulk of BOS training activity. The 
relative importance of that process has gradually diminished, 
however, as a gaggle of new programs and CETA titles 
spawned additional federal requirements and administrative 
tasks. By fiscal 1980, the result was a multiplicity of loosely- 
coordinated BOS planning and management systems, most
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of them circumventing the Title II-B planning system which 
formerly constituted the heart of the state's decisionmaking 
process.
Devising unified, cohesive management systems was fur 
ther frustrated by leadership changes, multiple reorganiza 
tions, conflicting CETA goals, and the administrative isola 
tion of BOS staff from local programs. Prime sponsor con 
tact with program operators has tended more to enforce 
compliance than to assess program content, promote quali 
ty, or effect substantive improvements. Fiscal management 
has been especially difficult, and problems surfacing in 1980 
triggered yet another revamping of a BOS administrative 
structure thus far inadequate to handle the demands placed 
upon it.
Rather than having to establish a new training system for 
CETA, the BOS had ready access to occupational and pre- 
job training through the state's existing network of 
autonomous community colleges, locally-chartered institu 
tions offering many quality safeguards. CETA's buy-in for 
such training has been small, however, and only rarely has 
CETA concerned itself with the content or appropriateness 
of these schools' offerings. Outside the community college 
system, where some training contractors seem to function 
without benefit of quality standards, there is evidence that 
major deficiencies in CETA-funded programs can persist in 
definitely. To date, the BOS has placed far more emphasis 
on managing CETA grants than on creating the policy 
framework and planning capacity to foster training pro 
grams of consistently good quality. And, entering CETA's 
seventh year, the BOS still has no coherent policies concern 
ing who gets trained, for what, or by whom.
There have been encouraging signs in recent months, 
however. State CETA leaders and other key state officials 
now seem to generally agree on the need for devising new
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training policies and renewing the state's commitment to 
economic and labor force development—two areas in which 
GET A can make important contributions. The recently 
reconstituted state CETA staff—including a new executive 
director, BOS director, and SETC director—is clearly the 
most experienced and capable North Carolina has ever had. 
Given time and the latitude to run CETA openly and profes 
sionally, the future may be bright indeed. To date, however, 
the path has been difficult and the public perception of 
CETA has deteriorated steadily.
CETA may have expected too much, too soon, of a BOS 
system poorly prepared to handle the duties heaped upon it 
since 1974. Yet, other than the assistance provided by the 
single DOL representative assigned to the BOS, federal 
guidance has consisted mostly of a flood of written instruc 
tions specifying what should be done, but not hqw. Federal 
oversight has been concerned far more with numbers and 
compliance than with capacity-building or substance, and in 
terms of affecting the quality of CETA training programs, 
the federal influence has been at best benign, and not con 
structive. Moreover, recent developments in the BOS seem to 
raise doubts not only concerning federal capacity to correct 
major administrative deficiencies, but also concerning the 
ability of DOL's annual assessment process to even detect 
them.
The six-year BOS experience indeed reveals problems in 
the CETA system—some perhaps soluble at the state level, 
and others clearly insoluble without adjustments in federal 
expectations for large BOS sponsors. As currently con 
stituted, CETA may be unintentionally biased against states, 
holding them to the same statutory, regulatory, and repor- 
torial requirements as local sponsors, while ignoring crucial 
dissimilarities in government structure, politics, delivery in 
frastructure, geography, and program magnitude. Indeed, 
federal policymakers may need to reassess CETA's implicit
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assumption that all sponsors are created equal, and that all 
should conform to the same set of national policies and 
operating procedures.
To the extent that North Carolina's experiences are typical 
of those in other BOS jurisdictions, they may also suggest 
the need for redefining both the role and the responsibilities 
CETA now confers on state governments. Almost a third of 
all CETA funds nationally are administered through states, 
fully half of which operate at levels of funding and enroll 
ment exceeded by only a handful of localities. Yet DOL's 
research is rarely aimed at state sponsors, and relatively little 
is known nationally about the extent to which other states 
share problems similar to North Carolina's. If optimal 
results are to be achieved through state-sponsored efforts in 
the foreseeable future, it may be imperative for policymakers 
to re-examine the past performance of states as CETA spon 
sors and, where appropriate, formulate new policies for con 
sideration during CETA's 1982 reauthorization hearings.
In the interim, federal officials should consider immediate 
upgrading and expansion of their in-house BOS technical 
assistance and staff development capabilities, could assume 
at least a share of the responsibility for substate capacity- 
building, and may need to declare a national moratorium on 
new programs and policies that fail to recognize inherent 
BOS limitations. For its part, the state could provide CETA 
with a more stable operating environment, and it clearly 
needs to place greater emphasis on the development of 
substate planning expertise, the creation of coherent CETA 
training policies, and the articulation of policy preferences to 
appropriate parties. Another useful step would involve 
building the capacity to look across regional lines and in 
stitutional boundaries to determine what works, what does 
not, and why. For now, however, these factors seem to be 
largely unknown.
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Geographic and Population Characteristics
The Penobscot Consortium prime sponsor provides 
employment and training services to residents of three large, 
but primarily rural, counties in the north central part of 
Maine—Hancock County, Penobscot County and Piscata- 
quis County. The three counties occupy 7,500 square miles, a 
land area nearly as large as the state of Massachusetts. The 
substantial size and largely rural nature of the area pose 
logistical problems for the consortium, including a highly 
dispersed population, a lack of training institutions in major 
parts of the area, and transportation barriers.
The total population of the consortium in 1970 was 
176,268, of which 125,393, or 71 percent, were residents of 
Penobscot County. The 1970 population of Hancock and 
Piscataquis Counties was 34,590 and 16,285, respectively. 
Since 1970, the consortium's population has been growing at 
an above-average rate because of net inmigration—a major 
turnaround for the consortium, which has previously ex 
perienced substantial net outmigration. The population of 
the consortium is practically all white. Only a few hundred 
blacks live in the consortium, and American Indians—the 
largest minority group in the consortium—account for only 





The industrial characteristics of the economies of the three 
counties comprising the consortium differ in several substan 
tive ways. Hancock County, which borders the Atlantic 
Ocean, is highly dependent on tourism and other seasonal in 
dustries, including fishing, clamming, and lobstering. 
Employment in the county experiences sharp seasonal fluc 
tuations, plummeting in the winter months and rising rapidly 
during the summer. Piscataquis County's employment is 
dominated by manufacturing, particularly woods-related in 
dustries. Penobscot County's economy is the most evenly 
balanced, with manufacturing and trade combined account 
ing for approximately one-half of employment. The typical 
economic establishment in the consortium is quite small in 
terms of employment. Only 5 percent of the business 
establishments in the consortium had 50 or more employees 
on their payroll.
The family incomes of the residents of the consortium 
have been well below the national average—14-25 percentage 
points below the national median in 1969. These results were 
primarily influenced by below average earnings of employed 
males, due to lower weekly wages and fewer year-round 
employment opportunities, and relatively low labor force 
participation rates of teenagers. Although the per capita per 
sonal money incomes of residents of the three counties grew 
as much or more than the national average, they were still 17 
to 23 percentage points below the U.S. average in 1977.
The Political Environment
Given the structure of the consortium, counties are the 
governmental units most directly relevant to its operations. 
County government in Maine traditionally has not played a 
major role in the provision of public services, being primari-
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ly confined to law enforcement, road maintenance, and land 
deeds responsibilities. The operations of the CETA system 
have provided county government with major respon 
sibilities in the human resources area for the first time. As a 
consortium executive remarked, "CETA has given the coun 
ties of the consortium a major role in providing human 
resources to people. . . it has put county government back 
on the map in Maine."
Each of the three counties of the consortium is governed 
by an elected board of three county commissioners. The nine 
county commissioners serve on an executive board governing 
the Penobscot Consortium. The executive board has not had 
a major independent effect on the policies or operations of 
the consortium. It has in effect delegated these respon 
sibilities to the executive director, demanding only that the 
CETA program be run efficiently and effectively and be free 
of abuse.
CETA Funding and Enrollments 
During Fiscal 1979
During fiscal 1979, the Penobscot Consortium had 
available approximately $10.5 million for CETA programs, 
of which it spent approximately $9.04 million. In addition to 
its formula-funded monies for operating programs under 
CETA title II-B, II-D, IV, and VI, the consortium received 
$962,000 in title III monies to administer a migrant/seasonal 
farmworkers program and several national demonstration 
skill training programs. During fiscal 1979, 4,758 persons 
were enrolled in the various employment and training pro 
grams administered by the Penobscot Consortium including 
3,540 new enrollees. Title II-B programs enrolled the largest 
number of participants (1,823, or 38 percent of the total).
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Organization and Operations
Formation of the Consortium
The current organizational structure and policymaking 
processes of the Penobscot Consortium have been influenced 
substantially by its evolution over the past few years. Each of 
the three counties comprising the consortium broke away 
from the state prime sponsor. Penobscot County assumed 
independent prime sponsorship during 1975. A prime mover 
behind this drive for independence was Earl Banks, who had 
been a county commissioner for the previous 12 years. Banks 
believed that by assuming independent operations the county 
would obtain more control over the distribution of CETA 
monies and that it would be able to provide both "more effi 
cient and better" services to its residents.
During fiscal 1976, Hancock County withdrew from the 
Maine balance-of-state prime sponsor and formed a consor 
tium with Penobscot County. In October 1978, Piscataquis 
County joined this consortium. These two counties' deci 
sions to affiliate with Penobscot County were influenced by 
their dissatisfaction with the quality of services provided by 
the balance-of-state prime sponsor, their desire for greater 
autonomy in CETA decisionmaking, and their perceptions 
of the Penobscot prime sponsorship as an efficient, profes 
sional, and nonpolitical organization. In addition, Chuck 
Tetro, the executive director of the Penobscot prime spon 
sor, lobbied the commissioners of the two counties to join 
the consortium, because he believed that the additional ad 
ministrative monies from such growth were critical to suc 
cessful operation of the CETA program.
The evolution of the Penobscot Consortium has influenc 
ed its policies and organizational structure in several key 
respects. First, the executive board governing the consortium 
consists of the county commissioners of the three counties,
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each of which has equal voting power despite substantial 
disparities in population. Second, the consortium allocates 
monies under each CETA title and subpart to each county on 
the basis of the federal allocation formulas used to distribute 
national CETA monies among prime sponsors. Third, to 
guarantee residents of each county access to practically the 
entire range of employment and training services, the con 
sortium has established a highly decentralized intake, assess 
ment, and service delivery system. Each county contains a 
local office of training and employment programs (OTEP), 
which serves as the primary service delivery arm of the con 
sortium.
Organizational Structure
During fiscal 1980, the consortium assumed operational 
responsibility for a statewide Job Corps center. The consor 
tium is the only prime sponsor in the nation that operates a 
Job Corps center. The consortium also implemented the con 
solidated youth employment program, a national 
demonstration youth program designed to integrate the 
delivery of educational, employment, and training services 
to youth at the local level. Partly in preparation for these 
new program responsibilities, the Penobscot Consortium 
underwent a major reorganization during the summer of 
1979, the fourth such change since it assumed prime sponsor 
ship.
The organizational structure of the Penobscot Consortium 
Training and Employment Administration has been shaped 
by three major factors. First, the Penobscot prime sponsor 
has explicitly recognized the diversity of the labor market 
problems experienced by its unemployed and economically 
disadvantaged residents. To combat these problems effec 
tively, the consortium has emphasized individualized 
employability planning and the provision of an array of ser 
vices to enrollees, including participation in multiple
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employment and training programs both within and among 
various CETA titles and subparts.
Second, to increase participants' access to the full range of 
available employment and training services, the consortium 
has attempted to construct a "one stop" delivery system by 
establishing a network of offices of training and employment 
programs (OTEPs).
Third, the executive director of the consortium views the 
CETA prime sponsor as not only a human resource develop 
ment agency, but also as an "institutional change agent." 
Since assuming the post of executive director in 1975, he has 
attempted to establish an integrated delivery system that 
could effectively respond to changes in both local economic 
conditions and national priorities for the CETA system. 
With only a few exceptions, the prime sponsor does not 
deliver employment and training services directly to par 
ticipants. Tetro has placed a high priority upon actively 
working with existing institutions (schools, training in 
stitutes, employers, labor unions, the job service) in pro 
viding services to participants, while simultaneously trying to 
make them more responsive to the employment and training 
needs of the unemployed and the economically disadvantag- 
ed.
The central administrative offices of the consortium are 
located in Bangor, in Penobscot County. Earl Banks, the key 
mover behind Penobscot County's initial drive for prime 
sponsorship, serves as a special assistant to the executive 
director. He is a trusted adviser to Tetro and an ambassador 
to the county commissioners and the community at large 
who has played a critical role in keeping the operations of the 
consortium free from politics.
The division of community employment and training pro 
grams houses the major service delivery arms of the consor 
tium and is responsible for providing a wide range of services
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to participants under CETA title II-B, II-D, IV, and VI pro 
grams. The division consists of the network of OTEPs and 
three offices providing an array of support services to them. 
Each OTEP is headed by an administrator, who oversees a 
staff of 18 to 30. The OTEPs are responsible for delivering 
the full array of employment and training services to CETA- 
eligible residents of the consortium. These services include 
outreach, assessment, testing, employability development 
planning, referrals to classroom training, work experience 
and PSE programs, OJT development and placement, sup 
portive services, and job search assistance.
Staffing
The Penobscot prime sponsor has experienced substantial 
employment growth as its geographic coverage expanded 
and it assumed major new program responsibilities, especial 
ly the Job Corps. The staff of the consortium had grown 
from 15 during the first year of operation to 268 permanent 
employees by April 1980, of whom 105 were on the staff of 
the Job Corps center. The employees of the consortium are 
not protected by any civil service system. The personnel 
classification system of the consortium contains 11 job 
grades, with a heavy concentration in grade 5 positions 
which include the bulk of the intake, employability develop 
ment, and job placement personnel in the OTEP offices.
The salary structure for consortium staff is determined in 
dependently of that of county government. The salary of the 
executive director is set by the county commissioners, and 
they also review and approve the salaries of other high level 
executive staff. An analysis of the salary structure of the 
Penobscot Consortium in the summer of 1979 indicated that 
the consortium was competitive with the salaries paid for key 
executive and managerial staff by other prime sponsors in 
the region.
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Hiring authority is quite decentralized and free of political 
influences. The department heads have authority to hire and 
fire their own staffs, as do the OTEP administrators. Several 
OTEP administrators have also delegated responsibility for 
the hiring of lower level staff to specialists in their offices. 
The characteristics of professional staff, particularly in 
OTEP offices, have changed somewhat with the recruitment 
of older, more experienced, and more stable employees. 
Overall staff turnover has been rather low—less than 10 per 
cent in 1980, according to the personnel director. Turnover 
rates varied by job grade, being lowest among the higher 
level executive staff and OTEP administrators and highest 
among clerical workers and intake and employability 
development staff.
Management Systems
The OTEP offices maintain comprehensive and detailed 
records on GET A program participants. The participant in 
take, work history, change of status, and termination forms 
compiled by the OTEPs are also submitted to the consor 
tium's management information System (MIS) unit. The in 
take and work history data are reviewed by MIS staff as a 
final check on the eligibility of participants and are used to 
prepare a wide variety of internal biweekly and monthly 
reports for use by consortium executives and administrators 
in monitoring the on-going performance of the local delivery 
system. These data are also used to produce the required 
federal quarterly reports on enrollments, terminations, and 
placements.
The accounting unit pays vendors within 5 days of receipt 
of a proper invoice. Local service deliverers cited prompt 
payment as a very favorable factor in their dealings with the 
prime sponsor. The fiscal and MIS units of the consortium 
are closely integrated, with allowance payments tied to MIS 
approval of required paperwork.
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The Penobscot Consortium systematically and com 
prehensively monitors and evaluates its program activities. 
OTEP employability developers and job developers monitor 
enrollees' progress during their participation in the program, 
including the use of participant evaluation forms by job site 
supervisors and classroom teachers. The independent 
monitoring unit makes on-site reviews of work experience 
and PSE job sites, monitors financial aspects of OJT con 
tracts, and interviews classroom training instructors and par 
ticipants. The consortium conducts in-house followup 
surveys of program terminees from its title II-B and II-D 
programs and has used the findings to influence its title II-B 
services mix, to encourage the use of multiple program par 
ticipation, and to initiate new program efforts, including 
self-directed job search workshops.
All basic policymaking, program planning, and program 
administration decisions are made by consortium staff. 
Planning councils, community based organizations, labor 
unions, the job service, and the private industry council have 
contributed to the consortium's policymaking and planning 
process, but do not generally appear to have had a major im 
pact upon training policies or programs. The Maine State 
AFL-CIO administers one part of the consortium's title II-B 
OJT program, emphasizing development of OJT slots in 
unionized firms. The private industry council recently fund 
ed a marketing campaign to get local employers involved in 
the consortium's OJT programs and the Targeted Jobs Tax 
Credit program.
Federal/State Relations; CETA 
and the Local Community
The executives of the Penobscot Consortium have general 
ly maintained cordial relationships with the ETA regional of 
fice and have received its support for a number of recent pro 
gram initiatives, including the development of the con-
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solidated youth employment program and the New England 
Institute on Human Resource Program Management. Con 
sortium staff members, however, have had a few conflicts 
with ETA field representatives, but recently more har 
monious relationships have developed. Nevertheless, only 
legislation, not relationships with ETA staff, has had any 
major independent impact on the training policies and prac 
tices of the consortium.
There was a widespread feeling on the part of many con 
sortium staff that the community's perception of CETA was 
beginning to improve. This positive change was attributed by 
several staff to the fact that the consortium was "running 
more of a training program now." The greater emphasis 
upon training was believed to be more widely respected by 
the community and the county commissioners.
Training Policies and Decisions
The primary goals of the Penobscot Consortium's 
employment and training programs are to strengthen the 
labor force attachment, improve the employability, and in 
crease the earnings of economically disadvantaged residents. 
To achieve these goals, the consortium has designed a decen 
tralized and integrated employment and training delivery 
system with five major features. First, a "one stop" delivery 
system enables a CETA-eligible individual to obtain the full 
array of available services at one location, that is, the local 
OTEP offices. Second, the OTEP office formulates in 
dividual employability development plans with occupational 
employment goals and service strategies determined jointly 
by the employability developer and the participant. Third, 
public service employment, particularly under title II-D, is 
viewed as an integral part of the training system, with some 
PSE slots used as "OJT in the public sector." Fourth, most 
employability development plans include participation in
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more than one CETA program. Fifth, job placement is the 
participants' responsibility, and job search workshops have 
recently been set up to help those who experience difficulties 
in securing unsubsidized employment.
Training Purposes 
and the Services Mix
The consortium has emphasized the role of training in 
enhancing the employability and earnings of many par 
ticipants. The title II-B programs are considered to be the 
"core" of the local employment and training system and 
provide the bulk of training services to enrollees.
The Penobscot Consortium has allocated an increasing 
share of its title II-B monies to classroom and OJT training 
activities. This trend is attributable to several factors, in 
cluding the availability of title IV monies to finance work ex 
perience activities for youth, the perception by consortium 
staff that many of the economically disadvantaged needed 
training to become employable, and the ability of consor 
tium staff to develop good working relationships with ex 
isting education and training institutions and build new 
training capacities, particularly in rural areas.
During fiscal 1979, the consortium spent approximately 60 
percent of its title II-B monies on classroom and OJT train 
ing. OJT commanded slightly more than one-fourth of II-B 
expenditures—more than double the national average. 
Several OTEPs had to rely more heavily on OJT because 
small rural communities lacked training institutions. Most 
OJT in these areas consisted of one slot contracts in small 
establishments.
Per enrollee expenditures for regular title II-B classroom 
training in the Penobscot Consortium were only $556 com 
pared with $1,430 for the nation as a whole. This cost advan 
tage exists because the consortium enrolls many participants
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either simultaneously in classroom training and such other 
activities as work experience and PSE, or in evening courses 
for which the tuition is cheaper. The consortium has utilized 
its monies under the governor's CETA vocational educa 
tional grant to finance lengthier and more costly training ac 
tivities in such occupational areas as licensed practical nurses 
and wood harvesters.
The consortium allocated an increased share of its fiscal 
1981 title II-B monies to classroom training and OJT ac 
tivities despite a slowdown in the local economy during the 
spring and summer of 1980. After the private industry coun 
cil sponsored an OJT marketing campaign during the spring 
of 1980, the OTEP job development staff claimed that the 
number of OJT contracts had risen in spite of declining 
overall employment opportunities.
Training Decisions
While CETA prime sponsors are allowed to utilize a por 
tion of their title II-B and C monies to finance retraining and 
upgrading activities under title II-C, the Penobscot Consor 
tium has not done so. The executive director feels that such 
activities will eventually lead to delivery of scarce resources 
to less disadvantaged individuals and that employers would 
tend to substitute CETA upgrading monies for self-financed 
training efforts.
The selection of significant segments of the population for 
title II-B services influences the planned services mix, as dif 
ferent target groups require somewhat different types and 
combinations of employment and training services to over 
come their particular barriers to employment. For example, 
work experience is frequently used as an initial service com 
ponent for many young persons and adult women lacking re 
cent employment experience. Work experience in the consor 
tium, however, is regarded as a feeder mechanism rather
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than a final service activity. The share of title II-B monies 
devoted to training activities is also influenced by the 
perceived capacity of the consortium to develop such ac 
tivities. The planned level of expenditures on OJT is regard 
ed as a "flexible figure" to be revised upward or downward 
depending upon projected local labor market conditions and 
the capacity of the OTEP system to develop additional OJT 
contracts. Finally, the title II-B services mix has been in 
fluenced by the findings of the consortium's followup 
evaluations. The persistent finding of more favorable im 
mediate outcomes for participants in multiple program com 
ponents (classroom training and OJT) has led to increased 
emphasis on the provision of classroom skills training and 
OJT services.
The determination of significant segments for programs 
under each CETA title is made by the planning department. 
The characteristics of significant segments have varied 
somewhat in line with the objectives and services provided by 
programs under the various titles. Youth (under age 22), 
women, and high school dropouts have been the major 
significant segments for the consortium's title II-B pro 
grams.
Since its inception, the Penobscot prime sponsor has 
adhered to a policy of contracting out practically all of its 
classroom training, both prevocational and vocational. 
Classroom training in the consortium has been operated by a 
wide variety of educational and training institutions, in 
cluding regional vocational high schools, adult education 
programs in local public high schools, local adult learning 
centers, community colleges, postsecondary vocational and 
technical institutes, private junior colleges, and 4-year col 
leges and universities. Recent title VII private sector-oriented 
training programs have involved collaboration among com 
munity colleges, 4-year colleges, and private firms. The title
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II-B O JT programs of the prime sponsor are administered by 
both OTEP staff and the Maine State AFL-CIO.
Selection of the facilities and occupations in which 
classroom training will be provided is frequently a joint deci 
sion, because the number of training institutions in the area 
is limited. The bulk of the classroom training consists of in 
dividual referrals to occupations and facilities jointly 
selected by the adult employability developer and the partici 
pant as part of the employability development planning pro 
cess. These decisions are, however, reviewed by the adult 
employability development specialist and the OTEP ad 
ministrator. The OTEPs have adopted a general policy of 
limiting CETA funding to no more than two semesters of 
training, so that CETA participants who enroll in 2-year pro 
grams are expected to find other sources of financial 
assistance, including federal basic educational opportunity 
grants, for the second year.
Training Program Administration
Training Authority
During fiscal 1979, the bulk of the consortium's classroom 
and OJT activities were funded with title II-B monies. Ap 
proximately 82 percent of the individuals receiving training 
services during that year were enrolled in title II-B training 
programs. The consortium allocated nearly 60 percent of its 
fiscal 1979 title II-B monies to classroom and OJT training 
activities and another 13 percent for services to participants 
(including testing, assessment, employability development 
planning, OJT development, and transportation 
allowances). The rural nature of most of the consortium area 
frequently requires participants to travel substantial 
distances (30-50 miles) to attend classroom training pro 
grams in Bangor.
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Like many other prime sponsors, the Penobscot Consor 
tium has experienced some difficulties in spending the con- 
gressionally mandated share of title II-D monies (15 percent 
in fiscal 1980) on training activities. Hence, it used title II-D 
monies to fund a self-directed job search workshop. This 
program was designed to provide skills in resume prepara 
tion, job interviewing and job search. Preliminary findings 
of a formal evaluation of the effectiveness of this job search 
program indicate that 60-70 percent of the participants were 
successful in obtaining unsubsidized employment.
Who Gets Trained
The basic decisions on referral of CETA-eligible ap 
plicants to specific employment and training activities are 
made by employability development staff in the local 
OTEPs. All enrollees must have an employability develop 
ment plan formulated for them by the adult employability 
developer with the approval of the specialist. Formal testing 
of applicants during this process is encouraged. These plans 
are viewed by many OTEP staff as a type of "trial and error 
system" in planning occupational goals for participants. 
Modifications in the initial employability development plans 
are anticipated as participants learn through actual ex 
perience what they are capable of and interested in doing.
Adult work experience programs under title II-B are used 
primarily as an assessment tool to determine and/or build 
basic work habits and to test the occupational interests of 
participants. Young persons, AFDC recipients, and displac 
ed homemakers are prime candidates for the consortium's 
work experience programs. The OTEP staff tends to en 
courage participants lacking a high school diploma to enroll 
in adult basic education and GED preparatory programs. 
Many local employers require job applicants to possess a 
high school diploma or GED, and the attainment of a GED
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is believed to improve participants' self-image and build 
their personal pride and confidence.
Referrals to classroom training activities consist of in 
dividuals with clear and realistic occupational employment 
goals. The existence of local training institutions also in 
fluences the likelihood of enrollment in a classroom training 
program. A substantially higher proportion of title II-B par 
ticipants residing in Bangor are enrolled in classroom train 
ing in comparison with their counterparts in the more rural 
areas of the consortium. Women have constituted 72 percent 
of the enrollments in title II-B classroom training. Young 
persons—male and female—under 22 years of age accounted 
for nearly 36 percent of title II-B classroom training par 
ticipants during fiscal 1979, and high school dropouts of all 
ages accounted for slightly more than 42 percent.
Individuals referred to the OJT programs were persons 
who had exhibited good work habits and who either had an 
established work history or had performed well in the local 
CETA system. The majority of the OJT referrals were in 
direct; that is, they had previously participated in another 
CETA activity, such as work experience, PSE, or classroom 
training. Men accounted for most of the participants in the 
fiscal 1979 OJT programs administered by both the OTEPs 
(60 percent) and AFL-CIO (79 percent). Two-thirds of the 
OJT participants were age 22 or older, more than seven- 
tenths had graduated from high school, and two-fifths were 
family heads.
Service Deliverers
During fiscal 1979, prevocational and vocationally- 
oriented classroom training was provided to title II-B par 
ticipants by 71 different educational and training institutions 
located both within and outside the consortium planning 
area. The majority of these institutions, however, enrolled
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only one or two title II-B participants during this year. Five 
educational and training institutions accounted for approx 
imately two-thirds of all classroom training enrollments 
under title II-B programs. These major classroom training 
service deliverers do not play a key role in either policymak- 
ing or planning in the consortium.
OTEP administrators and staff have begun to assume a 
more active role in developing an institutional training in 
frastructure and selecting service deliverers during the past 
year. Two rural OTEPs have developed and staffed in-house 
learning centers to expand basic educational and GED 
preparatory services to participants. The OTEPs also have 
recently designed classroom skill training programs for cer 
tified nurse aides and clerical workers. Greater flexibility in 
designing courses and diversity in course offerings have been 
sought by OTEP administrators and staff to enable them to 
more effectively meet the educational and training needs of 
current GET A participants and of new target groups.
Occupational Areas 
of Classroom Training
The class-size institutional training programs of the con 
sortium during the past 2 years have concentrated on oc 
cupations with favorable employment conditions. Under ti 
tle II-B, the consortium funded class-size programs for 
licensed practical nurses and wood harvesters, two occupa 
tions in which employment has grown rapidly within the con 
sortium. During fiscal 1980, it used title VII monies to fund 
class-size training programs for medical secretaries and com 
puter programmers—occupational choices well-justified by 
recent occupational employment trends in the consortium.
The bulk of the title II-B classroom skills training activities 
of the consortium consist of individual referrals to existing 
educational and training institutions. Adult employ ability
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developers in the OTEPs determine the appropriateness of 
training in an occupational area, with final approval by the 
specialist and OTEP administrator. Clerical (40 percent) and 
allied health occupations (29 percent) accounted for the 
largest shares of enrollments in title II-B classroom skills 
training programs during fiscal 1979. There were substantial 
differences in the occupational distributions of female and 
male skills training program participants. Women con 
stituted 96 percent of the trainees in the clerical and allied 
health occupations while men dominated the craft (93 per 
cent) and operative-related (96 percent) occupations.
OJT Program Administration
The title II-B OJT activities of the consortium are manag 
ed by both the local OTEPs and the Maine AFL-CIO. At the 
local OTEP level, the delivery of OJT services is carried out 
through the combined efforts of the employability develop 
ment and job development staffs. Employability develop 
ment staff generally refer individuals that they deem "ap 
propriate for OJT" to the job development staff with sup 
porting material on their OJT readiness. The job developers 
then either attempt to develop particular OJT slots for the 
applicants or—more often—refer them to existing OJT slots 
that match their occupational interests, job desires, and 
abilities.
Rather than relying heavily upon formal sources of labor 
market information, the job developers stressed obtaining 
leads on available job openings through personal contacts 
with the local business community and appressive marketing 
of the OJT program with local employers. Both OTEP ad 
ministrators and job development staff considered the per 
sonal relationships between staff and employers as critical to 
the success of the OJT program, arguing that personal trust 
in staff and the ability of the consortium staff to deliver on 
its promises were primary determinants of private sector
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cooperation with the OJT effort. The unusually high propor 
tion of enrollees in OJT seems to attest the success of this ap 
proach.
The Maine State AFL-CIO has three full-time job 
developers in its Brewer offices, two of whom devote most of 
their time to OJT development for the consortium. The 
AFL-CIO job development efforts have focused on both the 
union and nonunion sectors of the Penobscot Consortium; 
however, the bulk of the OJT positions have been in blue- 
collar occupations in unionized manufacturing 
establishments.
Training Program Operations and Quality
During the spring and summer of 1980, site visits were 
made to assess the operations and quality of the training pro 
vided by the six major educational and training institutions 
involved in the delivery of title II-B and VII classroom train 
ing services: the Bangor Adult Education Learning Center, 
Eastern Maine Vocational-Technical Institute, Beal College, 
James A. Taylor Hospital, Husson College, and Bangor 
Community College. As part of the evaluation, participants' 
views of classroom training were analyzed. For OJT, the 
evaluation consists of a review of consortium statistics on the 
OJT program.
Bangor Adult Education 
Learning Center
The Bangor Adult Education Learning Center is part of 
the Bangor adult education system, which receives the bulk 
of its funding from the Maine Department of Education. 
During 1980, the center was staffed by a coordinator and six 
other professional certified teachers, all employed on a part- 
time basis. All of the teaching staff had 5 or more years of
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experience at the primary and secondary school level as well 
as some experience in adult education programs.
The learning center routinely serves practically all ap 
plicants; it has no family income eligibility criteria or 
residence requirements. The center does not charge tuition. 
Learning is individually paced, with students assigned initial 
reading materials based upon their test scores on entrance ex 
ams administered by the center. During their participation, 
students are given the ABLE test or the GED pretest to deter 
mine their progress in preparing for the GED examination. 
The center administers the GED exam and scores the test.
CETA participants in the learning center are treated 
similarly to other students. Participation by CETA enrollees 
is open-ended, with the actual duration dependent on the 
time needed to acquire the desired math and reading com 
petencies or acquire the GED. The Bangor OTEP, however, 
limits allowance payments for participation in the center's 
programs to 6 hours per week. The center's coordinator in 
dicated that CETA students often came on their own time to 
the center for 20 or more hours per week.
The coordinator claimed that CETA participants were on 
average more stable and committed students. Relationships 
between the center and the Bangor OTEP appeared to be 
quite harmonious and based on mutual respect and trust. 
The effectiveness of the educational services provided to 
CETA participants was difficult to ascertain, because of the 
absence of any formal monitoring or evaluation of the 
center's activities by the consortium's Independent Monitor 
ing Unit and evaluation staff.
Eastern Maine Vocational-Technical Institute
The Eastern Main Vocational-Technical Institute (EMV- 
TI) is a public, postsecondary technical and vocational train 
ing institute in Bangor—one of six such institutes operated
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throughout Maine by the State Board of Education. EMVTI 
operates both day and evening programs. The day program 
includes instruction in 11 different areas leading to a 2-year 
associate in applied science degree.
Most CETA participants are enrolled either in nondegree 
courses during the evening or in one or two courses during 
the day, thus saving the consortium a considerable sum for 
tuition, which is less for evening and part-time day students. 
As the OTEPs do not allow the funding of training courses 
beyond one year, participants desiring to enroll in 2-year 
programs would be required to arrange their own financing 
for the last 12 months. In practically all instances, CETA 
participants attend classes with regular students. The policy 
of intermingling was advocated by the EMVTI director. 
During fiscal 1979, title II-B CETA participants were enroll 
ed in 20 different types of courses, but the allied health field 
accounted for 55 percent of those enrollments.
The directors of the institute and the adult and continuing 
education program claimed that the performances of CETA 
participants were quite mixed. They said participants in the 
practical nursing program performed in an exemplary man 
ner while others, particularly title VI participants enrolled in 
basic construction and building maintenance courses, lacked 
motivation and a desire to learn. More careful screening of 
potential enrollees by OTEP staff was felt to be desirable.
During the past three years, the consortium has used title 
II-B monies to reserve slots in the EMVTI practical nursing 
program for CETA participants. For example, during fiscal 
1980, 12 of the 45 slots in the training program were oc 
cupied by CETA participants. The CETA monies provided 
to EMVTI by the consortium have been used to hire addi 
tional instructors for the practical nursing program. The 
linkages developed between the consortium and EMVTI in 
this situation have expanded institutional training capacity 
for practical nurses.
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Admission into the regular practical nursing program is 
quite competitive, with 200 persons typically applying for the 
30 to 40 available positions. Candidates must possess a high 
school diploma or its equivalent, achieve a passing score on a 
national prenursing aptitude examination, and be personally 
interviewed by the program director and her staff. Final 
selection of candidates is made by Ms. Pederson, the director 
of the program.
The practical nursing program is 45 weeks long and com 
bines classroom instruction and laboratory work in EMVTI 
with clinical experiences in local hospitals and nursing 
homes. Given the rigorous nature of the training program, 
consortium and EMVTI staff developed a 10-week prenurs 
ing program for CETA participants to bolster their basic 
skills and increase their confidence in coping with the regular 
course material. Once the regular practical nursing program 
begins, CETA participants attend the same classes with other 
students and receive no special treatment.
CETA participants have performed quite well in this pro 
gram and in several years have outperformed other students. 
Their somewhat superior performance was attributed in 
large part to the effects of the prenursing program. 
Graduates of the practical nursing program are awarded a 
diploma by EMVTI and must then pass a national licensing 
exam to retain employment as a licensed practical nurse. No 
graduate of the EMVTI practical nursing program has ever 
failed the exam. The placement rate of CETA graduates has 
been nearly 100 percent. Practically all of the graduates line 
up their own jobs prior to graduation because of the 
tightness of the labor market for practical nurses.
Beal College
Deal College is a proprietary junior college specializing in 
business education that is located in Bangor. The college
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operates both day and evening programs during which 
students can enroll in courses leading to 2-year associate 
degrees, 1-year diplomas, or certificates.
More than 90 percent of the fiscal 1979 CETA title II-B 
participants attending Beal College were enrolled in clerical- 
related courses. A substantial majority of the CETA par 
ticipants were enrolled in only one or two courses per 
semester, including evening courses rather than being full- 
time day students. The consortium has used the courses of 
fered by Beal College to develop basic clerical skills of CETA 
participants rather than to enroll them in the school's 2-year 
degree programs.
CETA participants generally attend classes with other 
students and are treated in a similar manner by the faculty. 
The president of the college and department heads indicated 
that a high proportion of the CETA students have perform 
ed quite well in the classroom, but also noted that perfor 
mance was quite varied. Staff claimed that women in the 
25-40 age group did best, while the 18-20 year old CETA 
students often seemed to have attitude, attendance, and 
basic skill problems.
James A. Taylor Hospital/Husson College 
Medical Secretary Training
During fiscal 1980, the consortium funded a medical 
secretary training program with its title VII monies. Services 
under this training program are provided by the James A. 
Taylor Hospital, Husson College, and Bangor Community 
College. Enrollees also participate in several practicums in 
volving other hospitals, medical clinics, and doctors' offices 
in Bangor. James A. Taylor Hospital has assumed the major 
coordination role for this training program. It provides 
classroom facilities for several of the courses and office 
space for the coordinator (an employee of the hospital),
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lends professional staff to provide classroom instruction on 
specialized topics, and serves as a job site for the practicum.
The medical secretary training program was designed to 
serve 20 participants, of whom 15 were expected to suc 
cessfully complete the program and be placed in training- 
related jobs. Minimum requirements for acceptance into the 
program included a high school diploma or GED, 
reasonably strong English and math skills, and good com 
munication skills. Recruitment, testing, and initial assess 
ment were carried out by OTEP and central office staff. 
Final selection of candidates was made by the program coor 
dinator and the personnel director of the hospital.
The medical secretary training program is scheduled to last 
52 weeks and consists of three terms. Classroom training is 
planned in all three terms, and a practicum during the final 
term. Students will obtain 30 hours of college credit for their 
classroom course work.
During the site visits, teachers and administrators of the 
program assessed the students' performance positively. 
Several instructors were particularly impressed with the at 
tendance records, dedication, and classroom performance of 
the students, indicating that the CETA participants perform 
ed as well if not better than the regular students. Given the 
fact that the program was only half completed at the time of 
the site visits, final judgment on its effectiveness must be 
deferred. It appears, however, that the participants are 
developing an extraordinarily diverse set of skills in the 
medical secretary and health area that should enhance their 
placement potential upon graduation.
Bangor Community College Computer 
Programmer Training for the Handicapped
During fiscal 1980, the Penobscot Consortium agreed to 
fund, jointly with the Maine state bureau of vocational
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rehabilitation, a computer programmer training program for 
severely handicapped individuals. The program is operated 
by Bangor Community College. While the consortium 
agreed to finance part of the training ($50,000) with its title 
VII monies, the bureau of vocational rehabilitation retained 
responsibilities for most program operations, including 
recruitment of eligible participants, selection of the contrac 
tor, job development, and placement of program terminees.
A rather rigorous screening process was employed by the 
bureau of vocational rehabilitation in selecting participants. 
Over 120 individuals applied for the 12 positions available in 
the program. Final selection of participants was made jointly 
by staff from the bureau of vocational rehabilitation and 
Bangor Community College and members of a business ad 
visory group overseeing program operations.
The length of the training program was 37 weeks. The cur 
riculum consisted of four courses for which a total of 14 
hours of academic credit was awarded by Bangor Communi 
ty College. The courses included an introduction to com 
puter sciences and emphasized the application of COBOL 
programming techniques to business problems. The fourth 
segment of the program included a 4-5 week work practicum 
involving training-related employment in a data processing 
department of a cooperating Maine firm. Course instruction 
was provided primarily by a teacher hired by Bangor Com 
munity College.
The participants in the program seemed to have performed 
quite well, with all but one earning an average grade of "B" 
or better in their formal course work. The instructor at 
tributed the solid performance of the class to the effec 
tiveness of the screening process. By September 1980, all but 




During fiscal 1979, there were approximately 500 title II-B 
OJT positions in the consortium. The vast majority (73 per 
cent) were in establishments located within Penobscot Coun 
ty. Typically, OJT contracts (86 percent) consisted of only 
one or two slots; the largest contained 34 slots. Craft and 
operative-related occupations accounted for 58 percent of 
the OJT positions. The dominance of blue-collar occupa 
tions is readily understandable because the skills needed are 
more specific to the particular firm and are more likely to be 
acquired in an actual production setting. The occupational 
distributions of the OJT positions held by men and women 
differed substantially. More than three-fourths of the OJT 
positions held by men were in craft and operative occupa 
tions, while a majority of those held by women were in 
clerical and service occupations. The average (mean) starting 
hourly wage of title II-B OJT positions was $3.33, with men 
averaging $3.57 in comparison with $3.08 for women, large 
ly reflecting differences in the occupational characteristics of 
jobs obtained. The OJT positions developed by the AFL- 
CIO paid $4.19 per hour, while OTEP-developed positions 
paid only $3.27 per hour, largely because the AFL-CIO slots 
were in more highly skilled blue-collar jobs in unionized 
manufacturing firms.
Participants' Views of the 
Quality of Classroom Training
The findings of a spring 1980 IMU survey of a sample of 
participants in title II-B classroom training revealed that they 
were generally quite satisfied with the training services pro 
vided. The students tended to give very high ratings to the 
quality of the instruction, with 87 percent describing their 
teachers as "very good." The equipment and supplies made 
available to students by the training institutions were also 
assessed quite favorably, with 93 percent of the respondents
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rating the equipment and supplies as "very good." The vast 
majority of the participants believed that the course material 
would be of value to them in finding future employment. 
More than 9 out of 10 participants indicated that they would 
recommend the training program to a friend.
Qualitative assessments of the services received by par 
ticipants are also available from the consortium's 6-month 
followup survey. Findings of interviews with 232 terminees 
from the consortium's fiscal 1979 title II-B and II-D pro 
grams again revealed substantial satisfaction with the pro 
gram services. Approximately 70 percent of the terminees 
stated that program participation had enhanced their pro 
spects for obtaining unsubsidized employment. Again, about 
9 in 10 terminees indicated that they would recommend the 
program to others, and over 8 in 10 rated the GET A program 
overall as either excellent or good.
Potential for Expanding 
Training Activities
The Penobscot Consortium has always emphasized its role 
as a "training" institution. It has stressed training more 
heavily during the past few years, and allocations of titles II- 
B and II-D monies have been shifted toward classroom and 
OJT activities. The consortium also seems to have developed 
the experience and skills for expanding and diversifying its 
training capabilities.
The prime sponsor has recently expanded the local train 
ing infrastructure in the areas of basic education and GED 
preparation by working closely with local adult basic educa 
tion agencies and by developing in-house learning centers in 
the more rural areas of the consortium. The consortium has 
developed effective working relationship with the area's ma 
jor public and private postsecondary educational and train 
ing institutions. The consortium has also designed and im-
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plemented innovative training programs that tie together 
public and private educational and training institutions and 
private firms.
The offices of training and employment programs have 
begun to plan and design a variety of mini-training pro 
grams. These programs have tied together existing institu 
tions in a new delivery approach to expand course offerings 
to participants in the clerical, allied health, and basic educa 
tional areas.
The private industry council was using title VII monies to 
market the OJT and Targeted Jobs Tax Credit programs to 
local employers. The prime sponsor recently implemented a 
job search workshop to assist in the placement of terminees 
from both its title II-B and II-D programs. The private in 
dustry council and the local chamber of commerce became 
more actively involved in the planning and administration of 
the job search program, and their contributions may 
enhance its potential for expanding unsubsidized employ 
ment opportunities for CETA participants.
The Penobscot Consortium has steadily moved toward 
establishing a comprehensive, integrated training delivery 
system that utilizes effective service deliverers, both public 
and private. This system has been designed to respond effec 
tively to the diverse needs of the local unemployed and 
economically disadvantaged populations. Only the future 
will reveal the limits of such an employment and training 
strategy within the context of the consortium's economic 
structure. Currently, this prime sponsor appears to have 
moved in a direction that the drafters of the 1978 CETA 
reauthorization would find to be highly desirable.
San Francisco 
The Politics of Race and Sex
Garth L. Mangum
University of Utah
San Francisco has to be counted among the most capable 
prime sponsors in the nation. But competence in the CETA 
system must be assessed by the sponsors' ability to respond 
to local circumstances, rather than by a set of national stan 
dards.
This summary first sketches the economic and political en 
vironment within which CETA functions in San Francisco. 
It then describes the planning and decisionmaking processes 
that govern the city's CETA activities, including the nature 
of the staff and the roles of federal and state governments. 
That leads to a description of the program that has emerged 
from those decisions. Finally, it appraises the quality of 
training in San Francisco's CETA programs and offers in 
sights for understanding the national system.
The Political Economy-of San Francisco
Race and sex politics is the key to understanding CETA in 
San Francisco, a fact that has its origins more in the area's 
geography than in its economy.
Geography and Population
Bounded on the north and east by San Francisco Bay, on 
the west by the Pacific Ocean, and boxed in on the south by 
another political jurisdiction, San Francisco encompasses 
only 49 square miles. With this limited area and only 650,000 
residents, it is relatively small in numbers as cities go, but it is 
one of the most densely populated areas in the United States.
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Widely renowned for the beauty of its physical setting and its 
cosmopolitan atmosphere, and serving as the major U.S. 
door to the Pacific, the area has experienced pressures on its 
housing market that have tended to prevent the deterioration 
of private and public buildings seen in many other cities. 
Slums develop and are rehabilitated through private financ 
ing in relatively short cycles.
The white non-Hispanics, who dominate the U.S. popula 
tion are a minority (49 percent) in San Francisco. Because 
the city is the U.S. door from, as well as to, the Pacific, 
Asians and Pacific islanders comprise the second largest 
population category (about 20 percent of the total). Within 
that group are people from at least a dozen nations, the 
largest groups being Chinese and Filipinos. The inflow of 
Orientals waxes and wanes with the fortunes of war and the 
economies in the Far East, with Indochina the major source 
in recent years. In third place is the substantial black popula 
tion (16 percent of the total), which had its origin during the 
shipbuilding boom during the Second World War and has 
experienced little influx since. Finally, the majority of San 
Francisco's Hispanics (14 percent of the total) have their 
roots in Central and South America, with relatively few 
Mexican-Americans and fewer Mexican nationals.
The proportions of the population who are CETA 
eligibles—that is, the long term unemployed living in pover 
ty, and those receiving benefits under the program of Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)—are all 
remarkably consistent with the ethnic ratios, except that 
blacks are overrepresented and Chinese underrepresented 
among the unemployed poor. By age, young adults are over- 
represented in comparison with national norms, indicating 
San Francisco's role as a youth mecca during the 1960s, and 
its continued attractiveness to young singles.
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The strong social and ethnic consciousness among San 
Francisco's population is perhaps not remarkable, but the 
degree of political organization and potency is. The city has 
at least a dozen strongly organized political associations bas 
ed on ethnicity. Homosexuals, both gays and lesbians, con 
stitute another well-organized and aggressive political entity. 
The rights of women, the handicapped, and the aging are the 
foci of other politically potent groups. Each of these has its 
role in GET A politics.
Government
Despite its apparent unification, the consolidated city/ 
county government in San Francisco is almost as divided as 
its political constituencies. City government scandals in the 
1930s led to a deliberate weakening of government. A mayor 
is chosen at large in nonpartisan elections. A board of super 
visors, each elected from a different section of the city, plays 
the legislative role. A chief executive officer—appointed by 
the mayor, confirmed by the board and removable only by 
impeachment—is responsible for administering the major 
departments of government such as health and sanitation. 
Another batch of professionally oriented services (such as 
police and fire) report to commissions also appointed by pre 
sent and past mayors but removable only by impeachment. 
A group of relatively independent agencies, such as the air 
port, have the power to generate and spend their own funds, 
yet every expenditure must be approved by the finance com 
mittee of the board of supervisors. Several other agencies, 
such as the housing authority and the Bay Area Rapid Tran 
sit district, known as BART, are city/state organizations 
that operate outside the city civil service.
The mayor gains substantial independent power through 
federal programs such as GET A. Appeal to the various race 
and sex organizations is the key to electoral success. Organiz-
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ed labor traditionally has been a power in San Francisco 
politics, but its influence has withered as blue-collar employ 
ment drifted out of the city.
Perhaps because of the lack of other elective entities, the 
school districts in San Francisco are a focus of political ac 
tivism, despite a relatively small school-age population. The 
San Francisco unified school district is responsible for 
elementary and secondary schools, the community college 
district for San Francisco City College and nine community 
college centers, which include adult education. The city also 
has an extensive parochial school system, an extraordinary 
number of private elementary and secondary schools, small 
colleges, and private proprietary training institutions. There 
is also in the city the state-supported San Francisco State 
University and the University of San Francisco, affiliated 
with the Catholic Church.
The Economy
In the past 30 years, San Francisco has shifted from a 
blue-collar labor market based in shipping, shipbuilding, 
warehousing, and manufacturing to a predominantly white- 
collar market based in company headquarters and govern 
mental agencies. Shipping activity and traditional manufac 
turing have tended to move across the bay to Oakland, and 
other East Bay locations, while newer manufacturing enter 
prises have settled in the "silicon valleys" of the peninsula, 
some 30 miles away. Meanwhile, the selection of San Fran 
cisco as a regional headquarters for federal and state govern 
ment activities has added to public employment. The 
westward movement of the U.S. center of economic gravity 
and the country's growing trans-Pacific ties have changed 
San Francisco's skyline (much to the chagrin of many local 
residents) by the growth of downtown corporate head 
quarters.
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The outflow of manufacturing and the inflow of govern 
ment reduced the city's tax base, as did the 1978 Proposition 
13 limitation on local property tax rates. As a result, public 
services have deteriorated somewhat and the city has become 
more anxious to grasp every source of state and federal 
funds available.
San Francisco's unemployment rate—5.4 percent in April 
1980 and 5.9 percent in May 1980—is not high for a central 
city. In fact, even construction activity was being maintained 
halfway through 1980. More notable is the abundance of 
white-collar and the dearth of manual jobs. All 41 occupa 
tions listed as demand categories for CETA purposes in the 
spring of 1980 were in the professional, clerical, sales, and 
service categories. Among San Francisco's job openings, on 
ly automotive repair, building maintenance, and truckdriv- 
ing, along with a few jobs for welders and machine 
operators, could be described as blue-collar. Almost all of 
the recent employment expansion has been concentrated in 
services; finance, insurance, and real estate; and retail 
trades. That industry and occupation structure is clearly ap 
parent in the choice of CETA clientele and activities in San 
Francisco.
Planning and Decisionmaking
Planning is, of course, a staff function but decisionmak- 
ing involves not only the prime sponsor's staff, but also the 
mayor and her staff, the board of supervisors, the employ 
ment and training council, and the influential community- 
based organizations (CBOs). Federal and state officials have 
a pro forma role, but not much more.
Staff Qualifications
The outstanding capability of the San Francisco prime 
sponsor is attributable primarily to the quality and influence
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of its staff. Their combination of longevity, experience, in 
fluence, and technical competence is unlikely to be exceeded 
anywhere in the GET A system.
The staff director, Eunice Elton, has been called the 
"mother of manpower" in San Francisco. She is a 43-year 
veteran of the California State Employment Service who has 
managed local offices, regional field offices, and antipoverty 
specialty programs, and directed the San Francisco Concen 
trated Employment Program (CEP), and its Community 
Manpower Program, which was CETA's predecessor. She 
has directed the Mayor's Office of Employment and Train 
ing (MOET) from the beginning of CETA (under three suc 
cessive mayors) and her technical judgments are considered 
beyond challenge in the city. Her position is even more in 
vulnerable than her credentials, because she has remained on 
the Employment Service payroll throughout her CETA ser 
vice and is beyond retirement age.
Ray Holland—director of the planning, evaluation, and 
management information system from CETA's initia 
tion—is a veteran of the Peace Corps and the community ac 
tion program.
Elton and Holland are the only "Anglos" among the top 
staff. The two program directors, one for employability 
development (training) and youth programs and the other 
for public service employment programs, also have MDTA 
and Economic Development Act program experience and 
have held their positions from the beginning of CETA. One 
is of Puerto Rican-Filipino origin, the other of Chinese de 
scent. The heads of the various housekeeping departments 
have been with MOET from the beginning though they have 
been promoted from lower level positions. Currently, the 
three top staff members heading these departments are a 
Chinese, a black, and a Mexican-American. There is con 
siderable turnover in subordinate positions but almost none 
in top management.
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Staff stability has been maintained despite the absence of 
formal job protection. All MOET employees are temporary 
city employees who, along with most of the mayor's staff, 
cannot achieve tenure. They receive health benefits and vaca 
tions but no retirement benefits. They are paid according to 
the entrance rate for the city's regular civil service grades but 
receive no in-grade step increases, so they earn less than their 
peers, although they face as many, if not more, job 
pressures. The explanation for MOET's staff stability must 
be adrenalin intoxication.
MOET has done an unusual job of structuring its lower 
ranks so that GET A enrollees can join the staff as 
paraprofessionals and then, by substituting experiences for 
academic credentials and perhaps taking further training, 
rise to technical and even professional roles. The Labor 
Department's regional training center is given high marks by 
the staff and community college and time off can be 
negotiated for university courses. Although staff develop 
ment has included training workshops, it has consisted 
primarily of guided on-the-job experience.
Prime Sponsor As Decisionmaker
MOET is a paradoxical decisionmaker. Probably no 
CETA prime sponsor is more data-oriented and planning- 
minded, yet few others are more politically responsive in 
their decisions. The MOET staff is personally well shielded 
from political influence, yet recognizes the necessity of 
responding to political pressures on the employment and 
training council, the mayor, and the board of supervisors.
MOET's staff of qualified planners accumulates the 
available labor market information and adds a good bit of its 
own. It has a highly sophisticated management information 
system and knows almost constantly what is going on 
amongst a vast array of contractors. Although its decisions
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are, for the most part, promptly, smoothly, and objectively 
made, ultimately they must be recognized as political.
To a large extent, the nature of the labor market and the 
unusual competence of politically potent institutions make 
possible this combination of objectivity and politics. The 
San Francisco labor market has no mysteries on the demand 
side. It is diversified, homogeneous, and stable.
It is diversified because no one industry or set of firms 
dominates it, nor does its activity rise or fall appreciably with 
any one set of economic forces. As an export-import center, 
its international markets are so diversified that no one coun 
try's economic colds can become its pneumonia.
It is homogeneous because it is a white-collar and service 
market. San Francisco houses corporate headquarters and 
financial institutions, not producing or materials-handling 
facilities. Its jobs are white-collar managerial, not technical 
or scientific. Surrounding those managerially oriented jobs 
are service jobs (in and out of the firms) that support the ex 
ecutive workforce. Its use as a regional headquarters for 
both federal and state governments intensifies the central 
focus on management.
Because these activities tend to emphasize overhead per 
sonnel, San Francisco's labor market does fluctuate as much 
as would a more production-oriented economy. Its set of 
clerical and data processing occupations seem always to be in 
demand, and employers' demand and employees' turnover 
can guarantee relatively continuous employment opportuni 
ty in a number of service occupations. If demand is quite 
stable, a satisfactory set of institutions and programs can be 
developed and continued.
On the supply side, San Francisco has a remarkably 
diverse but unusually sophisticated population. The stream 
of immigrants from both domestic and foreign sources tends
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to be those who departed by choice and selected their 
destination. The most successful from along the rim of the 
Pacific basin—Asian, Latin-American, and Pacific 
Islanders—choose San Francisco as their new home. They 
tend to combine relatively low incomes with education and 
other characteristics not generally associated with poverty. 
The domestic youth movement makes San Francisco a target 
for a new life style. The typical indigenous underclass is less 
notable than in many central cities.
Thus, San Francisco's population includes many who are 
eligible for CETA by economic criteria, yet who possess an 
organizational and political capability unusual in a poverty 
community. Most of these community-based organizations 
(CBOs) are indigenous to San Francisco; the national 
organization play little or no role in CETA decisionmaking 
or the delivery of services. What other prime sponsor in the 
system states explicitly in its request for proposals (RFP) that 
priority will be given to programs providing services to gays 
and lesbians? San Francisco's indigenous CBOs can obtain 
access to resources and then deliver services with a level of 
competence that is generally beyond challenge.
The area's economic stability has made it possible to 
predict a continuing need for a familiar set of services. 
Therefore, MOET has been able to set criteria which, when 
met, qualify the contractor for guaranteed 3-year fund 
ing—not for a stipulated amount of money, because federal 
funds cannot be known in advance, but for a proportionate 
share of the action. Of nearly 200 MOET contractors, 14 are 
in that secure status currently.
As decisionmaker, therefore, MOET has been able to re 
spond to political realities but defend its actions by standard, 
objective economic criteria. The use of labor market infor 
mation to determine service needs and of management infor 
mation to evaluate performance need not lead to markedly
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different decisions than those which politics would have dic 
tated.
For related reasons, MOET has been able to spread the 
base of decisionmaking without losing control of the deci- 
sionmaking process. Its advisory employment and training 
council, though too large for optimal effectiveness, is very 
active in its decisionmaking, but generally sides with the staff 
on most issues. The council is made up of roughly one-third 
ex officio members from public agencies, one-third mayoral 
appointees representing various interest groups, and one- 
third appointees of the board of supervisors drawn from 
geographical areas of the city.
The council's two most potent committees are the plan 
ning committee and the evaluation committee. The first 
decides annually how the budget will be distributed by 
enrollee characteristics and service functions. The evaluation 
committee is supplied twice a year with a mass of data on 
contractors' performance. Then each contractor must 
publicly defend its stewardship. The careful preparation, 
volume, and sophistication of the data supplied by MOET 
staff make it highly unlikely that the council will refute it. A 
former MOET staff member, now in the mayor's office, also 
sits in on all of these sessions so that the mayor's preferences 
get into the decision stream early, while the staff has a strong 
advocate with the mayor.
If the staff gets overruled, as it does occasionally, it is 
generally by the board of supervisors, which is much more 
difficult to reach and influence as a body, although any 
board member can be more easily subjected to political 
pressure from outside.
Monthly meetings of all MOET contractors provide infor 
mation, communication, and an opportunity to vent feelings 
and frustrations.
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Despite MOET's adroit decisionmaking process and its 
favorable economic setting, the presence of the competent 
but political CBOs has costs as well as advantages. Some 
CETA activities which staff members consider to be of high 
potential, notably individual referral and high-support on- 
the-job training discussed below, are difficult to defend for 
lack of a political constituency. Politics need not and 
generally do not force acceptance of a less than adequate 
program but it may block an outstanding one that lacks 
political support.
Federal, State, Local Relations
MOET has the advantage of history in its relations with 
both the DOL regional office and the state CETA system. In 
effect, MOET, in the person of Eunice Elton, was there first 
and the others are newcomers. The state CETA system has 
no supervisory role over any prime sponsor. However, San 
Francisco has done reasonably well in garnering governor's 
discretionary funds. The State Employment Development 
Department spends considerable state CETA money in the 
city. In addition, a variety of state-funded programs con 
tribute significantly to the resources available to the city.
Probably the most significant fact of MOET's relationship 
with other government bodies is that federal regional staff 
rarely hassles anyone from MOET. Residence in the regional 
office city helps, because misunderstandings sometimes grow 
with distance. MOET staff reports favorable experience with 
the regional training center run by a local consulting firm of 
strong reputation in the employment and training field. 
Beyond that, the regional staff is most helpful by not second- 
guessing MOET's decisions or intervening in its activities.
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Training Policies and Practices
San Francisco's CETA program—its funding, 
enrollments, and performance—demonstrate a clear and 
longstanding preference for training over all other CETA 
services if training is defined broadly as employability 
development. In fact, that is the name of the MOET ad 
ministrative unit responsible for all services except public 
service employment. What do CETA-eligible residents need 
to make them acceptable to employers in the stable San 
Francisco economy? Given the diversity of the population, it 
is not surprising that the most frequent answer is "enough 
command of English to be able to function in a white-collar 
or service job."
Table 1 summarizes the total CETA budget and 
enrollments for fiscal 1979. Of the Title II B-C funding total 
over which the prime sponsor had considerable discretion, 
56 percent was spent on classroom training and 16 percent 
for on-the-job training. The 10 percent spent on work ex 
perience was, in effect, mandated.

































Maintenance of effort requirements imposed by the Youth 
Employment Demonstration Projects Act of 1977 dictate 
that MOET reserve 48 percent of its Title II-B CETA slots 
for youth. A substantial amount of these services take the 
form of work experience, because many youth are not 
prepared to settle down to a training program or to work in 
its intended occupations afterward. Work experience is an 
acceptable "aging vat," but the MOET director objects to 
the way that theory works out in practice. School counselors 
too often refer students who are not CETA-eligible to any 
jobs they hear about, usually with private employers, 
because they know publicly subsidized jobs are available for 
disadvantaged youth. Thus, youth with the best out-of- 
school contacts leading to the regular labor market get fur 
ther reinforcement and those without any such contacts are 
diverted to a semi-income maintenance situation.
MOET has little or no control over that situation but has 
an explicit policy forbidding work experience programs for 
adults. Nine percent of Title II B-C funds were spent on sup 
portive services for the disadvantaged clientele. For public 
service employment under Title II-D, MOET is inaugurating 
an approach for 1981 in which PSE enrollees will spend half 
the day in classroom training and the other half on the job 
applying those skills. Title VI will remain standard PSE.
San Francisco CETA also has one other important non- 
training service—advocacy programs. Seven contractors 
have an explicit affirmative action role on behalf of age, 
race, sex, or handicap groups. They provide no significant 
training or employment. These agencies have been effective 
in the comfortable demand situation in working with 
employers to meet affirmative action goals by hiring CETA 
eligibles of various characteristics. The advocacy programs 
and miscellaneous services absorb the 9 percent of Title II 
B-C funds not accounted for above.
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In fiscal 1979, 192 contractors had assignments to deliver 
CETA services in San Francisco. Of these, 146 were hosts for 
public service employment. Seventeen supplied classroom 
training and seven promoted on-the-job training, in addition 
to the seven advocacy contractors. The largest investment is 
in English as a second language (ESL). For several contract 
ing institutions, ESL is the primary reason for being. Each 
concentrates on a specific language group: Spanish, Chinese, 
Korean, Filipino and so forth. Each teaches English in a skill 
training context, primarily clerical skills, and therefore most 
of their pupils are women. For smaller numbers of men, each 
also provides some training in service occupations as a vehi 
cle for language training.
A larger group of contractors emphasize skill training and 
treat language training as an adjunct skill. For instance, the 
Jewish Vocational Service has an outstanding program for 
Russian Jewish emigres. Because most of the emigres have 
university degrees, knowledge of U.S. weights and measures 
and similar material is taught to refurbish chemists, 
engineers, and so forth, with English instruction as an add 
on. With help from the Jewish Vocational Service, a similar 
program is being designed for Vietnamese.
Nonlanguage training institutions in San Francisco also 
tend to concentrate on a single skill or a narrow range of 
skills. Thus, the choice of an institution at which to enroll is 
equivalent to a choice of training type. Intake is centralized 
only for youth. For those with language problems that is no 
handicap, because enrollees must be referred to the institu 
tion specializing in their native language. For others, 
however, it means that the accident of contact determines the 
nature of the training opportunity. The sophisticated may 
learn of all of the alternative institutions and their offerings 
and select from among them. Those who go to a Job Service 
office and are fortunate enough to find an interviewer who
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recognizes their CETA eligibility may be referred to 
whatever the interviewer knows to be available. A Youth 
Service Office, funded by MOET and operated by Job Ser 
vice, provides central referral services for the young. But 
what is available for them is primarily work experience. A 
Job Service office located in the MOET building has a con 
tract to make individual referrals to ongoing programs in 
regular public and private schools.
San Francisco has no actual skill center, even though one 
institution bears that name. Under the Manpower Develop 
ment and Training Act, it approached but never achieved the 
qualification requirements for a skill center; the provision of 
training in a broad range of occupations, onsite counseling, 
job development and placement, and supportive services, 
and a concentration on the disadvantaged. In the interim, it 
has become one of nine nondegree community college 
centers serving a broader audience. It now serves CETA 
primarily by accepting individual referrals who can function 
on a par with its other students. Its one class-size CETA pro 
ject—for health care professionals—has an excellent place 
ment record but is somewhat selective in its enrollment.
The skill center is an example of a simultaneous boon and 
bane built into the California education system. When a 
CETA client enrolls in a tax supported school, that school is 
rewarded with the same average daily attendance education 
funds it would receive for any other student. Hence, the 
school usually absorbs the training costs; only the training 
stipend comes from CETA sources. That allows an attractive 
leverage of the CETA training dollar, but it may also bias 
training decisions. Better training in some fields may be 
available from private institutions, but the trade-off between 
the higher cost of these institutions and the pressure to 
spread available funds to serve more enrollees may tip the 
balance in favor of public institutions.
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Some of the MOET staff would prefer a centralized intake 
system for assessing all enrollees and referring them to the 
institution offering the most appropriate mix of services. In 
stitutions that specialize in services for particular age-race- 
national origin-sex groups, however, would resent such in 
tervention between them and their client groups and have the 
clout to prevent it, so the MOET staff has never actually pro 
posed to centralize intake.
The staff also harbors two related preferences that are not 
politically viable. Neither has a constituency of its own, and 
both are opposed by powerful community groups.
One is an expansion of the individual referral program. 
The majority of San Francisco CETA eligibles have high 
school diplomas and many have some college credits. By 
selecting trainees carefully and working with the schools, the 
staff members feel they could overcome the need for suppor 
tive services and purchase a higher level of training. The staff 
desire to move to training in higher level skills, even at higher 
per enrollee costs, reflects a nostalgic pride in the MOET 
Skill Training Improvement program experiences, all of 
which had been completed before this study began. This ap 
proach, too, would face opposition from those with vested 
interest in CBO based programs. The staff hopes to expand 
upgrading programs and does not expect as much opposi 
tion, because that emphasis probably can be accommodated 
within the current mix of contractors.
Similar political problems exist for the second staff 
preference: more and better on-the-job training. As noted 
above, the national CBOs have no political clout in the city. 
Only the local Urban League advocates OJT but the power 
lies with the indigenous organizations, which tend to look at 
OJT as a diversion from the resources available to them.
The staff also has no preference for standard low support 
OJT, which is seen as merely a wage subsidy for small
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employers. However, they are enthusiastic about high- 
support OJT, of which there have been some outstanding ex 
amples. Primarily in response to affirmative action 
pressures, public utilities and other large employers have oc 
casionally approached MOET or a contractor, and CETA- 
eligible persons have been selected to meet these employers' 
needs. A MOET contractor has provided vestibule training 
in simulated work settings. Grooming, deportment, and 
basic education, as well as entry level skills, have been stress 
ed. Then the enrollees have moved into an OJT phase but 
still have been coached by the contractor until secure in their 
jobs.
High level clerical, substantial technical, and low level 
management positions have been obtained in this way. A 
consortium of engineering and architectural firms is current 
ly inducting young blacks into technician positions by the 
high support OJT approach. But such opportunities are 
sporadic. Employers that can provide them cannot be per 
suaded by a modest wage subsidy. They respond to their own 
needs, and their affirmative action emphasis is shifting from 
the entry level to the upgrading stage. Employers will not 
participate in the competitive RFP process, so someone has 
to act as surrogate for them. Without strong direct ad 
vocacy, it is difficult for MOET staff to retain an uncommit 
ted pool of OJT funds to respond quickly to employer invita 
tion. Any uncommitted funds are well known to the CBOs, 
which bring pressure on the employment and training coun 
cil, board of supervisors, and mayor for their allocation.
High-support OJT seems unattainable as a regular pro 
gram, but it has been accomplished often enough to remain a 
tantalizing dream to the MOET staff.
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The Quality and Results of Training
One could summarize training in San Francisco CETA by 
saying that:
1. Employability development in a broad sense is the first 
priority of nearly all actors in the system.
2. The language problems of new immigrants are so over 
whelming as to swamp other needs.
3. The skills, qualifications, and commitments of the im 
migrants are sufficient, combined with a favorable 
labor market and competent trainers, to guarantee high 
placement rates and even higher retention.
4. The mix of services and service deliverers is probably 
not optimum, but it certainly is defensible.
The correlation between program quality and program 
outcomes is distorted by the nature of the population and the 
labor market. The ESL programs are the most successful, 
even though not necessarily of the highest quality. The 
facilities are generally crowded and uninspiring. The instruc 
tors must meet community college certification requirements 
and are generally competent and committed. Over time, the 
instructors in the various ESL programs in San Francisco 
have developed their own approach and denominated it as 
vocational English as a Second Language. They all tend to 
take pride in and use the same approach, regardless of 
language. There is no way to separate the competence of the 
instructor and the quality of the curriculum from the com 
mitment of the student body in assessing results. What is 
clear is that the participants do learn English—at least 
enough to get by and get a job. The job skills components of 
ESL are generally not well-equipped and often seem to be an 
afterthought. Nevertheless, placement and retention rates in 
the high 80s are standard across the ESL range and are 
bought at very low per enrollee costs.
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The quality of individual referral is dependent upon the 
quality of the institutions involved. The private proprietary 
schools are designed to meet the market and generally have 
impressive facilities and excellent equipment. Their major 
handicaps from a CETA standpoint is that many CETA 
eligibles have not been able to survive in those competitive 
environments. Most of the community colleges also offer 
good facilities and instruction and adequate equipment. 
However, the skill center is housed in an abandoned elemen 
tary school and carries the marks of a second class institu 
tion. Nevertheless its health programs are taught by profes 
sionals who maintain high quality.
Most impressive in the San Francisco setting are the high 
support OJT projects. The initial pre-entry training is ade 
quate but the employer involvement and commitment to hire 
is what makes all the difference. But these are sporadic and 
difficult to mount.
All in all, San Francisco can be described as a CETA 
system with a successful training emphasis, more because of 
the nature of the population and the economy than because 
of the training quality. In fact, San Francisco's native black 
and white poor would debate its effectiveness for them.
Capacity to Develop 
and Manage Training Programs
All of these factors are reflected in the development and 
management of CETA training programs. Stability of need 
and offering reduces the challenge to develop new programs 
and new approaches. That which works well can be con 
tinued without need for continuous modifications and new 
beginnings. A combination of ESL and clerical training is 
relatively easy to put together. Decentralized delivery lets the 
prime sponsor hold the contractors' feet to the fire without
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having to take full and direct responsibility for managing the 
training program.
Still there are always prices to pay. A decision to decen 
tralize to service units sponsored by politically potent groups 
means that almost every group has a right to a funded in 
stitution of its own. They cannot all be equally competent. 
Only in dire circumstances can one national origin group be 
denied any funding and its constituents required to seek ser 
vice from another group's entity. The California system of 
state-supported educational institutions offering free tuition 
is a boon to the leveraging of CETA funds, but it may lock 
MOET into continuation with a mediocre institution because 
of the low per enrollee cost. More selective individual refer 
rals and more high support OJT are the staffs own non- 
political preferences. The price of survival in a political at 
mosphere is compromise. But MOET has been able to mount 
an impressive service delivery mechanism in a political set 
ting which could have been chaotic.
The diversified employability development system also has 
the advantage of being readily expandable. MOET received, 
in 1980, proposals for over twice as much training as it was 
able to fund. The capacity for individual referral is almost 
infinite, given the number of private as well as public train 
ing institutions in the city. None of the San Francisco CETA 
training programs is capital-intensive and expansion of 
language training requires only instructors, which are plen 
tiful. Every program has a substantial waiting list of eligible 
applicants. MOET staff believes classroom training could be 
expanded by one-half in a few months if given the funding. 
Expanded classroom funding would also take the opposing 
political pressures off high support OJT, freeing resources to 
develop more of those programs.
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Conclusion
CETA in San Francisco is well managed by any set of stan 
dards. Its decisionmaking has a broad base and responds to 
both politics and economics. Its staff is not plagued by turn 
over and has extraordinary competence. The federal agency 
is neither a help nor a service hindrance. A major training 
need—the Americanization of a new generation of im 
migrants—has been identified and is being met within the 
limits of available resources. All of these achievements are 
being accomplished in a highly politicized atmosphere, and 
the response to those pressures is adroit. One might argue for 
a different response—one that would centralize intake and 
assign clients to training institutions by need and capability. 
But politics is as real as economics, and there is no obvious 
way to choose between them.

Seattle, Washington 
A CBO Delivery System
R. Thayne Robson
University of Utah
The CETA program in the Seattle-Everett SMSA, a con 
sortium until recently of seven cities and two counties, is a 
strong and successful program when viewed from the 
perspective of the services delivered to clients, but not 
necessarily as viewed from the regional office. In fact, the 
King-Snohomish Manpower Consortium (KSMC), can 
almost be described as two relatively distinct systems: (1) a 
system for delivery of services to clients by program agents 
who are predominantly community based organizations, 
along with a significant role for the Washington State 
Employment Service, and (2) a higher administrative and 
policy level, which encompasses the regional office of the 
Department of Labor and the prime sponsor organization 
and staff, whose primary focus is the implementation of 
federal regulations and guidelines. The latter functions 
within an environment which creates friction and too often 
diverts attention away from the primary goal of improving 
the services to and the accomplishments of the clients. The 
distance between these two levels appears to be growing 
wider and causes concern for everyone involved.
The Political Economy 
of Seattle Area
King and Snohomish Counties cover a large area of 4,226 
square miles with a population of 1,500,000. The Cascade 
Mountain range is the boundary on the east as the Puget 
Sound is on the west. Seattle is the commercial and service
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center of the region, and the Seattle-Everett SMSA is the 
seventeenth largest in the nation.
As the trading center for the Northwest, and with the ex 
panded energy activity in Canada and Alaska, growth in 
aerospace and defense, and increasing trade with the Orient, 
the economy of the Seattle area is strong and growing. 
Historically, the port facilities, the trade routes to Alaska 
and the Orient, fishing, lumber, pulp and paper, dominated 
the economy of the area. Since World War II, the general 
growth of manufacturing, and especially electronics, and of 
aerospace, particularly the Boeing Company as the area's 
largest employer, has broadened the economic base of the 
area.
Unemployment, however, has been significant, averaging 
between 6 and 8 percent over the past several years. The 
migration of minorities up the west coast and the recent im 
migration of Asian refugees continues to confront the area 
with a significant population of people who are disadvantag- 
ed and eligible for CETA services.
The political climate of the area has been somewhat mixed 
but generally Democratic, especially in state offices and the 
city of Seattle. Mayor Wes Ullman, Seattle's mayor in the 
early 1970s, was the driving force in implementing the new 
CETA legislation and in gaining support and cooperation 
from the King County executive, John Spellman, who was 
recently elected governor. The state of Washington and the 
city of Seattle had profited in federal budgetary matters 
from an influential congressional delegation, especially while 
Senator Warren Magnussen was Chairman of the Senate Ap 
propriations Committee.
Recent growth has occurred mainly in the suburban areas 
outside Seattle where more conservative views and traditions 
hold sway. Republicans have won important elections for the
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U.S. Senate and the governorship. Even so, the traditions of 
the Northwest, like those of the West generally, have provid 
ed strong support for education and human services. The 
metropolitan areas in particular have welcomed and general 
ly supported efforts to provide employment and training ser 
vices. These traditions have given the area quality education 
systems and a strong employment service. Also characteristic 
of the metropolitan area has been the multiplicity of units of 
government, school districts, and community college 
districts, each with a high degree of autonomy.
The emergence of a CETA delivery system utilizing com 
munity based organizations is probably best explained as a 
result of the power void that existed within the educational 
and human service institutions. There was no one who could 
convene and organize a metropolitan delivery system. Only 
the Washington State Employment Service had a network of 
area wide offices and interests which made possible its early 
and strong role in employment and training programs, 
dating to the beginning of MDTA and subsequent activities 
under the Economic Opportunity Act.
The employers of the area traditionally have been strongly 
involved in social and community affairs, as have the labor 
unions. As a result, the establishment of the planning pro 
cess with supporting advisory committees could draw on 
strong traditions of communtiy support and involvement. It 
is quite likely that this same tradition also explains the early 
and continuing involvement of elected officials in the new 
consortium activity.
Planning and Decisionmaking
The King-Snohomish Manpower Consortium (KSMC) 
was established as an independent governmental unit by the 
seven cities and two counties in the area. Thirteen elected of-
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ficials serve on an executive board that governs the consor 
tium. The chairperson of the executive committee has alter 
nated between the mayor of Seattle and the county executive 
of King County. Seattle with three of the thirteen votes is 
larger in population (500,000) than all of the other cities 
combined, and King County outside the limits of the 
member cities is the largest partner, as measured by popula 
tion. Snohomish County, which withdrew from the consor 
tium during the course of this study, represented slightly less 
than one-fifth of the total population and had three votes, 
one for the county and one each for Edmonds and Everett.
During the formative period, the executive director of the 
KSMC was Robert McPherson who built the alliance of 
elected officials and community based organizations that 
formed the core of the CETA system. The involvement of 
elected officials was accomplished by the establishment of a 
group of "subexecutives" consisting of key staff members 
serving each of the elected officials who met regularly to 
agree on the policies and actions that could be ratified by the 
executive board at monthly meetings. Strong employment 
and training advisory committees (ETAC) were established, 
one for Snohomish County and one for King County, with 
broad based representation from public and private 
employers, unions, and citizens representing major interest 
groups in the community. Organizations contracting with 
the consortium to provide services became non-voting 
members of the ETACs. The organization of two ETACs 
was initially a matter of geography. The thirty-five miles be 
tween Seattle and Everett seemed to justify the wisdom of 
separate meetings and committees although a joint commit 
tee was created to act for the two ETACs as needed.
McPherson left the KSMC staff in September 1977 during 
the dramatic expansion of CETA activities resulting from 
the Carter countercyclical initiative and the new youth pro-
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grams, a year during which the staff and funding for CETA 
activity in the area approximately doubled. Some of the key 
staff members who had been responsible for much of the 
development of training policies left with him.
Mayor Ullman arranged for the appointment of Lee Pas- 
quarella as the new executive director, just prior to leaving 
office later that year. The switch from McPherson to Pas- 
quarella came at a difficult time in KSMC's history and was 
accompanied by a sharp change in management styles. Mac- 
Pherson was a recognized expert with a great deal of ex 
perience in employment and training programs. His "open 
door" management style involved full communication with 
staff, program agents, and interest groups. Pasquarella had 
worked for Mayor Ullman and then moved on to 
Washington, D.C. to work for Senator Magnusson. He had 
no previous experience in employment and training pro 
grams and chose a much more formal style of management 
with his staff and the major program agents.
Despite the loss of key staff members in 1977 and a few 
changes since then, the core of managers of the various func 
tions and departments have considerable experience and are 
generally regarded as competent and dedicated. The 
managerial systems developed to handle personnel, MIS, 
planning, and the other functions are efficient and shared 
broadly with other prime sponsors throughout the nation.
The essential decisionmaking mechanisms have always in 
volved an elaborate planning process. Staff analysis and pro 
posals are developed after consultation and input from the 
program agents, and submitted to the review and comment 
of the ETACs. The advisory committees have done much 
more than simply review and approve proposals. Plans and 
policies have been thoroughly debated at the ETAC meetings 
and the differences largely ironed out. The final plans and 
funding are approved by the executive board at regular
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meetings. The planning process has been continuous, but has 
taken a great deal of time for at least six months of each year 
over the period from March to October. CETA in Seattle has 
been a sizeable undertaking with total funding under all titles 
in fiscal 1979 of approximately $84 billion dollars (Table 1).

































































a. Figures adjusted for Administration Cost Pool set-asides where appropriate, 
b. Includes availability for fiscal year 1980.
From the outset, there has been considerable friction be 
tween the Seattle regional office of the Department of Labor 
and the prime sponsor. In the formative years, the KSMC 
staff chose to deal directly with DOL officials in 
Washington, D.C., a practice that proved annoying to the 
regional office. In recent years the communications have re 
mained strained as the regional office has sought to enforce 
policies that the prime sponsor staff thought were either in 
appropriate or of a lesser priority. The regional office has 
given KSMC poor ratings for failure to maintain services to
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youth under Title II-B, slowness in implementing the in 
dependent monitoring unit, for lack of adequate systems to 
check enrollee eligibility, and other matters. Behind all of 
these issues have been clashes of personalities and a lack of 
genuine efforts to resolve issues which for the most part ap 
pear within the range of relatively easy solution. Yet the fric 
tions at the top level do not seem to have adversely affected 
the delivery of services to clients.
Effective in October 1980, Snohomish County, along with 
its two cities, Everett and Edmonds, withdrew from the con 
sortium and established itself as a prime sponsor. This left 
approximately 80 percent of the old consortium intact, with 
King County and the five cities of Seattle, Bellevue, Kent, 
Renton, and Auburn in the King-Seattle consortium. This 
realignment also had little impact upon service delivery since 
Snohomish County continued to use the same program 
agents to perform approximately the same functions at the 
same levels of activity.
Training Expenditures and Costs
Of the total fiscal 1979 funding of $83,913,773, 
$16,565,366 or 20 percent was devoted to training (Table 2). 
Of the $11 million reported as spent under II-B in that year, 
77 percent went for classroom training, 14 percent for OJT, 
and 9 percent for adult work experience (Table 3). Skills 
training accounted for 85.5 percent of all classroom training 
funds, with adult basic education, English as a second 
language, and general education development accounting for 
the remainder.
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Table 3. Title II-B Expenditures by Subrecipient, Fiscal
Expenditures





































































Training costs are relatively high at KSMC (Table 4) 
because of the cost structure of its two major classroom 
training institutions discussed below.


















































Who Provides the Training?
The distinguishing features of the KSMC delivery system 
for training are: (1) A unified recruitment, intake, assess 
ment, and referral program operated by a largely indepen 
dent unit within the Washington State Employment Security 
Department. These functions are carried on at 10 offices 
located throughout the area. (2) Community based organiza 
tions (CBOs) as the major actors in delivering both 
classroom training and on-the-job training. One CBO, the 
Seattle QIC, has conducted more than one-half of all the 
classroom training for KSMC, and another, Operation Im 
provement Foundation, manages an individual referral 
system which places participants in classroom training in 35 
public and private training institutions. These two CBOs, 
OIC and OIF, provide over 85 percent of all classroom train 
ing. Two other CBOs, the Seattle Urban League and SER,
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are major contractors in the on-the-job training programs. 
(3) The Washington State Employment Security Depart 
ment, in addition to the operation of the intake centers, is 
also a major OJT contractor, and has also been a contractor 
for work experience and PSE activity. Prior to 1977, WSES 
operated the individual referral activity which is now manag 
ed by Operation Improvement Foundation. Placement ac 
tivity was formerly limited to WSES which now shares the 
responsibility with the other contractors. WSES still plays a 
major role in the placement activities for KSMC par 
ticipants. WSES also handles all allowance payments from 
the state offices in Olympia.
There are, of course, other contractors providing both 
classroom training and OJT. The adult basic education, 
English as a second language, and general educational 
development programs, which account for approximately 15 
percent of Title II-B funds, are operated through four con 
tractors. The largest and most rapidly growing of the pro 
grams is an English as a second language (ESL) program for 
Asian refugees operated by the Seattle Central Community 
College. There are two small Spanish ESL programs, one in 
Snohomish County and the other in King County. In addi 
tion, KSMC funded a small basic education program for the 
Seattle Indian Center.
Of the six contractors operating OJT programs, WSES is 
the largest with approximately 27 percent of total funds. 
Seattle Urban League is second with approximately 25 per 
cent, and SER has a program that accounts for about 23 per 
cent of the OJT funds. In addition to the big three OJT con 
tractors, the Seattle Carpenters' Union operates a small OJT 
program and there are two coupled classroom/OJT pro 
grams, one for handicapped at the University of Washington 
and the other a small specialized program run by Job 
Therapy, a non-profit group serving ex-offenders.
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Who Gets Trained?
Women were over one-half of the participants in 
classroom training but less than one-third of the OJT 
placements. Minorities were 60 percent of classroom trainees 
and approximately 46 percent of the OJT placements. Youth 
were one-third of the classroom trainees but only one- 
quarter of the OJT placements (Table 5).
KSMC was serving approximately 49 percent youth in Ti 
tle II-B prior to the introduction of the youth programs and 
the guidelines required it to continue to do so. The decline in 
Title II-B youth enrollment has been a constant source of 
friction between KSMC and the DOL regional office. Given 
the relatively low proportion of minorities in the population, 
the high enrollment proportion is undoubtedly due to the 
role of the CBOs in the delivery system, as well as the general 
reputation of CETA as a minority program in Seattle.
As noted above, the WSES operates the recruitment, in 
take, screening, and referral centers for all CETA titles. 
These intake centers generally screen three people for every 
person referred. Forty-three percent of the persons screened 
for service were female, 39 percent were 21 years of age or 
under, 38 percent were high school dropouts, but 20 percent 
had some post-high school training. Approximately 48 per 
cent were minorities, 79 percent were below the poverty 
level, and 93 percent were unemployed.
The Geographic Issue
Executive board representatives and the ETACs of the 
three major geographical divisions within the KSMC area 
have been very sensitive, to the geographical distribution of 
funds and activities. As a result, all reports filed by contrac 
tors must report the residence of persons served by the pro 
gram. The goal for fiscal 1979 was that 53 percent of the par-
Table 5. Client Characteristics for Qassroom and OJT Training by Contractor, Fiscal 1979
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ticipants should be residents of Seattle, 30 percent residents 
of King County outside of Seattle, and 17 percent residents 
of Snohomish County. The distribution was based upon 
population, estimates of need, and some recognition that the 
major contractors were better located to serve Seattle 
residents.
For 1979, Snohomish County was more nearly propor 
tionately served by OJT than by classroom training. Seattle 
enrollees were overrepresented compared to goal by both 
types of training, and King County outside of Seattle City 
was slightly underrepresented in classroom training (4 per 
cent) and OJT (8 percent) compared to goals. Since 
classroom training has served the largest number of people 
and spent the most money, this has been the area of greatest 
sensitivity. Because of the persistent overrepresentation of 
Seattle residents, the funding allocations for fiscal 1981 were 
based upon a formula which rewarded or penalized contrac 
tors according to their records in achieving the desired 
geographical distribution. This was a major factor in the 
withdrawal of Snohomish County.
Training Quality
Training outcomes at KSMC are more impressive in terms 
of wage gains than in placements. The total classroom train 
ing enrollment during fiscal 1979 was 2,787 with 2,075 ex 
iting the program of whom 1,616 or 77.9 percent were com- 
pleters. Of this latter group 50.3 percent entered employment 
and another 23.5 percent were recorded as positive termina 
tions, leaving a nonpositive termination rate of 26.2 percent.
The before and after wage data for fiscal 1979 showed a 
median pre-CETA wage of $2.87 and a median post-CETA 
placement wage of $4.43 for an increase of $1.56 per hour or 
54.4 percent. Only the Indian and Concerned Chicanes pro 
grams fell substantially below the average gain. However,
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the outcomes are probably more a product of the economy 
than of the training which is generally of high quality.
Seattle QIC Skill Center
The Seattle QIC, the largest skill training program in the 
consortium with total funding of $5.5 million in 1980, 
operates one of the most modern skill centers found in the 
United States. The center serves people who are educational 
ly and economically disadvantaged in a full range of services 
from extensive counseling and GED/ABE, to skill training 
in any of 12 occupational areas. The facilities, equipment, 
and curriculum materials appear to be at or near the best 
available. The director and the managers are outstanding in 
their knowledge, experience, and skills in operating the 
facility. There are waiting lists of people desiring to enter the 
program.
Training costs are high at SOIC due to a combination of 
quality facilities, extensive supportive services, and unusual 
ly high administrative costs. However, the costs are not ex 
cessive in relation to the quality of the training. One of the 
strongest bases of support for the SOIC has been the 
employer advisory group which has assisted the SOIC to ob 
tain the facilities and equipment which high quality training 
demands. The employer advisory group has also been impor 
tant to an effective placement program for the students who 
complete the program.
During 1979 the costs associated with SOIC training were:
Total costs of SOIC program $4,556,480 100.0% 
SOIC costs as program agent 2,376,492 52.2% 
Allowance costs (paid by WSES) 1,661,025 36.5% 
Administrative costs (percent 
as proportion of SOIC costs) 563,963 23.6%
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Based on figures showing the total number served as 1,577, 
the total number entering employment as 604, and total 




Cost per person served $2,889 $1,507 
Cost per placement 7,544 3,935 
Cost per positive termination 5,262 2,744
Seattle QIC is not without its problems. SOIC now serves 
well over one-half of all those enrolled in classroom training 
in KSMC. However, as noted, SOIC serves predominantly 
the residents of Seattle. Therefore, strong pressure to shift 
resources away from Seattle to the balance of King County 
threatens the continuing growth of the SOIC program. SOIC 
has major expansion plans underway at a time when future 
funding is increasingly in doubt. Two additional floors are 
being added to the center, and plans are underway to add ad 
ditional areas of occupational training. These plans require 
that both SOIC and the consortium staff have a common set 
of goals and commitments regarding the future of classroom 
training, and SOIC's high role in providing training.
These issues highlight the difficulty of long-range planning 
given the current funding cycles of the CETA system. The 
gambles on expansion in the past have generally paid off. 
SOIC may need to explore some set of arrangements under 
which state and local financial support can be increased. 
Alternatively, employer support which has already been 
significant may be expandable. Can a community based 
organization operating a local educational facility gain ac 
cess to the tax base which supports the public training in 
stitutions within the area which already has an extensive net 




The individual referral program operated by the Opera 
tion Improvement Foundation is impressive in terms of the 
number of training institutions involved (35) and the number 
of occupational areas (40) in which training is offered. Ap 
proximately 800 CETA enrollees are enrolled annually with 
CETA funding of $2.8 million. The entire system is difficult 
to evaluate simply because of its size and diversity. The com 
munity college facilities visited were generally excellent and 
the Seattle area has a tradition of high quality training. The 
state vocational education system which exercises mandatory 
certification has been important in assuring quality control. 
However, the CETA supported students are a small part of 
the total training programs in the area and no special atten 
tion is paid to their needs.
A smaller number of training institutions or more em 
phasis on class-size units would simplify the administration 
of the program. However, the extensive network of com 
munity colleges, vocational-technical institutions, and 
private training schools each claim a role that would be dif 
ficult to simplify. The geographical territory serviced by the 
consortium is large. Even though it appears that CETA has 
had little impact upon the training institutions or their cur- 
riculums, the private schools are most vocal on insisting on a 
share of the CETA training effort. CETA buys whatever 
training is available on the terms and conditions set by the in 
stitutions. These terms and conditions are generally 
favorable, although the length of training time does add to 
per enrollee and per placement costs.
Financing of training costs comes from a combination of 
CETA funds, basic education opportunity grants, local tax 
support for the colleges, and state funds for GED/ABE. 
Once a CETA client enrolls at a community college, the con 
sortium's control over time in training, training given, and
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training costs becomes limited. The consortium does retain 
effective control over the payment of allowances. The 
primary reason for high per enrollee costs appears to be the 
length of time in training and the cost of operating the in 
dividual referral system with its own assessment program 
added to what is already done at the WSES assessment pro 
gram. As noted, the average length of training in this 
program ranges from nine months to one year, and there are 
a few two-year programs still being provided to CETA 
enrollees. For the consortium, the individual referral 
system's strength is its ability to serve the residents of King 
County outside of Seattle. These clients are mainly Cauca 
sian women, with high levels of educational attainment, 
though they qualify on the basis of economic disadvantage 
and unemployment.
Up to now, it has not been possible to trace carefully the 
success rates of enrollees by training occupation and by 
training institution. The steps now being taken to install a 
computerized management information system should 
remedy this lack.
Washington State Employment Service
The intake, assessment, and referral centers operated by 
the Washington State Employment Service's special CETA 
unit appear to offer an important and successful control unit 
in a highly pluralistic CETA delivery system. For the most 
part, the program levels have been maintained, slots have 
been filled, and waiting lists have been managed with con 
siderable skill. Program agents can obtain from WSES refer 
rals enrollees for the service available with client assessment 
information based on professional counseling and extensive 
testing. The Washington State Employment Service must be 
somewhat unique in its willingness to create a separate 
CETA unit with considerable autonomy within the Job Ser 
vice system. While each of the major program agents
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sometimes find fault with the others, the WSES unit seems 
firmly entrenched by virtue of the support it gets from all ac 
tors in the GET A system.
Conclusions
The classroom training program in the Seattle area could 
easily accommodate a significant expansion. The individual 
referral approach is highly expansible and SOIC is already 
strongly programmed for an expansion which may not be 
forthcoming. It would be safe to conclude that the classroom 
training activity within the two counties could be expanded 
to double the present levels, if funds were available. The 
training appears to be of high quality. But, unfortunately, 
there is no data available to determine whether quality train 
ing at relatively high cost brings a commensurate improve 
ment in the employment and income experience of its par 
ticipants. A careful evaluation of training results, especially 
for the individual referral program, should be completed 
prior to any major expansion.
By most tests, KSMC must be given reasonably high 
marks for operating what the staff considers to be one of the 
ten best CETA programs in the nation. The people being 
served are generally economically disadvantaged and 
unemployed but somewhat better educated than CETA 
enrollees in most locations. Strong emphasis is placed on 
training, especially classroom training, with reasonably 
strong secondary emphasis on OJT. The elected officials are 
both involved in and supportive of CETA activities, and 
most other interested groups within the community have am 
ple involvement in the planning process.
In reaching this basically favorable conclusion regarding 
the KSMC program, it is necessary to acknowledge that 
regional DOL officials have expressed some displeasure with 
performance during recent years, and have given KSMC an
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unsatisfactory rating. The major issue identified by inter 
views with both federal and local staff has been the failure to 
maintain 49 percent youth enrollment in Title II-B programs 
after the Title IV youth programs, including the entitlements 
program, became operative in Seattle. The other issues 
regarding eligibility, IMU, and minority staff should be easi 
ly resolvable under the circumstances. The underlying issues 
over the years, and more particularly under Pasquarella's 
administration of the consortium, have mainly related to 
communications and personality problems, including a 
general lack of responsiveness to regional office concerns. 
None of the issues go directly to the quality or effectiveness 
of the services provided.
The management of a complex CETA system is not easy. 
There is room for discussion and even debate over what 
numbers should be collected and how they should be 
presented for analytical purposes. There is a tendency to 
focus too much attention on some of the daily frictions—on 
the irritations of late reporting, on the present and prospec 
tive changes in regulations and funding. Under these 
pressures, it is possible to neglect the basic obligation to 
assist eligible clients to obtain improved skills and jobs.
The KSMC CETA program has been heavily funded and 
has operated with relatively high costs, especially in 
classroom training. The emphasis is on skills training with 
duration ranging from an average of six months at SOIC to 
between nine and twelve months in the individual referral 
program. The quality of the training provided is reflected in 
the wage gains if not in the placement rates. But whatever is 
accomplished in Seattle CETA, it is the CBOs which do it, 
counting the specialized WSES CETA unit as more like a 






The Prime Sponsor Area
Tucson is the second largest city (next to Phoenix) and the 
only other metropolitan area of any size in Arizona. The 
city, with its 1979 population of 319,300, has the only 
population of more than 6,000 in Pima County. Most of the 
county's 539,800 people live in Tucson and its suburbs, while 
the county spreads over a geographical area larger than the 
State of Connecticut.
A little more than one hour's drive from the Mexican 
border, the county was populated by 118,600 Hispanics, 
15,000 blacks, 12,900 Native Americans, 3,600 Asians, and 
352,600 non-Hispanic whites in 1978. The area's nearness to 
Mexico contributes to a low wage structure which makes 
jobs at the federal minimum wage relatively attractive, even 
though the area's cost of living is above the national average.
Historically, copper mining has been an important source 
of employment, and Pima County is still the home of the 
fourth and fifth largest copper mines in the country. 
However, attractiveness as a retirement community and an 
emerging electronics industry have moved to center place in 
the local economy. Low wages and the human resource base 
of the 30,000-student University of Arizona and the 
22,000-student Pima Community College have been the ma 
jor attractions for the emerging industry. The community 
suffered heavily from the 1974-75 recession but gives prom 
ise of riding through that of 1980 more comfortably.
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Unemployment was at a low of 3.9 percent in the spring of 
1980, rising to 5.8 percent by midsummer.
Staff and Institutional Stability
Contrary to a general CETA reputation for high staff 
turnover, the Tucson prime sponsor has experienced almost 
total stability throughout the entire CETA experience. The 
staff is, of course, small—a total of 35 in 1980—as behooves 
a relatively small prime sponsor in a modest sized city.
That staff has functioned under one director from the 
CETA beginning, and he directed the public employment 
program under the Emergency Employment Act of 1971 and 
was director of the Tucson Cooperative Area Manpower 
Planning System under the Manpower Development and 
Training Act prior to CETA. The Tucson Employment and 
Training Administration is divided into five major depart 
ments. Only one department head has ever left the post and 
he only to enter private business, run successfully for the city 
council, and become a strong supporter of his previous col 
leagues from that position.
Top management as well as staff has grown with the ex 
pansion of CETA, and those who came, stayed. Two techni 
cian level positions were lost to the city when a city-county 
consortium split in 1979 but the incumbents continued with 
the county prime sponsor. Thus the record of stability is 
maintained at the technician level. There has been the nor 
mal turnover of clerical personnel.
Only one position experiences troublesome turnover. 
Eleven persons have rotated through the five positions as 
field monitors, or service delivery coordinators in Tucson 
parlance, since the function was established in 1977. The job 
is a difficult one. Approximately 80 percent of the time is 
spent at CETA contractors' facilities observing and checking
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the delivery of service to enrollees. If there is any conflict 
between prime sponsor and contractor, the service delivery 
coordinator is in the middle of it. The service delivery coor 
dinator is also in circulation to observe and be observed, and 
all who have left did so for better jobs. Because the assign 
ment requires judgment and experience, that turnover could 
pose a recruitment and training problem. However, 
replacements are usually hired from the lower ranks of con 
tractor staff with readymade familiarity with the CETA 
world.
At the director level, the explanation of the staff stability 
is political stability. One mayor, now in his third 4-year 
term, has headed city government throughout the CETA ex 
perience. Tucson also has a city manager of similar tenure. 
The CETA staff director reports politically to the first and 
administratively to the second, and has the trust of both. For 
the rest of the staff, the primary explanation is that all have 
been incorporated into the city civil service with full rights 
and protections rather than being grafted on in some tem 
porary fashion as is the more usual CETA experience. In a 
small city like Tucson, city jobs are attractive ones, secure 
and competitively paid and few leave them.
However, the stability of Tucson CETA is not limited to 
the prime sponsor staff. The primary service delivery con 
tractors—the Tucson Skill Center, the Arizona Department 
of Economic Security (DES), Tucson Manpower Develop 
ment, Inc., Operation SER, and Tucson Urban 
League—were all actively involved under the pre-CETA 
Manpower Development and Training Act and Economic 
Opportunity Act. Other minor contractors come and go, 
either providing specialized services or acting as hosts for 
public service employment slots, but these five carry the bulk 
of CETA service delivery responsibility year after year.
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Contractor staff are almost as turnover-free as prime 
sponsor staff. The skill center went through a double transi 
tion at the end of MDTA as the director left to head a private 
trade school. The deputy became director but was not com 
fortable with the annual competitive funding process of 
CETA. The head of the DES/CETA unit, who had served 
the National Alliance of Businessmen-Job Opportunities in 
the Business Sector (NAB-JOBS) program from within DES, 
took over the skill center directorship in 1977 and has re 
mained since.
The DES/CETA unit is staffed by professional employ 
ment service staff, primarily of Mexican-American extrac 
tion, and has experienced only that one change of leadership. 
SER, the Urban League, and Tucson Manpower Develop 
ment all continue to function under their pre-CETA leader 
ship. Turnover below the director level has been moderate 
for all. Only the prime sponsor and DES enjoy the protec 
tion of tenured systems. But salaries of all are competitive 
within the employment and training fraternity and with the 
private sector in a relatively low wage labor market.
Personal relationships are good except with the SER direc 
tor, who is the "stormy petrel" of Tucson CETA. Militant, 
aggressive, and competent, he is a constant battler for more 
funds to provide adult basic education and English as a sec 
ond language programs for his Hispanic constituency. 
Private sector members of the planning and private industry 
councils find his conduct in meetings disruptive and ir 
ritating. But all of that is offset by SER's outstanding per 
formance. Thus Tucson CETA tends, in cliche, to be a 
reasonably happy and relatively close family.
Prime Sponsor/Federal Relations
"Adversary" is a better description of relations between 
the Tucson prime sponsor and the Labor Department's San
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Francisco regional office. For the Tucson staff, that rela 
tionship is personalized by the federal representative or "fed 
rep" assigned full time to the Tucson consortium and now to 
both the city and county prime sponsors. The position is 
characterized by high turnover, both because the fed reps do 
not stay on the job long and because there is deliberate rota 
tion. Of the eight fed reps who have served Tucson, only the 
current (mid-1980) one has ever had experience as a member 
of a prime sponsor staff. The Tucson staff, until that recent 
change, have viewed the fed reps as uniformly incompetent 
and uncooperative, inexperienced, and unwilling to invest 
the time to learn the Tucson scene and the reasons for and 
nature of its policies and practices. Knowing no way to be 
helpful, the Tucson staff feel, the fed reps can only be nit 
picking enforcers.
Compounding the problem of local-regional relations is 
the national system, devised by the Congress and the U.S. 
Department of Labor, which requires the prime sponsor 
each year to complete planning for the next without knowing 
what level of funding will actually be available and to adjust 
to frequent funding and policy changes within each program 
year. Then too, the Tucson director has excellent 
Washington contacts and invariably knows of national of 
fice decisions weeks before they are communicated to the 
regional office and more time passes before the regional of 
fice can translate and transmit them through field directives. 
Confidence in the regional office is not helped by situations 
in which that office is accusing the prime sponsor of non- 
compliance for advance response to a coming national direc 
tive.
On the other side of the coin, many of the regional staff 
consider Tucson staff obdurate and uncooperative. Admit 
ting all of the shortcomings of their position, they point out 
that relations are good with other prime sponsors in the 
region, despite the same set of obstacles.
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At the time of this writing, however, the whole CETA ad 
ministration in the regional office has been restructured and 
restaffed. A new federal representative has been assigned 
who has several years of prime sponsor level experience 
behind him. He has spent extensive time in Tucson to learn 
local conditions and practices and has been helpful in break 
ing loose some longstanding requests for information. Both 
sides are hopeful that a new and more positive relationship 
may emerge.
Political Vulnerability
The Tucson experience is an instructive example of the 
vulnerability of the CETA system to erratic forces of local 
politics. Tucson CETA functioned for five years as a consor 
tium consisting of Tucson city, Pima County, and the city of 
South Tucson.
At CETA's advent only the city or the county including 
the city had the 100,000 population required for prime spon 
sorship. The county, at the time, lacked the administrative 
structure to handle such an enterprise. A consortium was 
formed including the city of South Tucson—a mile square 
enclave of 6,000 population, three-fourths of them Mexican- 
American, totally surrounded by the city of Tucson.
Tucson city assumed lead position in the consortium and 
the CETA staff all became city employees. A liaison commit 
tee of one member each from the Tucson city council, the 
five county supervisors, and the mayor of South Tucson 
were the chief policymaking body reporting back to their 
larger groups. Administratively, however, the staff director 
reported to the Tucson city manager. The prime sponsor ad 
visory council was dominated by contractors who could not 
vote on issues of pecuniary interest to them, but meetings 
were long and acrimonious and tainted by self-interest. 
Despite that flaw, the system ran well except for continuous
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complaints from Hispanics and Native Americans about 
their share of the resources.
The county outside the city limits grew to prime sponsor 
eligibility. However, Tucson still so dominated the county's 
population that four of the five county supervisors were 
elected by a totally Tucson constituency and the fifth 
represented the rest of the county along with some Tucson 
voters. The latter, a university professor, came to resent the 
city's dominance in CETA affairs and agitated for exercise 
of the county's right to separate prime sponsorship. The city 
CETA staff charge that the federal regional office staff en 
couraged those ambitions, but the latter deny it. At any rate, 
Pima County filed in 1979 for independent prime sponsor 
ship, which became official October 1, 1979, for the 
1980 fiscal year. South Tucson could only go along with the 
county.
The split brought no evident gain for the CETA-eligible 
citizens of either the county or the city or for employers or 
for the labor market. The city staff continued intact except 
for the loss of two positions. A new county staff had to be 
developed and the aggregate administrative cost rose. Except 
for one private not-for-profit organization providing rural 
services, the same set of contractors serve both prime spon 
sors and both populations. Two sets of requests for pro 
posals go out each spring and each contractor makes two 
responses and keeps two sets of books and reports. The two 
sets of enrollees remain mixed in the receipt of services. The 
consortium bonus of $260,000 per year (a little less than 2 
percent of the new-CETA funding authorized for fiscal 
1979) was lost to both prime sponsors. A prime sponsor 
which had planned for an entire labor market and more was 
replaced by two, each operating over a fragment of both the 
demand and supply sides of the local labor market.
The only observable gain was reform of the advisory coun 
cil structure for the city prime sponsor.
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The Decisionmaking Process
The city had become eligible during the 1974-75 recession 
for aid under the Economic Development Act and an 
employer-dominated committee had been appointed to 
prepare the Overall Economic Development Plan (OEDP). 
That committee had worked well and the CETA staff direc 
tor and the director of the Urban League were already 
members of it. At the CETA director's advice, the mayor 
assigned CETA responsibilities to the same committee, add 
ing the representatives required by CETA law and regula 
tion.
The OEDP/CETA advisory council has worked ex 
ceedingly well during its first year, despite the OEDP group's 
amazement at the CETA workload. A long range planning 
committee and a plant siting committee carry on the major 
OEDP responsibilities. There is a CETA planning committee 
with task forces for Title II-B programs, youth programs, 
and public service employment programs. The CETA com 
mittee actively participates in setting the boundaries for the 
annual request for proposals and the task forces read, assess, 
and rank all of the proposals and join with the staff in 
recommendations to the full OEDP/CETA council.
The council chairman is vice president for economic 
development of a major bank and the membership is heavily 
weighted by business interests. The private industry council 
(PIC) chairman, another banker, is a council member, as are 
all but one of the PIC members. Council membership is for 
bidden to any person whose salary is paid from CETA 
funds, thus eliminating from membership all contractors ex 
cept the employment service, the skill center director whose 
salary is paid by the community college, and the Urban 
League director who is paid from United Way contributions. 
A nonvoting subcommittee of Community Based Organiza-
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tions (CBOs) exists to give a voice to the contractors and 
other interested parties.
The council chairman requires advance written request for 
all agenda items and will not allow any meeting to last more 
than two hours. Appearances before the full council are by 
invitation only but interested parties can be heard at the task 
force and committee levels at their own request. Not only the 
chairman but other private sector members have let it be 
known that they will continue to serve and devote the 
necessary time only if the meetings are brief and businesslike 
and if their advice is taken seriously.
The first year of the new arrangement was promising. 
Several training sessions were held to acquaint the council 
members with CETA history, goals, and procedures. The 
members turned out to be strong allies of the staff in favor 
ing objective criteria and rejecting political judgments. The 
mayor and council overturned only one joint council-staff 
recommendation. They funded a Native American contrac 
tor whose weak administrative abilities and fiscal controls 
produced chaos. Economic development and labor market 
policy decisions are admirably linked. Whether the private 
parties will continue to devote the needed time and energy re 
mains to be seen.
Orchestrated Decentralization
At first look, the Tucson decisionmaking process appears 
to be so decentralized as to prohibit any meaningful plan 
ning. The staff, along with the CETA planning committee of 
the OEDP/CETA advisory council, decide what mix of age, 
race, and sex characteristics is appropriate for the next fiscal 
year's enrollees. They make their best guess of the amount of 
funds likely to be available under various CETA titles. They 
then send out a request for proposals containing only those 
two pieces of information. With no further guidance except
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past experience, contractors then propose what groups and 
how many they hope to serve, what mix of services they pro 
pose, and the price tag. Each contractor is expected to be 
responsible for intake, all service delivery, whether directly 
or by subcontract, job development, and placement. Pro 
posers are provided with the limited amount of labor market 
data available from Department of Economic Security 
sources but essentially contractors are left to their own 
devices to judge what the labor market needs or will absorb.
Confronted with the charge that the procedure delegates 
or abrogates to the contractors the essential planning deci 
sions, the director counters, "Not so." He would prefer a 
centralized intake system, but is convinced that the political 
strength of the race and ethnic groups and their community 
based organizations and the responsiveness of the politicians 
preclude it. Advance allocation of the available funds among 
the alternative service components would tie the hands of the 
decisionmakers, he argues. Suppose most of the proposals in 
one service area such as classroom training are mediocre 
while all of those on-the-job training are outstanding. It 
would be necessary to fund the mediocre proposals up to the 
limits of the allocations for classroom training and reject the 
outstanding ones beyond the OJT limit. Under present pro 
cedures, staff and council select the best from an open 
"smorgasbord" of proposals and assemble a community 
employment and training program from among a concrete 
set of proposals rather than supposition and expectation.
But where is the impact of employer need and labor 
market information? The contractors know the needs of 
their constituent groups better than anyone else can, is the 
argument, while response to the demand side is kept flexible 
by the role of the skill center. A high proportion of the eligi 
ble enrollees need remedial education, language preparation, 
and job search training—all determined by the labor supply. 
Most training occurs in the skill center which contracts to
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deliver training unbounded by predetermined occupational 
clusters. If changing demand is signaled, by either employer 
contacts or placement rates, enrollments are simply shifted 
from less- to more-demanded occupations. In reality, of 
course, the CETA training occupations in Tucson, as 
elsewhere, tend to be in a set of high turnover, continuous 
demand entry level occupations which rarely change 
significantly. Therefore, the key decisions in Tucson are seen 
to be the relative competence of the contractor and the 
choice between occupational and nonoccupational pre 
requisites of employability. These choices can be made from 
the proposed smorgasbord.
The Primacy of Training
Training, in the broad sense of employability develop 
ment, is clearly the preferred choice of the prime sponsor, 
most contractors, and most eligible applicants whenever 
discretion is given and perceived. CETA Title VI offers no 
choice but public service employment. Title II-D funds could 
legally be used for training, but they are designated as public 
service employment (PSE) and the possibilities for realloca- 
tion are viewed as a legal technicality rather than a practical 
possibility. Depending as it does upon contractor initiatives 
to change the mix of services, the Tucson prime sponsor has 
been slow to take advantage of the invitation—and now the 
directive—to add and enlarge a training component to ac 
company Title II-D PSE. However, it has declared an inten 
tion to move more strongly in that direction in 1981.
Work experience is considered appropriate for youth and 
maintenance of effort regulations added by the Youth 
Employment Demonstration Projects Act keep a substantial 
amount of Title II-B funds allocated to youth programs and, 
therefore, in part to work experience.
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Beyond that, however, Title II-B funds, over which the 
prime sponsor has greatest discretion, are spent entirely on 
various forms of employability development with emphasis 
on occupational skill training (Tables 1 and 2 provide the 
mix of expenditures and enrollments for 1979). Under the 
Tucson smorgasbord approach, the training priority is exer 
cised in the selection of contractors. And since each contrac 
tor performs its own intake, contractor selection to a 
substantial degree determines who is to be served as well as 
what services are to be provided.






































Table 2. CETA Enrollments under Programs Funded by the Tucson, Pima 
























SER serves a substantially Hispanic population and em 
phasizes English as a second language (ESL) and adult basic 
education (ABE). Its program is a well articulated and highly 
effective one in which those who are monolingual in Spanish 
undergo six months to one year of ESL instruction, are 
taught job search and survival techniques at the same time, 
and are then placed by SER's job development staff. To add 
skill training to such extensive language training is con 
sidered to be an excessive investment in some individuals at 
the expense of others when SER applicants already wait two 
to four months.
For those with limited English speaking ability (LESA), 
SER conducts a program offering a few weeks to a few 
months of English language instruction followed by referral 
to the skill center for occupational skill training or to on-the- 
job training. For those verbally functional in English but of 
limited literacy, there is a three-level ABE program. The am 
bitious goal which has been accomplished by the average 
enrollee is to achieve three years of basic education advance 
ment for each six months of enrollment, the most advanced 
level leading to a General Educational Development (GED) 
certificate. The ABE program does not lead into the skill 
center but into on-the-job training or direct placement.
The services of the Tucson Urban League are available to 
all, but they are used by a primarily black population. After 
intake, the Urban League specializes in on-the-job training, 
job search training, and referral to the skill center for oc 
cupational training. On-the-job training has been the special 
ty of the national Urban League, and the Tucson chapter has 
followed that lead. Substantial numbers of Tucson 
employers are susceptible to affirmative action pressure, and 
the Urban League uses these pressures as leverage for on-the- 
job training placements.
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In addition, the Tucson Urban League staff were in 
structed by their national and regional leaders in the arts of 
job search training as that activity came into vogue across 
the country. The Tucson Urban League therefore initiated a 
pre-job training program through which, in a 2-week for 
mat, those considered job ready are taught how to search for 
their own jobs. Aided also by the job developers, enrollees in 
this 2-week sequence have maintained placement rates well 
above 80 percent.
Finally, Urban League, like SER, maintains responsibility 
for 31 slots at the Tucson Skill Center. All league applicants 
considered appropriate for skill training are first sent to the 
skill center for vocational assessment. Though the skill 
center must accept for skill training whoever the Urban 
League (or any other contractor) refers to slots controlled by 
the contractor, the assessment helps determine who should 
receive what service. Those referred by Urban League to its 
skill center slots continue to receive stipends from the con 
tractor and return for job development and placement at the 
completion of training. (That is also true for the other major 
contractors.) Tucson Urban League has also referred a few 
of its applicants to private clerical and trade schools, paid 
tuition for their enrollment, but has not found them effective 
because of their lack of supportive services.
The CETA unit of the Department of Economic Security 
belies any implication that the employment service cannot or 
will not serve the disadvantaged. Staff members pulled out 
of their regular DES activities appear to do as well in serving 
the total poverty population as the community based 
organizations do for their racially and ethnically concen 
trated poor. DES/CETA performs a broadly based intake 
role from a central city multipurpose center and outlying 
employment service offices. After counseling by one of the 
counselors assigned to the unit, clients are referred directly
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to jobs or to on-the-job training, classroom training, or pre- 
job training, prior to job development and placement.
DES/CETA maintains 13 OJT slots with cooperating 
employers. It maintains an additional 35 slots at the skill 
center. Many of the numerous applicants it cannot serve in 
either of these ways are put through its pre-job training pro 
gram, similar to the Urban League approach but somewhat 
higher in volume, with approximately 15 entering each two 
weeks. The mixes of age, race, sex, education, public of 
fender status, and handicap give no evidence of pre 
selection. A lone staff member puts them through an inten 
sive week of motivation, self analysis, resume writing, video 
taped simulated interviews, and telephone practice. They 
then decide upon an occupation to pursue and draw from the 
telephone yellow pages and other sources a list of employers 
likely to hire in that occupation. Goaded and cajoled by the 
instructor, they then spend the second week on the telephone 
eight hours a day seeking interviews or out being interviewed 
until a job is found. The placement rate is above 90 percent. 
The retention rate, as in all Tucson CETA programs is essen 
tially unknown.
The skill center is the primary source of occupational skill 
training in Tucson. A few applicants have been individually 
referred by contractors to a private clerical college and a 
trade school. The trade school had a direct CETA contract. 
The training in these two institutions is of high quality, but 
trainees can survive it only if they have the same attributes as 
the general student bodies. The prime sponsor and the con 
tractors prefer to allocate the training dollars to an institu 
tion designed to serve the disadvantaged.
The Tucson Skill Center is such an institution. It began 
under MDTA within the jurisdiction of the vocational 
education department of the public schools but made a suc 
cessful transition to CETA and administration as a unit of
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the Pima Community College. It conducts an extensive voca 
tional assessment program using an extraordinarily broad 
range of assessment tools. In fact, many schools and other 
institutions in the area refer their enrollees and applicants for 
assessment on a fee basis. It employs a sympathetic counsel 
ing staff, maintains a nurse on site and a doctor on call, has 
some supervised residential facilities, maintains two vans to 
bring students in from rural areas and Indian resevations, 
keeps its curriculum bilingual in Spanish and English, and 
offers basic education supplementations.
Current occupational offerings at the skill center are: auto 
body, automotive repair, basic financial skills (teller, 
cashier, etc.), building maintenance, business and office, 
electrical helper, electromechanical assembly, food service, 
and health occupations (licensed practical nurse and nurses 
aide). However, the skill center obligates a blanket number 
of slots to CETA without limiting them by occupational 
area. Intake is left to the other contractors acting as referral 
agencies. The vocational assessment unit recommends an ap 
propriate assignment for each referral. However, that is not 
binding on the referring agency or the applicant. The skill 
center must accept whoever is referred except that licensing 
requirements make it necessary to impose a high school 
graduation or equivalent minimum for the nursing program. 
If some occupational clusters grow as others shrink in 
response to the referral process, the skill center must meet 
the administrative challenge.
Despite administrative attachment to the community col 
lege system, skill center staff have none of its job security, 
few of its fringe benefits, and a lesser level of pay. On the 
other hand, they are not required to have the same set of 
credentials, though many do. Most instructors have substan 
tial trade experience, receive less pay than they had been ac 
customed to, but have more job security and more pleasant
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surroundings. Above all, they enjoy the challenge of 
teaching and the sense of community service.
The skill center has a well developed philosophy of educa 
tion based on the enrollee as an adult self-directed learner 
and the instructor as a resource person. It follows practices 
of open entry (enter any time from any background), open 
exit (leave whenever job ready), and individualized modular 
instruction. It trains in broad occupational clusters from 
which placement is possible into a range of jobs. It maintains 
a remedial learning center to which trainees are referred by 
their skill instructors according to need. It designs its own 
curricula as well as drawing upon those obtained from other 
sources. It is gradually using its community college affilia 
tion as leverage, so that its enrollees are now eligible for 
federal Basic Education Opportunity Grants and it is begin 
ning to give community college credit in some courses.
The skill center has worked closely with new or expanding 
employers in coupled classroom-OJT programs. Most 
recently in electronic assembly, the trainees receive short 
periods (typically two weeks) of pre-entry instruction from 
the skill center before entering an OJT phase of CETA sub 
sidized employment.
The skill center maintains a completion rate above 85 per 
cent. It is not responsible for job development and place 
ment. The enrollees return to the referring contractors for 
that. For 1979, placement rates were 74 percent placement 
rate for SER enrollees, 67 percent for Urban League, and 86 
percent for DES/CETA. However, data are not available to 
break tfut skill center completers from those overall place 
ment rates.
The only black mark on the skill center escutcheon is its 
facility. An abandoned department store in a declining part 
of town, its oft-remodeled innards resemble catacombs and 
its plumbing and air conditioning facilities (a must in the
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Tucson climate) are in frequent disrepair. For overflow it 
rents other buildings which are even worse. However, help is 
on the way. As another by-product of the fortuitous 
OEDP/CETA partnership, an industrial park developer 
member of the committee has offered to provide new space 
at submarket rates which will be designed specifically for 
skill center needs. Given the high maintenance costs of the 
present facility, the actual cost will not be much higher. If 
the Tucson skill center can maintain the current attitudes of 
dedication within the new setting, it will be a most admirable 
institution.
Overall, Tucson intake agencies report that 85 percent of 
CETA applicants request skill training. But skill training 
costs over $7,000 per trainee, including stipends, whereas 
OJT costs average less than $1,000 per enrollee and job 
search training costs about $150 per person. Table 3 provides 
a comparative breakdown of Title II expenditures between 
training and other services. The preference for classroom 
training is demonstrated by the fact that nearly all funds 
available for that purpose are spent, whereas there is less 
pressure to spend OJT and supportive services funds. The 
other services exist because the prime sponsor attempts to 
maintain a balance among alternative services. Waiting 
periods for CETA enrollments range from two to four 
months for all contractors. But within budget limitations, 
classroom skill training is nearly everyone's favorite.
The Tucson training system is still essentially what was put 
in place under the Manpower Development and Training 
Act. It has proven its adaptability as well as its durability. 
The decentralized nature of the system enables it to expand 
and contract without breaking. There is no large investment 
in buildings and equipment. No permanent commitments are 
made to instructors who seem to be readily available. Ex 
panding means renting space and adding instructors. Con 
tracting requires the opposite. The Tucson CETA training
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system appears to be capable of operating in a range of 75 
percent to 125 percent of current enrollments with no undue 
strain.
Table 3. Title II-B Authorizations and Outlays, Tucson, Pima County, 



























Need for Specialized Institutions
One of the lessons of the Tucson experience is the need for 
institutions that specialize in the serving of various popula 
tions. The Tucson Skill Center, SER, the Tucson Urban 
League, DES/CETA, and Tucson Manpower Development 
(not described here because of its youth concentration) sur 
vived their MDTA origins because they continued to meet a 
need. All serve a racial and ethnic mix, but their enrollees ap 
pear to have a preference for those that carry their own iden 
tity. That specialization is crucial when language and sharp 
cultural differentiation is involved. Thus SER specializes in 
bringing Hispanics to the point where they can compete in 
the skill center and the job market. The Papago Indian tribe 
meets most of CETA's reservation Indian responsibilities, as 
does a rural contractor for the Yaquis. Lacking a competent 
urban Indian contractor, members of those tribes living in 
the Tucson metropolitan area (and some of the reservation 
dwellers) are served by the skill center and other contractors 
but not without considerable dissatisfaction.
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But despite the need for racial and ethnic specialization, 
there are plenty of CETA eligible non-Hispanic whites as 
well as the less culturally different of other races who can be 
served effectively by a sympathetically specialized unit 
within the employment service. DES/CETA has the advan 
tage of direct linkage to major labor market and social 
welfare institutions. But without the specialized assignment 
to serve the CETA eligible, it is doubtful that they would 
seek and receive the same level of service from the 
mainstream Job Service offices.
As training institutions, the community college and the 
private proprietary schools can serve those few CETA 
eligibles who possess all of the characteristics of their regular 
student bodies except for family income. However, if there 
were not a skill center in Tucson, someone would have to in 
vent it. There are too many of culturally different and com 
petitively disadvantaged backgrounds who could neither sur 
vive in training institutions nor succeed in the labor market 
without specialized help.
Is CETA Worthwhile?
Hardly anybody in Tucson would categorize CETA as a 
four-letter word. Judging from employers who serve on the 
advisory and private industry councils and participate in 
OJT programs, the business community welcomes its help. 
Organized labor is not strong in Tucson but has been suppor 
tive of CETA to the extent of cooperating in specialized pro 
grams not described here for lack of space. The racial and 
ethnic communities want only more. The political support is 
bipartisan. To the extent they are aware of the situation, all 
would respond to the federal government, "Leave your 
money and go away and don't bother us. We need your 
resources, but, in administration and planning, you are only 
in the way." One can hope that attitude is subject to change.
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CETA's administrators and decisionmakers have well ar 
ticulated policies. To an outside observer, it would appear 
that a centralized intake and assessment process would be 
more likely to get each applicant the most compatible assign 
ment to services. The actors on the scene have concluded that 
the political price would be too high.
The labor economist sees the need for a greater labor 
market information input into planning, including projec 
tions of the future level and structure of employment by oc 
cupation and industry. The administrators argue that a flexi 
ble training institution responding to employer and enrollee 
demand and placement rates is more dependable. The truth 
in between is that the occupations trained for are those 
characterized by high turnover and always in demand or 
undergoing secular expansion such as the local electronics in 
dustry.
But do the enrollees complete training and get jobs? The 
administrator responds with impressive placement rates. But 
are those jobs which would not have been obtained without 
program participation, do they last, and are the benefits 
worth the cost? The administrator cannot answer except to 
protest that followup is too expensive, taking scarce money 
better spent on direct participant services, that control 
groups are impractical, and that only limited analysis is 
possible without a computerized management information 
system. The observer/analyst responds, "I know in my heart 
you are doing good but I can't prove it."

Utah 
The Perils of Pioneering
R. Thayne Robson
University of Utah
Utah's experiences served as a model in the design of the 
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act. Today, 
however, the state is a backwater in the CETA mainstream. 
Perhaps that fate is a penalty of pioneering. Utah established 
a statewide manpower planning council in 1969 by guber 
natorial initiative and legislative act. From then until 1972, 
Utah was a manpower mecca beckoning visitors from 
around the country. In 1972, the same governor who in 
itiated centralized manpower planning chose to decentralize 
it among nine multicounty associations of government. That 
pattern persisted into 1981 with Utah listed with the Labor 
Department as a single statewide consortium which consists 
in actuality of nine relatively autonomous planning and 
operating units. At the close of 1980, when two of the larger 
counties indicated they were withdrawing from the statewide 
consortium to become prime sponsors, the director of the 
Utah CETA consortium advised and the subsequent gover 
nor agreed to disband the consortium. Utah's innovative 
period actually ended before CETA became law. For CETA 
as a whole, the state offers little to write about. But there are 
useful lessons for a study of training.
The Utah Setting
Utah, relatively large in territory and small in population, 
is surprisingly urbanized. Approximately 80 percent of its 
nearly 1.5 million people live in what is essentially one 
metropolitan area 15 miles wide and 80 miles long. As 
Ogden, Salt Lake City, and Provo and their overlapping
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suburbs are plastered onto the lower slopes of the Wasatch 
Mountains (the westernmost range of the Rockies), the met 
ropolitan area is informally known as the Wasatch Front.
Demographically, Utah's major claims to distinction are 
the nation's highest birthrate (30 per 1,000 or about double 
the national average) and one of the lowest minority percen 
tages (7 percent divided among Hispanics, blacks, Native 
Americans, and Asians in that order). The state has the na 
tion's highest median years of school (12.8) and the second 
largest proportion of college graduates (17.5 percent). In ad 
dition, 37 percent of Utah's population is under age 18, com 
pared with a national figure of 29 percent.
Without an industrial base, Utah was hard hit by the 
depression of the 1930s. The Second World War brought a 
defense-based prosperity but a postwar vulnerability which 
kept Utah's unemployment rates well above national levels 
until the 1960s. Then a gradual growth of diversified 
manufacturing, followed by resurgence of its mineral wealth 
(coal, uranium, oil, oil shale, and tar sands, in addition to 
the longer exploited copper and allied metals), reversed that 
relationship so that Utah's unemployment rate is now about 
2 percentage points below the national level. The State Of 
fice of Labor and Training estimated CETA eligibility to be 
52,000 during 1979, of whom 41,000 had been unemployed 
15 weeks or more. Nearly 8,000 persons were registered for 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).
Politically, Utah shows the general conservatism of the 
mountain west. Its entire congressional delegation (two con 
gressmen and two senators) all classify themselves as conser 
vative Republicans. Yet the state is just beginning its fifth 
4-year term of being led by two conservative moderate 
Democratic governors. With brief exceptions, the legislature 
has been Republican since the end of the Roosevelt era. 
While the rhetoric in Utah is persistently anti-federal, every
389
available federal dollar is aggressively pursued and federally 
funded programs are generally well-administered, in part 
because of an oversupply of well-trained administrators.
Utah as a CETA Pioneer
Utah's pioneer position in CETA was part of a drive by its 
1965-76 Governor, Calvin Rampton, to strengthen the 
Governor's office by consolidating state activities. During 
his first 4-year term, he had learned that the governor was 
largely a figurehead with power vested in the relatively 
autonomous merit system-protected department heads. 
Many of these departments operated with federal funds and 
were somewhat autonomous of the legislature as well as the 
executive branch of state government. Ramptom resolved to 
corral these independent operations by consolidating them 
into cabinet departments headed by his own appointees.
The Johnson-Goldwater presidential race produced the 
first Democratic legislature since the Roosevelt years and 
made that consolidation possible. The Republicans swept 
back into control of the legislaure two years later, but the 
governor chose the most able of those 2-year Democratic 
freshmen as his appointees to head the new departments sup 
ported by new funds.
By 1968 Rampton was chairman of a National Governors' 
Association subcomittee with responsibility for employment 
and training programs. He found that other governors 
shared his concern that federally funded manpower pro 
grams operated through state agencies without any control 
from the governor's office. Hearing national discussion 
about the need to decentralize and decategorize manpower 
programs, Rampton resolved to add that effort to his own 
consolidation drive. In 1969, he persuaded the state 
legislature to establish a state Manpower Planning Council,
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composed of all state agencies involved in employment and 
training, and authorizing the council to direct and coor 
dinate all such activities within the limits of federal law. 
Thus while the Congress was debating the CETA legislation 
from 1969 to 1973, Utah was operating a significant pilot 
program for all to see. In what would later emerge as CETA 
language, Utah was operating a statewide prime sponsor 
ship.
In another vagary of personality politics, Rampton, upon 
being elected to an unprecedented third term in 1972, sud 
denly moved from consolidation to decentralization as the 
thrust of the manpower policy of his final term. As CETA 
was being shaped with the Utah experience as a major 
model, the Utah statewide system was being, in effect, split 
up and delegated to nine local associations of government 
(AOG) which had originally emerged around reclamation 
and natural resource issues.
The State Manpower Planning Council, as a statutory 
body, continued to exist but became meaningless insofar as 
CETA was concerned. The original chairman, a Rampton- 
appointed university professor, and the executive director 
who was also state planning coordinator, resigned. The 
deputy director, a nationally experienced manpower expert, 
became director but soon found the position to have little 
clout and moved on to take over the public employment ser 
vice of a neighboring state. A State Office of Labor and 
Training (SOLT) was established, primarily to collect federal 
funds and disperse them largely autonomous to multicounty 
associations of government on the same formula by which 
they are allocated from the federal government to the state. 
As of 1980, Utah had six entities eligible to be CETA prime 
sponsors—Salt Lake County, Salt Lake City, Weber Coun 
ty, Davis County, Utah County, and a 25-county balance-of- 
state. Because each had the autonomy of individual prime 
sponsors and had won additional concessions from the state,
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the eligible jurisdictions, all of them strung along the 
Wasatch Front, agreed to remain within the official 
statewide prime sponsorship.
CETA in Utah appears on the Department of Labor's map 
as a single prime sponsor, but funding is immediately divided 
among the nine state associations of government. Funds for 
fiscal year 1979 were divided among those units in the pat 
tern shown by Table 1. Each planning district prepares its 
own annual plan and these are merely consolidated for the 
state plan.
Administering CETA in Utah
"Don't rock the boat" seemed to be the operating slogan 
of Utah's CETA program, but the program did not lack 
sound administration. Utah's high levels of education com 
pared with its relatively small size and its economy's orienta 
tion to the basic industry, have generally provided an ample 
supply of high quality public administrators. Despite the an- 
tifederal rhetoric heard in Utah political campaigns, the state 
has long had a reputation among federal agencies for 
outstanding conduct of federally funded programs. Com 
petency is high and turnover low at both the state and AOG 
levels in CETA. Each of the small AOGs have from two to 
five CETA staff positions and often share staff with related 
activities. Those eligible for independent prime sponsorship 
have staffs ranging from 5 to 43, whereas the state office 
employs a staff of 30. Most at all levels are college graduates 
and a high percentage have specialized advanced degrees in 
human resource management.
These are the people who make the CETA decisions. The 
elected officials of the multijurisdiction planning units are 
mostly part-time politicians and have very little involvement. 
The state office does not try to tell the AOG professionals 
what to do except "obey the law." The statutory statewide





































































a. These figures are prior to final accounting adjustments and do not include special projects or the Governor's grants.
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Manpower Planning Council has lapsed into disuse. A state 
Employment and Training Council has been created, but it 
can get no handle on the decentralized system. Each AOG 
has an advisory council, but few really give advice. CETA in 
Utah is a local staff responsibility.
A favorable economy, a small minority population, and a 
waiting list of relatively homogeneous CETA-eligible ap 
plicants simplify decisionmaking and administration. 
Whatever CETA funds are not earmarked for other pur 
poses go into classroom and on-the-job training, primarily 
the former. Until the 1980 recession, which slowed but did 
not reverse economic growth, job opportunities were plen 
tiful and obvious. CETA's task in Utah has been to prepare 
the disadvantaged for jobs. The eligible populations were 
sufficiently homogeneous to allow first-come, first-served 
policies to distribute the available slots except in the 
metropolitan Salt Lake City and Ogden areas and in the Uin- 
tah Basin, and Southeastern planning districts which include 
major Indian reservations.
The CETA planning process consists of (1) getting an 
estimate of available funds from the State Office of Labor 
and Training, (2) contracting with the one pubilc postsecon- 
dary training institution in the planning district for provision 
of classroom training (only two districts have more than one 
such institution), and (3) contracting with the state Job Ser 
vice for promotion of on-the-job training and for intake, 
determination of eligibility and placement. With these pro 
cesses established, neither planning nor administration is dif 
ficult. The State Office of Labor and Training makes no at 
tempt to shape or influence local decisions but offers 
technical assistance. The only complexities in CETA ad 
ministration are those imposed by federal legislation and 
regulation.
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The minority populations of Salt Lake City and Ogden are 
sufficient to place the local CETA staffs under some political 
pressure. In response, in Salt Lake County particularly, the 
CETA staff has chosen to allocate funds to community 
based organizations for orientation, adult basic education, 
English as a second language, and similar nonskill training 
activities, as well as a minimum number of on-the-job train 
ing slots. Having purchased peace at that price, the staff 
allocates most of the remainder of the budget to the skill 
center at the local public technical college and to Job Service, 
as in the other planning districts. As followup and evaluation 
have been largely ignored by the planning districts and have 
not been pushed by the state office, the administrative 
assignment of the planning districts consists of getting the 
contracts negotiated and the money out. In the rural districts 
the CETA director knows personally everyone involved in 
the delivery of CETA services and often every individual 
enrollee, so formal evaluation does not seem essential. For 
Job Service, the assignment consists of identifying CETA 
eligibles, adding them to a waiting list, and peeling them off 
for referral to on-the-job and classroom training. Employer 
contact representatives maintain established relationships 
with employers and continue to negotiate on-the-job training 
contracts with a limited number of establishments. New on- 
the-job training employers enter the system primarily at their 
own initiative. The system has been a simple one, with never 
a taint of scandal. At one end, complexities are added by 
federal requirements, but these are blunted by the state of 
fices which maintain all federal contacts and act as an in 
termediary vis-a-vis the planning district. At the other end, 
an internal squabble between the State Board of Vocational 
Education and the state Board of Regents about who should 
control postsecondary vocational education in the state adds 
the only touches of complexity confronting state and local 
CETA administrators.
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The Quality of Training
How good is the training under Utah's decentralized 
GET A system? The simplest generalization is "very good." 
GET A classroom training occurs in two technical colleges, 
one university, two 4-year colleges, three 2-year colleges, and 
four area vocational schools. One technical college and one 
4-year college operate separate skill centers maintained for 
CETA and other disadvantaged clients. All other classroom 
training follows the individual referral model, with all CETA 
enrollees included in the same classroom groups as the non- 
subsidized student body. Utah's educational institutions en 
joy high rankings and these institutions are among the state's 
best. The major issue, leaving aside for the moment the two 
skill centers, is whether the training needs of the CETA 
clientele are adequately met by immersion in mainstream 
training situations.
With the exception of the Indian population near the 
reservations and the minority populations where the skill 
centers exist, the answer appears to be yes. Statewide, blacks 
constitute 3 percent, Hispanics 14 percent, and Indians 4 per 
cent of the CETA population—in each case, about three 
times their overall population proportion. Only in counties 
containing skill centers do blacks exceed 5 percent of the 
CETA population. Hispanics exceed 10 percent only in the 
Wasatch Front and the mining-oriented southeast. American 
Indians exceed 6 percent of CETA enrollment only in the 
planning district which contains part of the Navajo reserva 
tion. Only 60 percent of CETA enrollees have high school 
educations, although only 13 percent of Utah's high school 
students leave before graduating.
At any rate, no planning district has any difficulty finding 
CETA eligible people capable of competing successfully with 
the non-CETA enrollees in the available training institu-
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tions. In fact, there are waiting lists of such people needing 
only tuition and training allowances to make training as at 
tractive as possible. Once enrolled, trainees are not iden 
tifiable among other students in the same classrooms. Excep 
tion in Wasatch Front North and South (Ogden and Salt 
Lake City and their environs), those who cannot compete in 
the classroom are relegated to work experience (if youth) or 
left out of CETA entirely, because they are unlikely to be ac 
ceptable to employers, public or private, hosting public ser 
vice employment or on-the-job training. CETA enrollees 
who enter these training institutions with CETA stipends get 
excellent training, and the vast majority (generally over 80 
percent) get jobs. Those not placed are typically women who 
withdraw from the labor market or youth who are not yet 
ready to settle into it.
The Salt Lake and Ogden residents and CETA system are 
more typical of national patterns. CETA enrollees in the 
Ogden area (Weber-Morgan planning district) are approx 
imately 9 percent black and 20 percent Hispanic. The Salt 
Lake County area (Wasatch Front South) enrolls 5 percent 
blacks, 22 percent Hispanics, 4 percent urban Indians, and 5 
percent Asians. Davis County, between the two districts 
geographically, enrolls 11 percent Hispanic but hardly any 
other minorities. These minority populations are large 
enough to have their own ethnic organizations. There is also 
a noticeable women*s movement in this metropolitan setting. 
As a result of the larger number of minorities enrolled in 
these counties, the training institutions there have been 
designed to handle a more disadvantaged population, and 
CETA planners have responded with a more diversified mix 
of programs. One can be less confident of the quality of 
training offered, but more assured that the disadvantaged 
are being served.
The Wasatch Front South district has allocated 74 percent 
of its II-B funds to classroom training and 19 percent to on-
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the-job training. Of the classroom training funds, 45 percent 
go to Skill Center South, administratively attached to the 
Utah Technical College at Salt Lake City; 45 percent for 
orientation, adult basic education, English as a second 
language, and similar employability related but nonskill 
training; and 10 percent to a nonprofit organization that 
assists women who wish to break into nontraditional jobs. 
Except for a few slots at the women's organization, the on- 
the-job training is managed by the Utah Job Service.
The quality of the training provided by the community- 
based organizations (CBOs) is doubtful at best, but may still 
be worthwhile. These CBOs lack both staff and facilities for 
quality training, but do provide access routes for the small 
groups of minorities who might otherwise be left out of the 
CETA action entirely. CBO support does not depend on 
large minority populations, but occurs wherever ethnic 
groups feel the need to organize. The CETA contracts offer 
the only significant funding source for the struggling CBOs. 
Funding them not only increases the visibility of minority 
populations but also offers a visible source for employers 
wishing to meet affirmative action requirements. In addi 
tion, significant portions of their enrollees then enter the 
skill centers.
The women in the nontraditional occupations program 
have a tough assignment in a traditional community. The 
program's success rate is low and it spends more effort on 
raising the level of consciousness and assertiveness among its 
enrollees than on providing skills or persuading employers. 
Its enrollment is small, its placement rate ranges from 33 per 
cent to 50 percent, and many of these jobs are not far from 
being traditional. However, many of its completers then 
enter the skill center for occupational training (in the tradi 
tional occupations). The effort is probably best thought of as 
a pilot project which should be tried without expecting quan 
titative success.
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The Salt Lake Skill Center suffers the same limitations as 
many similar institutions. It offers quality training to a 
disadvantaged population in a second class facility. 
Although the skill center's instructors have the same train 
ing, experience, and credentials as those on the technical col 
lege campus, its equipment and buildings are only marginally 
adequate. The curriculum is limited to clerical, auto 
mechanics, and welding programs.
The primary problem at the skills center is one of stigma. 
The skill center is clearly second-class when compared with 
the technical college programs. The trainee in a 26-week 
CETA course may get as much training of equal quality hour 
for hour at the skill center as the enrollee in a 1- or 2-year 
program at the technical college. But in both the students' 
self-assessments and the employers' assessments, those who 
can claim technical college credentials are way ahead.
The same problem exists for Skill Center North at Ogden. 
It is administratively attached to Weber State College, a 
4-year academic institution with a substantial on-campus 
2-year technical offering. The skill center is housed in an 
abandoned high school closer to the central city, which 
nevertheless is fully adequate; its instructors are fully 
qualified; and its equipment is more nearly adequate than at 
the Salt Lake Skill Center, because the whole operation is of 
more recent date. Skill Center North has its own curriculum 
development unit, a good library, and its own day care 
center. Its course offerings are broader, ranging over bench 
and service trades, building trades, clerical, health services, 
and metal trades, and supported by adult basic education, 
and English as a second language. Objectively, it maintains 
an excellent program. But still, the stigma is there. The short 
scope of the courses and the disadvantaged backgrounds of 
those eligible give some objectivity to those negative 
judgments, but there is probably a significant stigmatic com 
ponent from the facility itself. Providing CETA-sponsored
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courses on one or both of the two campuses would be an in 
teresting and worthwhile experiment in public relations.
Nevertheless, a placement rate averaging over 80 percent 
at a cost of only $1,650 per placement should remove any 
doubt that the current program is worthwhile. Education in 
the State of Utah is in a financial bind, squeezed between a 
taxpayer revolt and an extraordinarily high birth rate. What 
little state moneys have gone into training the adult disad- 
vantaged are likely to disappear. Federal training moneys 
available in Utah are on the decline. The waiting list of eligi 
ble applicants is already six months long and growing. The 
economy remains promising despite the 1980 slowdown. 
Facilities, equipment, and instructors are available for a 
doubling of enrollments. The only missing element is the in 
evitable one—budgets.
Conclusions
Prior to CETA, Utah was a national pioneer and in 
novator in employment and training activities. But the 
pioneer often experiments, shows the way, and then gets 
locked into some mode while those who followed pass it by. 
In Utah's current CETA stance, nothing is worthy of special 
notice and emulation. There is no significant labor market 
planning and no innovation. Nevertheless, there is in place a 
solid program resting upon service delivery by efficient and 
effective Job Service and vocational education systems. 
Federal statutory provisions, regulations, guidelines, and 
policies are given a scripture-like sanctity and followed to the 
letter. The system is a conservative one, seeking always to 
avoid conflict. Moneys are carefully accounted for, with 
never a breath of scandal. Most important, eligible enrollees 
get, for the most part, high quality training and jobs. This 
study has not examined nontraining services, but training is 
clearly the preference of nearly all actors in the system.
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The common thread throughout the entire history of 
employment and training programs in Utah has been the 
prominent role played by the Utah Job Service and the State 
Office of Vocational Education. Most of the area councils of 
government have obtained the services of well-educated and 
competent CETA planners and administrators. While the 
programs differ considerably from one AOG to another, 
there are few if any serious problems relating to improper 
management, misuse of funds, or failure to implement the 
programs in a timely fashion. Utah has managed to spend 
CETA funds as they became available.
The relationship between the Utah CETA administrators 
and the federal Department of Labor Officials has been both 
friendly and supportive. Utah has given little cause for 
federal monitors to be concerned. The regulations have been 
followed, and the State Office of Labor and Training has 
served to keep some distance between the federal represen 
tatives and the program operation levels. On the other hand, 
federal representatives have had no influence on the nature 
or quality of the programs.
Elected officials have not played a strong role in the Utah 
CETA system. In the rural areas, many elected officials serve 
only part time and generally lack interest and time to follow 
programs such as CETA, and policy is made by the CETA 
planner/administrator, with participation by representatives 
of the Job Service and educational agencies. In metropolitan 
areas, the elected officials have been more involved in plan 
ning because of the competition for funds and programs, but 
their involvement has usually been confined to an annual 
review of funding allocations. During the period when PSE 
was operating at its peak level, the elected officials became 
involved in the allocation of funds among departments want 
ing PSE slots, but their activity in PSE did not carry over in 
to other CETA programs.
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The decentralization of Utah's CETA system to the nine 
subgrantees changed the relationship between the federal 
program managers and the program operating levels by plac 
ing the state in the role of middleman, translator, and buf 
fer. It would be difficult, however, to identify any specific 
programmatic impact of this role. Indeed, the Utah CETA 
program operates under an umbrella at the local level 
without either a strong federal or state role. The State Office 
of Labor and Training can legitimately claim to be carrying 
out some functions which the federal managers would carry 
out if each of the eligible prime sponsors operated in 
dependently, so the "feds" may miss the Utah consortium 
more than anyone else. On the other hand, the new prime 
sponsors may learn for the first time how onerous federal 
regulations can be.
The work of the State Office of Labor and Training can 
not be separated from the general acknowledgement that the 
Utah Job Service is among the best in the country by all DOL 
rating schemes. The state's educational agencies likewise rate 
well in comparison with others throughout the country. Fur 
thermore, the local AOGs through 1980 had jealously pro 
tected their autonomy (there had not been time at the conclu 
sion of this study for them to react to the governor's an 
nouncement). In short, the Utah CETA system is very much 
a product of the institutions, traditions, and general level of 
public service in the state.
Organization, Management and Policy
The most important conclusion of this case study is the 
recognition that the present system seemed satisfactory to 
almost all of the actors. There was little or no pressure for 
change within the system itself, although Salt Lake County, 
Davis County, Utah County, and Salt Lake City had 
threatened to withdraw from the consortium. Each time an
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eligible prime sponsor threatened to pull out, the governor 
intervened to encourage a continuation of the system. The 
primary benefits of the consortium are increased overall 
funding and better services in the rural areas. The prospec 
tive urban prime sponsors have been told that a breakup of 
the consortium might endanger the cordiality of overall 
urban-rural relationships. In addition, the governor had 
resolved some non-CETA issues during discussions about 
the preservation of the consortium.
During 1980 the Mountainlands AOG, or more particular 
ly Utah County within that AOG, went on record as intend 
ing to pull out of the consortium the following year. This 
county has grown somewhat faster than the state as a whole 
and has claimed that it is being underfunded. The claim, 
while probably true, would not affect funding until alloca 
tion formulas are revised to conform with the 1980 census 
data. Present policy about using federal formulas to allocate 
funds among the subgrantees gives the state little flexibility 
in handing out money. In fact, the whole system has been 
remarkably free from controversy over fund allocations. In 
the midst of this apparent stability, the governor's an 
nouncement of intent to disband the consortium was a com 
plete surprise to all of the actors, except apparently the 
SOLT director who gave his advice concurrent with his 
resignation.
An important question is, "What can be done to restore 
some managerial and policy initiatives to employment and 
training programs in Utah?" The answer must begin with the 
simplification of the federal statute, a reduction in the 
number of separate programs that it entails, and more flex 
ibility for local decisionmaking. The local actors are 
somewhat intimidated by the system, but at the same time, 
they seem pleased with their ability and success in accom 
modating to it.
403
A second change at the state level would require strong 
leadership from the governor's office and some attempt to 
focus on broader labor market aspects beyond the local 
AOGs. With the spread of large coal-fired power plants, the 
advent of the synthetic fuels program and other energy 
developments, and the possible deployment of the Air Force 
MX Missile system, the state appears to be on the verge of 
massive and perhaps disruptive development. In the years 
ahead, there is likely to be stronger support for more 
statewide planning. The governor could have chosen to use 
the statewide consortium as a vehicle for much of the labor 
market aspect of that planning. On the other hand, the 
metropolitan areas will be affected only indirectly by the 
pending energy and defense developments. A strong balance- 
of-state system dominated from the governor's office might 
be better able to shift CETA resources from one part of the 
state to another in accordance with need than could the pre 
sent system which assures each area of the state of its propor 
tion of limited CETA funds. Whatever happens, the pace of 
development makes clear the need for training and promises 
jobs for those trained.
Training Policy and Practice
Probably the single most important impact of Utah CETA 
and its predecessor and related programs has been to 
broaden the base of state funding for classroom training for 
high school dropouts. MDTA programs were coordinated in 
the larger cities by creating the two skill centers and pro 
viding more counseling and other support services, thus 
underscoring the needs of people who had dropped out 
before completing high school. The State Board of Educa 
tion first requested the legislature to raise the upper age limit 
at which the state educational program could pay for high 
school completion from 18 to 21. It then abolished the upper 
age limit completely, thereby making all area vocational
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centers, skill centers, and adult education programs of the 
various school districts eligible for regular state support to 
provide high school completion to dropouts regardless of 
age. These resources were utilized most effectively by those 
institutions which, because of their federal CETA, WIN, 
and related programs, were serving significant numbers of 
persons who had left school without a diploma.
A third step in the process occurred when the Board of 
Regents strengthened their claim over the governance of the 
two skill centers by obtaining from the state legislature a 
small but significant line item of support from state funds. 
As federal funding has declined appreciably, the existence of 
the high school completion support funds and the general 
appropriation have kept the two skill centers alive. The 
decline in federal CETA and WIN funds clearly will alter the 
nature of the institutions and the clientele they serve. The 
federal programs provide funds and disadvantaged enrollees 
and when federal funding declines, the state support will 
shift to enrollees who are less likely to be disadvantaged.
For the most part, the training in Utah is of high quality 
with institutions, curriculums, instruction, and facilities 
operating within the general framework of postsecondary 
public education. Except for the Salt Lake and Ogden areas, 
individual referrals to existing programs dominate classroom 
training. In the Ogden area, all training is done at the skill 
center except for a small project for the handicapped. In Salt 
Lake, the skill center is the largest training institution, but 
five CBOs also have relatively small programs.
Funding CBOs appears motivated as much by perceptions 
about the institutional identification and support for ethnic 
groups as by the need to provide high quality training. The 
criteria to be applied in funding allocations for CBOs and 
for the skill center are not, and probably cannot be, the 
same. The recognition of this fact seems to enforce the need
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to preserve local options and flexibility, but the forces that 
must be dealt with go far beyond any geographic area. The 
CBO is to the ethnic group or to the feminist movement in 
the modern city what the national grange movement and the 
national cooperative movement were to the farmers 50 years 
ago. GET A and its predecessor programs have been the one 
consistent source of funding sustaining these institutional 
developments. The CBOs in Utah provide opportunities for 
identification and self-realization to the groups in 
volved—both for the administrators and the clients served. 
Utah is an interesting setting from which to observe the 
CBOs because its minority population is less than 7 percent 
of the total. CBO support does not depend upon a large 
minority population any more than the success of the farm 
cooperative movement hinged on the size of a state's 
agriculture. The "movement" goes well wherever the setting 
creates an environment in which the ethnic groups feel the 
need to develop organizational and social support.
The skill centers are caught accidently in the issue of 
governance between the State Board of Vocational Educa 
tion and the Board of Regents. It is over who should govern 
postsecondary vocational education and would exist if there 
were no skill centers. It does complicate the lives of the skill 
centers, however. The funding and autonomy issues impact 
the centers more directly. Educational administrators dislike 
depending on funding from programs not under the control 
of the educational establishment. Education in Utah 
cherishes its autonomy and does not like the CETA funding 
process or the evaluation and monitoring from outsiders. 
Whether to maintain separate identities for the skill centers, 
absorb them into their parent institutions or, in the case of 
Skill Center North, transform it into an Area Vocational 
School, all are options centrally related to the issue of con 
trol.
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Those directly teaching or administering the training pro 
grams, however, are not concerned about these issues. They 
understand that CETA is a source of enrollees as well as 
funds, and the skill center staffs are generally committed to 
serving the enrollees referred under the CETA program. 
They are comforted by the fact that every study has praised 
their effectiveness. There are people whose need for training 
is very great and these same people achieve significant suc 
cess: between 6 and 8 of every 10 people served gain a 
substantial boost in income, employment, and self-image, 
although the immediate success rate declines during reces 
sion years.
The portion of Title II-B funds going into classroom and 
OJT training has risen in recent years from two-thirds to ap 
proximately four-fifths. There are waiting lists of persons 
who want to be enrolled but who cannot be served because 
programs are operating at capacity. In some cases prospec 
tive enrollees have waited from six months to a year to enter 
a program.
Among the most important conclusions of this study of 
CETA classroom training in Utah is that the present 
classroom training system could be doubled or even 
quadrupled without reaching all CETA-eligible clients. The 
training facilities can accommodate more students, and 
many eligible enrollees are not now being served or must wait 
too long for service. The long run promise is also for a rapid 
growth of jobs which can be met only by training or by im 
porting labor. Equally important, CETA has served to iden 
tify and refer to training significant numbers of disadvantag- 
ed people who would not receive training were it not for the 
CETA linkages between jobs, training, and income 
maintenance. While some progress is being made in educa 
tional circles to obtain more state funds for the disadvantag- 
ed, it is also clear that if CETA were to disappear, the disad-
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vantaged would be the first to be dropped from educational 
services.
If CETA is to continue as a major funding source for 
classroom training and for on-the-job training, the system 
should greatly expand efforts to develop curriculums and 
more importantly to finance training equipment and sup 
plies. Indeed, it may be appropriate to require state and local 
matching funds in defraying training costs to make possible 
the better funding of curriculum development and training 
equipment and facilities. Finally, institutions providing 
classroom training are not immune from the ravages of infla 
tion, and when increasing costs are incurred during a period 
of declining funding, the entire system is subjected to a 
serious strain that threatens not only quantity but quality of 
training as well. There is little in CETA funding and ad 
ministration that reflects an awareness of, or an effort to 
meet, the rising costs which inflation thrusts upon the pro 
gram operators.
Major Conclusions
Looking to what now exists, the important conclusions of 
this case study are:
1. Very little real planning is being done in Utah CETA, 
and the planning that is taking place is short 
term—usually confined to the next fiscal year.
2. CETA staff members defend their work but show lit 
tle real enthusiasm for the system within which they 
operate. The Utah vocational education establish 
ment divides almost equally between those who think 
CETA and similar programs will eventually disap 
pear, and those who think that CETA, or something 
which accomplishes much the same objectives, will 
continue indefinitely.
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3. State and local advisory councils play a very limited 
role in Utah CETA. They meet infrequently, show 
poor attendance, and function mainly to ratify CETA 
staff actions worked out in advance with the Job Ser 
vice and education authorities.
4. The entire system seems to be conservative and 
oriented toward avoiding risk and conflict. In achiev 
ing this goal, the system rates high marks.
5. One advantage of a CETA organization which 
delegates program responsibility to the local area 
councils of government is the coordination of CETA 
with other social programs in the rural areas. Here, 
staff positions are sometimes shared, the problems 
are small, the number of clients few, and the linkages 
well established.
6. Only in the Salt Lake/Tooele Wasatch Front South 
area does CETA take on the attributes of a system 
generally associated with larger cities. It is the only 
case in Utah where CBOs have contracts to provide 
services and where there is any degree of competition 
for the roles which Job Service and the public educa 
tion agencies perform elsewhere in the state.
7. The CETA system has made a great contribution to 
the current acceptance and strength of the Associa 
tions of Government (AOGs) by providing staff and 
program money to give these relatively new govern 
mental entities a strong role in their respective areas. 
Undoubtedly, this potential dominated the decision 
to decentralize the CETA system in 1972. To this ex 
tent, the current organization of CETA in Utah may 
be an accident of history—even so, it will not be easy 
to change.
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8. The statutory Utah Manpower Planning Council, 
created by the state legislature in 1969 with a mandate 
to coordinate all federally funded manpower pro 
grams within the state, has fallen into almost total 
disuse, even though it still exists on paper.
9. It is difficult to determine just what the State Office 
of Labor and Training staff might have done dif 
ferently given the diffusion of power and the decen 
tralization or fragmentation of the system. The exper 
tise of the state staff has been available to the local 
subgrantees, and its role in compiling reports, plans, 
and in establishing standards and interpreting regula 
tions and guidelines has been substantial. It would be 
too easy to reach a wrong conclusion and blame the 
SOLT staff for the demise of the once-strong state 
role in employment and training programs. The key 
decisions were made in the office of the governor, and 
any effective state-level impact on the administration 
of CETA would require the governor's power to 
coordinate the state's three major CETA actors; 
namely, the Job Service, the educational agencies, 
and the SOLT staff with local counterparts.
10. Through it all, eligible participants have received 
sound training and the preponderance of them have 
obtained jobs. That is the bottom line.

Worcester, Massachusetts







In mid-1980, the economy of the Worcester Labor Market 
Area (LMA) exhibited considerable strength. Employment 
reached record highs, unemployment rates indicated near 
full employment, the industrial structure of the local 
economy appeared to be sound, and a number of firms were 
completing significant capital investment projects. Substan 
tial labor shortages existed for many categories of labor, 
especially skilled machinists, computer programmers, 
medical care personnel, and some types of clerical workers. 
The local economy appeared to be providing jobs for almost 
all of the available labor force.
The Worcester LMA is located entirely within Worcester 
County in central Massachusetts and contains only one city, 
Worcester, the second largest in the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, and 26 towns. The population of the LMA at 
the time of the 1975 state census was 385,600, up 1.9 percent 
from the 378,300 at the time of the 1970 federal census. The 
population of the City of Worcester declined by 2.4 percent 
in the 5-year period, from 176,600 in 1970 to 172,300 in 
1975.
The Worcester Employment and Training Consortium 
(WETC) is located within the LMA, and contains the City of
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Worcester plus 13 surrounding communities. The population 
of the consortium in 1975 was 306,600, or almost 80 percent 
of the population of the LMA, and the consortium area con 
tinues to contain about 80 percent of the population and the 
labor force. Nonwhites represented 1.5 percent of the 
population and of the labor force in both the LMA and the 
consortium area. The participation rate was substantially 
lower for nonwhite males than for white males; and the same 
held true for nonwhite females compared to white females. 
Except for a slight dip in 1977, the labor force has grown 
steadily since 1974. From 1974 through 1979, employment 
rose every year, for a total gain of 11.4 percent over the 
period. Unemployment increased sharply in 1975, but 
recovered relatively quickly, and by 1978 was below 5 per 
cent. The Worcester unemployment rate has been consistent 
ly below the national and state figures.
By far the greatest demand among occupations in short 
supply is for skilled machinists; other skilled trade positions, 
auto body mechanics in particular, are also going begging. 
The largest shortage among white-collar occupations is for 
nurses aides, showing a continuing shortage of health care 
personnel in the area.
The only significant change in the demographic and 
economic characteristics of job applicants available and 
those actually placed in new jobs through the division of 
employment security offices throughout the Worcester LMA 
was the substantial decrease in the number of economically 
disadvantaged individuals—from about 36 percent of all ap 
plicants in fiscal 1978 to about 16 percent in fiscal 1979. 
Possibly, improved economic conditions—combined with 
concerted efforts at training, job development, and direct 
job placement—increased significantly the employability of 
the economically disadvantaged. There are job orders for 
employees in a number of semiskilled and skilled occupa-
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tions. There are needs for sales and service employees. The 
implication is clear that training programs are the basic tools 
which can help match those persons seeking employment and 
the job openings in the labor market.
The Political Climate
While the Worcester Consortium is composed of the City 
of Worcester and 13 surrounding communities, the city, with 
56 percent of the population, has taken the lead as prime 
sponsor of CETA activities. All of the surrounding com 
munities are very small and depend upon the city for their 
economic activities and life. The CETA prime sponsor for 
the consortium is in fact the City of Worcester and is run by 
the employment and training office, which reports directly to 
the city manager. The Worcester Employment and Training 
Consortium functions as an agency of the city's government.
The Worcester city manager is appointed by and reports to 
the elected city council. The city manager, who has held the 
position for more than 30 years, considers himself a profes 
sional who does not have to play day-to-day politics. As a 
result, the prime sponsor's staff members are employed 
because of their skills and experience. This professionaliza- 
tion assures a capable staff, but the staff has little political 
clout of its own.
The Prime Sponsor's Staff 
and Organization
WETC's organizational structure is unusual, at least 
within Region I of the U.S. Department of Labor. Opera 
tionally, the CETA prime sponsor is the office of employ 
ment and training, directly responsible to the city manager. 
This office is the administrative and planning unit for CETA 
provisions which involve the employment and training of the
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economically disadvantaged, but not the public service 
employment (PSE) provisions. The office of employment 
and training provides no direct services to CETA par 
ticipants, but rather contracts out all services to community- 
based organizations (CBO).
The relationship between the prime sponsor's staff and the 
regional office has been cordial, but each has been critical of 
the other. Members of the prime sponsor's staff feel that in 
sufficient understanding and assistance from the regional of 
fice have affected the WETC organization and operations. 
The regional office staff feels that WETC has not acted on 
any of the significant suggestions made to it.
The public service employment (PSE) program—not 
operated by the office of employment and training—func 
tions as a branch of the city's personnel department. This ar 
rangement appears relatively unusual, especially because the 
prime sponsor is a consortium of 14 communities. The PSE 
program provides services ranging from intake to job 
development, as well as the administrative, planning, and 
monitoring functions, for the public service employment 
program. The office of employment and training and the 
PSE program maintain separate fiscal units which, accord 
ing to the regional office of the employment and training 
administration, "perpetuate problems, past and present, of 
coordination and of administrative cost control, financial 
recordkeeping, audit resolution and overall accountability 
by the prime sponsor." No formal agreement outlines the 
responsibilities and defines the lines of authority between the 
prime sponsor and the PSE program. Hence, the relation 
ship between the two organizations could falter severely if 
other (different) persons were involved. These programs 
should not depend on the chance of congenial personalities.
Over the past two years, the current PSE director has built 
the organization as it stands today, increasing the staff from.
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20 to 53. For some time, intake was conducted independently 
by each consortium town, but it is now centralized. The 
fiscal officer has been in the personnel department; now PSE 
has an in-house fiscal unit with a staff of 10. Assessment had 
been contracted out, but starting in fiscal 1981 it was con 
ducted in-house at some savings.
Turnover for the principal positions in the office of 
employment and training has been surprisingly low. During 
the past five years the key officers—the director, deputy 
director, management information system supervisor, and 
chief planner—changed only once. The directors' and the 
supervisor's positions are currently filled with persons who 
were on the staff in lower level positions, indicating WETC 
either provides career opportunities for staff or it does not 
recruit from the outside with much success. It came as a sur 
prise that turnover was low, because the salary structure is 
also shockingly low. According to the "Employer Salary and 
Fringe Benefit Survey for All New England Prime 
Sponsors," November 1979, the Worcester Consortium has 
the lowest salaries in Region I for director and PSE director, 
and is well below the median for other staff members. This 
survey showed that the maximum salaries for directors 
ranged from $21,944 (in Worcester) to $39,374. A similar 
comparison for job developers showed a low of $10,062 and 
a high of $26,286. Staff salaries are determined in accor 
dance with the City of Worcester's established salary struc 
ture.
The fiscal 1980 regional office assessment revealed that an 
affirmative action plan does not exist for the Worcester Con 
sortium staff. Of 11 principal positions, 6 were filled by 
white males, 2 by black males and 3 by white females. Non- 
whites represent less than 2 percent of the population and of 
the labor force in the Worcester LMA and in the Worcester 
Consortium area.
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A review of the education and work experience of five key 
staff indicates that the length of employment with WETC 
ranged from 10 months to 7 years. Average tenure has risen 
as staff members have advanced within the organization. 
Levels of education attainment vary, but every top staff 
member has at least a bachelor's degree.
Management System
WETC operates a totally decentralized system with each 
program operator conducting intake, assessment, and 
eligibility determination. Information is submitted monthly 
by the program operators to the management information 
system (MIS) unit on standardized forms. At the time of the 
study an automated data processing system was being 
developed in the MIS unit, and this will increase the prime 
sponsor's ability to analyze the data.
All participant and program monitoring data are collected 
and analyzed by the MIS unit. Functional areas analyzed in 
clude intake, assessment, eligibility determination and ser 
vices to participants. For an evaluation of a followup of par 
ticipants, WETC has contracted with the Worcester Consor 
tium of Higher Education, Inc., an organization of represen 
tatives from local institutions of higher education. This an 
nual report is one factor in assessing the performance of pro 
gram operators.
The results of the evaluation and information gathered 
while monitoring are compiled and presented to the employ 
ment and training council's (ETC) subcommittees. 
Worcester's ETC appears well informed, and meetings of the 
planning and review and the evaluation and monitoring sub 
committees suggest that the evaluation and monitoring 
results are a meaningful consideration when recommending 
modifications and funding levels for programs.
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While evaluation and programmatic monitoring are done 
by the prime sponsor's MIS unit, the independent monitor 
ing unit (IMU) is concerned with compliance monitoring. 
The IMU was established in August 1979. Although a work 
plan and monitoring tools were developed during the first 
quarter of fiscal 1980, many questions concerning roles and 
procedures remained. Independence is the key to the IMU's 
operations, but it appears to function as a part of the prime 
sponsor's staff rather than autonomously. Further, several 
areas are monitored by both the IMU and MIS staff, sug 
gesting that the functions are not clearly defined.
Decisionmaking
As mandated by federal law, WETC established three ad 
visory councils: the employment and training council, the 
youth employment and training council, and the private in 
dustry council. After consulting with the current chairper 
son, the prime sponsor's director forwards recommenda 
tions on council memberships to the Worcester city manager, 
who selects council members and chairpersons. The GET A 
coordinator provides staff support to the councils.
WETC has demonstrated creativity and organizational ex 
pertise in working with its councils, committees, and task 
forces. An intercouncil agreement was drafted outlining 
membership, responsibilities, roles and procedures for con 
flict resolution. A recent assessment by ETA regional office 
staff found the intercouncil agreement "effective and in 
novative."
Because WETC relies on contractors to deliver services, its 
planning and decisionmaking process is more intricate than 
that of prime sponsors providing in-house services. It thus 
must begin the process quite early to select all the contractors 
and determine the allocations before preparing the annual 
plan required by the DOL. An inherent problem with this
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procedure is that WETC begins allocating funds to contrac 
tors before DOL releases the preliminary funding levels.
The prime sponsor's staff does a thorough and profes 
sional job in preparing and presenting information to the 
various committees and councils. In general, the staff 
members are highly regarded by the employment and train 
ing council, and staff recommendations are always given 
serious consideration. Council members' questions to pro 
gram operators about their programs are pertinent, in 
dicating knowledge about the program operators' services 
and local labor market needs.
While there has been relatively little turnover of organiza 
tions that have obtained funding under the CETA program, 
the decisions on contracts and size of funding appear to be 
based on objective criteria. The committee views the staff 
recommendations as professional judgments, with no 
political axe to grind. The prime sponsor's staff views the 
council members as persons with a public interest, acting 
without the pressures to make political decisions on program 
contracting and funding.
Training Policies
With the ready availability of jobs, the CETA programs 
have focused largely on job placement and job readiness 
(basic and prevocational education), rather than occupa 
tional skill training. The distribution of funds between voca 
tional training and other CETA programs has remained 
relatively stable over the past few years. In fiscal 1980, the 
career education training center (CETC), which handles 
almost all of the vocational skill training programs, received 
$251,000, or 11.2 percent of the total title II-B funds. The 
proposed allocation for fiscal 1981 showed a decline for 
CETC in absolute terms, to $246,000, but because the total
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title II-B allocation declined even more, CETC was to receive 
a slightly larger percentage (13.5 percent). One may note that 
this is a relatively small percentage of the total allocation of 
funds under this title. Neighborhood Youth Corps (in-school 
and out-of-school) was to receive over $328,000; New 
Careers, over $80,000; and Opportunities Industrialization 
Center, almost $138,000. In general, one can conclude from 
the fiscal 1981 funding recommendations that vocational 
skill training does not have the highest priority.
The WETC evaluation of economic conditions may be the 
principal reason for the vocational classroom training versus 
nontraining fund distribution. However, within the scope of 
the training funds there are choices and decisions to be 
made, in terms of titles used, program deliverers selected, 
and occupations trained. These decisions and choices do not 
always appear thoughtful from the perspective of contrac 
tors competing for funds. Nevertheless, the funding alloca 
tions can be rationalized from the standpoint of conditions 
in the labor market.
Serving those most in need while maintaining low cost per 
participant frequently presents conflicts for programs that 
are also attempting to train for higher paying occupations. 
In an effort to show a good record, contractors could 
"cream" among eligible clients, and some of this un 
doubtedly occurs. Intricate compromises must be made 
when distributing funds to contractors, always keeping in 
mind placement and cost rates, which are areas emphasized 
by the federal Department of Labor.
An analysis of contractors' program status summaries 
shows minimal movement of participants between program 
activities. Evidently, under a broad policy of decentralized 
intake and referral, contractors operate independent pro 
grams, thereby reducing opportunities for participants to 
receive a range of CETA activities.
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An additional deterrent to transfers between program ac 
tivities is found in WETC's program design: there is little 
evidence of coordination between contractors concerning 
course scheduling and content. It appears that the situation 
may be improved during fiscal 1981.
Training Decisions
The process of making training decisions is very complex. 
With numerous individuals and organizations involved at 
different levels and at different stages. There are various and 
different inputs of information at all points of the process, 
as well as pressures by the numerous organizations and 
groups that are affected by the decisions.
Key participants in the training decisions of WETC are the 
three councils. As in any large organization with diverse 
representation, key functions are performed by committees, 
principally the planning and review committee and the 
monitoring and evaluation committee, each composed of 
eight ETC members.
Program operators participate in the decisionmaking pro 
cess in a number of ways, especially through their represen 
tation on councils. The prime sponsor's staff contributes to 
the decisionmaking process by analyzing program operators' 
performance data, conducting site visits, analyzing labor 
market information, and recommending program modifica 
tions, if necessary. The ultimate staff authority is the WETC 
director, David L. O'Toole, who reports to the city manager. 
In fact, however, decisions work their way through the pro 
cess, and action by the employment and training council has 
turned out to be final.
Many sources of information are used in various combina 
tions to make the basic decision about trainees, occupations 
and service deliverers. A key source is an analysis of needs of
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both prospective clients and the labor market, which the 
staff prepares from data provided by the division of employ 
ment security, the Massachusetts department of manpower 
development, and the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory. 
Another source is the six-month follow-up study of title II-B 
participants which presents pre- and post-program profiles 
of participants and analyzes their job and wage status six 
months after they leave a CETA program. A third source is 
the MIS monitoring reports which contain performance in 
dicators, such as placement rates and costs for each program 
operator.
An examination of the characteristics of clients served and 
the occupations for which they are trained, indicates that 
WETC is similar to the national picture. Women represent 
66 percent of the enrollees in classroom training programs 
under title II-B, most of which focus on white-collar clerical 
jobs. The title VII program, concerned with private sector 
opportunities for the economically disadvantaged, trains 
electronic technicians, machinists and computer 
operators—male-dominated fields—and enrolls 80 percent 
men. Only 11 percent of the higher paying positions are filled 
by women.
A core of established program operators has provided the 
employment and training services in Worcester for many 
years. As a management strategy, WETC seems to en 
courage the program operators to alter their programs as 
needed and then retain them, rather than examining each 
proposal, old and new, on its merits. Fortunately, the 
monitoring reports by MIS staff straightforwardly address 
performance and administrative issues, and program 
operators apparently heed the recommendations and con 
tinue to strive for better performance. Evidently, also, pro 
gram strategies are adjusted in order to comply with staff 
and committee recommendations.
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The total funding requests submitted by potential program 
operators for fiscal 1981 under title II-B were approximately 
50 percent higher than the fiscal 1980 funding and about 85 
percent higher than the proposed funding for fiscal 1981. 
Actual funding was reduced by 20 percent. Clearly, the re 
quests had to be reduced below the 1980 level. The WETC 
staff recommended that no new programs be funded for 
fiscal 1981, which clearly supported the current program 
operators and therefore got their support. Thus, when total 
funding is severely slashed, the staff is prepared to make 
drastic recommendations. However, new programs are not 
likely to receive funding unless ETA funding is increased 
substantially. The better of the existing programs were cut 
back in their funding in a relatively uniform percentage. 
WETC is more committed to maintaining the status quo 
than to introducing innovative programs.
Training Administration
The general framework of CETA policies is not determin 
ed at the local level, but in Washington when funds are 
allocated by formula to the prime sponsor and to specific 
titles.
In fiscal 1979, WETC received a total of $14.8 million 
across all CETA titles. The $3 million allocation to title II-B 
represents approximately 20 percent of total funding, and it 
is under this title that most vocational training is funded. 
The CETA legislation requires prime sponsors to use 15 per 
cent of the title II-D funds allocated in fiscal 1980 for train 
ing. WETC allocated 18 percent for training, although near 
ly half of this was applied to a work experience component. 
Over 40 percent of title II-B expenditures in 1979 were allot 
ted to classroom training activities, which include basic 
education, English as a second language, and prevocational 
education. It is quite evident that a substantial proportion of
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the resources available to WETC is not devoted to occupa 
tional training and related instruction in labor force par 
ticipation skills and basic literacy. To some extent, this is an 
overt decision by the prime sponsor as a result of functioning 
in a relatively tight labor market where job opportunities ex 
ist even for those with comparatively few occupational skills.
Regardless of the title, the majority of CETA participants 
served are men, with 62 percent under title II-D and 54 per 
cent under title II-B. The smaller proportion enrolled under 
II-B probably reflects the heavy emphasis under this title on 
white-collar clerical occupations, which attract more 
women.
Representation by ethnic groups was also similar for each 
title, with whites constituting 62 percent of title VI, 71 per 
cent of title II-D and 73 percent of title II-B. The comparable 
percentages for blacks were 13, 10, and 10, respectively—on 
the order of 10 times the percentage of blacks in the local 
labor force. Hispanics were the largest minority under all 
titles, and they accounted for 24 percent of title VI par 
ticipants.
A typical title II-B training participant for fiscal 1979 was 
white, young, a female, and a high school dropout. Further, 
title II-B enrolled a higher proportion of ex-offenders, of 
AFDC recipients, and of handicapped persons than any 
other title.
Quality of Training
WETC has four major deliverers of training services. The 
career education training center (CETC), sponsored by the 
Worcester vocational school department, provides occupa 
tional training, English as a second language, and basic 
education. The opportunities industrialization center (OIC) 
offers prevocational clerical courses, English as a second
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language, and basic education. The National Alliance of 
Business (NAB) provides all the on-the-job training. The 
preemployment seminar program teaches job seeking to all 
public service employment participants and, upon request, 
to classroom-training enrollees. In addition, four CBOs of 
fer smaller training programs for the special population 
groups of women, physically handicapped, youthful of 
fenders, and persons over 55 years of age.
The career education training center was started in August 
1972 to meet the needs for more extensive vocational and 
skill training in the Worcester area. As a unit of the voca 
tional school department, CETC receives technical 
assistance in curriculum design from the vocational school 
staff. The center offers CETA-funded programs to qualified 
individuals, and during fiscal 1980 the following programs 
were offered under title II-B: bookkeeper, general office 
clerk, culinary arts, patient care assistant, secretary, ward 
clerk, and English as a second language. Course offerings 
under title VII differed substantially and included electronics 
technology, machinist, and computer operator.
CETC requires applicants to spend two half-days in the 
actual classroom situation for assessment by instructors and 
to complete a pretraining test. Those not selected are to be 
referred to the prevocational training program run by OIC, 
but because there is no centralized intake system, some re 
jected applicants never receive any CETA services or train 
ing.
The ETA regional office has directed WETC to discon 
tinue the tests for selection and has encouraged WETC to 
implement a centralized intake system which would make 
available the full range of CETA services to all eligible ap 
plicants. WETC is the only prime sponsor within Region I 
that does not conduct centralized intake and assessment. 
WETC's resistance to change has been due largely to the at-
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titude that its placement rates indicate it succeeds without a 
centralized system.
The Worcester opportunities industrialization center 
(OIC) aims to assist participants in establishing and attaining 
realistic career goals, through skills assessment, career 
counseling, basic education, and general educational 
development (GED). The following programs are offered by 
OIC:
1) General prevocational— 10-week program providing 
education and job readiness skills that will lead to fur 
ther skill training.
2) Clerical prevocational— 12 weeks of prevocational 
and English as a second language courses.
3) Hispanic prevocational—-20 weeks of prevocational 
and English as a second language courses.
OIC also provides assistance in determining interests and 
skills, individual counseling, group counseling, referral for 
supportive services, and referral to further training or 
employment opportunities.
OIC is basically designed to help trainees get accepted into 
higher level skill training programs, although about one- 
fourth do obtain jobs directly. The staff has increased the 
length of time required for each course, claiming that it was 
needed to master the material. The lengthening of courses 
suggests that OIC is moving toward operating vocational 
rather than prevocational programs. Since many of their 
participants are not interested in further training and 35 per 
cent of those referred to CETC (during two quarters of fiscal 
1980) were not accepted, this seems to be the logical step to 
take. It is not, however, consistent with the OIC goals of 
operating a prevocational center.
The preemployment seminar program (PSP) is a series of 
motivational seminars, under the authority of the CETA
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public service employment (PSE) program. PSP is designed 
to assist PSE participants in acquiring the motivational skills 
and self-confidence necessary to obtain an unsubsidized job. 
PSP has been operating for two years and is mandated for all 
public service employment participants. Unfortunately, no 
evaluation and followup is conducted on this program, so it 
is impossible to assess its quality based on assisting clients 
with a job search.
The National Alliance of Business (NAB) administers all 
WETC's on-the-job training services. Although the division 
of employment security conducts intake and initial assess 
ment, NAB operates as a personnel agency after it receives a 
referral. Except for one class-size project, bank teller train 
ing, OJT positions are individual placements, made in a 
large variety of firms in different industries.
The one class-size project conducted by NAB is sponsored 
by the American Institute of Banking and enrolls 9 to 12 
trainees per year. The program has been in operation since 
1970 and the current funding is 34,000 at $2,700 per place 
ment. Although this program leads to unsubsidized employ 
ment within the occupation trained for, the numbers involv 
ed are so small as to make this OJT program in Worcester of 
very minor consequence.
Results of the six-month follow-up study of title II-B par 
ticipants conducted six months after termination indicate 
that post-CETA incomes remained low; in fact, 33 percent 
would still have qualified as economically eligible for the 
program. Participants enrolled in training for 21 weeks or 
longer earned substantially more than those enrolled for less 
than 21 weeks ($6,884 and $5,934 respectively). Clients who 
were job-placed, that is, placed in jobs developed by the pro 
grams, had higher post-CETA incomes than those who were 
not job-placed ($6,312 compared to $5,559 respectively). 
NAB-OJT emerged as the program producing the highest
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post-CETA main income, at $8,809, while CETC averaged 
$5,818.
Two-thirds of those surveyed were employed six months 
after terminating from GET A. Again NAB stood out, with 
84 percent employed, while CETC had 68 percent and OIC 
had 53 percent.
Although a sizable proportion of trainees were employed 
six months after leaving, apparently only OJT participants 
realized a substantial income gain. If WETC is concerned 
with increasing the earning power of participants, their skill 
training programs must be lengthened and must encompass 
more than secretarial and clerical courses.
Conclusions
The Worcester prime sponsor is somewhat atypical in at 
least three separate areas. One is the relatively tight labor 
market area that WETC has been operating in for a number 
of years. The second is the rather complete decentralization 
of the total system, the result of an overt decision by the 
prime sponsor. The third distinction is the administrative 
separation of the PSE program from other CETA programs. 
This separation has not had substantial or significant effects 
on the training programs or the public service employment 
program, but the cooperation between the two organizations 
depends upon the personal relationship between the direc 
tors.
Prime sponsors continually face decisions on how to 
design, implement and maintain employment and training 
programs. Because of the system's decentralized structure, 
the decision process starts at the staff level, where relevant 
information is gathered and analyzed. Program operators 
and potential operators participate at various levels of the 
process, sometimes as members of a committee, and
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sometimes only as discussants. The principal organization in 
the making of major decisions is the employment and train 
ing council. In fact, the recommendations of the ETC are 
final decisions, and all participants in the process are aware 
of this and expect it.
In identifying target groups, the staff found more people 
were eligible for CETA than could be served in a meaningful 
way with the available funds. WETC's response to this issue 
defined certain segments of the population as most in need, 
estimated their size and characteristics, and specified ap 
propriate levels of service. WETC's staff planning unit 
presents this information in its annual analysis of need.
WETC adheres to a complex process of selecting training 
occupations through analysis of many sources of informa 
tion. Apparently the most important element in the decisions 
relates the current program operators' training capability 
and capacity. The bulk of WETC's training occurs in the 
secretarial and clerical fields, with only one contractor offer 
ing a small program for machinists, which are much higher 
on the list of growth occupations.
WETC has an elaborate and thorough method for select 
ing service deliverers. Although for several years no change 
among the major service deliverers had taken place, the 
deliverers are subject to exhaustive performance monitoring. 
Monitoring results are used wisely and contribute 
significantly to improved program performance.
Communication between WETC and the ETA regional of 
fice on management and decisionmaking appears limited to 
routine, noncontroversial matters. In general, the federal 
representatives have made little or no positive contribution 
to the operation of CETA programs in the Worcester area. 
Several WETC staff members expressed a reluctance to ask 
the regional office for advice; they felt that the regional of 
fice staff was overly critical and made no effort to under-
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stand their problems. For the most part, no federal interven 
tion concerning planning decisions has occurred; manage 
ment issues addressed in the 1980 assessment include assur 
ing the independence of the independent monitoring unit and 
consolidating the financial management systems of the prime 
sponsor and the public service employment program.
Performance indicators alone do not adequately assess the 
quality of training offered under the sponsorship of WETC. 
Some program operators claimed that the CETA system's in 
stability was a deterrent to the long-range planning necessary 
for excellent program development.
In our opinion, WETC has the capacity (in terms of 
facilities and staff) to expand its training program quickly 
and economically. The following suggestions, if im 
plemented, would increase WETC's capacity to develop and 
manage programs:
1. Implement a centralized intake system, permitting 
selection, assessment, and referral to programs on a 
more equitable basis. Individual employability could 
be developed and kept up to date, rather than starting 
over with each program. Transfers among program 
activities could be based on participants' needs, and 
job development could be conducted in an intensive 
nonduplicating manner.
2. Restructure the organization, merging the public ser 
vice employment organization with the Worcester 
Employment and Training Consortium. The coopera 
tion of the two organizations should not depend upon 
the personalities and relations of the two directors.
3. Assign the responsibility for coordinating program 
operators to one staff member. Currently, many staff 
members contact a program operator, but no one per 
son monitors the memoranda of agreement among
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community-based organizations. It is left to each 
agency to coordinate its CETA services with other 
agencies.
4. Increase the frequency of the present 6-month 
followup study report. This would make the results 
available and useful in planning of the training pro 
grams.
5. Require the contractors to eliminate the use of tests 
and other preselection devices which tend to screen 
out eligible clients from CETA training programs. 
Such tests are inequitable, and are a "creaming" 
device which eliminates those most in need of CETA 
services.
6. The role of the independent monitoring unit should 
be clarified to differentiate its responsibilities and 
functions from those of the management information 
system unit. Further, the autonomy of the IMU 
should be strengthened.
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